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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 181 records · Page 10
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2018

Development of Non Destructive Assay Approach for Characterization of Spent Fuel Debris at Fukushima - 18543

Fukushima is considering options for decommissioning the damaged reactor. One of the technical challenges is the accurate characterization of fissile isotopes in the spent fuel debris. This is due to the fissile content, high gamma and neutron emission and uncertainties regarding the fuel burnup and unknown, heterogeneous mixture of materials that may be present. These requirements lead to significant challenges for potential measurement approaches with regard to the requirements for shielding and remote operation that result from plant and operational constraints. Mirion Technologies (MTKK) has been working to perform feasibility and concept design studies for a non-destructive assay (NDA) system that could be used to characterize the fissile content of retrieved samples of fuel debris. The main advantage of using an NDA technique is that the entire volume of the sample is interrogated so the method is not reliant upon assumptions of representativeness of samples retrieved and sent for laboratory analysis. The proposed technique comprises a combination of gamma spectroscopy and combined passive / active neutron interrogation with advanced data analysis algorithms in order to determine the maximum available data on the spent fuel properties and obtain a full radionuclide characterization of each sample. This includes quantification of individual fissile nuclides with validated uncertainties. In this paper we describe the NDA techniques and systems that are proposed, their benefits and limitations, and how they may be implemented into a full-scale system for fuel element debris characterization. We describe the studies that were performed based on experience of real systems and research supplemented with extensive computer modelling work to represent the expected fuel element debris properties. The work benefits from Mirion's extensive global physics and engineering expertise in designing, supplying and operating a wide range of NDA systems for diverse applications and in different challenging physical and operational environments. We describe how the advanced and innovative physics techniques that have resulted from Mirion's collective experience in these areas, can be deployed in an NDA system. The final approach that has been developed provides a means for determining the masses of the individual fissile isotopes with robust uncertainties and capable of implementation into an NDA system that meets the expected requirements for an operational plant. We focus on the techniques that have been developed and describe how they are of wider relevance and interest for projects that include challenges for characterisation of fuel residues. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

A High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Transportation Concept

The uranium 235U enrichment commonly used in fuel production for U.S. light water nuclear reactors typically does not exceed 5 wt%. In contrast, many of the currently investigated advanced reactor concepts demand fuel with higher enrichments. This includes high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), characterized by a 235U enrichment of 5 to 20 wt%. The necessity of HALEU transportation in the fuel production cycle leads to new challenges caused by various technical and regulatory hurdles. Current U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission–approved transportation package designs for UF6 with enrichments above 5 wt% provide relatively small payloads [=116 kg (250 lb)]. Furthermore, in accordance with 10 CFR 71.55, package design activities for fissile material enriched above 5 wt% need to consider water infiltration in the containment as part of the criticality safety evaluations. This study presents a transportation package concept for HALEU advanced nuclear reactor fuel with a significantly higher payload of up to 376 kg (830 lb) of fissile material per package and up to 1881 kg (4149 lb) of HALEU per legal weight truck. The anticipated chemical form of the transported material is UO2 downblended from available highly enriched uranium. The concept utilizes a combination of existing transportation packaging, 18 inner canisters, and a novel basket design that includes a borated aluminum flux trap. Criticality and shielding evaluations; fundamental structural, confinement, and thermal assessments; and studies on package operations are presented. The results of this study build significant confidence in the technical feasibility of a high-capacity HALEU transportation package concept while demonstrating the concept’s potential to meet U.S. regulatory requirements.

Eidelpes, Elmar↗
DOE OSTI2015

Measurement of the plutonium hold-up in glove box before dismantling - 15111

The French Bruyeres-Le-Chatel CEA (Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique et aux Energies Alternatives - French Alternatives Energies and Atomic Energy Commission) research center is going through a period of cleaning and dismantling of theses old treatment facilities on fissile materials and others associated nuclides. Some very large glove boxes contained some machines like melting furnace which can't be moved and are dismantled in situ. We need to evaluate the quantity of fissile materials to prevent criticality risk, to bring the evidence to the safety authority, to manage for the best the radioprotection of the workers and to manage waste production. A melting furnace in a glove box was dismantled. Measurements by gamma spectrometry with an HPGe detector (High Purity Germanium) and passive neutron counting (coincidence counting with shift register) are done in situ (furnace in the glove box). In order to refine the measurements, some data acquisitions by sector of glove box were carried out. In view of the geometries to characterize, some modelings have been created, in order to correct the different attenuations and to determine the plutonium masses content in the glove box, including the use of infinite energy technique. For the measurement by passive neutron counting (coincidence counting with shift register), we have used two slabs in high density polythene including nine He3 counters in each slab. This measurement technique is complementary to gamma spectrometry, and allows quantizing the fissile material which would be included in interstice of high Z material. The 100-L and 200-L drums produced during the dismantling were also measured. Based on simplified assumptions to analyze in situ measurements, plutonium weight could be evaluated. This approach of measurement in amount, during and after dismantling, has allowed to quantize the fissile material mass present in the glove box and didn't produce waste package which wouldn't respected the technical specifications of storage outlets. The results show good agreement between in situ and waste measurements. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2018

Distinguishing Research Reactor Fuels Using Neutron Multiplicity - 25615

Neutron measurements are one of the reliable means of interrogation of fissile material. Neutron measurements are used for total counting (pure metal fissile samples) or counting coincidence/multiplicity (for impure fissile samples). Various flavors of neutron measurement are used routinely by the IAEA to determine the fissile mass of an unknown sample. The objective of this work is to design an experiment to distinguish the two different fuel types using neutron multiplicity method. The design of experiment is performed using Monte Carlo N- Particle (MCNP) transport code. General Electric (GE) designed 1-MWt pool-type research reactor at UMass Lowell (UMLRR) uses Materials Testing Reactor (MTR) plate-type fuel consisting of 19 full and 2 partial fuel assemblies, controlled by four boron control blades and one regulating control rod. Two different fuel types are available at the UMLRR facility. In 2008, UMass Lowell obtained slightly burnt fuel assemblies from the decommissioned WPI research reactor. The simulation results discussed in this paper show that within the limits of statistical error, the single and double moments for the WPI and UMLRR fuels can be measured. The two fuels have very similar composition and enrichments resulting in very similar neutron multiplicity moments. This implies that neutron multiplicity measurements alone would not be sufficient to distinguish between the two fuel types at low burnups. The change in the observed single-double ratio between each fuel type is less than 6 % which falls below the uncertainty in the efficiency of the JCC71 slab detectors. The neutron signature from low burnup and low enriched uranium fuel are not strong, however, these can be measured under low background and long measurement times. This would be an important consideration in designing the experiments and parallel gamma measurements will also be planned. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Analysis of the likelihood of post-closure criticality in a geological disposal facility - 14349

Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) is responsible for implementing geological disposal of the UK's higher activity radioactive wastes. These wastes include significant quantities of fissile nuclides and, therefore, demonstration of the criticality safety of the wastes under disposal conditions forms an important component of RWM's disposal system safety case. At the time of disposal, controls will ensure that all waste packages are sub-critical, and the containment provided by the engineered barrier system of a geological disposal facility (GDF) will ensure that criticality is prevented for some time after disposal. However, as waste packages begin to degrade, fissile and other materials may be mobilised, which could affect the potential for criticality. Therefore, the possibility for the evolution of conditions in a GDF to result in criticality requires assessment. RWM established the 'Likelihood of Criticality' research project to develop qualitative and quantitative arguments to demonstrate that criticality after closure of a GDF is unlikely. The project included consideration of the criticality safety of disposal concepts for intermediate and high level waste, spent fuel, separated plutonium and highly-enriched uranium in different generic geological settings. The results are underpinned by the construction of post-closure criticality scenarios that have been evaluated using high-level judgments about scenario credibility as well as modelling of evolving conditions in a GDF. In the latter case, a probabilistic modelling approach has been undertaken to address uncertainty in the calculation of concentrations and masses of fissile material that could occur at potential accumulation sites. The potential for criticality has been judged based on comparisons of the calculated fissile masses with minimum values required for criticality at different locations in the barrier system. This paper explains the novel approach taken to evaluating the likelihood of criticality in a GDF based on the probabilistic modelling of waste package evolution and plutonium and uranium migration. The role of this research in RWM's work to demonstrate the criticality safety of a GDF in the UK is presented in a companion paper, which also draws on the results of a parallel research project that demonstrates that, even if a criticality were to occur, then its consequences would be insignificant to GDF performance. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Understanding the consequences of hypothetical post-closure transient criticality in a geological disposal facility - 14439

Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) is responsible for implementing geological disposal of the UK's higher-activity radioactive wastes. These wastes include significant quantities of fissile nuclides and, therefore, demonstration of criticality safety for the wastes under disposal conditions forms an important component of RWM's disposal system safety case. At the time of disposal all waste packages will be safely sub-critical. Containment provided by the engineered barrier system of a geological disposal facility (GDF) will ensure that criticality is not possible for some time after disposal. However, as waste packages degrade, fissile and other materials may be mobilised, which could affect the potential for criticality. Although the likelihood of a critical configuration developing is demonstrably low, it cannot be assumed to be zero over long post-closure timescales. The UK environment agencies' Guidance on Requirements for Authorisation for a GDF includes a specific requirement to consider the consequences of hypothetical 'what-if' post-closure criticality. RWM has undertaken a programme of research to model and understand the consequences of hypothetical post-closure criticality events. Initially focused on the scenario of fissile material relocation and accumulation following intermediate level waste (ILW) disposal, two bespoke computer models were developed. The quasi-steady-state (QSS) model considered critical systems maintained by accumulation of fissile materials where the temperature feedback remains negative throughout the transient. The rapid transient model (RTM) considered systems with positive temperature feedback. The QSS model development included a successful comparison with the Oklo natural reactors. With a requirement to consider post-closure criticality for a wider range of potential waste types under different illustrative disposal concepts, the initial transient criticality models had some limitations. For the QSS model this was the assumption of fixed geometry, while the complex functional inputs required in the RTM were not readily available for different materials. For the QSS model this paper describes the model development to allow changing volume; this has enabled its application to 'what-if' scenarios of flooding within a spent fuel waste package and the slumping of a stack of ILW packages. For rapid transient criticality this paper explains how the development of a simpler 'bounding approach' model to complement the RTM has enabled transient criticality analysis for a wider range of host materials. The role of this research in demonstrating post-closure criticality safety of a GDF in the UK is presented in a companion paper which also draws on the results of a parallel research project to demonstrate that the likelihood of post-closure criticality is low. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

Assessment of the potential for criticality in the far field of a used nuclear fuel repository

This study aims to assess the likelihood for criticality in the far field of a repository for direct disposal of commercial light water reactor used nuclear fuel. Two models are used in combination: (1) a neutronics model to estimate the minimum critical masses of spherical, water-saturated depositions of fissile material; (2) a transport model to simulate the dissolution of waste packages arranged in an array and the subsequent transport of fissile solutes through fractured bedrock to a single accumulation location. The neutronics model shows that heavy metals from different types of used fuel present the same minimum critical mass behavior in the parameter space of initial enrichment and burnup, dictated largely by the fissile content. However, the magnitude of the minimum critical mass varies significantly within that parameter space, and secondary effects like the presence of absorbing nuclides play a minor role. Here, the transport model employs various subsurface transport scenarios, and for each scenario the mass of each isotope and the overall fissile content of the accumulation is reported from the time of canister failure up to one hundred million years at various distances from the repository edge. Taking the results of the two models in concert, it is shown that even if the accumulation of a critical mass is possible under conservative conditions, these conditions are unlikely to be present in the vicinity of a carefully engineered repository. Based on the results of each model, recommendations for risk mitigation in terms of waste characteristics and repository design are given.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2011

Criticality Safety Validation of Scale 6.1

The computational bias of criticality safety computer codes must be established through the validation of the codes to critical experiments. A large collection of suitable experiments has been vetted by the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiment Program (ICSBEP) and made available in the International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments (IHECSBE). A total of more than 350 cases from this reference have been prepared and reviewed within the Verified, Archived Library of Inputs and Data (VALID) maintained by the Reactor and Nuclear Systems Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The performance of the KENO V.a and KENO-VI Monte Carlo codes within the Scale 6.1 code system with ENDF/B-VII.0 cross-section data in 238-group and continuous energy is assessed using the VALID models of benchmark experiments. The TSUNAMI tools for sensitivity and uncertainty analysis are utilized to examine some systems further in an attempt to identify potential causes of unexpected results. The critical experiments available for validation of the KENO V.a code cover eight different broad categories of systems. These systems use a range of fissile materials including a range of uranium enrichments, various plutonium isotopic vectors, and mixed uranium-plutonium oxides. The physical form of the fissile material also varies and is represented as metal, solutions, or arrays of rods or plates in a water moderator. The neutron energy spectra of the systems also vary and cover both fast and thermal spectra. Over 300 of the total cases used utilize the KENO V.a code. The critical experiments available for the validation of the KENO-VI code cover three broad categories of systems. The fissile materials in the systems vary and include high and intermediate-enrichment uranium and mixed uranium/plutonium oxides. The physical form of the fissile material is either metal or rod arrays in water. As with KENO V.a, both fast and thermal neutron energy spectra are represented in the systems considered. The results indicate generally good performance of both the KENO V.a and KENO-VI codes across the range of systems analyzed. The bias of calculated k{sub eff} from expected values is less than 0.9% {Delta}k in all cases. All eight categories of experiments show biases of less than 0.5% {Delta}k in KENO V.a with the exception of intermediate enrichment metal systems using the 238-group library. The continuous energy library generally manifests lower biases than the multi-group data. The KENO-VI results show slightly larger biases, though this may primarily be the result of modeling systems with more geometric complexity, which are more difficult to describe accurately, even with a generalized geometry code like KENO-VI. Several additional conclusions can be drawn from the results of this validation effort. These conclusions include that the TSUNAMI tools can be used successfully to explain the cause of aberrant results, that some evaluations in the IHECSBE should be updated to provide more rigorous expected k{sub eff} values and uncertainties, and that potential cross-section errors can be identified by detailed review of the results of this validation. It also appears that the overall cross-section uncertainty as quantified through the Scale covariance library is overestimated. Overall, the KENO V.a and KENO-VI codes are shown to provide consistent, low bias results for a wide range of physical systems of potential interest in criticality safety applications.

Marshall, William BJ J↗
DOE OSTI2012

Report on Potential Advantages and Uncertainties of the Thorium Seed Blanket Unit Fuel Concept

Thorium is a naturally occurring radioactive element with potential application in the nuclear fuel cycle. Thorium has no fissile isotopes, meaning that unlike uranium it cannot be enriched to produce a viable nuclear fuel. Natural thorium is almost entirely comprised of the isotope 232 Th and a microscopic amount of 228 Th that is created from the radioactive decay of 232 Th. Small amounts of other thorium isotopes can be detected from the decay of uranium that often occurs with thorium in nature. During the early stages of the development of nuclear power in the United States it was believed that uranium supplies would be insufficient and that breeding would be required to fuel the envisioned nuclear infrastructure. The use of 232 Th in the nuclear fuel cycle would play a role equivalent to 238 U. Both elements are fertile and can absorb a neutron to transmute into a fissile isotope capable of sustaining a chain reaction. In the case of 238 U the fissile isotope produced is 239 Pu. 232 Th produces the less well-known fissile isotope 233 U. This report provides a brief overview of light water reactor thorium technology, and an assessment of the technology proposed by Lightbridge based on available open literature and information provided by Lightbridge Corporation. It serves to identify gaps in the current understanding of this technology, and to identify areas where further work may be required or beneficial. Analysis of the fuel cycle was not included in the scope of this report. Based on the data available and the scope of this assessment, this document cannot draw definitive conclusions about this particular technology, and should not be understood to be comprehensive or to make a recommendation, either positive or negative, on the suitability of this fuel cycle for commercial use.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2012

Differential Die-Away Self-Interrogation for Treaty Verification Applications (Final Report)

In this report, we summarize our experimental and simulation study of Differential Die-Away Self-Interrogation (DDSI) method used to assay 4 PuO 2 samples of almost identical isotopic composition with total Pu content ranging from 60-614g. With measured and calculated traditional neutron coincidence rates such as singles (S), doubles (D) and triples (T) we explore three different proposed DDSI signatures (D/S, T/S and D L /D F ) over a wide range of gating scenarios and analyze the sensitivity of individual observables to fissile content of the sample. We find that only the D L /D F observable is exclusively sensitive to the fissile content of sample, while D/S and T/S yield sensitivity to both fertile and fissile component of the sample. Based on the results of the Monte Carlo simulations, depending on the mass of the PuO 2 sample and considering 900s assay time with the Epithermal Neutron Multiplicity Counter (ENMC) we are able to reconstruct the fissile content with statistical uncertainty of 0.4-3.7% in case of D/S ratio, 1.1-4.3% in case of T/S ratio, and 4.9-34.3% in the case of the D L /D F .

Instrumentation Related to Nuclear Science & Techn↗
DOE OSTI2013

Criticality Safety Validation of SCALE 6.1 (Revised)

The computational bias of criticality safety computer codes must be established through the validation of the codes to critical experiments. A large collection of suitable experiments has been vetted by the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiment Program (ICSBEP) and made available in the International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments (IHECSBE). A total of more than 350 cases from this reference have been prepared and reviewed within the Verified, Archived Library of Inputs and Data (VALID) maintained by the Reactor and Nuclear Systems Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The performance of the KENO V.a and KENO-VI Monte Carlo codes within the SCALE 6.1 code system with ENDF/B-VII.0 cross-section data in 238-group and continuous energy is assessed using the VALID models of benchmark experiments. The TSUNAMI tools for sensitivity and uncertainty analysis are utilized to examine some systems further in an attempt to identify potential causes of unexpected results. The critical experiments available for validation of the KENO V.a code cover eight different broad categories of systems. These systems use a range of fissile materials including a range of uranium enrichments, various plutonium isotopic vectors, and mixed uranium/plutonium oxides. The physical form of the fissile material also varies and is represented as metal, solutions, or arrays of rods or plates in a water moderator. The neutron energy spectra of the systems also vary and cover both fast and thermal spectra. Over 300 of the total cases used utilize the KENO V.a code. The critical experiments available for the validation of the KENO-VI code cover three broad categories of systems. The fissile materials in the systems vary and include high- and intermediate-enrichment uranium and mixed uranium/plutonium oxides. The physical form of the fissile material is either metal or rod arrays in water. As with KENO V.a, both fast and thermal neutron energy spectra are represented in the systems considered. The results indicate generally good performance of both the KENO V.a and KENO-VI codes across the range of systems analyzed. The bias of calculated k eff from expected values is less than 0.9% Δk in all cases. All eight categories of experiments show biases of less than 0.5% Δk in KENO V.a with the exception of intermediate enrichment metal systems using the 238-group library. The continuous energy library generally manifests lower biases than the multigroup data. The KENO-VI results show slightly larger biases, though this may primarily be the result of modeling systems with more geometric complexity, which are more difficult to describe accurately, even with a generalized geometry code like KENO-VI. Several additional conclusions can be drawn from the results of this validation effort. These conclusions include that the TSUNAMI tools can be used successfully to explain the cause of aberrant results, that some evaluations in the IHECSBE should be updated to provide more rigorous expected k eff values and uncertainties, and that potential cross-section errors can be identified by detailed review of the results of this validation. It also appears that the overall cross-section uncertainty as quantified through the SCALE covariance library is overestimated. Overall, the KENO V.a and KENO-VI codes are shown to provide consistent, low-bias results for a wide range of physical systems of potential interest in criticality safety applications.

Marshall, William (BJ) J.↗
DOE OSTI2016

NEET Enhanced Micro-Pocket Fission Detector for High Temperature Reactors - FY16 Status Report

A collaboration between the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), the Kansas State University (KSU), and the French Atomic Energy Agency, Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique et aux Energies Alternatives, (CEA), has been initiated by the Nuclear Energy Enabling Technologies (NEET) Advanced Sensors and Instrumentation (ASI) program for developing and testing High Temperature Micro-Pocket Fission Detectors (HT MPFD), which are compact fission chambers capable of simultaneously measuring thermal neutron flux, fast neutron flux and temperature within a single package for temperatures up to 800 °C. The MPFD technology utilizes a small, multi-purpose, robust, in-core fission chambers and thermocouple. As discussed within this report, the small size, variable sensitivity, and increased accuracy of the MPFD technology represent a revolutionary improvement over current methods used to support irradiations in US Material Test Reactors (MTRs). Previous research conducted through NEET ASI1-3 has shown that the MPFD technology could be made robust and was successfully tested in a reactor core. This new project will further the MPFD technology for higher temperature regimes and other reactor applications by developing a HT MPFD suitable for temperatures up to 800 °C. This report summarizes the research progress for year two of this three year project. Highlights from research accomplishments include: • Continuation of a joint collaboration between INL, KSU, and CEA. Note that CEA is participating at their own expense because of interest in this unique new sensor. • An updated parallel wire HT MPFD design was developed. • Program support for HT MPFD deployments was given to Accident Tolerant Fuels (ATF) and Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR) irradiation test programs. • Quality approved materials for HT MPFD construction were procured by irradiation test programs for upcoming deployments. • KSU improved and performed electrical contact and fissile material plating. • KSU delivered fissile HT MPFD parts to INL for final construction of HT MPFD prototype. • A prototype HT MPFD was constructed and analyzed at INL. • The HT MPFD has been modeled in MCNP to optimize the amount of fissile material deposition. • The HT MPFD has been modeled in MCNP to optimize the sensor location in the irradiation test. • The fissile material deposition is undergoing independent verifications. • Detector amplifier electronics have been revised and tested by KSU. • Several project meetings were held at INL and KSU to discuss the roles and responsibilities between INL, KSU, and CEA for development and deployment of the HT MPFDs. As documented in this report, FY16 funding has allowed the project to meet year two planned accomplishments to develop a HT MPFD. In addition, the accomplishments of this project have attracted independent funding from other Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) programs for MTR irradiations of the MPFD technology. These are significant opportunities for this NEET Enhanced Micro-Pocket Fission Detector for High Temperature Reactors project because the irradiation expense of these experiments could not be included in the original project scope.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2021

Gandolinium poison solubility testing for the downstream impacts from accelerated basin de-inventory

The Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) Program at the Savannah River Site (SRS) is designed to accelerate the de-inventory of L-Basin and accelerate the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Disposition mission. Spent fuel will be dissolved in H-Canyon without recovery of uranium. The dissolver solutions will be temporarily stored, pH-adjusted to excess hydroxide (which will facilitate precipitation of metal oxides/hydroxides), transferred to the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facility (CSTF), and subsequently immobilized in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) during planned sludge batch campaigns. ABD accelerates basin closure, significantly reduces programmatic risk, and greatly reduces the lifecycle budget requirements for the site by eliminating the need for a SNF drying and packaging capability. The ABD approach represents a significant change to the clean-up approach for the SRS. However, the increased fissile loading in sludge batches, due to the dissolver solutions, requires investigation to ensure fissile limits are efficiently and safely managed; higher fissile loadings in the glass are projected to be two to three times higher than the current fissile concentration limit of 897 g/m 3 and will be addressed in a future report.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Improbability of Nuclear Criticality in Compacted Criticality Control Overpacks after Room Closure by Salt Creep at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Based on the rationale presented, nuclear criticality is improbable after salt creep causes compaction of criticality control overpacks (CCOs) disposed at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, an operating repository in bedded salt for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from atomic energy defense activities. For most TRU waste, the possibility of post-closure criticality is exceedingly small either because the salt neutronically isolates TRU waste canisters or because closure of a disposal room from salt creep does not sufficiently compact the low mass of fissile material. The criticality potential has been updated here because of the introduction of CCOs, which may dispose up to 380 fissile gram equivalent plutonium-239 in each container. The criticality potential is evaluated through high-fidelity geomechanical modeling of a disposal room filled with CCOs during two representative conditions: (1) large salt block fall, and (2) gradual salt compaction (without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation to permit maximum room closure). Geomechanical models of rock fall demonstrate three tiers of CCOs are not greatly disrupted. Geomechanical models of gradual room closure from salt creep predict irregular arrays of closely packed CCOs after 1000 years, when room closure has asymptotically approached maximum compaction. Criticality models of spheres and cylinders of 380 fissile gram equivalent of plutonium (as oxide) at the predicted irregular spacing demonstrate that an array of CCOs is not critical when surrounded by salt and magnesium oxide, provided the amount of hydrogenous material shipped in the CCO (usually water and plastics) is controlled or boron carbide (a neutron poison) is mixed with the fissile contents.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Post-closure Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations for Disposition of Criticality Control Overpacks at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a geological repository in southern New Mexico that provides for disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes from atomic energy defense activities. The Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) Report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addresses nuclear criticality safety based on the projected inventory characteristics for the initial compliance certification application of WIPP in 1996. As the inventory, waste forms, and disposal package designs change, revised or new analyses are necessary to demonstrate acceptability for these configurations within the WIPP safety basis and compliance with 10,000-year post-closure standards of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Saylor and Scaglione evaluated criticality control overpacks (CCOs) in 2017 based on conservative assumptions for post-closure repository structural conditions with resulting effects on containers and container spacing, The Saylor and Scaglione evaluation of CCOs addressed a single waste configuration that represents the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program’s dilute and dispose waste form and composition. This initial CCO study demonstrated that 50 grams of boron carbide (B 4 C) per CCO is sufficient to ensure post-closure criticality safety based on a well-mixed waste composition, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) subsequently determined that this amount of B 4 C does not require constraints on moisture or plastic present as moderator. The Saylor and Scaglione analysis conservatively assumes repository room closure that eliminates all space between fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu masses. The close-packed array was selected based on limited availability of repository salt creep modeling results at that time. In 2019, Brickner provided additional evaluations for pipe overpack containers (POCs), building on the conservative basis provided by Saylor and Scaglione. Brickner’s 2019 analysis made use of new geomechanical data for post-closure spacing that rely on advances in repository modeling as documented in the work by Reedlunn and Bean. This current CCO evaluation for generic waste materials expands on earlier work performed at ORNL and includes evaluation of CCOs across a much broader range of possible waste compositions and geometries. This evaluation is intended to provide input for the required feature, event and process (FEP) screening to determine if post-closure criticality must be included as an event in the 10,000-year regulatory evaluation. As such, the approach to modeling post-closure criticality presented in this report has been coordinated with the Sandia team responsible for FEP screening. The resulting analysis supports disposition of fissile materials in the CCO containing up to 380 FGE 239 Pu and expands conditions acceptable for disposal of fissile material in CCOs. This evaluation builds on the methodology of Saylor and Scaglione and Brickner, using the most recently available geomechanical data for CCO spacing under salt creep compaction scenarios provided by Reedlunn and Bean. The broad range of fissile material configurations analyzed in this report are intended to account for configurations that may occur during the post-closure disposal time period, and it also includes waste configurations that are not physically possible to support analysis of conditions that influence neutron fluence.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Technical Evaluation of Accelerated Basin De-Inventory Material Addition to Sludge Batch 11 (Rev. 1)

The Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) program involves discarding spent nuclear fuel that is currently stored in L-Basin to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for vitrification. The first ABD discards will occur during the preparation of Sludge Batch (SB) 11. Savannah River Mission Completion has requested that the Savannah River National Laboratory assess the technical gaps related to the increased gadolinium poisoning requirement and the impacts of performing the Low Temperature Aluminum Dissolution (LTAD) process in Tank 51 with H-Canyon discards present. The following summarizes the evaluation of the impacts of increasing the quantity of gadolinium (and related topics) from what was previously evaluated in the SRNL studies of gadolinium-poisoned ABD material solubility, the overall ABD flowsheet review, and increasing the fissile mass loading in glass: 1) Based on literature surveys, there is no indication that organic interactions with gadolinium will be significant at the high pH (typically >13) conditions of the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities. Any interactions of gadolinium with organics in DWPF are not expected to adversely impact DWPF or downstream facilities. Thus, there is little-to-no residual risk from organic interactions with gadolinium [Gap closed]; 2) Adding depleted uranium to ABD material, targeting 235 U enrichment of 4.90% within each transfer window, will mitigate potential impacts from an increase in soluble 235 U enrichment during sludge washing and LTAD. The plan to take advantage of previous transfers and allow 235 U enrichment of >5% during the final transfer window carries a risk that Tank 51 supernate will have a 235 U enrichment of >5%, which should be evaluated for acceptance; 3) Increasing the gadolinium mass ratio to 3.0:1 Gd: 235 U(eq SLU ) should lead to the same or higher partitioning of gadolinium into the solid phase within the DWPF Chemical Process Cell, resulting in both liquid and solid phases with expected partitioning of Gd consistent with the prior solubility study [Gap closed for SB11]; 4) There are no expected impacts on DWPF melt temperature and melter operations due to the minimal ~0.2 weight percent (wt%) increase in Gd concentration relative to previous sludge batches [Gap closed for SB11]; 5) As observed previously, Gd is expected to enter the off-gas system via physical entrainment, but at a slightly higher concentration than what was observed for SB9 melter off-gas pluggage deposits (0.07 wt%) [Gap closed for SB11] ; 6) There are no expected impacts on DWPF recycle or the Recycle Collection Tank glycolate destruction process. [Gap closed for SB11]; 7) Gd is projected to be a trace component in the SB11 glass (<0.5 wt%) and can be ignored for process control. Trace components do not significantly impact glass durability, thus the conclusions of the previous Product Consistency Test evaluation at a fissile mass loading of 2,500 g fissile/m3 glass still applies to SB11. The ~0.1 wt% increase in Gd2O3 concentration relative to the previous study will not impact the predictability of SB11 glass with the DWPF Product Composition Control System (PCCS) models for durability or the acceptability of glass according to the Waste Acceptance Product Specifications (WAPS) criterion for product consistency [Gap closed for SB11]; 8) No additional Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure testing is necessary for SB11 and the hazardous waste specification of the SB11 DWPF waste form is unchanged after the addition of the ABD stream [Gap closed for SB11]. The following summarizes the evaluation of the impacts of adding two-thirds of the ABD material to Tank 51 prior to LTAD: 1) The addition of two-thirds of the ABD increases overall aluminum mass from 1.39×10 4 kg to 1.64×10 4 kg (15.5% ABD Al). The form of the insoluble portion of the Al resulting from ABD addition should be the more readily dissolved Al(OH) 3 and amorphous forms. The portion of the ABD aluminum that is processed by LTAD is expected to be completely soluble, thus requiring that less of the boehmite in the sludge be dissolved to reach the same Al target in the SB. [Gap closed for SB11]; The expected LTAD impact on other components, as related primarily to the components in ABD, are discussed. Gd is expected to remain insoluble during LTAD and not impact the solubility of other components. [Gap closed for SB11]; The addition of two-thirds of the ABD increases overall projected SB11 uranium mass from 4,740 kg to 13,100 kg (63% ABD U) and the projected plutonium mass from 86.0 kg to 89.5 kg (3.9% ABD Pu). The addition of all of the ABD increases overall projected SB11 uranium mass from 4,740 kg to 16,100 kg (70% ABD U) and the projected plutonium mass from 86.0 kg to 90.4 kg (5.3% ABD Pu). The 235 U enrichment will be ≤5%. The fissile uranium will be adequately poisoned by Gd and the fissile Pu will be adequately poisoned by Fe from the sludge. [Gap closed for SB11]; There is a low risk that ABD addition will impact the rheology or pumpability of the slurry. There is a low but higher risk of ABD addition prior to LTAD impacting the settling rate; Based on the evaluation of adding two-thirds of the ABD material and all of the ABD material prior to the LTAD process, there is no volume or mass limit that would need to be imposed on ABD additions prior to LTAD. [Gap closed for SB11]. Revision 1 of this report addresses a variation on the ABD additions and LTAD strategy where sodium hydroxide additions for LTAD may be performed intermittently or concurrently with an ABD addition window. The proposed change does not alter the conclusions of this evaluation.

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DOE OSTI2023

Hand Calculation Methods for Nuclear Criticality Safety

This primer provides an overview of the most common hand calculation methods used for criticality safety calculations. The most widely used tools available to a nuclear criticality safety (NCS) practitioner are probably the common Monte Carlo or deterministic criticality safety codes, which can be used to model very complex systems. However, use of these codes can obscure the parameters to which a particular fissile system may be sensitive, whereas the hand calculation methods can be used to delve into the ways each parameter may affect the reactivity of a fissile material system. Furthermore, practitioners must avoid using computer codes as devices that take inputs and simply provide outputs (i.e., a “black box”). Many years ago, pioneers such as Joe Thomas, David Smith, and Hugh Paxton, among others in the field of nuclear criticality safety, took the time before the advent of high-speed desktop computers to create simple hand methods for criticality safety analyses. Some of the methods can be used for single fissile units; others are applicable to fissile units arranged into simple array configurations. This primer discusses the applicability of the various methods, illustrates how they are used, and provides an interpretation of the various results. The NCS practitioner will need to spend time to master the methods that could be most useful; however, they can provide the practitioner with fast and accurate answers to criticality safety problems if they are used correctly and if critical data exist for the problem at hand. Hand calculation methods can be used as a starting point for more advanced calculations, and in many circumstances, they can provide sensitivity and perturbation information more quickly than using a criticality code.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Improbability of Post-Closure Criticality in Compacted Criticality Control Overpacks after Room Closure at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

As part of its periodic re-certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), an operating repository in bedded salt for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from atomic energy defense activities, the United States Environmental Protection Agency expects a re-evaluation of features, events, and processes, such as post-closure nuclear criticality. Although salt creep beneficially encapsulates the TRU waste in the closed WIPP repository, the spacing between an array of waste packages is disrupted as the salt creep closes disposal rooms and containers lose structural integrity. For most TRU waste, the possibility of post-closure criticality is exceedingly small either because the salt neutronically isolates TRU waste canisters or because closure of a disposal room from salt creep does not sufficiently compact the low mass of fissile material. The criticality evaluation was updated, however, because of the introduction of criticality control overpack (CCO) containers, which may dispose up to 380 fissile gram equivalent plutonium-239 in each container. The criticality potential is evaluated through high-fidelity geomechanical modeling of a disposal room filled with CCO containers during two representative conditions: (1) large salt block fall, and (2) gradual disposal room closure from salt creep. Geomechanical models of roof fall demonstrate three tiers of CCO containers are not greatly disrupted. Geomechanical models of gradual room closure from salt creep (without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation to permit maximum room closure) were used to predict irregular arrays of closely packed CCOs after 1000 years, when room closure has asymptotically approached maximum compaction. Models of spheres or cylinders with 380 fissile gram equivalent of plutonium (as oxide) at the predicted irregular compacted spacing demonstrate that an array of CCO containers is not critical when surrounded by salt and magnesium oxide, provided the mass of hydrogenous material shipped in CCO containers (usually plastics) is controlled or boron carbide (a neutron poison) is mixed with the fissile contents.

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