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Streeper, Charles

Publications and source records attributed to Streeper, Charles.

Sustainable Security through International Source Repatriation - 19659

Ensuring that there is a viable pathway for characterizing, transporting, and disposing of disused radioactive sealed sources (sources) is essential to any end-of-life management strategy. The Off-Site Source Recovery Program, sponsored by the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Radiological Security, provides permanent and sustained threat reduction through the secure removal and repatriation of disused sealed radioactive sources of United States origin at international locations. With over two decades of operations, the Off-Site Source Recovery Program has developed source removal processes and techniques to ensure the compliant, effective and timely disposition of the material. For device disassembly support, the program subcontracts vendors qualified and experienced in source extraction from devices. United States origin source repatriations provide for permanent threat reduction and reduce their overall global footprint. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

OSRP Source Repatriations-Case Studies: Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's (GTRI) Offsite Source Recovery Project (OSRP) began recovering excess and unwanted radioactive sealed sources (sources) in 1999. As of February 2012, the project had recovered over 30,000 sources totaling over 820,000 Ci. OSRP grew out of early efforts at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to recover disused excess Plutonium- 239 (Pu-239) sources that were distributed in the 1960's and 1970's under the Atoms for Peace Program. Source recovery was initially considered a waste management activity. However, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the interagency community began to recognize that excess and unwanted radioactive sealed sources pose a national security threat, particularly those that lack a disposition path. After OSRP's transfer to the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to be part of GTRI, its mission was expanded to include all disused sealed sources that might require national security consideration. Recognizing the transnational threat posed by porous borders and the ubiquitous nature of sources, GTRI/OSRP repatriates U.S. origin sources based on threat reduction prioritization criteria. For example, several recent challenging source repatriation missions have been conducted by GTRI/OSRP in South America. These include the repatriation of a significant amount of Cs-137 and other isotopes from Brazil; re-packaging of conditioned Ra-226 sources in Ecuador for future repatriation; and, multilateral cooperation in the consolidation and export of Canadian, US, and Indian Co-60/Cs-137 sources from Uruguay. In addition, cooperation with regulators and private source owners in other countries presents opportunities for GTRI/OSRP to exchange best practices for managing disused sources. These positive experiences often result in long-term cooperation and information sharing with key foreign counterparts. International source recovery operations are essential to the preservation of U.S. national security interests. They are also mutually beneficial for fostering positive relationships with other governments and private industry, and demonstrate that responsible end-of-life options are given to legacy U.S.-origin sources in other countries. GTRI/OSRP does not take back sources that have a viable path for commercial disposal. Most US origin sources were sold commercially and were not provided by the US government. Below is a synopsis of cooperative efforts with Brazil, Ecuador, and Uruguay. Bilateral and multilateral efforts have been successful in removing hundreds of U.S.origin sealed radioactive sources from Latin American countries to the U.S. As many disused sources remain in the region, and since repatriation is not always an option, GTRI will continue to work with those countries to ensure that these sources are stored securely for the long-term. Successful Latin America operations should serve as a model for other regional cooperation in the repatriation of sealed sources, encouraging other source exporting countries to implement similar programs. Securing and removing sources, both domestically and internationally, is crucial to strengthening the life-cycle management of radioactive sources worldwide. Such efforts not only prevent these materials from being used maliciously, but also address public health and safety concerns, and under-gird the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Compilation of presentations: LANL-NRSS-Institute of Physics: radiological source technical cooperation

A workshop was held in Tibilisi, Republic of Georgia February 7-8,2011 to discuss and train personnel on various instrumentation provided to the Nuclear Radiation Service and the Institute of Physics by the United States Global Threat Reduction Initiative. Instruments provided have been reviewed and approved via the local customs office. The instruments include: (1) Ludlum 3030E Smear Counters; (2) Ludlum 2360 Rate meter/Scalars; (3) Ludlum model 4310 detectors; (4) Arrow Tech Direct Reading Dosimeters and chargers; (5) ThermoFisher Scientific Mk2 Electronic Personal Dosimeter (EPD); (6) ThermoFisher Scientific EASYEPD2 configuration software; and (7) Associated support equipment, cables, planchets, etc. During the course of the training several power point briefs will be delivered. These briefs include theory of operation, operation, maintenance, calibration and configuration of the instruments described above. Several table top scenarios will be conducted during the training to reinforce the training material presented in the slides.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Workshop introduction

The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) has three subprograms that directly reduce the nuclear/radiological threat; Convert (Highly Enriched Uranium), Protect (Facilities), and Remove (Materials). The primary mission of the Off-Site Source Recovery Project (OSRP) falls under the 'Remove' subset. The purpose of this workshop is to provide a venue for joint-technical collaboration between the OSRP and the Nuclear Radiation Safety Service (NRSS). Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative and the Soviet equivalent both promoted the spread of the paradoxical (peaceful and harmful) properties of the atom. The focus of nonproliferation efforts has been rightly dedicated to fissile materials and the threat they pose. Continued emphasis on radioactive materials must also be encouraged. An unquantifiable threat still exists in the prolific quantity of sealed radioactive sources (sources) spread worldwide. It does not appear that the momentum of the evolution in the numerous beneficial applications of radioactive sources will subside in the near future. Numerous expert studies have demonstrated the potentially devastating economic and psychological impacts of terrorist use of a radiological dispersal or emitting device. The development of such a weapon, from the acquisition of the material to the technical knowledge needed to develop and use it, is straightforward. There are many documented accounts worldwide of accidental and purposeful diversions of radioactive materials from regulatory control. The burden of securing sealed sources often falls upon the source owner, who may not have a disposal pathway once the source reaches the end of its useful life. This disposal problem is exacerbated by some source owners not having the resources to safely and compliantly store them. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) data suggests that, in the US alone, there are tens of thousands of high-activity (IAEA Category I and II) sources in thousands of devices; and there are many more tens of thousands of smaller sources scattered among thousands of other NRC licensees. As a result of the ubiquitous nature and undeterminable number of current and legacy sources, even in developed countries they can be abandoned, disposed of in a haphazard manner, lost, stolen, and/or otherwise fallout of regulatory control. Supply and demand of sources, being market based, is more or less fluid. Normative security of radioactive sources exists, but varies in each country, and is loosely implemented through non-legally binding recommendations and standards provided by International Atomic Energy Agency technical documents and cooperation and through bilateral efforts such as this workshop where we share best-practices with one another. Much of the reason for the difficulty in securing sealed sources rests in the enormous need for their beneficial applications in the medical, industrial, and agricultural sectors. Alternative technologies to replace high-risk sources continue to be explored, but very few of these alternative solutions have reached the development stage for common usage and distribution. The beneficial uses of sources must be allowed to continue; however, to minimize the potential for their misuse, current controls and regulating mechanisms must be constantly evaluated to ensure the benefits gained outweigh potential risks. From a global perspective, an evaluation and modification of requirements over the entire life cycle of sources from their manufacture to their final disposition is required. The proper removal and disposal of vulnerable disused or orphan sources is essential to maintaining a safe operating environment. One of our goals in this workshop is to share our methodologies for recovering sources and learn how they differ or are similar to the challenges faced in recovering, storing, and disposing of sources in the Republic of Georgia . The suggestions we will make are flexible in allowing for the imperfect situations and capabilities we have all encountered in source recovery efforts. We have designed a table-top exercise specifically to address your concerns about the prevention and mitigation of contaminated facilities, soil, containers, and sources. Our discussion begins with an overview and video of the OSRP along with a brief on our projects ongoing international cooperation and activities. A presentation will be given by the NRSS illustrating the successes and challenges of source management in Georgia. A brief overview will be given of selected significant cases of the intentional misuse of sources. This will be followed by two comprehensive discussions focusing on the decontamination from the facility perspective down to the issues of container and source leakage. The second day will begin with the abovementioned table-top exercise on contamination control. On the third day, a second presentation from the NRSS will open up the session.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

U.S.-CHINA RADIOLOGICAL SOURCE SECURITY PROJECT: CONTINUING AND EXPANDING BILATERAL COOPERATION

The successful radiological security cooperation between the U.S. and China to secure at-risk sites near venues of the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics has led to an expanded bilateral nonproliferation cooperation scope. The U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, the Chinese Atomic Energy Authority and the China Ministry of Environmental Protection are continuing joint efforts to secure radiological sources throughout China under the U.S.-China Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology (PUNT) Agreement. Joint cooperation activities include physical security upgrades of sites with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Category 1 radiological sources, packaging, recovery, and storage of high activity transuranic and beta gamma sources, and secure transportation practices for the movement of recovered sources. Expansion of cooperation into numerous provinces within China includes the use of integrated training workshops that will demonstrate methodologies and best practices between U.S. and Chinese radiological source security and recovery experts. The fiscal year 2009 expanded scope of cooperation will be conducted similar to the 2008 Olympic cooperation with the Global Threat Reduction Initiative taking the lead for the U.S., PUNT being the umbrella agreement, and Los Alamos, Sandia, and Oak Ridge National Laboratories operating as technical working groups. This paper outlines the accomplishments of the joint implementation and training efforts to date and discusses the possible impact on future U.S./China cooperation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗