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DOE OSTI · 3002667

Impact of Cyber Threat Awareness on Driver Response to an Unexpected Vehicle Cyberattack

Abstract

Here, the integration of advanced cyber-physical systems in heavy vehicles introduces new vulnerabilities by expanding the possibility of cyberattacks. The objective of this study is to evaluate (1) how threat awareness influences driver response to an unexpected cyberattack, (2) how the provision of a basic cyberattack response protocol influences driver performance, and (3) how professionally trained versus standard drivers compare in their responses to a cyberattack. An on-road driving study (N = 50) was conducted using a medium heavy-duty vehicle. Participants were divided into three groups: Control, which remained unaware of any potential cyberattack; Aware, which was informed about the potential cyberattack; and Aware + Protocol, which received the same warning as the Aware group with the addition of a basic cyberattack response protocol. An instrument cluster cyberattack was executed at the same location for all participants. The findings highlight the essential role of awareness and response protocol in enhancing driver response to an unexpected vehicle cyberattack. The Aware + Protocol group had the highest stop rate (100%) and the shortest stopping distances (224 m for standard drivers and 254 m for professionals), compared to the Control group (828 and 520 m, respectively). Aware + Protocol also had the fastest reaction time, averaging 7.53 s, versus 16.12 s (Aware) and 30.29 s (Control). These results emphasize that awareness alone is insufficient. Providing drivers with clear, actionable protocols significantly improves their ability to react quickly and safely to cyberattacks, enhancing overall road safety.

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BibTeXRIS

Lanigan, Trevor F. [Colorado State Univ., Fort Collins, CO (United States)], Biggs, Tyler [Colorado State Univ., Fort Collins, CO (United States)], Gallegos, Erika E. [Colorado State Univ., Fort Collins, CO (United States)], Daily, Jeremy [Colorado State Univ., Fort Collins, CO (United States)], Reid, Emma [Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)] (ORCID:0000000271704297), Powers, Sarah [Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)] (ORCID:0000000180580794). 2025-08-14. Impact of Cyber Threat Awareness on Driver Response to an Unexpected Vehicle Cyberattack. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12198-025-00303-0

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