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At least 181 records · Page 10

Methodology for prioritizing cyber-vulnerable critical infrastructure equipment and mitigation strategies.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Cyber Security Division (NSCD), Control Systems Security Program (CSSP), contracted Sandia National Laboratories to develop a generic methodology for prioritizing cyber-vulnerable, critical infrastructure assets and the development of mitigation strategies for their loss or compromise. The initial project has been divided into three discrete deliverables: (1) A generic methodology report suitable to all Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource (CIKR) Sectors (this report); (2) a sector-specific report for Electrical Power Distribution; and (3) a sector-specific report for the water sector, including generation, water treatment, and wastewater systems. Specific reports for the water and electric sectors are available from Sandia National Laboratories.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

ORNL Trusted Corridors Project: Watts Bar Dam Inland Waterway Project

Radiation has existed everywhere in the environment since the Earth's formation - in rocks, soil, water, and plants. The mining and processing of naturally occurring radioactive materials for use in medicine, power generation, consumer products, and industry inevitably generate emissions and waste. Radiological measuring devices have been used by industry for years to measure for radiation in undesired locations or simply identify radioactive materials. Since the terrorist attacks on the United States on 9-11-01 these radiation measuring devices have proliferated in many places in our nation's commerce system. DOE, TVA, the Army Corps and ORNL collaborated to test the usefulness of these devices in our nation's waterway system on this project. The purpose of the Watts Bar Dam ORNL Trusted Corridors project was to investigate the security, safety and enforcement needs of local, state and federal government entities for state-of-the-art sensor monitoring in regards to illegal cargo including utilization of the existing infrastructure. TVA's inland waterways lock system is a recognized and accepted infrastructure by the commercial carrier industry. Safety Monitoring activities included tow boat operators, commercial barges and vessels, recreational watercraft and their cargo, identification of unsafe vessels and carriers, and, monitoring of domestic and foreign commercial vessels and cargo identification. Safety Enforcement activities included cargo safety, tracking, identification of hazardous materials, waterway safety regulations, and hazardous materials regulations. Homeland Security and Law Enforcement Applications included Radiological Dispersive Devices (RDD) identification, identification of unsafe or illicit transport of hazardous materials including chemicals and radiological materials, and screening for shipments of illicit drugs. In the Fall of 2005 the SensorNet funding for the project expired. After several unsuccessful attempts to find a Federal sponsor to continue with the project, the Watts Bar Dam Project was canceled and the Exploranium radiation monitors were removed from the doors of Watts Bar Dam in early 2006. The DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office decided to proceed with a Pilot building on the ORNL work performed at the TN and SC weigh stations in the highway sector of the Trusted Corridors project and eventually expanded it to other southern states under the name of Southeastern Corridor Pilot Project (SETCP). Many of the Phase I goals were achieved however real-world test data of private watercraft and barges was never obtained.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

A C. elegans -Based Foam for Rapid On-Site Detection of Residual Live Virus

In the response to and recovery from a critical homeland security event involving deliberate or accidental release of biological agents, initial decontamination efforts are necessarily followed by tests for the presence of residual live virus or bacteria. Such 'clearance sampling' should be rapid and accurate, to inform decision makers as they take appropriate action to ensure the safety of the public and of operational personnel. However, the current protocol for clearance sampling is extremely time-intensive and costly, and requires significant amounts of laboratory space and capacity. Detection of residual live virus is particularly problematic and time-consuming, as it requires evaluation of replication potential within a eukaryotic host such as chicken embryos. The intention of this project was to develop a new method for clearance sampling, by leveraging Sandia's expertise in the biological and material sciences in order to create a C. elegans -based foam that could be applied directly to the entire contaminated area for quick and accurate detection of any and all residual live virus by means of a fluorescent signal. Such a novel technology for rapid, on-site detection of live virus would greatly interest the DHS, DoD, and EPA, and hold broad commercial potential, especially with regard to the transportation industry.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

A Report on the Activities, Publications, and Pending Research of DHS/DOD Sponsored Post-doctoral Research Associate at Los Alamos National Laboratory

Since beginning at Los Alamos National Laboratory in February of 2012, I have been working as a DHS./DNDO Postdoctoral Research Associate under the mentorship of Lav Tandon and Khalil Spencer (NA-22 and mass spectrometry). The focus of my efforts, in addition to pursuing needed training and qualifications, has been the application of various instrumental approaches (e.g. Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry; TIMS) to a range of systems of interest in materials characterization and nuclear forensics. Research to be pursued in the coming months shall include the continued use of such approaches to advance current methods for: modified total evaporation, monitoring critical minor isotope systems, and chronometry. Each of the above points will be discussed.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Nevada National Security Site: Site-Directed Research and Development (Fiscal Year 2011 Annual Report)

This fiscal year 2011 annual report of the Site-Directed Research and Development program, the 10th anniversary edition, recognizes a full decade of innovative R&D accomplishments in support of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Last year the NNSS itself was renamed to reflect a diversifying mission, and our R&D program has contributed significantly to shape emerging missions that will continue to evolve. New initiatives in stockpile stewardship science, nonproliferation, and treaty verification and monitoring have had substantial successes in FY 2011, and many more accomplishments are expected. SDRD is the cornerstone on which many of these initiatives rest. Historically supporting our main focus areas, SDRD is also building a solid foundation for new, and non-traditional, emerging national security missions. The program continues its charter to advance science and technology for a broad base of agencies including the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and many others.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Visual Sample Plan (VSP) Statistical Software as Related to the CTBTO’s On-Site Inspection Procedure

In the event of a potential nuclear weapons test the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is commissioned to conduct an on-site investigation (OSI) of the suspected test site in an effort to find confirmatory evidence of the nuclear test. The OSI activities include collecting air, surface soil, and underground samples to search for indications of a nuclear weapons test - these indicators include radionuclides and radioactive isotopes Ar and Xe. This report investigates the capability of the Visual Sample Plan (VSP) software to contribute to the sampling activities of the CTBTO during an OSI. VSP is a statistical sampling design software, constructed under data quality objectives, which has been adapted for environmental remediation and contamination detection problems for the EPA, US Army, DoD and DHS among others. This report provides discussion of a number of VSP sample designs, which may be pertinent to the work undertaken during an OSI. Examples and descriptions of such designs include hot spot sampling, combined random and judgment sampling, multiple increment sampling, radiological transect surveying, and a brief description of other potentially applicable sampling methods. Further, this work highlights a potential need for the use of statistically based sample designs in OSI activities. The use of such designs may enable canvassing a sample area without full sampling, provide a measure of confidence that radionuclides are not present, and allow investigators to refocus resources in other areas of concern.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Inherently Safer Technology Gaps Analysis Study

This project consisted of an analysis of the current state of knowledge for improving safety regarding toxic industrial chemicals, including an examination of current and state-of-the-art techniques and technologies capable of increasing safety and security in production, transportation, storage, and use of hazardous chemicals. The primary goal was to improve national security through improved safety by providing a foundation for a comprehensive evaluation of the current state of knowledge surrounding the source and production methods of the “Release – Toxic” chemicals in DHS CFATS Appendix A list of chemicals of interest. Additionally, this project assisted in the data gathering and development of the CSAC IST Metrics. This involved an in-depth effort to understand specific chemical processes followed by a conceptual effort to redefine the Chemical Release Reduction Modifier that was included in the original Index.

Anstey, Mitchell R.↗

Receiver Operating Characteristic Analysis for Detecting Explosives-related Threats

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) are interested in developing a standardized testing procedure for determining the performance of candidate detection systems. This document outlines a potential method for judging detection system performance as well as determining if combining the information from a legacy system with a new system can significantly improve performance. In this document, performance corresponds to the Neyman-Pearson criterion applied to the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves of the detection systems in question. A simulation was developed to investigate how the amount of data provided by the vendor in the form of the ROC curve effects the performance of the combined detection system. Furthermore, the simulation also takes into account the potential effects of correlation and how this information can also impact the performance of the combined system.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Remediation Guidance for Major Airports after a Bioterrorist Attack

This document provides general guidelines for airport managers, local officials, and other stakeholders for developing a response and recovery plan for a major airport following the release of a biological warfare agent, with specific guidance for remediation. San Francisco International Airport was selected as the example airport during development of the guidance to illustrate specific details. The spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis was selected as the biological agent of primary concern because it is the most difficult of known bioterrorism agents to inactivate and is considered to be one of the agents most likely to be used as a biological weapon. The focus of the guidance is on cleanup and disposal activities associated with the Characterization, Decontamination, and Clearance Phases that are defined herein. Activities associated with the Notification and First-Response Phases are brieÀy discussed in Appendixes A and B, respectively. In addition to the main text of this Remediation Guidance document and associated appendixes, a data supplement was developed specifically for San Francisco International Airport. Requests for the data supplement must be made directly to the Emergency Planning Operations Division of San Francisco International Airport. This document does not describe public health responses to release of a biological warfare agent. If laboratory analytical results confirm the presence of a biological agent, the responsible public health agency involved in the response will commence appropriate public health actions, such as treatment (CDC 2004) and decontamination of potentially contaminated individuals, distribution of prophylaxis, and medical examinations. See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention web site for more information on emergency public health responses (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/). Effective communication with the media and the public is an essential component of airport remediation and recovery. Whereas such communication is beyond the scope of this document, many helpful resources are available. (See Section 1.1 for more information.) The concept of operations described in this document for cleanup of a Bacillus anthracis release at a major airport conforms to the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2008) and implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS 2004). In most cases, a Unified Command would be formed to direct the cleanup process jointly and to take ultimate responsibility for all cleanup decisions. The Unified Command would likely include the Airport Manager or Airport Emergency Operations Manager, representatives from state and local public health and emergency management agencies, and Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The Unified Command and Incident Command Staff would ideally be co-located in an Incident Command Post in an uncontaminated area of the airport. If a release is large or complex, co-location of all key players may not be possible. If a major incident is declared, a Principal Federal Official may be appointed by the Department of Homeland Security to facilitate Federal support to the Unified Command. In some facilities and jurisdictions, additional response plans or procedures (such as BioWatch or other emergency response plans, procedures, or protocols) may govern notification and first response. Facility personnel, responders, and emergency management coordinators should be aware of all applicable plans and procedures and how to implement them. Cleanups following the anthrax attacks of 2001 in the U.S. pre-dated the NRF and NIMS and did not make use of a NIMS Incident Command System as we know it today. Most Incident Commanders for the larger of those cleanups chose to convene a Technical Working Group (TWG) of multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, outside experts to advise in developing sampling and decontamination plans. Most of the Incident Commanders also convened a separate Environmental Clearance Committee (ECC) to independently review pre- and post decontamination sampling data as well as data on decontamination parameters, to evaluate whether the decontamination was effective, and to add credibility regarding a decision that decontaminated areas may be reoccupied. Use of such specialized technical expertise is strongly recommended, although it would now operate within the construct of the NIMS Incident Command System. The TWG, if convened, would act in an advisory capacity to the Environmental Unit within the Planning Section. Likewise, the ECC, if convened, would provide independent peer review of products and recommendations by the Environmental Unit. For maximum impartiality, the ECC could also provide recommendations directly to the Unified Command. Cleanup activities commence with site characterization. The principal goal of characterization is to define the extent of contamination and to gather information needed to design the decontamination approach. Initial sampling data collected by first responders are assessed to approximate the location(s) of contamination. Confirmation of the agent type and viability is obtained from a Laboratory Response Network laboratory. Additional characterization data are collected to determine the extent of contamination and where decontamination actions are needed. Areas suspected of being contaminated are contained and isolated to the degree possible to prevent further movement of an agent to uncontaminated areas or the environment, and to reduce the potential for future exposure from the agent or fumigant, if fumigation is needed. Agent air monitoring in areas adjacent to the contained contamination zones is done to ensure the protection of remediation personnel and to monitor any release from the contained zones. Various sampling approaches are considered. For example, wipe samples can be used to sample hard, nonporous surfaces. Swab samples can be used to sample nooks, crannies, joints, and seams. Appendix I is a template for preparing an incident-specific, operational characterization plan. Upon completion of the characterization plan, an internal review is initiated. Upon approval of the plan by the Unified Command, characterization commences. The Site Safety Officer develops a Health and Safety Plan to ensure that coordinated health and safety measures are in place for all responding personnel. This plan describes physical, chemical, and biological hazards at the site, personal protective equipment, personal decontamination procedures, and emergency procedures to be used by sampling and remediation personnel. An incident-specific Remediation Action Plan is developed, which describes the decontamination methods to be used and other details, including waste disposal. Under NIMS, this overall plan, as well as other plans described below, are implemented through a series of standardized, shorter-term Incident Action Plans, which describe specific activities that will take place during a shift or a day. The template in Appendix J is designed to facilitate preparation of the Remediation Action Plan. If fumigation will be done, a Sampling and Analysis Plan will be needed, as well as an Ambient Air Monitoring Plan, which can be a component of the Remediation Action Plan. These three plans are needed to obtain a crisis exemption from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for authorized use of an unregistered sterilant or pesticide during cleanup. If pesticide products become registered for inactivation of B. anthracis in the future, the three plans will likely be required by the product’s labeling, but the plans would no longer be submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for approval; rather, the Incident Commander would approve them. If fumigation is used, an Emergency Response Plan is also recommended, although such a plan is not required for a crisis exemption. For some nonpersistent biological warfare agents, natural attenuation may be an adequate decontamination option. In cases where contamination is not extensive or an agent is not persistent, application of surface decontaminants or other methods of medical infection control may be effective. For extensive contamination by persistent agents, such as Bacillus anthracis, fumigation may be necessary. In those cases, the Decontamination Phase commences with source reduction, such as pre-cleaning surfaces to reduce the contaminant load. To expedite cleanup and prevent costs from escalating unnecessarily, a cost–benefit analysis should be incorporated in the decision process related to retention versus disposal of facility items and materials. Certain materials and structural components can be decontaminated for reuse, but it may not be feasible or cost-effective to decontaminate other items. Those items must be pre-treated, packaged (with the package decontaminated externally), and removed for disposal as waste. Site preparation includes sealing openings to prevent leaks and setting up equipment. Decontamination reagents and delivery systems are selected, and pre-testing all systems is done before carrying out chemical treatment(s). The important choice of decontamination technologies depends on characteristics of the agent, the nature and extent of contamination, and other site parameters identified during characterization. Decontamination-related decisions can have a major impact on waste-disposal costs, and it is necessary to develop a disposal plan that identifies a means of disposal, necessary approvals, transportation, and other details. A clearance strategy is developed to ensure that after decontamination, the risk of exposure to residual contamination is negligible. A clearance sampling plan is developed, which sets clearance criteria, specifies how to determine whether the criteria have been met, and describes how and where to collect clearance samples after decontamination. In most cases, clearance sampling includes both surface and aggressive air samples. Appendix K is a clearance plan template that identifies the types of required information. To determine whether the decontaminated area may be reoccupied, the Environmental Unit (and the ECC separately, if one is convened) evaluates the results of clearance samples. For the anthrax incidents to date, and given methods that have been used, cleanup was considered successful only when there was no growth of B. anthracis cultured from any environmental samples taken after decontamination. Other factors that will be considered include the decontamination process parameters (e.g., temperature, relative humidity, decontaminant concentration, and contact time) and the results from post-decontamination culture of biological indicators that may have been used during fumigation or sterilization processes. From such an evaluation the Environmental Unit or ECC, or both, recommend whether the area may be reoccupied, or whether further decontamination is necessary. The UC makes the final decision that a facility is appropriately decontaminated for reoccupancy. The facility owner or responsible public health agency makes the final decision to reopen a decontaminated facility. A theme that is emphasized throughout this document is that many activities can greatly reduce the time required to restore airport operations if those activities are conducted prior to an actual release of biological warfare agent. A summary of specific resources (such as Federal, state, and local agency contacts; contractors; prospective team members; subject-matter experts; laboratory facilities; and other entities) that should be identified in advance by airport officials is provided in each pertinent section of this document, and summary contact lists of such resources are provided in Appendix L. A summary of overall pre-planning actions that should be completed by airport officials is presented at the end of this document.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Resilience Measurement Index: An Indicator of Critical Infrastructure Resilience

The world faces numerous threats from both natural and man-made sources. Since the beginning of the 21 st century, in the United States alone, we have experienced several devastating events. Incidents such as the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, the Northeast blackout in 2003, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and Superstorm Sandy in 2012 have had far-reaching impacts that have directly affected our society’s well-being. Although current efforts that have focused on preventing or mitigating the impact of incidents have achieved admirable results, a more comprehensive approach is needed to improve the nation’s overall resilience. An all-hazards methodology that emphasizes not only protection but also preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery programs and capabilities is desired. Presidential Policy Directive 21 defines 16 critical infrastructure sectors that are essential to the nation’s security, public health and safety, economic vitality, and general quality of life (White House, 2013). If the operations of these critical infrastructure sectors are essential, their protection and resilience is paramount. As stated by President Obama, “Our goal is to ensure a more resilient Nation—one in which individuals, communities, and our economy can adapt to changing conditions as well as withstand and rapidly recover from disruption due to emergencies” (Department of Homeland Security, 2010a). Enhancing the resilience of critical infrastructure requires its owners/operators to determine the ability of the system to withstand specific threats, minimize or mitigate potential impacts, and to return to normal operations if degradation occurs. Thus, a resilience methodology requires the comprehensive assessment of critical infrastructure systems/assets—from threat to consequence. The methodology needs to support decision-making for risk management, disaster response, and business continuity. Considering these issues, the Infrastructure Assurance Center at Argonne National Laboratory, in partnership with the Protective Security Coordination Division of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has developed an index, the Resilience Measurement Index (RMI), to characterize the resilience of critical infrastructure.

Petit, F. D. P.↗

The future of infrastructure security :

Sandia National Laboratories hosted a workshop on the future of infrastructure security on February 27-28, 2013, in Albuquerque, NM. The 17 participants came from backgrounds as diverse as federal policy, the insurance industry, infrastructure management, and technology development. The purpose of the workshop was to surface key issues, identify directions forward, and lay groundwork for cross-sectoral and cross-disciplinary collaborations. The workshop addressed issues such as the problem space (what is included in infrastructure problems?), the general types of threats to infrastructure (such as acute or chronic, system-inherent or exogenously imposed) and definitions of secure and resilient infrastructures. The workshop concluded with a consideration of stakeholders and players in the infrastructure world, and identification of specific activities that could be undertaken by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other players.

Garcia, Pablo↗

BioCat 2.0

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) was established in 2008 with a primary mission to “(1) enhance the capability of the Federal Government to (A) rapidly identify, characterize, localize, and track a biological event of national concern by integrating and analyzing data relating to human health, animal, plant, food, and environmental monitoring systems (both national and international); and (B) disseminate alerts and other information to Member Agencies and, in coordination with (and where possible through) Member Agencies, to agencies of State, local, and tribal governments, as appropriate, to enhance the ability of such agencies to respond to a biological event of national concern; and (2) oversee development and operation of the National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS).” Inherent in its mission then and the broader NBIS, NBIC is concerned with the identification, understanding, and use of a variety of biosurveillance models and systems. The goal of this project is to characterize, evaluate, classify, and catalog existing disease forecast and prediction models that could provide operational decision support for recognizing a biological event having a potentially significant impact. Additionally, gaps should be identified and recommendations made on using disease models in an operational environment to support real-time decision making.

biosurveillance↗

Economics definitions, methods, models, and analysis procedures for Homeland Security applications.

This report gives an overview of the types of economic methodologies and models used by Sandia economists in their consequence analysis work for the National Infrastructure Simulation & Analysis Center and other DHS programs. It describes the three primary resolutions at which analysis is conducted (microeconomic, mesoeconomic, and macroeconomic), the tools used at these three levels (from data analysis to internally developed and publicly available tools), and how they are used individually and in concert with each other and other infrastructure tools.

Ehlen, Mark Andrew↗

2013 LLNL Nuclear Forensics Summer Program

The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Nuclear Forensics Summer Program is designed to give both undergraduate and graduate students an opportunity to come to LLNL for 8–10 weeks for a hands-on research experience. Students conduct research under the supervision of a staff scientist, attend a weekly lecture series, interact with other students, and present their work in poster format at the end of the program. Students also have the opportunity to meet staff scientists one-on-one, participate in LLNL facility tours (e.g., the National Ignition Facility and Center for Accelerator Mass Spectrometry) to gain a better understanding of the multi-disciplinary, on going science at LLNL. Currently called the Nuclear Forensics Summer Program, this program began 13 years ago as the Actinide Sciences Summer Program. The program is run within the Glenn T. Seaborg Institute in the Physical and Life Sciences Directorate at LLNL. The goal of the Nuclear Forensics Summer Program is to facilitate the training of the next generation of nuclear scientists and engineers to solve critical national security problems in the field of nuclear forensics and have the student experience conducting research at the Lab. We select students who are majoring in physics, chemistry, geology, mathematics, nuclear engineering, chemical engineering and environmental sciences. Students engage in research projects in the disciplines of actinide chemistry, radiochemistry, isotopic analysis, computational analysis, radiation detection, and nuclear engineering in order to strengthen the “pipeline” for future scientific disciplines critical to DHS (DNDO), NNSA.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Advancing Aviation Security

Air travel is a popular mode of transportation. Each year, more than 600 million people board U.S. flights for business or pleasure. As demonstrated on 9/11, a coordinated terrorist strike on commercial airlines has devastating consequences where many lives could be lost and the nation’s economy could be crippled. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has worked diligently to enhance security at airports and on flights so that people and cargo can continue to move freely. Today, all passengers and every piece of checked or carry-on luggage are screened before they are permitted on an aircraft. X-ray systems and walk-through metal detectors allow security personnel to identify dangerous metal objects, such as guns and knives. A more complex problem is the detection of explosives, where detection technologies such as multiple-energy X-ray radiography, computed tomography (CT), full body scanners using millimeter wave and X-ray backscatter and other techniques are used to screen for explosives hidden in luggage, in cargo and on the people boarding the aircraft. Scientists and engineers at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) are working with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), Explosives Division (EXD) to help improve aviation security by evaluating and enhancing the performance of next-generation explosives detection technologies. LLNL is providing subject matter expertise to TSA for their multi-billion dollar procurements of explosive detection system (EDS) for the nation’s airports and provides recommendations for process and system improvements. To further improve aviation security, EXD is funding research at LLNL to develop advanced explosives detection technologies that can more accurately discriminate between a wide range of explosives and non-threat materials. One challenge with scanning for explosives is that some nonthreatening materials share similar characteristics with actual threats, leading to false positives or false alarms. When an alarm is generated, security personnel must review the scan images to clear the alarm or manually open and verify the bag’s contents, which can increase labor costs and lead to passenger delays. The Livermore efforts currently focus on CT-based applications. First developed for the medical field as a method for diagnosing disease, X-ray CT has become instrumental in various industrial Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) applications. Explosives detection equipment that incorporates CT uses a broad-spectrum X-ray beam to capture projections of an object, in particular, the objects inside a piece of luggage. The CT system then applies complex reconstruction algorithms to the projections to produce a three-dimensional representation of the luggage and its contents. Automated threat-detection algorithms (also referred to as threat-recognition algorithms) further process the images to separate each item and flag potential threats for further review (see Figure 1). Transportation security officers can then examine these images and the relevant data to determine whether further interrogation is needed. LLNL has also performed research on advanced X-ray carry-on bag inspection systems and is helping to better understand the performance of X-ray backscatter and millimeter wave passenger screening systems.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Simulating Small-Scale Experiments of In-Tunnel Airblast Using STUN and ALE3D

This report details continuing validation efforts for the Sphere and Tunnel (STUN) and ALE3D codes. STUN has been validated previously for blast propagation through tunnels using several sets of experimental data with varying charge sizes and tunnel configurations, including the MARVEL nuclear driven shock tube experiment (Glenn, 2001). The DHS-funded STUNTool version is compared to experimental data and the LLNL ALE3D hydrocode. In this particular study, we compare the performance of the STUN and ALE3D codes in modeling an in-tunnel airblast to experimental results obtained by Lunderman and Ohrt in a series of small-scale high explosive experiments (1997).

42 ENGINEERING↗