NASA NTRS · 20060031258
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Powell, J.. 2001-03-05. Formal specification and analytical verification. https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20060031258
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PLCverif is an actively developed project at CERN, enabling the formal verification of Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) programs in critical systems. In this paper, we present our work on improving the formal requirements specification experience in PLCverif through the use of natural language. To this end, we integrate NASA’s FRET, a formal requirement elicitation and authoring tool, into PLCverif. FRET is used to specify formal requirements in structured natural language, which automatically translates into temporal logic formulae. FRET’s output is then directly used by PLCverif for verification purposes. We discuss practical challenges that PLCverif users face when authoring requirements and the FRET features that help alleviate these problems. We present the new requirement formalization workflow and report our experience using it on two critical CERN case studies.
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Traditionally, security is viewed as an organizational and Information Technology (IIJ systems function comprising of Firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS), system security settings and patches to the operating system (OS) and applications running on it. Until recently, little thought has been given to the importance of security as a formal approach in the software life cycle. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory has approached the problem through the development of an integrated formal Software Security Assessment Instrument (SSAI) with six foci for the software life cycle.