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Wikmark, Anna

Publications and source records attributed to Wikmark, Anna.

Panel Session 124: Challenges and Opportunities in Establishing a System for Transportation of SNF/UNF

An audience of approximately 24 attended this panel session, which focused on the current challenges and status of establishing a transportation system for spent and used nuclear fuel (SNF/UNF), which includes planning efforts, continuing impacts, risk assessment, equipment (e.g., rail cars, handling equipment, and fuel storage systems), and transportation routing. Individual panelist presentations focused on: - Planning for removal of SNF and greater-than-Class C (GTCC) waste from the shut down Oyster Creek nuclear power plant site; - Scope and workshop conducted to better understand how the railroad carriers are likely to route shipments of SNF based on U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) route risk assessment regulatory requirements; - Atlas railcar design and fabrication project for producing new railcars for transporting SNF that are compliant with Association of American Railroads (AAR) Standard S-2043.

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Panel reports session

This section brings together the reports of the 31 panel sessions listed below: - Avoiding the Human Capital Cliff in the DOE (PS22); - Implementing Technically-Based Cleanup; US DOE Balancing Regulatory and Fiscal Complexity (PS24); - United Kingdom - Remediation of Sellafield Legacy Ponds and Silos (PS25); - Aligning Decision-Making to Deliver Timely Results in Large Clean-up Programs (PS38); - Transition to Government Owned-Contractor Operated Site at Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (PS39); - Emerging Middle East Nuclear States' Status and Plans (PS40); - NPP Panel on Waste Management (PS41); - Robotics - International Innovations in Robotic Decommissioning Technology (PS43); - Fukushima Panel (1/2): Japan Fukushima Daiichi Decommissioning Update (PS54); - Fukushima Panel (2/2): Update on the Revitalization of Fukushima and the Surrounding Area (PS55); - US DOE LLW On-Site Disposal: LLW Disposal Facility Federal Review Group Review Process (PS56); - Challenges in DOE HLW Tank Management: Facility Start-up and Waste Disposition (PS57); - Waste Management Planning for Utility Small Modular Reactors (PS58); - US Nuclear Power Plant Waste Management - LLW Disposal Issues (PS59); - DOE-EM Robotics and Emerging Technologies Road-map (4/8) (PS60); - Graduating Students and New Scientists and Engineers - Wants and Needs - Are Companies Even Listening? (PS63); - U.S. Nuclear Robotics: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow (5/8) (PS74); - US DOE Mixed Waste: Proposals for Dealing with Problematic Waste Streams and Policy Changes (PS76); - Current and Emerging US NRC LLW Regulatory Topics (PS77); - Agency Perspectives (US and International) on the Use of Risk and Dose Assessment Tools (PS80); - Progress on Deep Repository Programs Around the World (PS81); - US DOE Procurement and Contracting Opportunities (PS82); - Collaboration across Borders to Deliver Cleanup and Decommissioning Challenges (PS93a); - DOE Mission Success through Application of Practices and Solutions (PS94); - Challenges in Cask Certification - International Perspectives (PS96); - Robotics: Leveraging Innovations in Science and Technology to Benefit Safety Performance (PS98); - DOE Panel: DOE EM Featured Office - Portsmouth/Paducah Project Office (PS109); - Robotics: Lessons Learned from Industrial Robotics Deployment that can be Applied to the Nuclear Field (PS110a); - Roundtable: DOE Radioactive Management - Energy Facility Contractors Group - Waste Management Working Group (EFCOG WMWG) (PS118); - Thursday Topical Session 'Management of Used Nuclear Fuel: Will the United States Reengage and Align with International Efforts' (PS124); - Remotely Operated Vehicles for Emergency, Disaster, and Operational Upset Response (PS125)

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How to Handle the Conflict between Safety and Security - 18564

The purpose of safety and security for nuclear activities are the same. They are both necessary measures to protect people and the environment from radioactive material. There are many measures that enhance both the safety and the security but there are also measures serving one area that are in direct conflict with the other. How information is handled is maybe the best example to demonstrate this conflict between interests. In the security field, information is handled on a need-to-know basis, preventing valuable details to fall into hands of antagonists, terrorists etc. The safety culture, on the contrary, is based on knowledge and transparency and it encourages the sharing of information and experience to improve the safety. There is little guidance on how to manage the conflicts between safety and security for a transport system moving nuclear fuel and radioactive waste and especially when there are conflicts between different legislation areas, for example the Act on Nuclear Activities and Safety of Life at Sea. The Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co, SKB, transports all Swedish spent fuel and operational waste from the Nuclear Power Plants to the central storage facilities in Sweden. To manage the transport system, SKB owns a fleet of packages, road vehicles and an INF 3 ship. For the shipments of nuclear material, the security focus has increased rapidly over the years after the 9/11 attack, followed by regulatory requirements on enhanced security. SKB is currently running a project to further strengthen the transport security, an activity that requires a careful balance between safety and security. This paper describes the methods used and the challenges experienced trying to manage the conflicts between safety and security for the Swedish nuclear transport system. (authors)

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