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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Automated Waterbox Inspection for Nuclear Power Plants Using Computer Vision - Based Change Detection

Nuclear power plant waterboxes require regular inspection for leaks, missing components, and structural damage during maintenance outages. Traditional manual inspection is time-consuming and poses safety risks from confined space entry. We developed an automated computer vision system for drone-based waterbox inspection in partnership with Florida Light and Power. Our approach uses feature detection and matching to identify critical changes between baseline and current inspection images, automatically flagging additions (leaks/debris), removals (missing plugs), and translations (displaced components) while compensating for drone movement and environmental variations. We systematically evaluated six feature matching methods, from classical approaches (SIFT+BF) to state-of-the-art neural networks (SuperPoint+SuperGlue), using both standard benchmarks (HPatches) and waterbox-specific validation with real-world augmentations. SuperPoint+SuperGlue achieved superior performance with 7.82 pixels RMSE and 100% success rate—2.8x better accuracy than our baseline. While the pre-trained model has commercial licensing restrictions for nuclear deployment, our findings validate this architecture for custom training. We implemented a real-time GUI demonstrating the SIFT+BF approach for immediate deployment, processing drone feeds at 30 FPS with color-coded change visualization. Future work includes training a custom SuperPoint+SuperGlue model on waterbox data and integrating Vision-Language Models for automated reporting and maintenance guidance.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗
DOE OSTI2022

Performance Monitoring Program: Developing Comparative Metrics for Fitness-for-Duty Programs

To comply with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations, licensees and entities authorized under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 26 Section 26.3 (§ 26.3) are required to have fitness-for-duty (FFD) programs. Under § 26.3, the expectation of these FFD programs is to provide reasonable assurance that individuals who are granted unescorted access to nuclear power reactor protected areas and Category I fuel cycle facility material control areas are trustworthy, will perform their tasks in a reliable manner, are not under the influence of any substance, legal or illegal, that may impair their ability to perform their duties, and are not mentally or physically impaired from any cause that can adversely affect their ability to safely and competently perform their duties. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) was tasked with developing a performance monitoring program to risk inform NRC inspection and policy regarding quantitative FFD performance data. To meet this need, PNNL developed methodologies that could be implemented within a performance monitoring program. Throughout this report, these methodologies are referred to as comparative metrics. The NRC provided PNNL with 2016–2019 data from annual reporting forms and single positive test forms provided by licensees and other entities. For most of the comparative metrics, the analyses required customized processing, such as creating filtering fields, adding data fields and summaries, and joining datasets. The comparative metrics developed include: random testing rate, random policy violation rate, pre-access policy violation rate, subversion attempt rate, and number of policy violations by labor category. The comparative metrics can be used for parsing and visualizing FFD program data and monitoring FFD performance at the labor category, facility, licensee, and industry levels to risk inform NRC inspection and policy with regard to the FFD data currently collected from licensees and other entities that implement Part 26 requirements. Furthermore, these developed comparative metrics allow a more in-depth look at the FFD programs for the industry to discern trends and patterns that may warrant changes at an industry level and to inform policy decisions. These analyses should be refreshed as new FFD data become available.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Datasets and U-Net Model for "A Deep Learning Based Framework to Identify Undocumented Orphaned Oil and Gas Wells from Historical Maps: a Case Study for California and Oklahoma"

This dataset has results and the model associated with the publication Ciulla et al., (2024). It contains a U-Net semantic segmentation model (unet_model.h5) and associated code implemented in tensorflow 2.0 for the model training and identification of oil and gas well symbols in USGS historical topographic maps (HTMC). Given a quadrangle map (7.5 minutes), downloadable at this url: https://ngmdb.usgs.gov/topoview/, and a list of coordinates of the documented wells present in the area, the model returns the coordinates of oil and gas symbols in the HTMC maps. For reproducibility of our workflow, we provide a sample map in California and the documented well locations for the entire State of California (CalGEM_AllWells_20231128.csv) downloaded from https://www.conservation.ca.gov/calgem/maps/Pages/GISMapping2.aspx. Additionally, the locations of 1,301 potential undocumented orphaned wells identified using our deep learning framework or the counties of Los Angeles and Kern in California, and Osage and Oklahoma in Oklahoma are provided in the file found_potential_UOWs.zip. The results of the visual inspection of satellite imagery in Osage County is in the file visible_potential_UOWs.zip. The dataset also includes a custom tool to validate the detected symbols in the HTMC maps (vetting_tool.py). More details about the methodology can be found in the associated paper: Ciulla, F., Santos, A., Jordan, P., Kneafsey, T., Biraud, S.C., and Varadharajan, C. (2024) A Deep Learning Based Framework to Identify Undocumented Orphaned Oil and Gas Wells from Historical Maps: a Case Study for California and Oklahoma. Accepted for publication in Environmental Science and Technology. The geographical coordinates provided correspond to the locations of potential undocumented orphaned oil and gas wells (UOWs) extracted from historical maps. The actual presence of wells need to be confirmed with on-the-ground investigations. For your safety, do not attempt to visit or investigate these sites without appropriate safety training, proper equipment, and authorization from local authorities. Approaching these well sites without proper personal protective equipment (PPE) may pose significant health and safety risks. Oil and gas wells can emit hazardous gasses including methane, which is flammable, odorless and colorless, as well as hydrogen sulfide, which can be fatal even at low concentrations. Additionally, there may be unstable ground near the wellhead that may collapse around the wellbore. This dataset was prepared as an account of work sponsored by the United States Government. While this document is believed to contain correct information, neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor the Regents of the University of California, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by its trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof, or the Regents of the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof or the Regents of the University of California.

Artificial Intelligence↗
NASA NTRS2004

The Office of Inspector General (OIG)

The NASA Office of Inspector General is the Federal Law Enforcement Agency at NASA which conducts criminal and regulatory investigations in which NASA is a victim. The OIG prevents and detects crime, fiaud, waste and abuse and assists NASA management in promoting economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in its programs and operations. Investigations (OI) and the Office of Audits (OA). The investigations side deals with criminal Investigations, administrative investigations, and civil investigations. The Audits side deals with inspections and assessments as well as the Auditing of NASA Programs and Activities. Our mission at the OIG is to conduct and supervise independent and objective audits and investigations relating to agency programs and operations; to promote economy, effectiveness and efficiency within the agency; to prevent and detect crime, fraud, waste and abuse in agency programs and operations; to review and make recommendations regarding existing and proposed legislation and regulations relating to agency programs and operations. We are also responsible for keeping the agency head and the Congress fully and currently informed of problems in agency programs and operations. deal with False Claims, False Statements, Conspiracy, Theft, Computer Crime, Mail Fraud, the Procurement Integrity Act, the Anti-Kickback Act, as well as noncompliance with NASA Management Instructions, the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), and the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Most of the casework that is dealt with in our office is generated through gum shoe work or cases that we generate on our own. These cases can come from Law Enforcement Referrals, GIDEP Reports, EPlMS (NASA Quality System), Defense Contract Audit Agency, Newspaper Articles, and Confidential Information. In many cases, confidentiality is the biggest factor to informants coming forward. We are able to maintain confidentiality because the 01 is independent of NASA Management and doesn t report to the Center Directors, therefore the informant s mangers and supervisors are unaware of the informants actions. The only time when an informant s confidentiality may be compromised is when it is needed in a Court of Law and is released through a Judicial Court Order. During my tenure here at the NASA OIG/OI at Glenn Research Center, I have been involved in many different tasks. They have ranged from updating Suspected Unapproved Parts case files to independently interviewing NASA employees to turn up general background information. The 01 has the duty of informing NASA aeronautical safety managers of potential Nonconforming products. My mission is to compile a database of Nonconformance reports for distribution. The background information that I turn up from my interviews is then used to determine NASA s susceptibility to acceptance of unapproved parts. The IG organization is divided up into two separate disciplines, the Office of 01 investigations primarily focus on violations of Federal laws. Some of these violations

Macisco, Christopher A.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Identifying Trends in Deep Space Network Monitor Data

A computer program has been developed that analyzes Deep Space Network monitor data, looking for changes of trends in critical parameters. This program represents a significant improvement over the previous practice of manually plotting data and visually inspecting the resulting graphs to identify trends. This program uses proven numerical techniques to identify trends. When a statistically significant trend is detected, then it is characterized by means of a symbol that can be used by pre-existing model-based reasoning software. The program can perform any of the following functions: Given an expectation that data in a given list should exhibit an upward, downward, constant, or unknown trend, it can determine whether the data do or do not follow such a trend. Given a list of data, it can identify which of the aforementioned trends the data follow. Given two lists of data, it can determine whether or not both follow the same trend. This program can be executed on a variety of computers. It can be distributed in either source code or binary code form. It must be run in conjunction with any one of a number of Lisp compilers that are available commercially or as shareware.

James, Mark↗
NASA NTRS2008

NASA Tech Briefs, October 2008

Topics covered include: Control Architecture for Robotic Agent Command and Sensing; Algorithm for Wavefront Sensing Using an Extended Scene; CO2 Sensors Based on Nanocrystalline SnO2 Doped with CuO; Improved Airborne System for Sensing Wildfires; VHF Wide-Band, Dual-Polarization Microstrip-Patch Antenna; Onboard Data Processor for Change-Detection Radar Imaging; Using LDPC Code Constraints to Aid Recovery of Symbol Timing; System for Measuring Flexing of a Large Spaceborne Structure; Integrated Formation Optical Communication and Estimation System; Making Superconducting Welds between Superconducting Wires; Method for Thermal Spraying of Coatings Using Resonant-Pulsed Combustion; Coating Reduces Ice Adhesion; Hybrid Multifoil Aerogel Thermal Insulation; SHINE Virtual Machine Model for In-flight Updates of Critical Mission Software; Mars Image Collection Mosaic Builder; Providing Internet Access to High-Resolution Mars Images; Providing Internet Access to High-Resolution Lunar Images; Expressions Module for the Satellite Orbit Analysis Program Virtual Satellite; Small-Body Extensions for the Satellite Orbit Analysis Program (SOAP); Scripting Module for the Satellite Orbit Analysis Program (SOAP); XML-Based SHINE Knowledge Base Interchange Language; Core Technical Capability Laboratory Management System; MRO SOW Daily Script; Tool for Inspecting Alignment of Twinaxial Connectors; An ATP System for Deep-Space Optical Communication; Polar Traverse Rover Instrument; Expert System Control of Plant Growth in an Enclosed Space; Detecting Phycocyanin-Pigmented Microbes in Reflected Light; DMAC and NMP as Electrolyte Additives for Li-Ion Cells; Mass Spectrometer Containing Multiple Fixed Collectors; Waveguide Harmonic Generator for the SIM; Whispering Gallery Mode Resonator with Orthogonally Reconfigurable Filter Function; Stable Calibration of Raman Lidar Water-Vapor Measurements; Bimaterial Thermal Compensators for WGM Resonators; Root Source Analysis/ValuStream[Trade Mark] - A Methodology for Identifying and Managing Risks; Ensemble: an Architecture for Mission-Operations Software; Object Recognition Using Feature-and Color-Based Methods; On-Orbit Multi-Field Wavefront Control with a Kalman Filter; and The Interplanetary Overlay Networking Protocol Accelerator.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2004

Toward Synthesis, Analysis, and Certification of Security Protocols

Implemented security protocols are basically pieces of software which are used to (a) authenticate the other communication partners, (b) establish a secure communication channel between them (using insecure communication media), and (c) transfer data between the communication partners in such a way that these data only available to the desired receiver, but not to anyone else. Such an implementation usually consists of the following components: the protocol-engine, which controls in which sequence the messages of the protocol are sent over the network, and which controls the assembly/disassembly and processing (e.g., decryption) of the data. the cryptographic routines to actually encrypt or decrypt the data (using given keys), and t,he interface to the operating system and to the application. For a correct working of such a security protocol, all of these components must work flawlessly. Many formal-methods based techniques for the analysis of a security protocols have been developed. They range from using specific logics (e.g.: BAN-logic [4], or higher order logics [12] to model checking [2] approaches. In each approach, the analysis tries to prove that no (or at least not a modeled intruder) can get access to secret data. Otherwise, a scenario illustrating the &tack may be produced. Despite the seeming simplicity of security protocols ("only" a few messages are sent between the protocol partners in order to ensure a secure communication), many flaws have been detected. Unfortunately, even a perfect protocol engine does not guarantee flawless working of a security protocol, as incidents show. Many break-ins and security vulnerabilities are caused by exploiting errors in the implementation of the protocol engine or the underlying operating system. Attacks using buffer-overflows are a very common class of such attacks. Errors in the implementation of exception or error handling can open up additional vulnerabilities. For example, on a website with a log-in screen: multiple tries with invalid passwords caused the expected error message (too many retries). but let the user nevertheless pass. Finally, security can be compromised by silly implementation bugs or design decisions. In a commercial VPN software, all calls to the encryption routines were incidentally replaced by stubs, probably during factory testing. The product worked nicely. and the error (an open VPN) would have gone undetected, if a team member had not inspected the low-level traffic out of curiosity. Also, the use secret proprietary encryption routines can backfire, because such algorithms often exhibit weaknesses which can be exploited easily (see e.g., DVD encoding). Summarizing, there is large number of possibilities to make errors which can compromise the security of a protocol. In today s world with short time-to-market and the use of security protocols in open and hostile networks for safety-critical applications (e.g., power or air-traffic control), such slips could lead to catastrophic situations. Thus, formal methods and automatic reasoning techniques should not be used just for the formal proof of absence of an attack, but they ought to be used to provide an end-to-end tool-supported framework for security software. With such an approach all required artifacts (code, documentation, test cases) , formal analyses, and reliable certification will be generated automatically, given a single, high level specification. By a combination of program synthesis, formal protocol analysis, certification; and proof-carrying code, this goal is within practical reach, since all the important technologies for such an approach actually exist and only need to be assembled in the right way.

Schumann, Johann↗
DOE OSTI2023

Manufacturing and Hydro Testing of a 10 MWe sCO2 Axial Turbine

Abstract Supercritical CO2 (sCO2) power cycles designed for thermodynamic efficiencies above 50% push component designs into pressure and temperature combinations that approach the limits of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and ASME Piping Design Codes with Turbine inlet conditions near 250 bar and 715 °C. These design conditions which limit available materials to high nickel alloys are compounded by the high fluid densities of sCO2 at these conditions which result in very compact machinery at the 10 MWe class which are currently being developed for the DOE supercritical transformational electric power (STEP) program. Design of the STEP Turbine is complete with integrated lessons learned from a previous 1 MWth subscale demonstration of a high temperature 10 MWe Turbine designed under the DOE SunShot Program. Fabrication of the STEP Turbine is nearing completion with all housings and pressure containing components in hand. This paper provides a detailed look at design intentions and limitations for the pressurized sections of the main pressure casing and the fabrication of key turbine components. Additional discussion is provided regarding postfabrication inspection and acceptance of the casing for use after issues with casing welds were identified late in the fabrication process.

Engineering↗
DOE OSTI2020

Validation of ORIGEN for VVER-440 Spent Fuel with Application to Fork Detector Safeguards Measurements

The US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) are collaborating with the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority in Finland to assess spent fuel verification methods for potential application to measurements at the planned spent fuel encapsulation plant and geological repository prior to final disposal in Finland. The fork detector (FDET) used to measure the neutron and gamma radiation from a given spent fuel assembly is an existing technology widely used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Euratom for the safeguards verification of spent fuel operator declaration. Recently, an FDET data analysis software, referred to as the ORIGEN module, was developed and incorporated into the IAEA/Euratom Integrated Review and Analysis Program. This module uses the ORIGEN burnup code to calculate the nuclide concentrations and the neutron and gamma source terms in the spent fuel based on operator declarations. Then, to predict the expected FDET signals for a given fuel assembly, the module combines the source terms calculated by ORIGEN with FDET response functions that were pre-generated using MCNP models. The inspector can compare the calculated signals to the measured values in real time to identify possible anomalies in fuel assembly’s operator declaration, integrity, or measurement. In this work, the capability of the ORIGEN module was extended from application to typical light water reactor fuels to use for VVER-440 assembly types. The accuracy of ORIGEN for this type of fuel assembly calculations was assessed by comparing calculated nuclide concentrations against destructive assay measurements for VVER-440 spent fuel. The performance of the ORIGEN module for FDET safeguards verification in routine inspections was assessed using FDET measurement data for 13 spent VVER-440 assemblies that were measured at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant in Finland, by comparing the calculated signals to the measured quantities. The results show that the calculated FDET neutron and gamma detector signals are generally within 12% of the measurements except for one assembly. Thus, these results are applicable to future safeguards verification in the planned Finland encapsulation plant, such as for passive neutron albedo reactivity safeguards measurements.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
NASA NTRS2020

A Summary of Airframe Results from a Fokker F28 Full-Scale Crash Test

On June 20, 2019, a full-scale crash test was conducted on a Fokker F28 MK1000 aircraft as a part of a joint NASA / Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) research effort to investigate the crashworthiness characteristics of a Transport Category Aircraft (TCA), as defined by 14 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 25. The test was conducted at NASA Langley Research Center’s Landing and Impact Research Facility and was the third in a test series to further understand TCA crashworthiness characteristics. The test article featured 24 Anthropomorphic Test Devices (ATDs, a.k.a. crash test dummies), and over 700 channels of instrumentation covering major aircraft structures such as the wings, tail, nose, cockpit and cabin, along with recording seat, overhead bin and ATD accelerations. Five different U.S. Government agencies collaborated on the test including: NASA, the FAA, the U.S. Army Research Laboratory, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). This report will covertest article build up, which includes weight and balance measurements and pre-test laser scans. It will also cover the events of the test, which includes the test sequence of events and post-test damage inspections. Finally, it will show airframe level accelerations at all positions measured, with discussion on correlation to the airframe damage witnessed. The test build up consisted of outfitting the main cabin section of the aircraft with 24 ATDs seated in 12 rows of seats, overhead mass and the under floor cargo area with foam representing the luggage. The main cabin also included all of the onboard data system pallets, which recorded711 channels of data from the test. All major portions of the aircraft were instrumented, including locations at the floor / frame junction locations in the cabin where the ATDs were located along with other major exterior components such as the nose, the tail, each engine cowling, and at overhead hat rack ballast locations. The aircraft impacted a soil surface at65.3 ft/s horizontal and 31.8 ft/s vertical velocities. The aircraft plowed through the soil and slid a distance of 32.5 feet from the initial impact location. There was a secondary impact occurring 0.9 s due to the “slap down” of the nose during the post-impact response. The duration of the event from impact to rest was1.62 seconds. There was major structural damage in the lower fuselage areas around the Wingbox and Aft Fuselage sections. The Aft Fuselage section deformation caused some cabin intrusion from the keel beams pushing the aft cabin floor into the cabin. Other structural deformations occurred around the tail and at transition regions in the aircraft structure; mainly in locations of differing overall stiffness. The data obtained showed average vertical accelerations between 12 and 16 g with spikes reaching almost 40 g at certain floor locations. Average horizontal accelerations were approximately 10 g for all floor locations measured with spikes reaching approximately 25 g in some locations. The report includes a full set of results on aircraft deformation and accelerations along with discussions as to the effect on the aircraft structure.

Justin D Littell↗
NASA NTRS1995

The AAMP5/AAMP-FV project

This presentation describes a project, formal verification of the microcode in the AAMP5 microprocessor, conducted to explore how formal techniques for specification and verification could be introduced into an industrial process. Sponsored by the Systems Validation Branch of NASA Langley and by Collins Commercial Avionics, a division of Rockwell International, it was conducted by Collins and the SRI International Computer Science Laboratory. The project consisted of specifying in the PVS language developed by SRI a portion of a Rockwell proprietary microprocessor, the AAMP5, at both the instruction set and register-transfer levels and using the PVS theorem prover to prove the microcode correct for a representative subset of instructions. While this presentation includes a brief technical overview, its emphasis is on the lessons learned in using PVS for an example of this size and the implications for using formal methods in an industrial setting. The central result of this project was to demonstrate the feasibility of formally specifying a commercial microprocessor and the use of mechanical proofs of correctness to verify microcode. This is particularly significant since the AAMP5 was not designed for formal verification, but to provide a more than three fold performance improvement, by pipelining instruction execution, while remaining object code compatible with the earlier AAMP2. As a consequence, the AAMP5 is one of the most complex microprocessors to which formal methods have been applied. Another key result was the discovery of both actual and seeded errors. Two actual microcode errors were discovered and corrected during development of the formal specification, illustrating the value of simply creating a precise specification. Two seeded errors were systematically uncovered while doing correctness proofs. One of these was an actual error that had been discovered after first fabrication but left in the microcode provided to SRI. The other error was designed to be unlikely to be detected by walkthroughs, testing, or simulation. Several other results emerged during the project, including the ease with which practicing engineers became comfortable with PVS, the need for libraries of general purpose theories, the usefulness of formal specification in revealing errors, the natural fit between formal specification and inspections, the difficulty of selecting the best style of specification for a new problem domain, the high level of assurance provided by proofs of correctness, and the need to engineer proof strategies for reuse.

Miller, Steven P.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Metrological and Spectral Characterization of the Aspera Flight Optics

Aspera is a NASA's Astrophysics Pioneers mission, led by the University of Arizona. The aim of this mission is to study the presence of hot gasses (T=10^5-10^6 K) in the circumgalactic medium (CGM) and how the flow of these gasses affects galactic formation. One key enabling technology in the Aspera optical system is the use of more efficient UV-reflective optical coatings particularly at around 103.2 nm where the O VI emission line is located . In order to meet radiometric effective area requirements, the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) code 551 Optics Branch applied Al (aluminum) + eLiF (enhanced lithium fluoride) on these optics, where the Al+LiF is annealed at elevated temperature (~250˚C) after the deposition and thus providing an improved version of the Al+LiF used in FUSE . Furthermore, these optics are encapsulated with a thin film of atomic layer deposited MgF2 at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory for enhanced durability . The efficiency and durability of these coatings depends on the quality of the optical surface in terms of cleanliness and roughness. Roughness increases the scatter off the coating and reduces the specular reflectance, and surface contaminants can accommodate moisture and other contaminants, increase scattering, and are weak points in the coating that may affect adhesion and subsequently the longevity of these coatings. Extensive optical metrology is necessary to minimize and quantify the impact of surface roughness and contaminants on optical surfaces. In this proceeding we report the inspection procedure implemented for Aspera optics at GSFC, from initial receiving of the optics to post-coating. Inspection includes Atomic Force Microscopy (AFM), Scanning White Light Interferometry (SWILI), Dark Field Microscopy (DFM), Phase Shifting Interferometry (PSI), and Vacuum ultraviolet (VUV) spectroscopy. Combinations of these techniques are used to inspect flight optics at each of the following steps: i) as-received, pre-cleaning inspection, ii) pre-coating, post-cleaning inspection, and iii) post-coating inspection. The evolution of roughness and other surface inspections such as contaminants are compared between each step to quantify the effect each step has on the flight optics. The final far ultraviolet (FUV) spectral performance of witness samples coated with the flight optics are presented.

Far Ultraviolet (FUV)↗
NASA NTRS2015

Software Validation via Model Animation

This paper explores a new approach to validating software implementations that have been produced from formally-verified algorithms. Although visual inspection gives some confidence that the implementations faithfully reflect the formal models, it does not provide complete assurance that the software is correct. The proposed approach, which is based on animation of formal specifications, compares the outputs computed by the software implementations on a given suite of input values to the outputs computed by the formal models on the same inputs, and determines if they are equal up to a given tolerance. The approach is illustrated on a prototype air traffic management system that computes simple kinematic trajectories for aircraft. Proofs for the mathematical models of the system's algorithms are carried out in the Prototype Verification System (PVS). The animation tool PVSio is used to evaluate the formal models on a set of randomly generated test cases. Output values computed by PVSio are compared against output values computed by the actual software. This comparison improves the assurance that the translation from formal models to code is faithful and that, for example, floating point errors do not greatly affect correctness and safety properties.

Dutle, Aaron M.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Fracture Mechanics Analysis of LH2 Feed Line Flow Liners

Inspections of the Space Shuttle Main Engine revealed fatigue cracks growing from slots in the flow liner of the liquid hydrogen (LH2) feed lines. During flight, the flow liners experience complex loading induced by flow of LH2 and the resonance characteristics of the structure. The flow liners are made of Inconel 718 and had previously not been considered a fracture critical component. However, fatigue failure of a flow liner could have catastrophic effect on the Shuttle engines. A fracture mechanics study was performed to determine if a damage tolerance approach to life management was possible and to determine the sensitivity to the load spectra, material properties, and crack size. The load spectra were derived separately from ground tests and material properties were obtained from coupon tests. The stress-intensity factors for the fatigue cracks were determined from a shell-dynamics approach that simulated the dominant resonant frequencies. Life predictions were obtained using the NASGRO life prediction code. The results indicated that adequate life could not be demonstrated for initial crack lengths of the size that could be detected by traditional NDE techniques.

James, Mark A.↗
DOE OSTI2023

Continuum Damage Mechanics Modeling of High-Temperature Flaw Propagation: Application to Creep Crack Growth In 316H Standardized Specimens and Nuclear Reactor Components

Predicting creep crack growth (CCG) of flaws found during operation in high-temperature alloy components is essential for assessing the remaining lifetime of those components. While defect assessment procedures are available for this purpose in design codes, these are limited in their range of applicability. This study assesses the application of a local damage-based finite-element methodology as a more general technique for the prediction of CCG at high temperatures on a variety of structural configurations. Numerical results for stainless steel 316H, which are validated against experimental data, show the promise of this approach. This integration of continuum damage mechanics (CDM) based methodologies, together with adequate inelastic models, into assessment procedures can therefore inform the characterization of CCG under complex operating conditions, while avoiding excessive conservatism. This article shows that such modeling frameworks can be calibrated to experimental data and used to demonstrate that the degree of tri-axiality ahead of a growing creep crack affects its rate of growth. The framework is also successfully employed in characterizing CCG in a realistic reactor pressure vessel geometry under an arbitrary loading condition. These results are particularly relevant to the nuclear power industry for defect assessment and inspections as part of codified practices of structural components with flaws in high-temperature reactors.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS2005

NASA Tech Briefs, August 2005

Topics include: Hidden Identification on Parts: Magnetic Machine-Readable Matrix Symbols; System for Processing Coded OFDM Under Doppler and Fading; Multipurpose Hyperspectral Imaging System; Magnetic-Flux-Compensated Voltage Divider; High-Performance Satellite/Terrestrial-Network Gateway; Internet-Based System for Voice Communication With the ISS; Stripline/Microstrip Transition in Multilayer Circuit Board; Dual-Band Feed for a Microwave Reflector Antenna; Quadratic Programming for Allocating Control Effort; Range Process Simulation Tool; Simulator of Space Communication Networks; Computing Q-D Relationships for Storage of Rocket Fuels; Contour Error Map Algorithm; Portfolio Analysis Tool; Glass Frit Filters for Collecting Metal Oxide Nanoparticles; Anhydrous Proton-Conducting Membranes for Fuel Cells; Portable Electron-Beam Free-Form Fabrication System; Miniature Laboratory for Detecting Sparse Biomolecules; Multicompartment Liquid-Cooling/Warming Protective Garments; Laser Metrology for an Optical-Path-Length Modulator; PCM Passive Cooling System Containing Active Subsystems; Automated Electrostatics Environmental Chamber; Estimating Aeroheating of a 3D Body Using a 2D Flow Solver; Artificial Immune System for Recognizing Patterns; Computing the Thermodynamic State of a Cryogenic Fluid; Safety and Mission Assurance Performance Metric; Magnetic Control of Concentration Gradient in Microgravity; Avionics for a Small Robotic Inspection Spacecraft; and Simulation of Dynamics of a Flexible Miniature Airplane.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2024

Digital-Twin-Enabling Technologies for Online Condition Monitoring of Nuclear Power Plant Components

Online condition monitoring is an area of active research that may enable optimized scheduling, maintenance, and safety of nuclear power plant components, reducing unnecessary derates while simultaneously improving operational capacity. Digital twins (DTs) are one avenue to conduct online condition monitoring and are currently being explored by national laboratories and universities alike. DTs for online condition monitoring are, in essence, state concurrent models that emulate a physical process which predicts a parameter and compares it against a measured value. A DT’s goal is to provide additional insights by combining and interpreting various sources of information for preventative maintenance scheduling optimization or early fault detection. DTs for condition monitoring are projected to be valuable for meeting requirements under 10 CFR 50.55a, “Codes and Standards,” and 10 CFR 50.65, “Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants”. However, DT technologies are still under significant development, and the process for developing a DT for condition monitoring has not been formalized. Therefore, in this work, we present an initial framework for developing a DT, discuss and review the various challenges and considerations for DT deployment, and identify the opportunities that a DT can improve. The presented framework is intended to help developers formulate a strategy when approaching DT development for condition monitoring. In conclusion, a DT use case for a reactor coolant pump is presented to demonstrate the proposed framework.

advanced sensor instrumentation↗
DOE OSTI2024

In-line, High-Throughput Quality Monitoring for Fuel Cell and Electrolyzer Components Based on Transmission and Reflection Imaging

During the manufacturing of fuel cell and electrolyzer membranes and membrane electrode assemblies (MEAs), real-time, in-line, high-throughput optical-based quality monitoring methods are essential for detecting defects and monitoring thickness variations, thus improving the performance and increasing the durability of fuel cell and electrolyzer in the hydrogen industry. For the MEAs with very opaque coatings, optical transmission-based imaging has been developed and applied in the Roll-to-Roll system using a flashlight and a high-sensitivity CCD camera. We observed high signal-to-noise ratio images while the Roll-to-Roll system ran at 5 ft/min. The entire sample image could quickly be recovered from the discrete frames using customized Python codes for automatic frame cropping and stitching. We detected significant non-uniformities in our experimental MEAs specimen. For fuel cell and low-temperature electrolysis (LTE) transparent membranes, we used optical reflectance hyperspectral imaging with interference fringe-based thickness mapping. We set up a hyperspectral camera to measure various rolls of commercial membranes. The measurement results are analyzed to find the thickness distribution of each roll and to check for defects. Transmission and reflection imaging-based quality monitoring techniques demonstrated in this project can be widely used in the mass production environment to improve the production yield and performance of hydrogen devices.

DIRECT ENERGY CONVERSION,ENGINEERING↗