Engineering topics
Viswanathan, Arun
Publications and source records attributed to Viswanathan, Arun.
A Systems Approach to Analyzing Cyber-Physical Threats in the Smart Grid
This paper presents a systems analysis approach to characterizing the risk of a Smart Grid to a load-drop attack. A characterization of the risk is necessary for the design of detection and remediation strategies to address the consequences of such attacks. Using concepts from systems health management and system engineering, this work (a) first identifies metrics that can be used to generate constraints for security features, and (b) lays out an end-to-end integrated methodology using separate network and power simulations to assess system risk. We demonstrate our approach by performing a systems-style analysis of a load-drop attack implemented over the AMI subsystem and targeted at destabilizing the underlying power grid.
Mission-centric cyber security assessment of critical systems
We present a novel model-based, mission-centric approach to perform cyber security assessments for evaluating the impact of low-level cyber events on high-level mission objectives.We demonstrate the benefits of our approach using a system model and attack trees specific to the command-and-control system of a spacecraft. Specifically, we demonstrate how our approach enables a decision-maker to assess the security posture of the system, identify necessary mitigations and prioritize their deployment.
Mission-Centric Cyber Security Assessment of Critical Systems
No abstract available
Analyzing Resiliency of the Smart Grid Communication Architectures
Smart grids are susceptible to cyber-attack as a result of new communication, control and computation techniques employed in the grid. In this paper, we characterize and analyze the resiliency of smart grid communication architecture, specifically an RF mesh based architecture, under cyber attacks. We analyze the resiliency of the communication architecture by studying the performance of high-level smart grid functions such as metering, and demand response which depend on communication. Disrupting the operation of these functions impacts the operational resiliency of the smart grid. Our analysis shows that it takes an attacker only a small fraction of meters to compromise the communication resiliency of the smart grid. We discuss the implications of our result to critical smart grid functions and to the overall security of the smart grid.
Deconstructing the Assessment of Anomaly-based Intrusion Detectors for Critical Applications
Anomaly detection is a key strategy for cyber intrusion detection because it is conceptually capable of detecting novel attacks. This makes it an appealing defensive technique for environments such as the nation's critical infrastructures that is currently facing increased cyber adversarial activity. When considering deployment within the purview of such critical infrastructures it is imperative that the technology is well understood and reliable, where its performance is benchmarked on the results of principled assessments. This paper works towards such an imperative by analyzing the current state of anomaly detector assessments with a view toward mission critical deployments. We compile a framework of key evaluation constructs that identify how and where current assessment methods may fall short in providing sufficient insight into detector performance characteristics. Within the context of three case studies from literature, we show how error factors that influence the performance of detectors interact with different phases of a canonical evaluation strategy to compromise the integrity of the final results.
Towards Reliable Evaluation of Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection Performance
This report describes the results of research into the effects of environment-induced noise on the evaluation process for anomaly detectors in the cyber security domain. This research was conducted during a 10-week summer internship program from the 19th of August, 2012 to the 23rd of August, 2012 at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California. The research performed lies within the larger context of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) Smart Grid cyber security project, a Department of Energy (DoE) funded effort involving the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology and the University of Southern California/ Information Sciences Institute. The results of the present effort constitute an important contribution towards building more rigorous evaluation paradigms for anomaly-based intrusion detectors in complex cyber physical systems such as the Smart Grid. Anomaly detection is a key strategy for cyber intrusion detection and operates by identifying deviations from profiles of nominal behavior and are thus conceptually appealing for detecting "novel" attacks. Evaluating the performance of such a detector requires assessing: (a) how well it captures the model of nominal behavior, and (b) how well it detects attacks (deviations from normality). Current evaluation methods produce results that give insufficient insight into the operation of a detector, inevitably resulting in a significantly poor characterization of a detectors performance. In this work, we first describe a preliminary taxonomy of key evaluation constructs that are necessary for establishing rigor in the evaluation regime of an anomaly detector. We then focus on clarifying the impact of the operational environment on the manifestation of attacks in monitored data. We show how dynamic and evolving environments can introduce high variability into the data stream perturbing detector performance. Prior research has focused on understanding the impact of this variability in training data for anomaly detectors, but has ignored variability in the attack signal that will necessarily affect the evaluation results for such detectors. We posit that current evaluation strategies implicitly assume that attacks always manifest in a stable manner; we show that this assumption is wrong. We describe a simple experiment to demonstrate the effects of environmental noise on the manifestation of attacks in data and introduce the notion of attack manifestation stability. Finally, we argue that conclusions about detector performance will be unreliable and incomplete if the stability of attack manifestation is not accounted for in the evaluation strategy.