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NASA NTRS2001

Report of the Odyssey FPGA Independent Assessment Team

An independent assessment team (IAT) was formed and met on April 2, 2001, at Lockheed Martin in Denver, Colorado, to aid in understanding a technical issue for the Mars Odyssey spacecraft scheduled for launch on April 7, 2001. An RP1280A field-programmable gate array (FPGA) from a lot of parts common to the SIRTF, Odyssey, and Genesis missions had failed on a SIRTF printed circuit board. A second FPGA from an earlier Odyssey circuit board was also known to have failed and was also included in the analysis by the IAT. Observations indicated an abnormally high failure rate for flight RP1280A devices (the first flight lot produced using this flow) at Lockheed Martin and the causes of these failures were not determined. Standard failure analysis techniques were applied to these parts, however, additional diagnostic techniques unique for devices of this class were not used, and the parts were prematurely submitted to a destructive physical analysis, making a determination of the root cause of failure difficult. Any of several potential failure scenarios may have caused these failures, including electrostatic discharge, electrical overstress, manufacturing defects, board design errors, board manufacturing errors, FPGA design errors, or programmer errors. Several of these mechanisms would have relatively benign consequences for disposition of the parts currently installed on boards in the Odyssey spacecraft if established as the root cause of failure. However, other potential failure mechanisms could have more dire consequences. As there is no simple way to determine the likely failure mechanisms with reasonable confidence before Odyssey launch, it is not possible for the IAT to recommend a disposition for the other parts on boards in the Odyssey spacecraft based on sound engineering principles.

Mayer, Donald C.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Probability and Confidence Trade-space (PACT) Evaluation: Accounting for Uncertainty in Sparing Assessments

There are two general shortcomings to the current annual sparing assessment: 1. The vehicle functions are currently assessed according to confidence targets, which can be misleading- overly conservative or optimistic. 2. The current confidence levels are arbitrarily determined and do not account for epistemic uncertainty (lack of knowledge) in the ORU failure rate. There are two major categories of uncertainty that impact Sparing Assessment: (a) Aleatory Uncertainty: Natural variability in distribution of actual failures around an Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) (b) Epistemic Uncertainty : Lack of knowledge about the true value of an Orbital Replacement Unit's (ORU) MTBF We propose an approach to revise confidence targets and account for both categories of uncertainty, an approach we call Probability and Confidence Trade-space (PACT) evaluation.

Anderson, Leif↗

NASA NTRS1977

Redundant integrated flight control/navigation inertial sensor complex

A redundant strapdown inertial navigation system for integrated flight control/navigation use is described. Design of the system, which consists of four tuned-gimbal gyros, eight accelerometers, and four processors, is discussed, with emphasis on its compact configuration (13 by 13 by 14 in.), based on symmetry properties of an octahedron. A matrix operator for least-squares combination of data from an arbitrary number of two-degree-of-freedom gyros is derived, and general parity equations for error analysis are given. Self-contained detection and isolation of a two-axis gyro failure is considered; system failure probability, which depends on component failure rates and self-correction capacities, is analyzed. Test data, including typical parity equation responses during motion and simulated gyro and accelerometer failures, are also presented.

Ebner, R. E.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Reliability Effects of Surge Current Testing of Solid Tantalum Capacitors

Solid tantalum capacitors are widely used in space applications to filter low-frequency ripple currents in power supply circuits and stabilize DC voltages in the system. Tantalum capacitors manufactured per military specifications (MIL-PRF-55365) are established reliability components and have less than 0.001% of failures per 1000 hours (the failure rate is less than 10 FIT) for grades D or S, thus positioning these parts among electronic components with the highest reliability characteristics. Still, failures of tantalum capacitors do happen and when it occurs it might have catastrophic consequences for the system. This is due to a short-circuit failure mode, which might be damaging to a power supply, and also to the capability of tantalum capacitors with manganese cathodes to self-ignite when a failure occurs in low-impedance applications. During such a failure, a substantial amount of energy is released by exothermic reaction of the tantalum pellet with oxygen generated by the overheated manganese oxide cathode, resulting not only in destruction of the part, but also in damage of the board and surrounding components. A specific feature of tantalum capacitors, compared to ceramic parts, is a relatively large value of capacitance, which in contemporary low-size chip capacitors reaches dozens and hundreds of microfarads. This might result in so-called surge current or turn-on failures in the parts when the board is first powered up. Such a failure, which is considered as the most prevalent type of failures in tantalum capacitors [I], is due to fast changes of the voltage in the circuit, dV/dt, producing high surge current spikes, I(sub sp) = Cx(dV/dt), when current in the circuit is unrestricted. These spikes can reach hundreds of amperes and cause catastrophic failures in the system. The mechanism of surge current failures has not been understood completely yet, and different hypotheses were discussed in relevant literature. These include a sustained scintillation breakdown model [1-3]; electrical oscillations in circuits with a relatively high inductance [4-6]; local overheating of the cathode [5,7, 8]; mechanical damage to tantalum pentoxide dielectric caused by the impact of MnO2 crystals [2,9, 10]; or stress-induced-generation of electron traps caused by electromagnetic forces developed during current spikes [11]. A commonly accepted explanation of the surge current failures is that at unlimited current supply during surge current conditions, the self-healing mechanism in tantalum capacitors does not work, and what would be a minor scintillation spike if the current were limited, becomes a catastrophic failure of the part [l, 12]. However, our data show that the scintillation breakdown voltages are significantly greater that the surge current breakdown voltages, so it is still not clear why the part, which has no scintillations, would fail at the same voltage during surge current testing (SCT).

Teverovsky, Alexander↗

NASA NTRS1974

Reliability analysis of Skylab ATM solar cell modules

A detailed reliability analysis was performed on both types of Skylab Apollo telescope mount solar cell modules. Failure rates used were based on testing of several modules of each type for over 4000 thermal cycles. The analysis delineated several important differences between the failure modes of the two differently designed solar cell modules, and, more importantly, showed that the modules can be expected to meet all mission requirements.

Jones, G. M.↗

NASA NTRS1976

Reliability analysis of structures under periodic proof tests in service

A reliability analysis of structures subjected to random service loads and periodic proof tests treats gust loads and maneuver loads as random processes. Crack initiation, crack propagation, and strength degradation are treated as the fatigue process. The time to fatigue crack initiation and ultimate strength are random variables. Residual strength decreases during crack propagation, so that failure rate increases with time. When a structure fails under periodic proof testing, a new structure is built and proof-tested. The probability of structural failure in service is derived from treatment of all the random variables, strength degradations, service loads, proof tests, and the renewal of failed structures. Some numerical examples are worked out.

Yang, J.-N.↗

NASA NTRS2005

A Methodology for Quantifying Certain Design Requirements During the Design Phase

A methodology for developing and balancing quantitative design requirements for safety, reliability, and maintainability has been proposed. Conceived as the basis of a more rational approach to the design of spacecraft, the methodology would also be applicable to the design of automobiles, washing machines, television receivers, or almost any other commercial product. Heretofore, it has been common practice to start by determining the requirements for reliability of elements of a spacecraft or other system to ensure a given design life for the system. Next, safety requirements are determined by assessing the total reliability of the system and adding redundant components and subsystems necessary to attain safety goals. As thus described, common practice leaves the maintainability burden to fall to chance; therefore, there is no control of recurring costs or of the responsiveness of the system. The means that have been used in assessing maintainability have been oriented toward determining the logistical sparing of components so that the components are available when needed. The process established for developing and balancing quantitative requirements for safety (S), reliability (R), and maintainability (M) derives and integrates NASA s top-level safety requirements and the controls needed to obtain program key objectives for safety and recurring cost (see figure). Being quantitative, the process conveniently uses common mathematical models. Even though the process is shown as being worked from the top down, it can also be worked from the bottom up. This process uses three math models: (1) the binomial distribution (greaterthan- or-equal-to case), (2) reliability for a series system, and (3) the Poisson distribution (less-than-or-equal-to case). The zero-fail case for the binomial distribution approximates the commonly known exponential distribution or "constant failure rate" distribution. Either model can be used. The binomial distribution was selected for modeling flexibility because it conveniently addresses both the zero-fail and failure cases. The failure case is typically used for unmanned spacecraft as with missiles.

Adams, Timothy↗

NASA NTRS2010

Reliability of High-Voltage Tantalum Capacitors. Parts 3 and 4)

Weibull grading test is a powerful technique that allows selection and reliability rating of solid tantalum capacitors for military and space applications. However, inaccuracies in the existing method and non-adequate acceleration factors can result in significant, up to three orders of magnitude, errors in the calculated failure rate of capacitors. This paper analyzes deficiencies of the existing technique and recommends more accurate method of calculations. A physical model presenting failures of tantalum capacitors as time-dependent-dielectric-breakdown is used to determine voltage and temperature acceleration factors and select adequate Weibull grading test conditions. This model is verified by highly accelerated life testing (HALT) at different temperature and voltage conditions for three types of solid chip tantalum capacitors. It is shown that parameters of the model and acceleration factors can be calculated using a general log-linear relationship for the characteristic life with two stress levels.

Teverovsky, Alexander↗

NASA NTRS2010

Analysis of Weibull Grading Test for Solid Tantalum Capacitors

Weibull grading test is a powerful technique that allows selection and reliability rating of solid tantalum capacitors for military and space applications. However, inaccuracies in the existing method and non-adequate acceleration factors can result in significant, up to three orders of magnitude, errors in the calculated failure rate of capacitors. This paper analyzes deficiencies of the existing technique and recommends more accurate method of calculations. A physical model presenting failures of tantalum capacitors as time-dependent-dielectric-breakdown is used to determine voltage and temperature acceleration factors and select adequate Weibull grading test conditions. This, model is verified by highly accelerated life testing (HALT) at different temperature and voltage conditions for three types of solid chip tantalum capacitors. It is shown that parameters of the model and acceleration factors can be calculated using a general log-linear relationship for the characteristic life with two stress levels.

Teverovsky, Alexander↗

NASA NTRS2000

A Nuclear Interaction Model for Understanding Results of Single Event Testing with High Energy Protons

An internuclear cascade and evaporation model has been adapted to estimate the LET spectrum generated during testing with 200 MeV protons. The model-generated heavy ion LET spectrum is compared to the heavy ion LET spectrum seen on orbit. This comparison is the basis for predicting single event failure rates from heavy ions using results from a single proton test. Of equal importance, this spectra comparison also establishes an estimate of the risk of encountering a failure mode on orbit that was not detected during proton testing. Verification of the general results of the model is presented based on experiments, individual part test results, and flight data. Acceptance of this model and its estimate of remaining risk opens the hardware verification philosophy to the consideration of radiation testing with high energy protons at the board and box level instead of the more standard method of individual part testing with low energy heavy ions.

Culpepper, William X.↗

NASA NTRS2008

J-2X Abort System Development

The J-2X is an expendable liquid hydrogen (LH2)/liquid oxygen (LOX) gas generator cycle rocket engine that is currently being designed as the primary upper stage propulsion element for the new NASA Ares vehicle family. The J-2X engine will contain abort logic that functions as an integral component of the Ares vehicle abort system. This system is responsible for detecting and responding to conditions indicative of impending Loss of Mission (LOM), Loss of Vehicle (LOV), and/or catastrophic Loss of Crew (LOC) failure events. As an earth orbit ascent phase engine, the J-2X is a high power density propulsion element with non-negligible risk of fast propagation rate failures that can quickly lead to LOM, LOV, and/or LOC events. Aggressive reliability requirements for manned Ares missions and the risk of fast propagating J-2X failures dictate the need for on-engine abort condition monitoring and autonomous response capability as well as traditional abort agents such as the vehicle computer, flight crew, and ground control not located on the engine. This paper describes the baseline J-2X abort subsystem concept of operations, as well as the development process for this subsystem. A strategy that leverages heritage system experience and responds to an evolving engine design as well as J-2X specific test data to support abort system development is described. The utilization of performance and failure simulation models to support abort system sensor selection, failure detectability and discrimination studies, decision threshold definition, and abort system performance verification and validation is outlined. The basis for abort false positive and false negative performance constraints is described. Development challenges associated with information shortfalls in the design cycle, abort condition coverage and response assessment, engine-vehicle interface definition, and abort system performance verification and validation are also discussed.

Santi, Louis M.↗

NASA NTRS1982

A unified method for evaluating real-time computer controllers: A case study

A real time control system consists of a synergistic pair, that is, a controlled process and a controller computer. Performance measures for real time controller computers are defined on the basis of the nature of this synergistic pair. A case study of a typical critical controlled process is presented in the context of new performance measures that express the performance of both controlled processes and real time controllers (taken as a unit) on the basis of a single variable: controller response time. Controller response time is a function of current system state, system failure rate, electrical and/or magnetic interference, etc., and is therefore a random variable. Control overhead is expressed as a monotonically nondecreasing function of the response time and the system suffers catastrophic failure, or dynamic failure, if the response time for a control task exceeds the corresponding system hard deadline, if any. A rigorous probabilistic approach is used to estimate the performance measures. The controlled process chosen for study is an aircraft in the final stages of descent, just prior to landing. First, the performance measures for the controller are presented. Secondly, control algorithms for solving the landing problem are discussed and finally the impact of the performance measures on the problem is analyzed.

Shin, K. G.↗

NASA NTRS1985

A unified method for evaluating real-time computer controllers and its application

Shin, K. G.↗

NASA NTRS2018

Synthesizing a New Launch Vehicle Failure Probability Based on Historical Flight Data

New launch vehicles have historically had significantly higher failure rates in early flights than what has been predicted using Probabilistic Risk Assessment - PRA. This is because PRAs typically model a mature vehicle where a significant portion of the early failure probability contributors have been eliminated due to testing and improvements after actual field operation. To capture a more accurate early flight failure probability estimate, this paper develops a method that estimates ascent failure probability starting with the first flight based on historical launch vehicle records. With new launch vehicles being developed, such as the Space Launch System - SLS, a PRA model must be extended to cover early flight failure probability contributions that are either not covered in the mature-vehicle PRA or are underestimated. These failure probability contributions include design errors, quality control deficiencies, installation errors, and environmental impacts. There are also failure dependencies due to systemic errors that still exist due to limited entire-system testing.

Cross, Robert B.↗

NASA NTRS1989

Motivating the sure bounds

Motivation is provided for a theorem that provides upper and lower bounds for the reliability of reconfigurable digital control systems. The reliability goals for these systems are too high to be established by natural life testing, which means the probability of system failure must be computed from mathematical models that capture the essential elements of fault occurence and system fault recovery. The upper and lower bound theorem shows that system recovery can be adequately described by its first two moments, provided component failure rate is low and system recovery is fast. This result greatly simplifies both the fault injection experiments that study system recovery and the numerical computations that estimate the probability of system failure from a mathematical model.

White, Allan L.↗

NASA NTRS1993

Modelling early failures in Space Station Freedom

A major problem encountered in planning for Space Station Freedom is the amount of maintenance that will be required. To predict the failure rates of components and systems aboard Space Station Freedom, the logical approach is to use data obtained from previously flown spacecraft. In order to determine the mechanisms that are driving the failures, models can be proposed, and then checked to see if they adequately fit the observed failure data obtained from a large variety of satellites. For this particular study, failure data and truncation times were available for satellites launched between 1976 and 1984; no data past 1984 was available. The study was limited to electrical subsystems and assemblies, which were studied to determine if they followed a model resulting from a mixture of exponential distributions.

Navard, Sharon E.↗

NASA NTRS2016

The Threat of Uncertainty: Why Using Traditional Approaches for Evaluating Spacecraft Reliability are Insufficient for Future Human Mars Missions

Through the Evolvable Mars Campaign (EMC) study, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) continues to evaluate potential approaches for sending humans beyond low Earth orbit (LEO). A key aspect of these missions is the strategy that is employed to maintain and repair the spacecraft systems, ensuring that they continue to function and support the crew. Long duration missions beyond LEO present unique and severe maintainability challenges due to a variety of factors, including: limited to no opportunities for resupply, the distance from Earth, mass and volume constraints of spacecraft, high sensitivity of transportation element designs to variation in mass, the lack of abort opportunities to Earth, limited hardware heritage information, and the operation of human-rated systems in a radiation environment with little to no experience. The current approach to maintainability, as implemented on ISS, which includes a large number of spares pre-positioned on ISS, a larger supply sitting on Earth waiting to be flown to ISS, and an on demand delivery of logistics from Earth, is not feasible for future deep space human missions. For missions beyond LEO, significant modifications to the maintainability approach will be required.Through the EMC evaluations, several key findings related to the reliability and safety of the Mars spacecraft have been made. The nature of random and induced failures presents significant issues for deep space missions. Because spare parts cannot be flown as needed for Mars missions, all required spares must be flown with the mission or pre-positioned. These spares must cover all anticipated failure modes and provide a level of overall reliability and safety that is satisfactory for human missions. This will require a large amount of mass and volume be dedicated to storage and transport of spares for the mission. Further, there is, and will continue to be, a significant amount of uncertainty regarding failure rates for spacecraft components. This uncertainty makes it much more difficult to anticipate failures and will potentially require an even larger amount of spares to provide an acceptable level of safety. Ultimately, the approach to maintenance and repair applied to ISS, focusing on the supply of spare parts, may not be tenable for deep space missions. Other approaches, such as commonality of components, simplification of systems, and in-situ manufacturing will be required.

Stromgren, Chel↗

NASA NTRS1973

Investigation of mercury thruster isolators

Mercury ion thruster isolator lifetime tests were performed using different isolator materials and geometries. Tests were performed with and without the flow of mercury through the isolators in an oil diffusion pumped vacuum facility and cryogenically pumped bell jar. The onset of leakage current in isolators occurred in time intervals ranging from a few hours to many hundreds of hours. In all cases, surface contamination was responsible for the onset of leakage current and subsequent isolator failure. Rate of increase of leakage current and the leakage current level increased approximately exponentially with isolator temperature. Careful attention to shielding techniques and the elimination of sources of metal oxides appear to have eliminated isolator failures as a thruster life limiting mechanism.

Mantenieks, M. A.↗