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This viewgraph presentation gives a general overview of the biomedical and technological challenges of Extravehicular Activity (EVA). The topics covered include: 1) Prebreathe Protocols; 2) Lunar Suit Testing and Development; and 3) Lunar Electric Rover and Exploration Operations Concepts.
Recent study of Space Station Freedom requirements for extravehicular activity (EVA) to perform external maintenance tasks emphasize an oversubscription of resources for performing on-orbit tasks. Extravehicular robotics (EVR) and cooperative EVA combined with EVR (using crew and robots synergistically to perform tasks) have been suggested as a part of the solution to reduce EVA. The question remains however, 'Under what conditions is it cost-effective to use the EVA and/or EVR resource.' The answer to such a question also has implications for the Space Station Freedom and its external maintenance as well as the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) where the issue of work-system allocation is magnified by the long distances and scope of EVA work. This paper describes a simple technique of interest to operational planners and robot technology planners for determining in an economic context whether to use EVA alone, EVR alone, or Cooperative EVA. It is also shown that given: (1) the task times for these alternatives; and (2) the marginal costs of EVA, EVR, and IVA, the appropriate work system for performing the task can be identified. The paper illustrates how the work system choice is based on the ratio of costs. An example using Space Station Freedom data is presented to illustrate the trade-offs among alternative work-systems.
The International Space Station (ISS), because of its large structure and high voltage solar arrays, has a complex plasma interaction with the ionosphere in low Earth orbit (LEO). This interaction of the ISS US Segment photovoltaic (PV) power system with the LEO ionospheric plasma produces floating potentials on conducting elements of the ISS structure relative to the local plasma environment. To control the ISS floating potentials, two Plasma Contactor Units (PCUs) are installed on the Z1 truss. Each PCU discharges accumulated electrons from the Space Station structure, thus reducing the potential difference between the ISS structure and the surrounding charged plasma environment. Operations of the PCUs were intended to keep the ISS floating potential to 40 Volts (Reference 1). Exposed dielectric surfaces overlying conducting structure on the Space Station will collect an opposite charge from the ionosphere as the ISS charges. In theory, when an Extravehicular Activity (EVA) crewmember is tethered to structure via the crew safety tether or when metallic surfaces of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) come in contact with conducting metallic surfaces of the ISS, the EMU conducting components, including the perspiration-soaked crewmember inside, can become charged to the Space Station floating potential. The concern is the potential dielectric breakdown of anodized aluminum surfaces on the EMU producing an arc from the EMU to the ambient plasma, or nearby ISS structure. If the EMU arcs, an electrical current of an unknown magnitude and duration may conduct through the EVA crewmember, producing an unacceptable condition. This electrical current may be sufficient to startle or fatally shock the EVA crewmember (Reference 2). Hence, as currently defined by the EVA community, the ISS floating potential for all nominal and contingency EVA worksites and translation paths must have a magnitude less than 40 volts relative to the local ionosphere at all times during EVA. Arcing from the EMU is classified as a catastrophic hazard, which requires two-failure tolerant controls, i.e., three hazard controls. Each PCU is capable of maintaining the ISS floating potential below the requirement during EVA. The two PCUs provide a single failure tolerant control of ISS floating potential. In the event of the failure of one or two PCUs, a combination of solar array shunting and turning the solar arrays into their own wakes will be used to supply control of the plasma hazard (Reference 3). The purpose of this paper is to present on-orbit information that shows that ISS solar array placement with respect to the ISS velocity vector can control solar array plasma charging, and hence, provide an operational control for the plasma hazard. Also, this paper will present on-orbit information that shows that shunting of the ISS solar arrays can control solar array plasma charging, and hence, provide an additional operational control for the plasma hazard.
Programmatic benefits to payloads are examined which can result from the routine use of extravehicular activity (EVA) during space missions. Design and operations costs were compared for 13 representative baseline payloads to the costs of those payloads adapted for EVA operations. The EVA-oriented concepts developed in the study were derived from these baseline concepts and maintained mission and program objectives as well as basic configurations. This permitted isolation of cost saving factors associated specifically with incorporation of EVA in a variety of payload designs and operations. The study results were extrapolated to a total of 74 payload programs. Using appropriate complexity and learning factors, net EVA savings were extrapolated to over $551M for NASA and U.S. civil payloads for routine operations. Adding DOD and ESRO payloads increases the net estimated savings of $776M. Planned maintenance by EVA indicated an estimated $168M savings due to elimination of automated service equipment. Contingency problems of payloads were also analyzed to establish expected failure rates for shuttle payloads. The failure information resulted in an estimated potential for EVA savings of $1.9 B.
This document contains a mixture of tools and equipment used throughout the space shuttle-based extravehicular activity (EVA) program. Promising items which have reached the prototype stage of development are also included, but should not be considered certified ready for flight. Each item is described with a photo, a written discussion, technical specifications, dimensional drawings, and points of contact for additional information. Numbers on the upper left-hand corner of each photo may be used to order specific pictures from NASA and contractor photo libraries. Points of contact were classified as either operational or technical. An operational contact is an engineer from JSC Mission Operations Directorate who is familiar with the basic function and on-orbit use of the tool. A technical contact would be the best source of detailed technical specifications and is typically the NASA subsystem manager. The technical information table for each item uses the following terms to describe the availability or status of each hardware item: Standard - Flown on every mission as standard manifest; Flight specific - Potentially available for flight, not flown every mission (flight certification cannot be guaranteed and recertification may be required); Reference only - Item no longer in active inventory or not recommended for future use, some items may be too application-specific for general use; and Developmental - In the prototype stage only and not yet available for flight. The current availability and certification of any flight-specific tool should be verified with the technical point of contact. Those tools built and fit checked for Hubble Space Telescope maintenance are program dedicated and are not available to other customers. Other customers may have identical tools built from the existing, already certified designs as an optional service.
In January 2004, the President announced a new Vision for Space Exploration. NASA's Office of Exploration Systems has identified Extravehicular Activity (EVA) as a critical capability for supporting the Vision for Space Exploration. EVA is required for all phases of the Vision, both in-space and planetary. Supporting the human outside the protective environment of the vehicle or habitat and allow ing him/her to perform efficient and effective work requires an integrated EVA "System of systems." The EVA System includes EVA suits, airlocks, tools and mobility aids, and human rovers. At the core of the EVA System is the highly technical EVA suit, which is comprised mainly of a life support system and a pressure/environmental protection garment. The EVA suit, in essence, is a miniature spacecraft, which combines together many different sub-systems such as life support, power, communications, avionics, robotics, pressure systems and thermal systems, into a single autonomous unit. Development of a new EVA suit requires technology advancements similar to those required in the development of a new space vehicle. A majority of the technologies necessary to develop advanced EVA systems are currently at a low Technology Readiness Level of 1-3. This is particularly true for the long-pole technologies of the life support system.
During the Apollo Program, space suit outer‐layer fabrics were badly abraded after performing just a few extravehicular activities (EVAs). For example, the Apollo 12 commander reported abrasive wear on the boots that penetrated the outer‐layer fabric into the thermal protection layers after less than 8 hrs of surface operations. Current plans for the exploration planetary space suits require the space suits to support hundreds of hours of EVA on a lunar or Martian surface, creating a challenge for space suit designers to utilize materials advances made over the last 40 years and improve on the space suit fabrics used in the Apollo Program. Over the past 25 years the NASA Johnson Space Center Crew and Thermal Systems Division has focused on tumble testing as means of simulating wear on the outer layer of the space suit fabric. Most recently, in 2009, testing was performed on 4 different candidate outer layers to gather baseline data for future use in design of planetary space suit outer layers. In support of the High Performance EVA Glove Element of the Next Generation Life Support Project, testing a new configuration was recently attempted in which require 10% of the fabric per replicate of that need in 2009. The smaller fabric samples allowed for reduced per sample cost and flexibility to test small samples from manufacturers without the overhead to have a production run completed. Data collected from this iteration was compared to that taken in 2009 to validate the new test method. In addition the method also evaluated the fabrics and fabric layups used in a prototype thermal micrometeoroid garment (TMG) developed for EVA gloves under the NASA High Performance EVA Glove Project. This paper provides a review of previous abrasion studies on space suit fabrics, details methodologies used for abrasion testing in this particular study, results of the validation study, and results of the TMG testing.
Injuries to the hands are common among astronauts who train for extravehicular activity (EVA). When the gloves are pressurized, they restrict movement and create pressure points during tasks, sometimes resulting in pain, muscle fatigue, abrasions, and occasionally more severe injuries such as onycholysis. A brief review of the Lifetime Surveillance of Astronaut Health's injury database reveals that 58% of total astronaut hand and arm injuries from NBL training between 1993 and 2010 occurred either to the fingernail, MCP, or fingertip. The purpose of this study was to assess the potential of using small sensors to measure force acting on the fingers and hand within pressurized gloves and other variables such as blood perfusion, skin temperature, humidity, fingernail strain, skin moisture, among others. Tasks were performed gloved and ungloved in a pressurizable glove box. The test demonstrated that fingernails saw greater transverse strain levels for tension or compression than for longitudinal strain, even during axial fingertip loading. Blood perfusion peaked and dropped as the finger deformed during finger presses, indicating an initial dispersion and decrease of blood perfusion levels. Force sensitive resistors to force plate comparisons showed similar force curve patterns as fingers were depressed, indicating suitable functionality for future testing. Strategies for proper placement and protection of these sensors for ideal data collection and longevity through the test session were developed and will be implemented going forward for future testing.
Multiple HRP Risks and Gaps require detailed characterization of human health and performance during exploration extravehicular activity (EVA) tasks; however, a rigorous and comprehensive methodology for characterizing and comparing the health and human performance implications of current and future EVA spacesuit designs does not exist. This study will identify and implement functional tasks and metrics, both objective and subjective, that are relevant to health and human performance, such as metabolic expenditure, suit fit, discomfort, suited postural stability, cognitive performance, and potentially biochemical responses for humans working inside different EVA suits doing functional tasks under the appropriate simulated reduced gravity environments. This study will provide health and human performance benchmark data for humans working in current EVA suits (EMU, Mark III, and Z2) as well as shirtsleeves using a standard set of tasks and metrics with quantified reliability. Results and methodologies developed during this test will provide benchmark data against which future EVA suits, and different suit configurations (eg, varied pressure, mass, CG) may be reliably compared in subsequent tests. Results will also inform fitness for duty standards as well as design requirements and operations concepts for future EVA suits and other exploration systems.
The EVA (Extravehicular Activity) Wiki was recently implemented as the primary knowledge database to retain critical knowledge and skills in the EVA Operations group at NASA's Johnson Space Center by ensuring that information is recorded in a common, searchable repository. Prior to the EVA Wiki, information required for EVA flight controllers and instructors was scattered across different sources, including multiple file share directories, SharePoint, individual computers, and paper archives. Many documents were outdated, and data was often difficult to find and distribute. In 2011, a team recognized that these knowledge management problems could be solved by creating an EVA Wiki using MediaWiki, a free and open-source software developed by the Wikimedia Foundation. The EVA Wiki developed into an EVA-specific Wikipedia on an internal NASA server. While the technical implementation of the wiki had many challenges, the one of the biggest hurdles came from a cultural shift. Like many enterprise organizations, the EVA Operations group was accustomed to hierarchical data structures and individually-owned documents. Instead of sorting files into various folders, the wiki searches content. Rather than having a single document owner, the wiki harmonized the efforts of many contributors and established an automated revision control system. As the group adapted to the wiki, the usefulness of this single portal for information became apparent. It transformed into a useful data mining tool for EVA flight controllers and instructors, and also for hundreds of other NASA and contract employees. Program managers, engineers, astronauts, flight directors, and flight controllers in differing disciplines now have an easier-to-use, searchable system to find EVA data. This paper presents the benefits the EVA Wiki has brought to NASA's EVA community, as well as the cultural challenges it had to overcome.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has developed and matured many technologies over the decades to advance extravehicular activity (EVA) systems. Over the last 15 years, major steps were taken to advance the technology with the Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU) government reference design at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) in Houston, Texas. The xEMU builds on the lessons learned of the Apollo, Space Shuttle, and International Space Station (ISS) EMUs, evolving the technology to increase performance for extreme environments. As NASA sets its goals toward Earth’s Moon and Mars, a spacesuit design tolerable of gravity and dust will be needed for these adverse environments. NASA has used roadmaps as the means of documenting actionable plans for strategizing technology developments needed to meet NASA’s mission and goals. To help reach and create a sustained presence on the Moon, NASA procured EVA services from industry through the Exploration EVA Services (xEVAS) contract. These services include certified contractor-provided spacesuits, tools, equipment, vehicle interfaces, and support to training and real-time operations. NASA will now focus on a mission to Mars. NASA leadership has set goals and objectives related to the Agency’s vision and a Moon to Mars (M2M) strategy. This paper presents an organizational framework to provide insight into how NASA’s vision is realized. Additionally, this paper covers the maturation and development of the spacesuit technology and reveals the EVA technology roadmaps for the M2M Program. These EVA roadmaps visualize an actionable path to EVA capabilities needed for Mars exploration.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has developed and matured many technologies over the decades to advance extravehicular activity (EVA) systems. Over the last 15 years, major steps were taken to advance the technology with the Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU) government reference design at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) in Houston, Texas. The xEMU builds on the lessons learned of the Apollo, Space Shuttle, and International Space Station (ISS) EMUs, evolving the technology to increase performance for extreme environments. As NASA sets its goals toward Earth’s Moon and Mars, a spacesuit design tolerable of gravity and dust will be needed for these adverse environments. NASA has used roadmaps as the means of documenting actionable plans for strategizing technology developments needed to meet NASA’s mission and goals. To help reach and create a sustained presence on the Moon, NASA procured EVA services from industry through the Exploration EVA Services (xEVAS) contract. These services include certified contractor-provided spacesuits, tools, equipment, vehicle interfaces, and support to training and real-time operations. NASA will now focus on a mission to Mars. NASA leadership has set goals and objectives related to the Agency’s vision and a Moon to Mars (M2M) strategy. This paper presents an organizational framework to provide insight into how NASA’s vision is realized. Additionally, this paper covers the maturation and development of the spacesuit technology and reveals the EVA technology roadmaps for the M2M Program. These EVA roadmaps visualize an actionable path to EVA capabilities needed for Mars exploration.
Understanding how to effectively train for Extravehicular Activities (EVAs) for Artemis missions is critical. Developing high-fidelity simulation environments is important for Artemis mission preparation. Because the actual Lunar exploration environment cannot be fully replicated on Earth, it is paramount to determine where and how to properly train the Artemis team. Tasked by the new Extravehicular Activity and Human Surface Mobility Program(EHP), a team of stakeholders from engineering, flight operations, human health and performance, astromaterials and science, and the crew office worked together to perform EVAs in 3 simulated lunar environments. The overall focus for this test series was developing the capability to perform Artemis simulated EVAs in high-fidelity, full-scale environments. This test series was broken into 3 distinct tests titled after the EHP integrated test team: Joint EVA Test Team (JETT). The test locations are planned to serve as Artemis training sites and were selected because of their relevance to the expected Artemis Lunar terrain. JETT1was conducted near Kilbourne Holeby El Paso, Texas and focused on hardware development and checkout. JETT2 was conducted in the Icelandic Highlands and began the transition towards EVA concept operations(con-ops), risks and technology.JETT3 was conducted near SP Crater by Flagstaff Arizona and focused on simulating the Artemis III mission with a simulated Houston based Flight Control Team (FCT) and a Science Mission Directorate (SMD) science team. All three JETT tests utilized the Excon mockup space suit. The Excon mockup suit is a light-weight, unpressurized Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU)simulator. While it cannot replicate the feel of working within a pressurized suit, it does introduce similar volume constraints and some of the mobility programing to simulate the user experience in the xEMU. Overall, the JETT testing was able to create a simulated Lunar EVA and have two subjects perform full scale operations in line with Artemis III mission expectations. Future work is planned to continue to improve the simulation quality of Lunar EVA simulations.
Spacewalkers enjoy a view of Earth once reserved for Apollo, Zeus, and other denizens of Mt. Olympus. During humanity's first extravehicular activity (EVA), Alexei Leonov floated above Gibraltar, the rock ancient seafarers saw as the gateway to the great unknown Atlantic. The symbolism was clear, Leonov stepped past a new Gibraltar when he stepped into space. More than 32 years and 154 EVAs later, Jerry Linenger conducted an EVA with Vladimir Tsibliyev as part of International Space Station Phase 1. They floated together above Gibraltar. Today the symbolism has new meaning: humanity is starting to think of stepping out of Earth orbit, space travel's new Gibraltar, and perhaps obtaining a new olympian view, a close-up look at Olympus Mons on Mars. Walking to Olympus: An EVA Chronology chronicles the 154 EVAs conducted from March 1965 to April 1997. It is intended to make clear the crucial role played by EVA in the history of spaceflight, as well as to chronicle the large body of EVA "lessons learned." Russia and the U.S. define EVA differently. Russian cosmonauts are said to perform EVA any time they are in vacuum in a space suit. A U.S. astronaut must have at least his head outside his spacecraft before he is said to perform an EVA. The difference is based in differing spacecraft design philoso- phies. Russian and Soviet spacecraft have always had a specialized airlock through which the EVA cosmonaut egressed, leaving the main habitable volume of the spacecraft pressurized. The U.S. Gemini and Apollo vehicles, on the other hand, depressurized their entire habitable volume for egress. In this document, we apply the Russian definition to Russian EVAS, and the U.S. definition to U.S. EVAS. Thus, for example, Gemini 4 Command Pilot James McDivitt does not share the honor of being first American spacewalker with Ed White, even though he was suited and in vacuum when White stepped out into space. Non-EVA spaceflights are listed in the chronology to provide context and to display the large num- ber of flights in which EVA played a role. This approach also makes apparent significant EVA gaps, for example, the U.S. gap between 1985 and 1991 following the Challenger accident. This NASA History Monograph is an edited extract from an extensive EVA Chronology and Reference Book being produced by the EVA Project Office, NASA Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas. The larger work will be published as part of the NASA Formal Series in 1998. The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance rendered by Max Ary, Ashot Bakunts, Gert-Jan Bartelds, Frank Cepollina, Andrew Chaikin, Phillip Clark, Richard Fullerton, Steven Glenn, Linda Godwin, Jennifer Green, Greg Harris, Clifford Hess, Jeffrey Hoffman, David Homan, Steven Hopkins, Nicholas Johnson, Eric Jones, Neville Kidger, Joseph Kosmo, Alexei Lebedev, Mark Lee, James LeBlanc, Dmitri Leshchenskii, Jerry Linenger, Igor Lissov, James McBarron, Clay McCullough, Joseph McMann, Story Musgrave, Dennis Newkirk, James Oberg, Joel Powell, Lee Saegesser, Andy Salmon, Glen Swanson, Joseph Tatarewicz, Kathy Thornton, Chris Vandenberg, Charles Vick, Bert Vis, David Woods, Mike Wright, John Young, and Keith Zimmerman. Special thanks to Laurie Buchanan, John Charles, Janet Kovacevich, Joseph Loftus, Sue McDonald, Martha Munies, Colleen Rapp, and Jerry Ross. Any errors remain the responsibility of the authors.
Forearm muscle fatigue is one of the major limiting factors affecting endurance during performance of deep-space extravehicular activity (EVA) by crew members. Magnetic resonance (MR) provides in vivo noninvasive analysis of tissue level metabolism and fluid exchange dynamics in exercised forearm muscles through the monitoring of proton magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and phosphorus magnetic resonance spectroscopy (P-31-MRS) parameter variations. Using a space glove box and EVA simulation protocols, we conducted a preliminary MRS/MRI study in a small group of human test subjects during submaximal exercise and recovery and following exhaustive exercise. In assessing simulated EVA-related muscle fatigue and function, this pilot study revealed substantial changes in the MR image longitudinal relaxation times (T2) as an indicator of specific muscle activation and proton flux as well as changes in spectral phosphocreatine-to-phosphate (PCr/Pi) levels as a function of tissue bioenergetic potential.
Apollo 11 Commander Neil Armstrong and Lunar Module Pilot Edwin Aldrin, Jr., are seen on the surface of the Moon performing their extravehicular activities (EVAs).
The film depicts an extravehicular activity (EVA) that involved the assembly of six "space-weight" columns into a regular tetrahedral cell by a team of two "space"-suited test subjects. This cell represents the fundamental "element" of a tetrahedral truss structure. The tests were conducted under simulated zero-gravity conditions, achieved by neutral buoyancy in water. The cell was assembled on an "outrigger" assembly aid off the side of a mockup of the Shuttle Orbiter cargo bay. Both manual and simulated remote manipulator system (RMS) modes were evaluated. The simulated RMS was used only to transfer stowed hardware from the cargo bay to the work sites. Articulation limits of the pressure suit and zero gravity could be accommodated by work stations with foot restraints. The results of this study have confirmed that astronaut EVA assembly of large, erectable space structur is well within man's capabilities.
The topics are presented in viewgraph form and include: dextrous manipulator development (DMD), projected extravehicular activity (EVA) backlog, potential Special Purpose Dextrous Manipulator (SPDM) tasks, DMD Laboratory FY 1992-94, and program goals.