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Younkin, Chance R.

Publications and source records attributed to Younkin, Chance R..

Cybersecurity Plan Review Summary: For Connected Communities

As part of the Connected Communities (CC) Technical Assistance Program led by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) oversees the cybersecurity technical assistance for the CC cohort. PNNL’s role is to provide a combination of provision of resources and technical assistance to support the development of successful cybersecurity plans for the Connected Communities cohort. This report is an update for June 2023 on the current status of plans reviewed to date.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

FIC Consequence Profile - Hypothetical Cybercrime Syndicate Adversary Dossier

The FIC team has engaged PNNL’s Shamrock Cyber team to produce this Consequence Profile. This Consequence Profile is an Adversary Dossier, which provides the foundation for a thorough understanding of unacceptable mission outcomes, and the threats and vulnerabilities that make these outcomes plausible. The dossier helps stakeholders and development teams understand each other’s viewpoints. It also provides a means for reducing overall risk by prioritizing threats and vulnerabilities based on unacceptable outcomes. The Consequence Profile can be used as is, or as content to inform other reports tailored to a specific audience. It is intended to enable decision makers at all levels to improve the security posture of the system.

Beaman, Jacob E.↗

ROTOR: Research to Operations and Operations to Research

PNNL’s Research to Operations/Operations to Research (ROTOR) Program fosters a cybersecurity operations to researcher collaboration, identifying hard problems and challenges for cyber defenders and bringing researcher science disciplines to these challenges. ROTOR allows PNNL’s cyber defenders to better protect the laboratory but also fosters innovation and incubation of solutions for our sponsor missions across DOE, DOD, DHS and the intelligence community. Our sponsors and their missions are faced with many of the same cyber defense challenges that PNNL faces. By using our own laboratory security operations environment as an innovation generator and testing ground, allowing research to be tested and tried, our sponsors are directly benefitted. PNNL is in a unique position to combine our world class research organization with enterprise cybersecurity operations. ROTOR is taking advantage of this to bring PNNL cybersecurity research projects into an operational environment within PNNL’s Cyber Security Operations Center. With ROTOR, PNNL researchers gain the advantage of operational experience and expertise and have an avenue for showcasing research in an operational environment. This helps to advance PNNL research, prove operability of PNNL projects to its sponsors, and provide real-world insight to real-world problems for our cybersecurity research agenda. ROTOR is the conduit for PNNL cybersecurity research to find its way to operational use. PNNL researchers and engineers are informed by real-world operations and operations has access to current PNNL research and engineering capabilities. All of this leads to improved reputation for PNNL as a provider of national security solutions that are tried and tested. To date, ROTOR has collaborated with six projects, enabling each to conduct operational work within the CSOC.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

FIC Threat Profile: Provided by Shamrock Cyber

The FIC team has engaged with PNNL’s Shamrock Cyber Team to produce this Threat Profile. The Threat Profile provides the foundation for a thorough understanding of threats for development teams and stakeholders, and users of the system. The Threat Profile can be used as is, or as content to inform other reports tailored to a specific audience. It is intended to enable decision makers at all levels to improve the security posture of the system.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

FIC Vulnerability Profile

The FIC team is engaged with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL’s) Shamrock Cyber Team to provide cybersecurity analyses of the FIC software. Shamrock offers both Threat-Based Analysis services and Secure Software Development services. These services are ultimately used to understand and mitigate threats against software and to reduce vulnerabilities in software, thus improving overall cybersecurity and informing decision makers. Shamrock’s Secure Software Development services, specifically Static Analysis Security Testing (SAST) and Open-Source Analysis (OSA), produced this Vulnerability Profile.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A Cybersecurity Threat Profile for a Connected Lighting System

In anticipation of improved energy performance and cost savings, cities and building owners are increasingly considering “smart lighting initiatives” that aim to convert their collection of simple luminaires (i.e., lighting fixtures) into an intelligent connected lighting system (CLS) capable of remotely monitoring energy consumption and fault conditions, and possibly implementing adaptive lighting schemes. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has set an national goal of tripling the energy efficiency and demand flexibility of the buildings sector by 2030, relative to 2020 levels 1. It is forecast that connected lighting systems can contribute to that goal by delivering 125 TWh of annual energy savings by 2035 2, equivalent to the annual output of 50 typical (500 MW) power plants. However, these energy savings and the DOE goal are put at significant risk if connected technologies are not adopted due to real or perceived cybersecurity concerns. Connected IoT devices such as these have historically been rife with vulnerabilities which sometimes put security considerations secondary to functionality and operability. What are the cybersecurity threats that will impact these systems, as formerly banal luminaires transition into intelligent connected devices that collect information about themselves, their surrounding environment, and possibly us? In this paper we analyze a threat profile performed on a fault-detection use case for streetlights. A threat profile establishes security requirements, justifies security measures, yields actionable controls, and effectively communicates risk to stakeholders. This effort provides critical information for making threat-based decisions to increase security at a reasonable cost, and can effectively be used by development teams, software architects, and managers to make cybersecurity a part of their ongoing culture of awareness, training, and prevention. This leads to more secure systems and better-understood security. On-premise, cloud, and hybrid architectures with different authentication mechanisms were modeled and later categorized using the Microsoft STRIDE framework. An analysis of the recommended controls for each threat was performed to determine which controls could and should be put in place by manufacturers or third-party suppliers, and which controls need to be left up the end-user to implement. Fifty-seven threats were identified. Among our key findings: (1) 65% (37/57) of the threats did not involve the luminaires, but rather the other components needed to communicate with and manage them; (2) 63% (36/57) of the threats could have been mitigated through manufacturer-implemented defensive techniques or “controls”; and (3) 23% (13/57) of the threats were dependent on the network configuration. Recommendations based on the results of this work are made to key stakeholder groups. Notably, lighting technology developers are advised to address all threats that can be reasonably controlled with baked-in technology solutions (e.g., encryption or authentication controls), and employ some form of secure supply chain management and tracking where other parts (e.g., sensors, microprocessors) of a luminaire must also be built and manufactured with the proper security controls in place. Developers should also review threats involving assets not developed in-house to understand how connectivity with other devices will affect their product during system operation and determine if a compensating control for a defense-in-depth strategy will be needed. Finally, those interested in deploying CLS should compare the differences between cloud and on-premise models to determine which is more suitable for their needs and the abilities of their security team.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Secure Software Central-The VOLTTRON Case

The SSC work arose from VOLTTRON’s PNNL campus deployment and resulted in a Threat Profile containing critical assets, prioritized threats, and controls for mitigating those threats. The Threat Profile outlines controls already in place, controls not yet in place, and recommendations for implementing controls. As a companion to the software, the Threat Profile shows due diligence in cybersecurity risk management in terms of security requirements, security recommendations, security budgeting, justification, and prioritization. This report describes the SSC offerings in general and the specific offerings applied to VOLTTRON.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗