Engineering topics

Stevens, Jennifer

Publications and source records attributed to Stevens, Jennifer.

5 records

DOE OSTI2024

Machine learning and deep learning tools for the automated capture of cancer surveillance data

The National Cancer Institute and the Department of Energy strategic partnership applies advanced computing and predictive machine learning and deep learning models to automate the capture of information from unstructured clinical text for inclusion in cancer registries. Applications include extraction of key data elements from pathology reports, determination of whether a pathology or radiology report is related to cancer, extraction of relevant biomarker information, and identification of recurrence. With the growing complexity of cancer diagnosis and treatment, capturing essential information with purely manual methods is increasingly difficult. These new methods for applying advanced computational capabilities to automate data extraction represent an opportunity to close critical information gaps and create a nimble, flexible platform on which new information sources, such as genomics, can be added. This will ultimately provide a deeper understanding of the drivers of cancer and outcomes in the population and increase the timeliness of reporting. These advances will enable better understanding of how real-world patients are treated and the outcomes associated with those treatments in the context of our complex medical and social environment.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

NASA NTRS2016

In the Hot Seat: STS-115 Lightning Strike Stand Down Debate - NASA Case Study

There is no way the PIC's could have seen any current' was the gist of Mike Griffin's assessment. Griffin was the NASA Administrator at the time. The buck stopped at his desk. Holding a napkin out to Pat Lampton, Griffin showed Lampton the calculations he'd made over dinner that predicted that the Pyrotechnic Initiator Controllers (PIC's) at the base of the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) were fine. A lightning strike the day before, the worst ever experienced with a Space Shuttle on the launch pad, caused a halt to the launch count down as technicians, engineers, and managers scrambled identify any damage to the launch system. SRB technicians and engineers assessed the data against their Lightning Strike Re-Test Requirements, determining that all but one of the requirements could be checked if they resumed the countdown. For the one remaining requirement, testing the integrity of the PIC's would require 96 hours to set up, test, and reassemble. The engineers were convinced that there was no way to do calculations to show the PIC's were okay. The only option was to stand down. It was SRB Deputy Project Manager (PM) Pat Lampton's responsibility to decide what the SRB project position needed to be to certify that their hardware was safe to fly. He had to communicate that decision to the Mission Management Team (MMT) as a Go or No Go position to resume the count down. If the answer was Go they could still meet a delayed, but acceptable launch schedule. If the answer was No Go, rescheduling the launch would be a grueling shuffling of hardware, personnel, and mission timelines to accommodate Russian missions to the Space Station, supplies for the launch, and personnel manning launch operations. On top of that, Hurricane Ernesto was spinning off the coast of Florida, threatening the need for the Shuttle to roll back to the hangar if they waited too long.

Kummer, Lizette↗

NASA NTRS2016

Tethered Space Satellite-1 (TSS-1): Wound About a Bolt

In the early 1990's US and Italian scientists collaborated to study the electrodynamics on a long tether between two satellites as it moved through the electrically charged portion of Earth's atmosphere called the ionosphere. Potential uses for the electrical current induced in the long wire include power and thrust generation for a satellite, momentum exchange, artificial gravity, deployment of sensors or antennas, and gravity-gradient stabilization. The Tethered Space Satellite (TSS) was a first-of-its-kind experiment with long tethers in space. It consisted of a satellite with science experiments attached to a 12.5 mile long, very thin (0.10 inch diameter) copper wire assembly wound around a spool in the deployer reel mechanism. The whole mechanism sits on a pallet that is installed into the Shuttle bay. At an altitude of 160 nautical miles above earth, the satellite would be deplodeployed from the Shuttle bay by raising it on a boom facing away from Earth. Once cleared of the bay, the deployer mechanism would slowly feed out the 12-plus miles of tether. Scientific data would be collected throughout the operation, after which the satellite would be reeled back in. A receiver spool to catch the 12.5 mile tether as it was being unwound by the deployer reel mechanism was set up to do the system-level test of deployer real mechanism prior to installing the loaded pallet into the Shuttle bay. The system level tests were required before the pallet could be installed into the Space Shuttle cargo bay. A few months before flight, the system level tests, including unreeling and reeling the tether, were completed at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and the TSS payload was installed onto the Spacelab pallet. Some of this testing equipment was then shipped back to the contractor, Martin Marietta. Integration with the Shuttle began. Systems-level load analyses, which cannot be run until all information about each payload is finalized, was run in parallel with the physical integration of the hardware into the Shuttle payload bay. An analysis, called Coupled loads analysis, incorporates any updates to the model due to system level tests of all the different payloads, and any changes that were found during integration. Engineering analysis examines the worst case scenarios for the loads the hardware will see. The two times during the mission where the dynamic loads are the worst were 1) the first 10-second portion of Shuttle lift off, and 2) a 2-second time during landing when the landing gears hit the ground. The coupled loads analysis using the final verification loads showed that a single bolt attaching the deployer reel mechanism to the support structure had a "negative margin" - which is an indication that it might fail - during touch down. Hardware certification rules do not allow for hardware to fly with negative margins. A structural failure of one payload could have serious or catastrophic consequences to other payloads, or may significantly damage the Orbiter. The issue had to be resolved before the flight.

O'Connor, Brian↗

NASA NTRS2016

Tethered Space Satellite-1 (TSS-1): Technical Roundabouts

In the early 1990's US and Italian scientists collaborated to study the electrodynamics of dragging a satellite on a tether through the electrically charged portion of Earth's atmosphere called the ionosphere. An electrical current induced in the long wire could be used for power and thrust generation for a satellite. Other tether uses include momentum exchange, artificial gravity, deployment of sensors or antennas, and gravity-gradient stabilization for satellites. Before the Tethered Space Satellite (TSS-1), no long tether had ever been flown, so many questions existed on how it would actually behave. The TSS consisted of a satellite with science experiments attached to a 12.5 mile long, very thin (0.10 inch diameter) copper wire assembly wound around a spool in the deployer reel mechanism. With the Space Shuttle at an altitude of 160 nautical miles above earth, the satellite was to be deployed by raising it from the Shuttle bay on a boom facing away from Earth. Once cleared of the bay, the deployer mechanism was to slowly feed out the 12-plus miles of tether. Scientific data would be collected throughout the operation, after which the satellite would be reeled back in. Pre-flight testing system level tests involved setting up a tether receiver to catch the 12.5 mile tether onto another reel as it was being unwound by the deployer reel mechanism. Testing only the reel mechanism is straightforward. This test becomes more complicated when the TSS is mounted on the flight pallet at Kennedy Space Center (KSC). The system level tests must be passed before the pallet can be installed into the Space Shuttle cargo bay. A few months before flight, the TSS payload had been integrated onto the Spacelab pallet and system level tests, including unreeling and reeling the tether, had been successfully completed. Some of this testing equipment was then shipped back to the contractor Martin Marietta. Systems-level load analyses, which cannot be run until all information about each payload is finalized, was run in parallel with the physical integration of the hardware into the Shuttle payload bay. The coupled loads analysis, as it is called, incorporates any updates to the model due to system level tests, and any changes that were found during integration. The coupled loads analysis revealed that a single bolt attaching the deployer reel mechanism to the support structure had a "negative margin" - which is an indication that it might fail during operation. Hardware certification rules do not allow for hardware to fly with negative margins, so this issue had to be resolved before the flight. Since there is conservatism in engineering analysis, there is an option to "waive" the margin requirement, and fly the experiment as is. On the other hand, a structural failure of one payload could have serious or catastrophic consequences to other payloads and possibly the mission. Minor design changes or fixes might be feasible within the payload bay prior to launch. Any major design changes that required the spooling test to validate the hardware, or for the pallet to be removed, would cause TSS not to be ready for the Shuttle launch.

O'Connor, Brian↗

NASA NTRS2016

After Math - Foamology and Flight Rationale

The Space Shuttle was developed by NASA to be a largely reusable launch system which could provide frequent access to low earth orbit. Like all previous launch systems, safe reentry for the crew and payload required the use of a thermal protection system (TPS). Unlike previous spacecraft though, the Shuttle's TPS was exposed from launch, making it sensitive to debris which could be generated by the vehicle on ascent. The most likely and potentially destructive source of debris was considered to be ice, which could build-up anywhere on the External Tank (ET) where there was exposed metal. Ice could form during ground operations after the cryogenic propellants had been loaded and then be knocked loose on ascent. In order to prevent both ice build-up and boil-off of the propellants, the entire ET and all protuberances (orbiter attach points, pressurization lines, propellant feed lines, etc.) were covered with a spray on foam insulation (SOFI) type TPS. Unfortunately the foam was also susceptible to liberation during ascent, and posed a debris risk of its own. During the early years of the Shuttle Program engineers spent a good deal of effort characterizing the amount of foam that was shed.

Steva, Thomas↗