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NASA NTRS · 19700027293

Prevention of Coupled Structure-Propulsion Instability (POGO) On The Space Shuttle

S. Rubin
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Abstract

Many liquid-propellant rocket vehicles have experienced longitudinal vibration, nicknamed pogo after the jumping stick, due to an instability arising from interaction of the vehicle structure with the propulsion system. These vibrations can produce an intolerable environment for astronauts and equipment, can overload vehicle structure, and can lead to loss of propulsion performance. A NASA monograph concerned with the prevention of pogo is well on its way toward publication and should serve as a useful guide to design for the Space Shuttle. The paper will briefly describe the nature of the pogo phenomenon, present a summary of past instabilities, relate the possible deleterious effects of pogo, and discuss the contents of the design criteria monograph. Finally, research tasks are recommended for support of pogo development activities on the Space Shuttle.

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S. Rubin. 1970-07-15. Prevention of Coupled Structure-Propulsion Instability (POGO) On The Space Shuttle. https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19700027293

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