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Voss, James

Publications and source records attributed to Voss, James.

Deep Isolation-Development of the Safety Case for Disposal of Radioactive Wastes in Horizontal Boreholes - 20028

Deep Isolation has developed a safe, secure, and permanent geological disposal method for high-level waste, including spent nuclear fuel as well as sealed sources and other highly radioactive materials. The method leverages well established directional drilling technology to create horizontal repositories deep underground. The combination of great depth (1-3 km) and the ability to precisely position repositories in a horizontal orientation provides access to geologic strata that are inaccessible for typical mined and deep vertical borehole repositories. A number of potential direct and indirect safety benefits accrue including:1) greater depth below regional freshwater aquifers; 2) increased flexibility and more geologic options for siting; 3) access to deep formations with persistent and sustained reducing conditions. In addition there are a number of safety elements related specifically to the horizontal repository geometry including: 1) passive direction of thermally driven fluid and radionuclide movement away from the vertical access hole and toward the 'dead end' portion of the repository; 2) mitigation of seismic hazards by orienting repositories parallel to local and regional fault structures. In this paper we explore and discuss some of the key technologic, geologic and hydrologic elements that support the deep horizontal borehole safety case. The stalemate seen across the globe on the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste can be broken. Deep Isolation offers a novel option for safe, secure, and permanent deep geological disposal of nuclear waste that can be developed as centralized repositories or adapted to smaller regional or site-specific repositories located near waste sources. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Execution Strategy Analysis (ESA) Origin Sites Readiness Model - 19073

This is a technical paper that does not take into account the contractual limitations under the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (Standard Contract) (10 CFR Part 961). Under the provisions of the Standard Contract, DOE does not consider spent nuclear fuel in multi-assembly canisters to be an acceptable waste form, absent a mutually agreed to contract amendment. To the extent discussions or recommendations in this paper conflict with the provisions of the Standard Contract, the Standard Contract provisions prevail. The DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD) Integrated Waste Management System (IWMS) program is developing an Execution Strategy Analysis (ESA) Origin Sites Readiness Model using the Goldsim{sup TM} software application to provide information on potential future approaches for removing SNF and HLW from origin sites such as commercial nuclear power plant sites. The purpose of this ESA model is to apply integrated waste management system analysis, system engineering, and decision analysis principles to inform future decisions regarding potential future nuclear waste management system architectures. The ESA Origin Sites Readiness Model is a dynamic simulation modeling capability. It is developed for use in the analysis and comparison of potential future implementation strategies associated with an integrated nuclear waste management program. The model is designed to be independent of the destination of the SNF or HLW so the results from the Origin Sites Readiness Model are equally applicable to a wide range of scenarios involving shipments to generic destinations in an integrated waste management system. The model explicitly takes significant assumptions, uncertainties, and risks into account. Currently, the ESA Origin Sites Readiness Model includes 14 shutdown sites (Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Vermont Yankee, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Zion, Kewaunee, Fort Calhoun, Trojan, Rancho Seco, Humboldt Bay, San Onofre, and Crystal River) and is designed to be modular so that other sites can be added in the future. The model also includes multiple transportation modes (heavy haul truck, rail, and barge), activities related to the acquisition of transportation assets such as railcars and transportation casks, and site-specific considerations of on-site and near-site transportation infrastructure. The model was developed using the ESA process with Subject Matter Experts (SME); it incorporates uncertainty and risks and provides a structured, systematic methodology for evaluating potential SNF campaign scenarios. The model also complements other system-level logistics tools being developed by SFWD. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗