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Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 415: Project 57 No. 1 Plutonium Dispersion (NTTR), Nevada (Revision 0)

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 415, Project 57 No. 1 Plutonium Dispersion (NTTR). CAU 415 is located on Range 4808A of the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) and consists of one corrective action site: NAFR-23-02, Pu Contaminated Soil. The CAU 415 site consists of the atmospheric release of radiological contaminants to surface soil from the Project 57 safety experiment conducted in 1957. The safety experiment released plutonium (Pu), uranium (U), and americium (Am) to the surface soil over an area of approximately 1.9 square miles. This area is currently fenced and posted as a radiological contamination area. Vehicles and debris contaminated by the experiment were subsequently buried in a disposal trench within the surface-contaminated, fenced area and are assumed to have released radiological contamination to subsurface soils. Potential source materials in the form of pole-mounted electrical transformers were also identified at the site and will be removed as part of closure activities.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: October 1, 2013, through December 31, 2014

On April 24, 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC, now the Department of Energy [DOE]) conducted the Project 57 safety experiment in western Emigrant Valley north east of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly the Nevada Test Site) on lands withdrawn by the Department of Defense (DoD) for the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). The test was undertaken to develop (1) a means of estimating plutonium distribution resulting from a nonnuclear detonation; (2) biomedical evaluation techniques for use in plutonium-laden environments; (3) methods of surface decontamination; and (4) instruments and field procedures for prompt estimation of alpha contamination (Shreve, 1958). Although the test did not result in the fission of nuclear materials, it did disseminate plutonium across the land surface. Following the experiment, the AEC fenced the contaminated area and returned control of the surrounding land to the DoD. Various radiological surveys have been performed in the area and in 2007, the DOE expanded the demarked contamination area by posting signs 200 to 400 feet (60 to 120 meters) outside of the original fence. Plutonium in soil is thought to attach preferentially to smaller particles. Therefore, redistribution of soil particulates by wind (dust) is the mechanism most likely to transport plutonium beyond the boundary of the Project 57 contamination area. In 2011, DRI installed two instrumentation towers to measure radiological, meteorological, and dust conditions. The monitoring activity was implemented to determine if radionuclide contamination was detectable in samples of airborne dust and characterize meteorological and environmental parameters that influence dust transport. Collected data also permits comparison of radiological conditions at the Project 57 monitoring stations to conditions observed at Community Environmental Monitoring Program (CEMP) stations around the NTTR. Biweekly samples of airborne particulates are submitted for laboratory assessment of gross alpha and gross beta radioactivity and for determination of gamma-emitting radionuclides. Annual average gross alpha values at the Project 57 monitoring stations are in the same range as the highest two values reported for the CEMP stations surrounding the NTTR. Annual average gross beta values at the Project 57 monitoring stations are slightly higher than the lowest value reported for the CEMP stations surrounding the NTTR. Gamma spectroscopy analyses on samples collected from the Project 57 stations identified only naturally occurring radionuclides. No manmade radionuclides were detected. Thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) indicated that the average annual radioactivity dose at the monitoring stations is higher than the dose determined at surrounding CEMP stations but approximately half of the estimated national average dose received by the general public as a result of exposure to natural sources. The TLDs at the Project 57 monitoring stations are exposed to both natural sources (terrestrial and cosmic) and radioactive releases from the Project 57 contamination area. These comparisons show that the gross alpha, gross beta, and gamma spectroscopy levels at the Project 57 monitoring stations are similar to levels observed at the CEMP stations but that the average annual dose rate is higher than at the CEMP stations. Winds in excess of approximately 15 mph begin to generate dust movement by saltation (migration of sand at the ground surface) or direct suspension in the air. Saltated sand, PM10 (inhalable) dust, and PM2.5 (fine particulate dust) exhibit an approximately exponential increase with increasing wind speed. The greatest concentrations of dust occur for winds exceeding 20 mph. During the reporting period, winds in excess of 20 mph occurred approximately 1.6 percent of the time. Preliminary assessment of individual wind events suggests that dust generation is highly variable likely because of the influence of other meteorological and environmental parameters. Although winds sufficient to generate significant amounts of dust occur at the Project 57 site, they are infrequent and of short duration. Additionally, the potential for wind transport of dust is dependent on other parameters whose influence have not yet been assessed.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Lakeview, Oregon, Disposal Site

9.1 Compliance Summary The Lakeview, Oregon, Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) Title I Disposal Site was inspected September 16 and 17, 2015. Other than some ongoing concern with erosion-control rock riprap degradation, the disposal cell was in good condition. Some minor fence repairs and vegetation removal, and minor erosion repair work along the west site fence is planned. Inspectors identified no other maintenance needs or cause for a follow-up or contingency inspection. Disposal cell riprap is evaluated annually to ensure continued long-term protection of the cell from erosion during a severe precipitation event. Degradation of the rock riprap was first observed at the site in the mid-1990s. Rock gradation monitoring of the riprap on the west side slope has been performed as part of the annual inspection since 1997 to determine the mean diameter (D 50 ) value. As prescribed by the monitoring procedure, the rock monitoring is routinely conducted at random locations. However, at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) request, the 2015 rock monitoring approach deviated from the normal procedure by using a pre-established monitoring grid in a subset area of the west side slope. This changed the monitoring approach from random sampling to biased sampling. The D 50 value measured during the 2015 gradation monitoring is 2.39 inches, which falls below the original D 50 design size range of 2.7–3.9 inches for the Type B size side slope riprap. At NRC’s request, rock durability monitoring was added to the gradation monitoring in 2009 to monitor durability by rock type. Results of the 2015 durability monitoring showed that74 percent of the total rock sampled is durability class code A rock with an assigned durability class of “highly durable” or durability class code B “durable” rock, and that over 90 percent of the 3-inch or larger rock is durability class code A or B. The rock durability classifications are further explained in Section 9.4.2.2.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: January 1 through December 31, 2016

On April 24, 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC, now the Department of Energy [DOE]) conducted the Project 57 safety experiment in western Emigrant Valley northeast of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly the Nevada Test Site) on lands withdrawn by the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). The test was undertaken to develop (1) a means of estimating plutonium distribution resulting from a non-nuclear detonation; (2) biomedical evaluation techniques for use in plutonium-laden environments; (3) methods of surface decontamination; and (4) instruments and field procedures for prompt estimation of alpha contamination (Shreve, 1958). Although the test did not result in the fission of nuclear materials, it did disseminate plutonium across the land surface. Following the experiment, the AEC fenced the contaminated area and returned control of the surrounding land to the DOD. Various radiological surveys were performed in the area and in 2007, the DOE expanded the demarked Contamination Area (CA) by posting signs 200 to 400 ft (60 to 120 m) outside of the original fence.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: January 1 through December 31, 2017

On April 24, 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) (now the Department of Energy [DOE]) conducted the Project 57 safety experiment in western Emigrant Valley northeast of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly the Nevada Test Site) on lands withdrawn by the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). The test was undertaken to develop (1) a means of estimating plutonium distribution resulting from a non-nuclear detonation; (2) biomedical evaluation techniques for use in plutonium-laden environments; (3) methods of surface decontamination; and (4) instruments and field procedures for prompt estimation of alpha contamination (Shreve, 1958). Although the test did not result in the fission of nuclear materials, it did disseminate plutonium across the land surface. Following the experiment, the AEC fenced the contaminated area and returned control of the surrounding land to the DOD. Various radiological surveys were performed in the area and in 2007, the DOE expanded the demarked Contamination Area (CA) by posting signs 200 to 400 ft (60 to 120 m) outside of the original fence. Plutonium in soil attaches preferentially to smaller particles (Tamura, 1985; Friesen, 1992; Murarik et al., 1992; and Misra et al., 1993). Therefore, redistribution of soil particles by wind (dust) and water are the mechanisms most likely to transport plutonium beyond the boundary of the Project 57 CA. Monitoring was implemented in 2011 by Desert Research Institute (DRI) to determine if radionuclide contamination was detectable in samples of airborne dust and to characterize meteorological and environmental parameters that influence dust transport. Initially, two monitoring stations consisting of radiological, meteorological, and dust sampling equipment were installed near the southeast and northeast corners of the CA. In January 2015, the original monitoring stations were dismantled and moved farther to the west along the CA boundary. This move was made to place the monitoring stations downwind of ground zero and the High Contamination Area (HCA) during the dominant northerly and southerly winds. Samples of particles suspended in the air are collected every two weeks and submitted for laboratory assessments of gross alpha and gross beta radioactivity, and for determinations of gamma-emitting radionuclides. In calendar year (CY) 2017, the mean gross alpha concentration at monitoring station P57-4 was approximately 4.25 times the value at monitoring station P57-3. In CY2015 and CY2016, the difference in mean gross alpha concentration at the two stations was approximately 1.5. The mean gross alpha concentrations at P57-3 and P57-4 were approximately 1.9 and 7.9 times, respectively, the mean gross alpha concentrations at the surrounding Community Environmental Monitoring Program (CEMP) stations. The minimum gross alpha concentrations reported for the Project 57 stations are in the range of the minimum values observed at the CEMP stations. However, maximum gross alpha concentrations are greater than the maximum concentrations observed at the surrounding CEMP stations. Gamma spectroscopy analyses resulted in the detection of seven radionuclides. Except for americium-241 (Am-241), all reported radionuclides occur naturally in the environment. The Am-241 detection by gamma spectroscopy was confirmed by alpha spectroscopy. During each quarter of CY2017, four suspended particulate matter samples were selected for alpha spectroscopy analysis. Two were selected each quarter from the regular biweekly samples collected at each of the two monitoring stations. Of the eight samples from P57-3, one was reported to have plutonium-238 (Pu-238) above the minimum detectable activity (MDA) and five were reported to have plutonium 239/240 (Pu-239/240) above the MDA. Of the eight samples from P57-4, three were reported to have Pu-238 above the MDA and six were reported to have Pu-239/240 above the MDA. Soil material is also transported by saltation, which is a wind driven phenomena that bounces sand-sized soil particles across the land surface because they are too heavy to be suspended in the air. Samples of particles transported by saltation were collected downwind and upwind of the CA at both monitoring stations in May 2017 after a 190-day deployment and again in September 2017 after a 114-day deployment. Mass of the saltation samples was determined after oven drying. The September sample had greater mass than the May sample. The same relationship was observed for the suspended particulate matter samples during periods of saltation sample collection. The difference in the collected mass appears to be because of the amount of soil moisture. Higher soil moisture exerts additional isotopic bonds between soil particles and water molecules, and between water molecules that envelop soil particles, making it more difficult for wind to raise the particles as dust. In general, samples collected from saltation traps facing south contained more material than samples collected from traps facing north. This suggests that although saltation material may have been moving back and forth in conjunction with the two dominant wind directions, there was a net trend for saltation material to be transported toward the north. Radiological analyses of the saltation samples show that the smaller particle size faction (<63 μm) generally produced the highest activity levels of Am-241, Pu-238, and Pu-239/240. In general, the isotope activity levels decreased as the particle size increased. These results are consistent with the expectation that the greatest potential for transport of radiological contamination is with the smaller particles. Thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) indicated that the average annual external radioactivity dose at the monitoring stations is slightly higher than the dose determined at the surrounding CEMP stations, but approximately half of the estimated national average dose received by the general public from exposure to natural sources. The TLDs at the Project 57 monitoring stations are exposed to both natural sources (terrestrial and cosmic) and radioactive releases from the Project 57 CA. Winds in excess of approximately 15 mph (24 km/hr) begin to generate dust movement by saltation or suspension, as determined by the monitoring instruments. Saltated particles, PM10 (i.e., inhalable dust), and PM2.5 (i.e., fine particulate dust) exhibit an approximately exponential increase with increasing wind speed. The greatest concentrations of dust occurred for winds exceeding 20 mph (32 km/hr). When the wind/dust analysis was performed for winds separated into the dominant northerly and southerly wind directions, it was evident that the northerly winds generated the higher PM10 concentrations and had the dominate influence on the PM10 concentration determined for all wind speeds when all wind directions were evaluated together. During the year, winds in excess of 20 mph (32 km/hr) occurred approximately one percent of the time. Although winds sufficient to generate dust occur at the Project 57 site, they are infrequent and of short duration. A preliminary assessment of individual wind events suggests that dust generation in response to specific wind conditions is highly variable. Wind speeds that would be expected to generate noticeable dust may not do so in every instance. Additionally, saltation transport in response to wind conditions was less common than expected. These variations were likely because of the influence of meteorological and environmental parameters other than wind.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada: For Calendar Year 2018 (Revision 0)

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities for the following closed corrective action units (CAUs): CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits; and CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches. The locations of the sites are shown in Figure ES-1. This report covers calender year 2018. The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit Number NEV HW0101 and are summarized in each CAU-specific section of this report. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report. Site inspections are conducted annually at CAUs 90, 91, and 112; semiannually at CAUs 92 and 110; and quarterly at CAU 111. Additional inspections are conducted at CAUs 92 and 111 if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.0 inch in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units, including covers, fences, signs, gates, and locks. At CAUs 110 and 111, soil moisture monitoring and subsidence surveys are conducted in addition to the visual inspections. At CAU 110 the site fence, gate, lock and use restriction signs are evaluated. At CAU 111, an ecological survey, direct radiation monitoring, air monitoring, radon flux monitoring, and groundwater monitoring are also conducted. This report will address all monitoring item notes above except groundwater monitoring. Groundwater monitoring is documented in the Nevada National Security Site Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. All required inspections, maintenance, and monitoring were conducted in accordance with the post-closure requirements of the permit. Revision 6 of Permit NEV HW0101 was issued effective December 10, 2015, and remains in effect until December 10, 2020.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Automated Identification of Human Incursion

According to a CBS news report, on April 16, 2013 a San Jose, CA PG&E substation’s security fence was breached, and five transformers were damaged. The damaged transformers had a lead time of several months, leaving the electrical system with reduced capacity through the summer. With the increasing value of copper, the theft of copper electrical lines has also become an issue. Such occurrences highlight the vulnerability of our electrical grid and the need for greater security than fencing.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Tonopah Test Range Air Monitoring: Meteorological, Radiological, and Wind Transported Particulate Observations (CY 2019)

In 1963, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) (formerly the Atomic Energy Commission [AEC]), implemented Operation Roller Coaster on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and an adjacent area of the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) (formerly the Nellis Air Force Range). This operation resulted in radionuclide-contaminated soils at the Double Tracks site and Clean Slate I, II, and III sites. This report documents observations made during ongoing monitoring of radiological, meteorological, and dust conditions at stations installed adjacent to the Clean Slate sites and at the TTR Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Range Operations Center (ROC). The main objectives of the monitoring effort are to support the DOE Environmental Management Nevada Program (EM NV) in the safe remediation of the environmental legacy of nuclear device development and testing by determining if wind blowing across the Clean Slate sites is transporting particles of radionuclide-contaminated soil beyond the physical and administrative boundaries of the sites, and providing information for designing long-term monitoring of the sites. The monitoring program in 2019 included five stations. Station 400, located within TTR Area 3 and near the ROC, monitors conditions near the local workforce center. Stations 401 and 403 are located on the northern and southeastern perimeter fence lines, respectively, of the Clean Slate III site. Stations 404 and 405 are along the northern and eastern boundary fence, respectively, at Clean Slate II. The stations are generally downwind of the contaminated areas during either northwesterly or southerly winds, which are the predominant wind directions.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: January 1 through December 31, 2019

On April 24, 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) (now the Department of Energy [DOE]) conducted the Project 57 safety experiment in western Emigrant Valley northeast of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) on lands withdrawn by the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). The test was performed to (1) assess a technique for estimating plutonium distribution resulting from a nonnuclear detonation, (2) develop biomedical evaluation techniques for use in plutonium-laden environments, (3) evaluate methods of surface decontamination, and (4) evaluate instruments and field procedures for the prompt estimation of alpha contamination (Shreve, 1958). Although the test did not result in the fission of nuclear materials, it did disseminate plutonium across the land surface. Following the experiment, the AEC fenced the contaminated area and returned control of the surrounding land to the DOD. Various radiological surveys were performed in the area and the DOE expanded the demarked Contamination Area (CA) in 2007 by posting signs 200 ft to 400 ft (60 m to 120 m) outside of the original fence.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada: For Calendar Year 2020 (Rev. 2)

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities in compliance with the requirements listed in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Permit Number NEV HW0101 associated with the following closed corrective action units (CAUs): 1) CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; 2) CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; 3) CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; 4) CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; 5) CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits; 6) CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches The locations of the sites are shown in Figure ES-1. This report covers calendar year 2020. The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 and are summarized in each CAU-specific section of this report. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report. Site inspections are conducted annually at CAUs 90, 91, and 112; semiannually at CAUs 92 and 110; and quarterly at CAU 111. Additional inspections are conducted at CAUs 92 and 111 if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.0 inch in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units, including covers, fences, signs, gates, and locks. At CAUs 110 and 111, soil moisture monitoring and subsidence surveys are conducted in addition to the visual inspections. At CAU 110, the site fence, gate, lock, and use restriction signs are evaluated. At CAU 111, an ecological survey, direct radiation monitoring, air monitoring, radon flux monitoring, and groundwater monitoring are also conducted. This report will address all monitoring item notes above except groundwater monitoring. Groundwater monitoring is documented in the Nevada National Security Site Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. All required inspections, maintenance, and monitoring were conducted in accordance with the post-closure requirements of the permit. Revision 6 of RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 was issued effective December 10, 2015, and remained in effect until December 10, 2020. At the time of this report submittal, the new RCRA permit application was in review.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Precipitation Meteorological Instruments (PRECIPMET) Handbook

The PRECIPMET surface meteorology instrument system provides temperature, relative humidity, pressure, wind speed and direction, and precipitation data relevant to the precipitation network instruments: laser disdrometer (PARS2) and radar wind profiler (RWP). The PRECIPMET is installed at the intermediate facilities (IF) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)’s Atmospheric Radiation Measurement (ARM) Southern Great Plains (SGP) atmospheric observatory. The instrument system consists of a Vaisala WXT520 weather transmitter and a 12”-diameter Novalynx tipping bucket rain gauge (TBRG). The WXT520 is mounted on top of the control building at a height of approximately 4 meters. The tipping bucket is mounted on a pole level with the surrounding fencing (approximately 2 meters) to prevent physical interference with the gauge.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Wind loads on flat plate photovoltaic array fields

The results of an experimental analysis (boundary layer wind tunnel test) of the aerodynamic forces resulting from winds acting on flat plate photovoltaic arrays are presented. Local pressure coefficient distributions and normal force coefficients on the arrays are shown and compared to theoretical results. Parameters that were varied when determining the aerodynamic forces included tilt angle, array separation, ground clearance, protective wind barriers, and the effect of the wind velocity profile. Recommended design wind forces and pressures are presented, which envelop the test results for winds perpendicular to the array's longitudinal axis. This wind direction produces the maximum wind loads on the arrays except at the array edge where oblique winds produce larger edge pressure loads. The arrays located at the outer boundary of an array field have a protective influence on the interior arrays of the field. A significant decrease of the array wind loads were recorded in the wind tunnel test on array panels located behind a fence and/or interior to the array field compared to the arrays on the boundary and unprotected from the wind. The magnitude of this decrease was the same whether caused by a fence or upwind arrays.

Miller, R. D.↗

Subsonic flow investigations on a cranked wing designed for high maneuverability

The characteristic pitching moment nonlinearity of cranked wings limits their usable lift coefficient well below C sub L max. The potential of several aerodynamic devices, viz., fences, pylon vortex generators (PVG), mid-span strakes and cavity flaps, in delaying the pitch up onset on a 70/50 deg cranked wing was explored in low speed tunnel tests. Upper surface pressure measurements and low visualizations were conducted on a semi-span wing model to observe the vortex flow development with increasing angle of attack, and then to assess the effectiveness of the devices in controlling the collapse of vortex lift over the wing panel outboard of the crank. Force tests on a full span wing and body model were also conducted to assess the fence and PVG in improving the usable C sub L.

Rao, D. M.↗

Experimental investigation of the F/A-18 vortex flows at subsonic through transonic speeds

A subsonic-to-transonic speed wind tunnel study has been conducted to deepen understanding of the nature and possibilities for control of vortical flows associated with wing leading edge extensions (LEXs) on the F/A-18 aircraft; these vortical phenomena encompass vortex breakdown and vortex interactions with vertical stabilizers. Wind tunnel results were correlated with in-flight flow visualizations as well as handling-qualities trend data from a USN F-18 with LEX fences to improve the vertical tail buffet environment. Attention is given to the sensitivity of the vortex flows to Re and Mach numbers, reduced vertical tail excitation due to the presence of a LEX fence, and the interpretation of off-body flow visualizations.

Erickson, Gary E.↗

Low-speed aerodynamic characteristics of a powered NASP-like configuration in ground effect

Results are presented on the low-speed aerodynamic characteristics of a simplified NASP (for National Aerospace Plane Program)-like configuration, obtained in the NASA-Langley 14-by-22-foot subsonic tunnel. The model consisted of a triangular wedge forebody, a rectangular midsection housing the propulsion simulation system, and a rectangular wedge aftbody; it also included a delta wing, exhaust flow deflectors, and aftbody fences. Flow visualization was obtained by injecting water into the engine simulator inlets and using a laser light sheet to illuminate the resulting exhaust flow. It was found that power-on ground effects for NASP-like configuration can be substantial; these effects can be reduced by increasing the angle-of-attack to the value of the aftbody ramp angle. Power-on lift losses in ground effect increased with increasing thrust, but could be reduced by the addition of a delta wing to the configuration. Power-on lift losses also increased with use of aftbody fences.

Gatlin, Gregory M.↗

A parametric experimental investigation of a scramjet nozzle at Mach 6 with Freon and argon or air used for exhaust simulation

A parametric experimental investigation of a scramjet nozzle was conducted with a gas mixture used to simulate the scramjet engine exhaust flow at a free-stream Reynolds number of approximately 6.5 x 10(exp 6) per foot. External nozzle surface angles of 16, 20, and 24 deg were tested with a fixed-length ramp and for cowl internal surface angles of 6 and 12 deg. Pressure data on the external nozzle surface were obtained for mixtures of Freon and argon gases with a ratio of specific heats of about 1.23, which matches that of a scramjet exhaust. Forces and moments were determined by integration of the pressure data. Two nozzle configurations were also tested with air used to simulate the exhaust flow. On the external nozzle surface, lift and thrust forces for air exhaust simulation were approximately half of those for Freon-argon exhaust simulation and the pitching moment was approximately a third. These differences were primarily due to the difference in the ratios of specific heats between the two exhaust simulation gases. A 20 deg external surface angle produced the greatest thrust for a 6 deg cowl internal surface angle. A flow fence significantly increased lift and thrust forces over those for the nozzle without a flow fence.

Cubbage, James M.↗

Ground effects on the low-speed aerodynamics of a powered, generic hypersonic configuration

A study was undertaken in the NASA Langley 14- by 22-foot subsonic tunnel to determine the low-speed aerodynamic characteristics of a powered, generic, hypersonic configuration in ground effect. The model was a simplified configuration consisting of a triangular wedge forebody, a rectangular mid-section which housed the flow through, an ejector type propulsion simulation system, and a rectangular wedge afterbody. Additional model components included a delta wing, a rectangular wedge forebody, inlet fences, exhaust flow deflectors, and afterbody fences. Aerodynamic force and moment data were obtaind over an angle of attack range from -4 to 18 degrees while model height above the tunnel floor was varied from 1/4 inch to 6 feet. Variations in freestream dynamic pressure, from 10 psf to 80 psf, and engine ejector pressure yielded a range of thrust coefficients from 0 to 0.8.

Gatlin, Gregory M.↗