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Varaiya, Pravin

Publications and source records attributed to Varaiya, Pravin.

Selling Demand Response Using Options

Wholesale electricity markets in many jurisdictions use a two-settlement structure: a day-ahead market for bulk power transactions and a real-time market for fine-grain supply-demand balancing. This paper explores trading demand response assets within this two-settlement market structure. Here, we consider two approaches for trading demand response assets: (a) an intermediate spot market with contingent pricing, and (b) an over-the-counter options contract. In the first case, we characterize the competitive equilibrium of the spot market, and show that it is socially optimal. Economic orthodoxy advocates spot markets, but these require expensive infrastructure and regulatory blessing. In the second case, we characterize competitive equilibria and compare its efficiency with the idealized spot market. Options contract are private bilateral over-the-counter transactions and do not require regulatory approval. We show that the optimal social welfare is, in general, not supported. We then design optimal option prices that minimize the social welfare gap. This optimal design serves to approximate the ideal spot market for demand response using options with modest loss of efficiency. Our results are validated through numerical simulations.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Regulating TNCs: Should Uber and Lyft set their own rules?

We evaluate the impact of three proposed regulations of transportation network companies (TNCs) like Uber, Lyft and Didi: (1) A minimum wage for drivers, (2) a cap on the number of drivers or vehicles, and (3) a per-trip congestion tax. The impact is assessed using a queuing theoretic equilibrium model which incorporates the stochastic dynamics of the app-based ride-hailing matching platform, the ride prices and driver wages established by the platform, and the incentives of passengers and drivers. We show that a floor placed under driver earnings can push the ride-hailing platform to hire more drivers and offer more rides, at the same time that passengers enjoy faster rides and lower total cost, while platform rents are reduced. Contrary to standard competitive labor market theory, enforcing a minimum wage for drivers benefits both drivers and passengers, and promotes the efficiency of the entire system. This surprising outcome holds for almost all model parameters, and it occurs because the wage floor curbs TNC labor market power. In contrast to a wage floor, imposing a cap on the number of vehicles hurts drivers, because the platform reaps all the benefits of limiting supply. The congestion tax has the expected impact: fares increase, wages and platform revenue decrease. Here, we also construct variants of the model to briefly discuss platform subsidy, platform competition, and autonomous vehicles.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Mechanism Design for Demand Response Programs

Demand response (DR) programs serve to reduce the consumption of electricity at times when the supply is scarce and expensive. Consumers or agents with flexible consumption profiles are recruited by an aggregator who manages the DR program. The aggregator calls on a subset of its pool of recruited agents to reduce their electricity use during DR events. Agents are paid for reducing their energy consumption from contractually established baselines. Baselines are counter-factual consumption estimates of the energy an agent would have consumed if they were not participating in the DR program. Baselines are used to determine payments to agents. This creates an incentive for agents to inflate their baselines in order to increase the payments they receive. There are several newsworthy cases of agents gaming their baseline for economic benefit. We propose a novel self-reported baseline mechanism (SRBM) where each agent reports its baseline and marginal utility. These reports are strategic and need not be truthful. Based on the reported information, the aggregator selects or calls on agents with a certain probability to meet the load reduction target. Called agents are paid for observed reductions from their self-reported baselines. Agents who are not called face penalties for consumption shortfalls below their baselines. Under SRBM, we show that truthful reporting of baseline consumption and marginal utility is a dominant strategy. Thus, SRBM eliminates the incentive for agents to inflate baselines. SRBM is assured to meet the load reduction target. To conclude, we show that SRBM is almost optimal in the metric of average cost of DR provision faced by the aggregator.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Sharing Storage in a Smart Grid: A Coalitional Game Approach

Sharing economy is a transformative socio-economic phenomenon built around the idea of sharing underused resources and services, e.g., transportation and housing, thereby reducing costs and extracting value. Anticipating continued reduction in the cost of electricity storage, we look into the potential opportunity in electrical power system where consumers share storage with each other. We consider two different scenarios. In the first scenario, consumers are assumed to already have individual storage devices and they explore cooperation to minimize the realized electricity consumption cost. In the second scenario, a group of consumers is interested to invest in joint storage capacity and operate it cooperatively. The resulting system problems are modeled using cooperative game theory. Finally, in both cases, the cooperative games are shown to have non-empty cores and we develop efficient cost allocations in the core with analytical expressions. Thus, sharing of storage in cooperative manner is shown to be very effective for the electric power system.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Analysis of Solar Energy Aggregation Under Various Billing Mechanisms

Ongoing reductions in the cost of solar photovoltaic (PV) systems are driving increased installations by residential households. Various incentive programs such as feed-in tariff, net metering, net purchase, and sale that allow the prosumers to sell their generated electricity to the grid are also powering this trend. In this paper, we investigate sharing of PV systems among a community of households, who can also benefit further by pooling their production. Using cooperative game theory, we find conditions under which such sharing decreases their net total cost. We also develop allocation rules such that the joint net electricity consumption cost is allocated to the participants. These cost allocations are based on the cost causation principle. The allocations also satisfy the standalone cost principle and promote PV solar aggregation. Here, we also perform a comparative analytical study on the benefit of sharing under the mechanisms favorable for sharing, namely net metering, and net purchase and sale. The results are illustrated in a case study using real consumption data from a residential community in Austin, TX, USA.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗