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Watkins, R

Publications and source records attributed to Watkins, R.

ONSITE TRANSPORTATION AUTHORIZATION CHALLENGES AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE

Prior to 2008, transfers of radioactive material within the Savannah River Site (SRS) boundary, referred to as onsite transfers, were authorized by Transportation Safety Basis (TSB) documents that only required approval by the SRS contractor. This practice was in accordance with the existing SRS Transportation Safety Document (TSD). In 2008 the Department of Energy Savannah River Field Office (DOE-SR) requested that the SRS TSD be revised to require DOE-SR approval of all Transportation Safety Basis (TSB) documents. As a result, the primary SRS contractor embarked on a multi-year campaign to consolidate old or generate new TSB documents and obtain DOE-SR approval for each. This paper focuses on the challenges incurred during the rewriting or writing of and obtaining DOE-SR approval of all Savannah River Site Onsite Transportation Safety Basis documents.

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RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGING TORQUE REQUIREMENTS COMPLIANCE

Shipping containers used to transport radioactive material (RAM) in commerce employ a variety of closure mechanisms. Often, these closure mechanisms require a specific amount of torque be applied to a bolt, nut or other threaded fastener. It is important that the required preload is achieved so that the package testing and analysis is not invalidated for the purpose of protecting the public. Torque compliance is a means of ensuring closure preload, is a major factor in accomplishing the package functions of confinement/containment, sub-criticality, and shielding. This paper will address the importance of applying proper torque to package closures, discuss torque value nomenclature, and present one methodology to ensure torque compliance is achieved.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

USING A RISK-BASED METHODOLOGY FOR THE TRANSFER OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL WITHIN THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE BOUNDARY

Shipment of radioactive materials (RAM) is discussed in the Code of Federal Regulations in parts of both 49 CFR and 10 CFR. The regulations provide the requirements and rules necessary for the safe shipment of RAM across public highways, railways, waterways, and through the air. These shipments are sometimes referred to as in-commerce shipments. Shipments of RAM entirely within the boundaries of Department of Energy sites, such as the Savannah River Site (SRS), can be made using methodology allowing provisions to maintain equivalent safety while deviating from the regulations for in-commerce shipments. These onsite shipments are known as transfers at the SRS. These transfers must follow the requirements approved in a site-specific Transportation Safety Document (TSD). The TSD defines how the site will transfer materials so that they have equivalence to the regulations. These equivalences are documented in an Onsite Safety Assessment (OSA). The OSA can show how a particular packaging used onsite is equivalent to that which would be used for an in-commerce shipment. This is known as a deterministic approach. However, when a deterministic approach is not viable, the TSD allows for a risk-based OSA to be written. These risk-based assessments show that if a packaging does not provide the necessary safety to ensure that materials are not released (during normal or accident conditions) then the worst-case release of materials does not result in a dose consequence worse than that defined for the SRS. This paper will discuss recent challenges and successes using this methodology at the SRS.

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DOE-EM-45 PACKAGING OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE COURSE

Savannah River National Laboratory - Savannah River Packaging Technology (SRNL-SRPT) delivered the inaugural offering of the Packaging Operations and Maintenance Course for DOE-EM-45's Packaging Certification Program (PCP) at the University of South Carolina Aiken on September 1 and 2, 2009. Twenty-nine students registered, attended, and completed this training. The DOE-EM-45 Packaging Certification Program (PCP) sponsored the presentation of a new training course, Packaging Maintenance and Operations, on September 1-2, 2009 at the University of South Carolina Aiken (USC-Aiken) campus in Aiken, SC. The premier offering of the course was developed and presented by the Savannah River National Laboratory, and attended by twenty-nine students across the DOE, NNSA and private industry. This training informed package users of the requirements associated with handling shipping containers at a facility (user) level and provided a basic overview of the requirements typically outlined in Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) Chapters 1, 7, and 8. The course taught packaging personnel about the regulatory nature of SARPs to help reduce associated and often costly packaging errors. Some of the topics covered were package contents, loading, unloading, storage, torque requirements, maintaining records, how to handle abnormal conditions, lessons learned, leakage testing (including demonstration), and replacement parts. The target audience for this course was facility operations personnel, facility maintenance personnel, and field quality assurance personnel who are directly involved in the handling of shipping containers. The training also aimed at writers of SARP Chapters 1, 7, and 8, package designers, and anyone else involved in radioactive material packaging and transportation safety. Student feedback and critiques of the training were very positive. SRNL will offer the course again at USC Aiken in September 2010.

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Packaging and Transportation of Additional Neptunium Oxide

The Savannah River Site's HB-Line Facility completed a second neptunium oxide production campaign in which nine (9) additional cans of neptunium oxide were produced and shipped to the Idaho National Laboratory and Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the 9975 shipping container. These additional cans were from a different feed solution than the first fifty (50) cans of neptunium oxide that were previously produced and shipped via a Letter of Amendment to the 9975 Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) content table. This paper will address the challenges associated with demonstrating the neptunium oxide produced from the additional feed solution was equivalent to the original neptunium oxide and within the content description of the Letter of Amendment.

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AUTHORIZING THE DOT SPECIFICATION 6M PACKAGING FOR CONTINUED USE AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE

The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification 6M packaging was in extensive use for more than 40 years for in-commerce shipments of Type B quantities of fissile and radioactive material (RAM) across the USA, among the Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories, and between facilities in the DOE production complex. In January 2004, the DOT Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) Agency issued a final rule in the Federal Register to ammend requirements in the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) pertaining to the transportation of radioactive materials. The final rule became effective on October 1, 2004. One of those changes discontinued the use of the DOT specification 6M, along with other DOT specification packagings, on October 1, 2008. A main driver for the change was due to the fact that 6M specification packagings were not supported by a Safety Analysis Report for Packagings (SARP) that was compliant with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 71 (10 CFR 71). The regulatory rules for the discontinued use have been edited in Title 49 of the CFR Parts 100-185, 2004 edition and thereafter. Prior to October 1, 2008, the use of the 6M within the boundaries of the Savannah River Site (SRS), called an onsite transfer, was governed by an onsite transportation document that referenced 49 CFR Parts 100-185. SRS had to develop an Onsite Safety Assessment (OSA) which was independent of 49 CFR in order to justify the continued use of the DOT Specification 6M for the transfer of radioactive material (RAM) at the SRS after October 1, 2008. This paper will discuss the methodology for and difficulties associated with authorizing the DOT Specification 6M Packaging for continued use at the Savannah River Site.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

NEW APPROACH TO ADDRESSING GAS GENERATION IN RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGING

Safety Analysis Reports for Packaging (SARP) document why the transportation of radioactive material is safe in Type A(F) and Type B shipping containers. The content evaluation of certain actinide materials require that the gas generation characteristics be addressed. Most packages used to transport actinides impose extremely restrictive limits on moisture content and oxide stabilization to control or prevent flammable gas generation. These requirements prevent some users from using a shipping container even though the material to be shipped is fully compliant with the remaining content envelope including isotopic distribution. To avoid these restrictions, gas generation issues have to be addressed on a case by case basis rather than a one size fits all approach. In addition, SARP applicants and review groups may not have the knowledge and experience with actinide chemistry and other factors affecting gas generation, which facility experts in actinide material processing have obtained in the last sixty years. This paper will address a proposal to create a Gas Generation Evaluation Committee to evaluate gas generation issues associated with Safety Analysis Reports for Packaging material contents. The committee charter could include reviews of both SARP approved contents and new contents not previously evaluated in a SARP.

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NEPTUNIUM OXIDE PROCESSING

The Savannah River Site's HB-Line Facility completed a campaign in which fifty nine cans of neptunium oxide were produced and shipped to the Idaho National Laboratory in the 9975 shipping container. The neptunium campaign was divided into two parts: Part 1 which consisted of oxide made from H-Canyon neptunium solution which did not require any processing prior to conversion into an oxide, and Part 2 which consisted of oxide made from additional H-Canyon neptunium solutions which required processing to purify the solution prior to conversion into an oxide. The neptunium was received as a nitrate solution and converted to oxide through ion-exchange column extraction, precipitation, and calcination. Numerous processing challenges were encountered in order make a final neptunium oxide product that could be shipped in a 9975 shipping container. Among the challenges overcome was the issue of scale: translating lab scale production into full facility production. The balance between processing efficiency and product quality assurance was addressed during this campaign. Lessons learned from these challenges are applicable to other processing projects.

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