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Adapting Cost Estimation Models to New Approaches & Recommended Science Community Paths
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NASA Human Spaceflight Scenarios - Do All Our Models Still Say No?
Historically, NASA human spaceflight planning has included healthy doses of life cycle cost analysis. Planners put projects and their cost estimates in a budget context. Estimated costs became expected budgets. Regardless, real budgets rarely matched expectations. So plans would come and go as NASA canceled projects. New projects would arise and the cycle would begin again. Repeatedly, NASA schedule and performance ambitions come up against costs growing at double-digit rates while budgets barely rise a couple of percent a year. Significant skepticism greets proposed NASA programs at birth, as cost estimates for new projects are traditionally very high, and worse, far off the mark for those carried forward. In this environment the current "capability driven framework" for NASA human spaceflight evolved, where long term life cycle cost analysis are even viewed as possibly counter-productive. Here, a space exploration project, for example the Space Launch System, focuses on immediate goals. A life cycle is that of a project, not a program, and for only that span of time to a near term milestone like a first test launch. Unfortunately, attempting to avoid some pitfalls in long-term life cycle cost analysis breeds others. Government audits have noted that limiting the scope of cost analysis "does not provide the transparency necessary to assess long-term affordability" making it difficult to understand if NASA "is progressing in a cost-effective and affordable manner." Even in this short-term framework, NASA realizes the importance of long-term considerations, that it must "maximize the efficiency and sustainability of the Exploration Systems development programs", that this is "critical to free resources for re-investment...such as other required deep space exploration capabilities." Assuming the value of long-term life cycle cost analysis, where due diligence meets reconnaissance, and accepting past shortcomings, the work here approaches life cycle cost analysis for human spaceflight differently. 1) If costs have traditionally been so high that adding them up is discouraging, are there any new facts on the ground offering paths to significantly lower costs? 2) If NASA's spaceflight budget and process is an over-arching constraint, with its planning limitations favoring short-term outlooks, is there a way to step outside the budget box? 3) If life cycle answers have historically been too uncertain to be useful, is there a process where stakeholders gain valuable insights merely from emphasizing a common understanding around questions? We analyze the potential life cycle cost of assorted NASA human spaceflight architectures - an architecture as a sum of individual systems, working together. With the prior questions of high costs, limited budgets and uncertainties in mind, public private partnerships are central in these architectures. The cost data for current commercial public private partnerships is encouraging, as are cost estimates for future partnership approaches beyond low Earth orbit. Private capital, directly or indirectly, an ingredient of public private partnerships, may be a significant factor in finding a path around the limits of the NASA spaceflight budget. Also, understanding and reviewing the pros, cons and uncertainties of assorted architectures can assist in developing a common understanding around key questions as important if not more so than the numbers and answers. Lastly, a scenario planning technique is briefly explored that can mature a common understanding about the agencies situation at hand and how diverse stakeholders can go forward together. Scenario planning, rather than focusing on answers, places emphasis on stakeholders developing a common understanding about the future. Putting aside costs, this is especially true of questions about sustainability and growth, results, benefits and expectations. While efficiency exercises or analysis look to reduce resources in one place to apply them elsewhere, moving around slices in a pie, scenario planning can get at the heart of the matter, growing the pie, transforming it, and making the pieces relevant. Especially important is the question of sustainability for different scenarios in the broad sense of the word - not just the narrow ability to survive or continue, but also the ability to adapt, prosper and grow.
Estimating The Cost Of Developing Software
Software Cost Estimation Model program, SOFTCOST, developed to provide consistent automated resource-and-schedule mathematical model more formalized than guesswork model. Combines several software-cost models found in open literature into one comprehensive set of algorithms compensating for nearly 50 implementation factors relative to size of task, inherited baseline, organizational and system environment, and difficulty of task. Produces mean and variance estimates of software size, implementation productivity, recommended staff level, probable duration, amount of computer resources required, and amount and cost of software documentation. Written in Microsoft BASIC.
A model for estimating the cost impact of schedule perturbations on aerospace research and development programs
The problem of determining the cost impact attributable to perturbations in an aerospace R and D program schedule is discussed in terms of the diminishing availability of funds. The methodology from which a model is presented for updating R and D cost estimates as a function of perturbations in program time is presented.
Space-based power conversion and power relay systems: Preliminary analysis of alternate systems
The results are presented of nine months of technical study of non-photovoltaic options for the generation of electricity for terrestrial use by satellite power stations (SPS). A concept for the augmentation of ground-based solar power plants by orbital sunlight reflectors was also studied. Three SPS types having a solar energy source and two which used nuclear reactors were investigated. Data derived for each included: (1) configuration definition, including mass statement; (2) information for use in environmental impact assessment; (3) energy balance (ratio of energy produced to that required to achieve operation), and (4) development and other cost estimates. Cost estimates were dependent upon the total program (development, placement and operation of a number of satellites) which was postulated. This postulation was based upon an analysis of national power capacity trends and guidelines received from MSFC.
Design of an expert system for estimating the cost of new knowledge in high energy astrophysics
The High Energy Astrophysics Costing Tool (HEACT) is a combined Expert System/Numerical Simulation to evaluate sensors and experiments proposed for space platforms in order to determine their expected performance and to assess the amount and quality of scientific information likely to be gathered by such experiments. The end product of this tool will be both a cost estimate for the experiment package as deployed and also an estimate of the amount of new scientific knowledge (both new data and reductions in the uncertainties of previous measurements) which would result from the actual deployment and operation of that experiment package. The numerical simulation part of HEACT will contain components to: (1) calculate the high energy signatures of both actual and proposed classes of astrophysical objects, and (2) model the response and resolution of the candidate sensors for observing those objects. The rule based part of the HEACT will be based on knowledge in the areas of experiment design, instrument selection, and system integration developed from experience with existing high energy astrophysics observatories, both orbiting and lofted by rockets or balloons. This paper presents mainly results from the design of the rule-based part of HEACT. It focuses on the structure of the rules and the structures used to represent the knowledge related to the design and integration of such experiments. Methods for integrating the results from numerical simulations into the expert system will also be discussed.
Estimating the Cost of NASA's Space Launch Initiative: How SLI Cost Stack Up Against the Shuttle
NASA is planning to replace the Space Shuttle with a new completely reusable Second Generation Launch System by approximately 2012. Numerous contracted and NASA in-house Space Transportation Architecture Studies and various technology maturation activities are proceeding and have resulted in scores of competing architecture configurations being proposed. Life cycle cost is a key discriminator between all these various concepts. However, the one obvious analogy for costing purposes remains the current Shuttle system. Are there credible reasons to believe that a second generation reusable launch system can be accomplished at less cost than the Shuttle? The need for a credible answer to this question is critical. This paper reviews the cost estimating approaches being used by the contractors and the government estimators to address this issue and explores the rationale behind the numbers.
Streamlining the Design Tradespace for Earth Imaging Constellations
Satellite constellations and Distributed Spacecraft Mission (DSM) architectures offer unique benefits to Earth observation scientists and unique challenges to cost estimators. The Cost and Risk (CR) module of the Tradespace Analysis Tool for Constellations (TAT-C) being developed by NASA Goddard seeks to address some of these challenges by providing a new approach to cost modeling, which aggregates existing Cost Estimating Relationships (CER) from respected sources, cost estimating best practices, and data from existing and proposed satellite designs. Cost estimation through this tool is approached from two perspectives: parametric cost estimating relationships and analogous cost estimation techniques. The dual approach utilized within the TAT-C CR module is intended to address prevailing concerns regarding early design stage cost estimates, and offer increased transparency and fidelity by offering two preliminary perspectives on mission cost. This work outlines the existing cost model, details assumptions built into the model, and explains what measures have been taken to address the particular challenges of constellation cost estimating. The risk estimation portion of the TAT-C CR module is still in development and will be presented in future work. The cost estimate produced by the CR module is not intended to be an exact mission valuation, but rather a comparative tool to assist in the exploration of the constellation design tradespace. Previous work has noted that estimating the cost of satellite constellations is difficult given that no comprehensive model for constellation cost estimation has yet been developed, and as such, quantitative assessment of multiple spacecraft missions has many remaining areas of uncertainty. By incorporating well-established CERs with preliminary approaches to approaching these uncertainties, the CR module offers more complete approach to constellation costing than has previously been available to mission architects or Earth scientists seeking to leverage the capabilities of multiple spacecraft working in support of a common goal.
Satellite Constellation Cost Modeling: An Aggregate Model
Satellite constellations and Distributed Spacecraft Mission (DSM) architectures offer unique benefits to Earth observation scientists and unique challenges to cost estimators. The Cost and Risk (CR) module of the Tradespace Analysis Tool for Constellations (TAT-C) being developed by NASA Goddard seeks to address some of these challenges by providing a new approach to cost modeling, which aggregates existing Cost Estimating Relationships (CER) from respected sources, cost estimating best practices, and data from existing and proposed satellite designs. Cost estimation through this tool is approached from two perspectives: parametric cost estimating relationships and analogous cost estimation techniques. The dual approach utilized within the TAT-C CR module is intended to address prevailing concerns regarding early design stage cost estimates, and offer increased transparency and fidelity by offering two preliminary perspectives on mission cost. This work outlines the existing cost model, details assumptions built into the model, and explains what measures have been taken to address the particular challenges of constellation cost estimating. The risk estimation portion of the TAT-C CR module is still in development and will be presented in future work. The cost estimate produced by the CR module is not intended to be an exact mission valuation, but rather a comparative tool to assist in the exploration of the constellation design tradespace. Previous work has noted that estimating the cost of satellite constellations is difficult given that no comprehensive model for constellation cost estimation has yet been developed, and as such, quantitative assessment of multiple spacecraft missions has many remaining areas of uncertainty. By incorporating well-established CERs with preliminary approaches to approaching these uncertainties, the CR module offers more complete approach to constellation costing than has previously been available to mission architects or Earth scientists seeking to leverage the capabilities of multiple spacecraft working in support of a common goal.
Effects of radiobiological uncertainty on vehicle and habitat shield design for missions to the moon and Mars
Some consequences of uncertainties in radiobiological risk due to galactic cosmic ray (GCR) exposure are analyzed for their effect on engineering designs for the first lunar outpost and a mission to explore Mars. This report presents the plausible effect of biological uncertainties, the design changes necessary to reduce the uncertainties to acceptable levels for a safe mission, and an evaluation of the mission redesign cost. Estimates of the amount of shield mass required to compensate for radiobiological uncertainty are given for a simplified vehicle and habitat. The additional amount of shield mass required to provide a safety factor for uncertainty compensation is calculated from the expected response to GCR exposure. The amount of shield mass greatly increases in the estimated range of biological uncertainty, thus, escalating the estimated cost of the mission. The estimates are used as a quantitative example for the cost-effectiveness of research in radiation biophysics and radiation physics.
Proposed Reliability/Cost Model
New technique estimates cost of improvement in reliability for complex system. Model format/approach is dependent upon use of subsystem cost-estimating relationships (CER's) in devising cost-effective policy. Proposed methodology should have application in broad range of engineering management decisions.
Seminar presentation on the economic evaluation of the space shuttle system
The proceedings of a seminar on the economic aspects of the space shuttle system are presented. Emphasis was placed on the problems of economic analysis of large scale public investments, the state of the art of cost estimation, the statistical data base for estimating costs of new technological systems, and the role of the main economic parameters affecting the results of the analyses. An explanation of the system components of a space program and the present choice of launch vehicles, spacecraft, and instruments was conducted.
Apollo experiments support on preliminary estimate of development costs and schedule for molab task report
Preliminary development cost estimate for Apollo project lunar mobile laboratory /Molab/
The use of cluster analysis techniques in spaceflight project cost risk estimation
Project cost risk is the uncertainty in final project cost, contingent on initial budget, requirements and schedule. For a proposed mission, a dynamic simulation model relying for some of its input on a simple risk elicitation is used to identify and quantify systemic cost risk.
The Dangers of Parametrics
Building a parametric cost model is hard work. The data is noisy and often does not behave like we want it to. We need statistics to give us an indication of the goodness of our models, but; statistics can be manipulated and mislead. On top of all of that, our own very human biases can lead us astray; causing us to see patterns in the noise and draw false conclusions from the data. Yet, it is the data itself that is the foundation for making better cost estimates and cost models. I believe the mistake we often make is we believe that our models are representative of the data; that our models summarize the experiences, the knowledge, and the stories contained in the data. However, it is the opposite that is true. Our models are but imitations of reality. They give us trends, but not truth. The experiences, the knowledge, and the stories that we need in order to make good cost estimates is bound up in the data. You cannot separate good cost estimating from a knowledge of the historical data. One final thought. It is our attempts to make sense out of the randomness that leads us astray. In order to make progress as cost modelers and cost estimators, we must accept that there are real limitations on our ability to model the past and predict the future. I do not believe we should throw up our hands and say this is the best we can do. Rather, to see real improvement we must first recognize these limitations, avoid the easy but misleading solutions, and seek to find ways to better model the world we live in. I don't have any simple solutions. Perhaps the answers lie in better data or in a totally different approach to simulating how the world works. All I know is that we must do our best to speak truth to ourselves and our customers. Misleading ourselves and our customers will, in the end, result in an inability to have a positive impact on those we serve.