Engineering topics

Wiersma, Bruce J.

Publications and source records attributed to Wiersma, Bruce J..

22 records · Page 2

DOE OSTI2021

An Assessment of the Materials of Construction for the Transfer Lines and Unit Operations Equipment Associated with the Recycle Diversion Process

The Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) processes and vitrifies radioactive waste that it receives from the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facility (CSTF) and Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF). As a result of the evaporation of water during both the melter feed preparation and the melter feed vitrification steps in DWPF, a recycle waste stream is generated, neutralized, and sent back to the CSTF. The recycle waste is a dilute water stream originating from the collection of condensate liquids containing some minor sludge and frit solids and other waste components primarily resulting from entrainment into the condensate during foam-over events. The recycle stream volume is significant and is expected to approach 3 million gallons per year once the SWPF reaches full operation. Diverting the bulk of the recycle waste stream from the CSTF is essential for the eventual closure of the waste tanks, and hence the completion of the SRS liquid waste mission.

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DOE OSTI2021

Corrosion of Steel During Long-Term Exposure to Evolving Cementitious Environments

SRS is proceeding with closure of the H-Area Tank Farm (HTF) and F-Area Tank Farm (FTF). Closure consists of removing the bulk waste, heel removal, and filling the tank with tailored grout formulations. The long-term performance of the concrete and steel materials of construction and the closure grout is an important consideration for Performance Assessment (PA) of closed tanks in FTF and HTF. Over PA timeframes of hundreds, thousands, to tens of thousands of years, the chemical and physical properties of the concrete and steel materials will slowly degrade due to environmental exposure and material aging. In the interim these materials will provide a barrier to the leaching of radionuclides into the soil. Savannah River Remediation (SRR) is updating relevant portions of these analysis inputs to support an imminent revision to the HTF PA and a future update to the FTF PA. This analysis provides an update to the previous PA inputs for steel corrosion. The Central Scenario for the PA analysis includes three postulated modeling cases: 1) Realistic Case, 2) Compliance Case, and 3) Pessimistic Case. This analysis also included a Fast Flow Path Case. This latter case considered the circumstance where the initial condition of the concrete was a completely degraded state and that grout shrinkage exposed the steel to the soil environment immediately. In effect, the steel was unprotected by the concrete and grout. The cases have various degrees of conservatism considered. Chemical, physical and tank configuration parameters were investigated to understand their effects on the predicted time to release of the contaminants. The assessment reviewed the initial tank and steel configuration, service life degradation of the steel, and potential corrosion mechanisms associated with degradation of the concrete materials.

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DOE OSTI2020

Reduced Neutralization Feasibility Study for H-Canyon Accelerated Basin De- Inventory (ABD) Program

An alternative approach to Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) and Nuclear Material Processing was developed for future H-Canyon (HCAN) and L-Area operations that involves a paradigm shift from current HCAN, Concentrate, Storage, and Transfer Facility (CSTF), and Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) operations. The alternative, referred to as Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD), requires that all Domestic and Foreign Research Reactor SNF currently at the Savannah River Site (SRS) will be dissolved, stored, and then transferred to CSTF without recovery of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). Concentrated nitric acid is utilized to dissolve aluminum spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) in HCAN. The vessels and piping in HCAN are fabricated from 304L stainless steel and are ideally suited to handle the acidic waste stream. However, as the waste is transferred to the CSTF and DWPF, it will contact the carbon steel waste tanks in CSTF. In order to prevent corrosion of the carbon steel, the acidic waste is neutralized (i.e., pH adjusted over 11) by the addition of sodium hydroxide (NaOH). The NaOH is added until the final solution contains 1.2 M excess -OH. Additionally, if the waste is not neutralized to a pH greater than 11, then aluminum hydroxide (Al(OH) 3 ) would form, and solids may form in the piping as it is transferred to CSTF. This document presents an analysis of the influence of reducing the excess caustic that is added to the neutralization tanks on the corrosion protection scheme primarily for the CSTF waste tanks. The implications to HCAN and DWPF were also assessed.

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DOE OSTI2020

Assessment of the Corrosion Risks to a Double Shell Tank During the Selective Removal of a Cesium-rich Supernate Layer - 20227

The Direct Feed Low Activity Waste (DF-LAW) activity will provide the initial feed to the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant at the Hanford Tank Farm facility. Feed preparation for DF-LAW will be carried out in multiple double shell waste tanks (DST) utilizing the Tank Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) process. Tank AP-106 will be an integral part of the TSCR process and hence key to the DFLAW activity. Prior to being utilized for this purpose, the Cs-137 concentration levels in the AP-106 supernate must be reduced significantly. The AP-106 re-purposing process manages normal waste tank addition procedures such that waste acceptance criteria objectives for Cs-137 removal are achieved. As this process was being developed, several concerns regarding tank integrity during and after repurposing of Tank AP-106, and the associated tanks (i.e., AP-102, AN-101, and AP-108), were addressed. The potential corrosion degradation mechanisms identified based on process knowledge included: general and pitting corrosion, caustic stress corrosion cracking, concentration cell corrosion, and microbiologically induced corrosion (MIC). A systematic approach was undertaken to assess the risk of corrosion during the AP-106 re-purposing process. The assessment considered the initial and present condition of the tank, the service history of the tank, the environmental conditions created in each tank during each stage of the process, process timing, and corrosion testing and modeling that approximated tank conditions. Based on this information, recommendations were provided to minimize the exposure of the tank to corrosive conditions. These recommendations included time limits for each stage of the process, staging of corrosion inhibitor solutions should process delays occur, and waste sampling with potential chemistry adjustments at defined steps in the process. Additionally, recommendations for post-process supernate chemistry adjustments and tank inspections were put forth. The greatest risk for this process occurs during the manipulation of large quantities of Columbia River water (i.e., greater than 450,000 gallons) within AP-106, the associated tanks and the supporting infrastructure (i.e., transfer line piping). This risk becomes more pronounced if there is a process upset and the tank walls remain exposed to a corrosive condition longer than intended. As long as the river water is blended into the supernate in a timely fashion, and the waste is adjusted appropriately with corrosion inhibitors, corrosion may be minimized and the final condition of the supernate in AP-106 and the associated tanks is expected to be in compliance with corrosion chemistry requirements. Contingency plans will be made to minimize the impact of a process upset. (authors)

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