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Younkin, Jim

Publications and source records attributed to Younkin, Jim.

Recommendations for Secure Transport: Material Conveyance Physical Protection Technology

Nuclear material is at higher risk of theft and sabotage during transport than during any other phase of the nuclear fuel lifecycle. Nuclear materials are transported in the public domain where adversaries have an upper hand by taking advantage of the time and location of the theft or sabotage attempt. As such, even modest threat profiles for transport of nuclear and radioactive material can require substantial detection and delay measures to support timely response. Conveyance tracking augmented with technology that improves on-the-scene situational awareness at a remote monitoring center has been adopted as a de-facto standard approach for transportation security. At present, the extended tracking and situational awareness capabilities needed for a nuclear material shipment, as is provided by the purpose designed, Transportation – Security, Tracking and Reporting (T-STAR) System, do not exist in a single commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solution. Typically, the COTS systems that excel in one area are deficient in other areas, presenting challenges to designing well-rounded, robust systems. Still, COTS solutions can offer the basic set of tracking and situational awareness capabilities by indicating last update time, current location, and route taken. By incorporating vehicle and driver performance measures via the vehicle’s controller area network (CAN bus) and video alongside other data streams allows telemetry and other shipment information to be assessed in novel ways.This paper describes the operation, capabilities and features of various conveyance protection systems and approaches, assesses emerging technologies and how they could be used through a unified interface, and enumerates additional ways to provide early detection using vehicle, onboard technologies, effective delay technologies and approaches and simple equipment to improve protection during transport.

Shannon, Michael↗

A Novel Fiber-Bragg-Grating-Based Unique Identifier for Use in Tags and Seals

Tags and seals are important tools used in safeguards regimes for the control of nuclear materials. Vital to a successful tag or seal is the ability to securely, uniquely, and positively distinguish it from others of the same kind. This allows one to validate that items entered into an inspection regime to which the tag or seal is affixed are as claimed. We are developing a new type of unique identifier (UID) for such applications that is based on fiber-Bragg grating (FBG) technology. The index of refraction of the core glass of a fiber optic can be locally and permanently altered if sensitized fibers are exposed to intense ultraviolet light. This can be used to create index modulations with a regular periodicity comparable to the wavelengths of light with which the fiber is used. If broadband illumination is sent down the fiber, any light that is in resonance with the modulations will be reflected back to the input end of the fiber where it can be detected. The shape of the returned spectrum can be set by the modulation pattern written into the fiber’s core. We take advantage of these properties to create a compact UID that contains several FBGs potted into a monolithic body. By connecting the UID to an optical interrogator, the complex spectral return can be uniquely identified with a short measurement, providing a robust identification. As a device based on narrowband spectral returns, FBGs are inherently radiation tolerant, making them ideal for use with nuclear materials. Further, they can be read out remotely via a long fiber optic or locally via brief connection to a portable optical interrogator. Because the spectral signature of FBGs is sensitive to external mechanical perturbations, we are exploring the ability to reversibly alter the signature obtained from the UID by applying controlled mechanical forces with a simple device. Such a “key” will allow different stakeholders to obtain their own unique signature from the device, providing a new level of surety to safeguards inspections.

Ziock, Klaus-Peter↗

ADVANCING THE TRANSPORTATION – SECURITY, TRACKING, AND REPORTING (T-STAR) SYSTEM

The Transportation – Security, Tracking and Reporting (T-STAR) System was developed by NNSA NA-21 Office of Radiological Security (ORS) to provide a transportation security system for use during transport of Category 1 and Category 2 radiological material to provide detection and tracking capability for shipments. While many off the shelf systems provide asset tracking of the conveyance, few offer detection of a breach into the cargo compartment or the removal of cargo from the conveyance. Systems that do offer such capability need to be permanently installed on the conveyance, requiring drilling of holes and running of cables throughout the conveyance itself. This means that dedicated shipping containers or vehicles are required, and this is not sustainable in many countries where ORS is building capacity for the security of radioactive materials in use, storage, and in transport. T-STAR is leveraging various ORNL technologies for improved communications capability and reduced power requirements; the multimode communications module developed by the Unmanned Aerial Systems group and the low power and extensible Authenticatable Container Tracking System (ACTS) tag developed for the US Department of Energy’s Packaging Certification Program provide a small footprint tracking system which can be installed quickly as needed. T-STAR uses a cellular and an Iridium modem to communicate configuration and alert information to a server used to monitor the shipment and incorporates a Z-wave © wireless security system allowing various intrusion detection sensors to be located in the conveyance. The Z-wave sensors are readily available, inexpensive, and power efficient, making them replaceable and low maintenance. The server software be configured as a standalone system installed on a light duty computer hosted by the competent authority, carrier, or response agency, or hosted as part of an Amazon Cloud Server (AWS) accessible via a secure login. The server has two functions, first is to handle messages to/from the T-STAR field unit, second is to host the user interface which can be accessed using a web browser on desktop or mobile device. The user interface implements roles to determine the level of access to shipment information, define geo-fences, and configure notifications. The user interface also supports multiple languages for display as well as notifications by using a simple lookup file which can be modified by the host country to ensure translations are correct and meaningful to responders receiving notifications and alerts. This paper will detail the overarching T-STAR capabilities, architecture and components, and provide insights on how it is deployed, used, and monitored during transportation of radioactive material.

Schultze, Michael↗

Advancing the Authenticatable Container Tracking System (ACTS)

The Authenticatable Container Tracking System (ACTS) is an extensible secure container tag that can be used to optimize chain-of-custody monitoring for packaged nuclear materials as they are being stored, processed, and transported. Based on the ultra–low power TI MSP430 mixed-signal microcontroller, ACTS is an active device that uses an almost-universal core platform that can be appropriately configured with expansion modules to provide the application-specific data acquisition, data logging, container sealing, and communications functions needed for 21st century material accountancy, monitoring, and tracking applications. This core architecture enables appropriately designed modules to be easily interfaced to the basic system, providing an integration path for current and new technologies. ACTS contains a built-in set of sensors and supports an expansion bus for up to six additional communications, tracking, authentication, encryption, sealing, location, or sensing modules that may enhance the monitoring and tracking of designated containers for specific applications. To date, testing has used an IEEE 802.15.4-2011 ultra-wideband–compliant wireless transceiver module that has additional capabilities for indoor positioning and proximity location. Proximity-based location (i.e., where an ACTS tag knows where it is relative to other ACTS tags) will be explored as a continuity-of-knowledge mechanism to determine unauthorized movement of containers in storage arrays of many items. Partners for this system are Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, Savannah River National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and commercialization partner the Aquila Group.

Younkin, Jim↗

Testing of the Authenticatable Container Tracking System (ACTS)

The Authenticatable Container Tracking System (ACTS) is being designed to provide a secure container tag that can be used to optimize chain-of-custody monitoring for packaged nuclear materials as they are being stored, processed, and transported. ACTS is an active device that uses an almost-universal core platform that can be appropriately configured to provide the necessary data acquisition, data logging, and communications functions needed for 21st century material accountancy, monitoring, and tracking applications. The core design supports active monitoring of containment, movement, and location and provides secure data transmission via selectable communication methods that can be used throughout the world. This core architecture enables appropriately designed modules to be easily interfaced to the basic system, thus providing an integration path for current and new technologies. ACTS contains a built-in set of sensors but also supports an expansion bus for up to six additional communications, tracking, or sensing modules that may enhance monitoring and tracking of particular containers for specific applications. ACTS stores events in memory, communicates activity to Argonne National Laboratory’s ARG-US TransPort tracking and information server, and provides options for data encryption and authentication. We are currently beginning a testing phase that will field five devices outdoors in a controlled environment to allow evaluation of the functionality of the systems and the hardness of the devices to outdoor conditions. Partners for this system are Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, Savannah River National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and commercialization partner The Aquila Group.

Britton Jr, Chuck↗

On Line Enrichment Monitor (OLEM) UF 6 Tests for 1.5" Sch40 SS Pipe, Revision 1

As global uranium enrichment capacity under international safeguards expands, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is challenged to develop effective safeguards approaches at gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants while working within budgetary constraints. The “Model Safeguards Approach for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants” (GCEPs) developed by the IAEA Division of Concepts and Planning in June 2006, defines the three primary Safeguards objectives to be the timely detection of: 1) diversion of significant quantities of natural (NU), depleted (DU) or low-enriched uranium (LEU) from declared plant flow, 2) facility misuse to produce undeclared LEU product from undeclared feed, and 3) facility misuse to produce enrichments higher than the declared maximum, in particular, highly enriched uranium (HEU). The ability to continuously and independently (i.e. with a minimum of information from the facility operator) monitor not only the uranium mass balance but also the 235 U mass balance in the facility could help support all three verification objectives described above. Two key capabilities required to achieve an independent and accurate material balance are 1) continuous, unattended monitoring of in-process UF 6 and 2) monitoring of cylinders entering and leaving the facility. The continuous monitoring of in-process UF 6 would rely on a combination of load-cell monitoring of the cylinders at the feed and withdrawal stations, online monitoring of gas enrichment, and a high-accuracy net weight measurement of the cylinder contents. The Online Enrichment Monitor (OLEM) is the instrument that would continuously measure the time-dependent relative uranium enrichment, E(t), in weight percent 235 U, of the gas filling or being withdrawn from the cylinders. The OLEM design concept combines gamma-ray spectrometry using a collimated NaI(Tl) detector with gas pressure and temperature data to calculate the enrichment of the UF 6 gas within the unit header pipe as a function of time. The OLEM components have been tested on ORNL UF 6 flow loop. Data were collected at five different enrichment levels (0.71%, 2.97%, 4.62%, 6.0%, and 93.7%) at several pressure conditions. The test data were collected in the standard OLEM N.4242 file format for each of the conditions with a 10-minute sampling period and then averaged over the span of constant pressures. Analysis of the collected data has provided enrichment constants that can be used for 1.5” stainless steel schedule 40 pipe measurement sites. The enrichment constant is consistent among all the wide range of enrichment levels and pressures used.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗