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Stern, Warren

Publications and source records attributed to Stern, Warren.

Recommendations for harmonized reporting of radiation Dosimetry by adoption of Compatibility in Irradiation Research Protocols Expert Roundtable (CIRPER)

Here, in radiobiology, radiation physics, and related areas, there is growing interest in transitioning from cesium-based irradiators to X-ray technologies. Therefore, it makes it imperative for reproducibility purposes, for researchers to provide specifications regarding device parameters, machine calibration details, and experimental setup when innovative X-ray technology is being employed. Several groups have already identified a glaring lack in completeness of critical information on experimental setups, equipment, and physical parameters in published radiation biology studies. The Alternative Technologies Meta Study Report by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) examined 456 manuscripts published between 2017-2021. Only 64 of the reviewed studies (14.0%) consistently reported methods that could allow for replication of their studies. However, 85% provided information on the manufacturer, the irradiator model and the absorbed radiation dose. Approximately 66% provided information on the energy spectra and the dose rate, but only one third disclosed the filter used. Less than 15% of the reviewed studies reported information on calibration and field geometry, specifically field size and distance from source, which are critical parameters in determining the absorbed radiation dose.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

A Better Method to Calculate Fuel Burnup in Pebble Bed Reactors Using Machine Learning

Burnup measurement is an important step in material control and accountancy (MC&A) at nuclear reactors, and may be done by examining gamma spectra of fuel samples. Traditional approaches rely on known correlations to specific photopeaks (e.g. 137 Cs) and operate via a standard linear regression method. However, the quality of these regression methods is limited even in the best case, and is significantly poorer at short fuel cool-down times, due to the elevated radiation background by short life-time isotopes, and self-shielding effect of the fuel. For practical operation of pebble bed reactors (PBRs), quick measurements (in minutes) and short cooling times (in hours) are required from a safety and security perspective. We investigated the efficacy and performance of machine learning (ML) methods to predict the burnup of the pebble fuel from full gamma spectra (rather than specific discrete photopeaks) and found a full-spectrum ML approach to far outperform baseline regression predictions in all measurement and cooling conditions - including in operational-like measurement conditions. We also performed model and data ablation experiments to determine the relative performance impact of our ML methods' capacity to model data nonlinearities and the inherent additional information in full spectra. Applying our ML methods, we found a number of surprising results, including improved accuracy at shorter fuel cooling times (the opposite of the norm), remarkable robustness to spectrum compression (via rebinning), and competitive burnup predictions even when using background signal only (i.e. explicitly omitting known isotope photopeaks).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Alternative Technologies Meta Study Report

Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) was tasked to conduct a meta-study to assess peer-reviewed published, in-vivo murine, radiation biology studies that utilize X-ray irradiators. The study is intended to support a more general effort to facilitate the adoption of X-ray technologies to identify best practices that can be implemented by potential adopters, or those who are still unfamiliar with X-ray technology. The meta-study identified over 450 published papers in the last four years (September 2017 through August 2021). The review builds upon the more extensive meta-study published by the Draeger Report (June 2019) and facilitates a more recent assessment of methodological practices in the use of X-ray irradiators.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Alternative Technologies Adopters Outreach Survey Report

Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), in collaboration with Ioanna Iliopulos and Christopher Boyd (independent contractors), conducted quantitative and qualitative surveys to document views and opinions of scientists and researchers with firsthand experience operating x-ray devices for a wide range of research applications. The goal of the study was to fill critical information gaps and identify misconceptions widely held among the research community regarding the transition from Cesium-137 irradiators to x-ray devices. The survey instrument focused on three distinct yet interrelated areas that impact users' experience: operational impacts, including infrastructure needs, workflow, personnel management, and training, and regulatory compliance; research design and investigation impacts, including calibration, dosimetry, continuity of previous studies, development of new research agendas, and the outcomes for both; and funding impacts, specifically how grant sources and opportunities have responded to the transition.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Using machine learning to improve efficiency and accuracy of burnup measurements at PBR reactors [Slides]

The outline of the slides include: Motivations of the work; Modeling and simulation; Machine learning model; Results and comparison study with linear regression; and Conclusions. This work was done to help PBR designers and operators understand the burnup measurement better. We look forward to discussing the results in detail with industrial collaborators.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Enhancing the Useability of the IAEA's Physical Model: An Analysis of User Feedback

This study presents the results of Physical Model user interviews conducted with 12 people who have International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards experience. The goal of this report is to provide additional context for policy makers when prioritizing the needs of the IAEA regarding support for enhancements to the Physical Model. The interviews covered the general usability of the Physical Model, its effectiveness as a technical reference, and the scope and utility of the Physical Model's indicators and content. The key conclusions from these interviews are as follows: 1) The Physical Model is difficult to find and not well advertised. 2) The Physical Model can be difficult to use due to its format, which makes searching for information difficult, and lack of visual content. Therefore, the Physical Model should be supported in multiple formats (print, PDF, web) to maximize its usability for different stakeholders. 3) The scope of the Physical Model's content and indicators is likely sufficient, and translating indicators into other languages is unlikely to be worth the effort. 4) Despite its inefficiencies and other issues, the Physical Model in its current form is a vital (albeit under-utilized) resource for key stakeholders. 5) Despite its broad use case the Physical Model is not a catch-all tool and force-fitting the Physical Model into functions for which it has not been designed for would likely diminish its value. 6) It can be difficult to disentangle challenges related to the Physical Model and its usability from broader challenges at the Agency, such as general issues with communication and coordination. Based on these conclusions and considering the results of past studies on the Physical Model funded by NA-241, the analysis team developed a list of recommendations and associated actions for IAEA consideration. These recommendations are prioritized based on the assessed level of difficulty for the IAEA to implement a recommendation, emphasizing low hanging fruit then building to more ambitious changes to the Physical Model's format and content.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

VERIFICATION OF TRISO FUEL BURNUP USING MACHINE LEARNING ALGORITHMS

Pebble Bed Reactors are fueled with fuel pebbles that are circulated multiple times through the reactor vessel before discharge. During the normal operation of a PBR, ejected pebbles are returned to the reactor or discharged depending on the fuel burnup and physical condition of the pebbles. The burnup measurement is usually based on detected radiation signatures of fission products accumulated in the pebble fuel over burnup. Previous research has shown that height of photopeaks of fission products, such as 134Cs, 137Cs, 154Eu, etc., can be used independently or in combination to infer or predict the level of burnup in the fuel. However, it remains challenging to measure such complex sources due to self-shielding effects, strong radiation background and intervening materials. Another operational challenge is the required high throughput of burnup measurement, which necessitates limited measurement time and thus impacts quality of measured gamma-ray spectra. Hence, advanced spectral analysis methods are needed to analyze the noisy gamma spectra and predict the burnup values. We propose to use machine learning (ML) method to interpret gamma-ray spectra and predict the burnup values of the pebbles. ML has achieved widespread success and adoption across a few domains that require pattern recognition and analysis in varied data types. In this work, we apply three proven ML approaches - multilayer perceptrons, convolutional neural networks, and transformers - to the task of predicting fuel burnup from measured gamma spectra, and compile a dataset of simulated spectra for training and validation of the ML models. In this paper, we will discuss the network architecture of these three ML approaches and compare the performance of the simplest of these (MLP) to a standard linear regression.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Verification of Triso Fuel Burnup Using Machine Learning Algorithms

Pebble Bed Reactors are fueled with fuel pebbles that are circulated multiple times through the reactor vessel before discharge. During the normal operation of a PBR, ejected pebbles are returned to the reactor or discharged depending on the fuel burnup and physical condition of the pebbles. The burnup measurement is usually based on detected radiation signatures of fission products accumulated in the pebble fuel over burnup. Previous research has shown that height of photopeaks of fission products, such as 134 Cs, 137 Cs, 154 Eu, etc., can be used independently or in combination to infer or predict the level of burnup in the fuel. However, it remains challenging to measure such complex sources due to self-shielding effects, strong radiation background and intervening materials. Another operational challenge is the required high throughput of burnup measurement, which necessitates limited measurement time and thus impacts quality of measured gamma-ray spectra. Hence, advanced spectral analysis methods are needed to analyze the noisy gamma spectra and predict the burnup values. We propose to use machine learning (ML) method to interpret gamma-ray spectra and predict the burnup values of the pebbles. ML has achieved widespread success and adoption across a few domains that require pattern recognition and analysis in varied data types. In this work, we apply three proven ML approaches - multilayer perceptrons, convolutional neural networks, and transformers - to the task of predicting fuel burnup from measured gamma spectra, and compile a dataset of simulated spectra for training and validation of the ML models. In this paper, we will discuss the network architecture of these three ML approaches and compare the performance of the simplest of these (MLP) to a standard linear regression.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Establishing a sustainable regulatory framework for the security of radioactive sources through harmonization with a safety regulatory framework

In order to establish and maintain sustainable nuclear security regulatory infrastructures for radioactive sources, it is important for States to develop nuclear security regulations with regulatory requirements and relevant criteria for security, which are consistent and well integrated with those for radiation safety. In establishing national regulations, experts worldwide follow the international recommendations on safety and security of radioactive sources published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Within the IAEA publications on safety and security of radioactive sources, some international recommendations are identical or very similar for both safety and security, for example, the requirement for the establishment of a national registry of radioactive sources. However, some other international recommendations are unique to the security area, such as the recommendation to examine the trustworthiness of employees, or to the safety area, such as the need to establish public exposure controls. Additionally, many international recommendations fall somewhere in between, such as the need for effective authorization of facilities and activities, a regulatory inspection and enforcement regime and the graded approach to establish and apply regulatory requirements. This paper examines how the IAEA international recommendations for establishing regulatory frameworks for safety and security relate to one another.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Science and Engineering Team Repository Selection and Validation

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD), Science and Engineering Team (SET) has engaged Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) in the selection, development and management of a knowledge management platform. This platform will serve as a repository for programmatic documents, data, and other relevant files. In support of this effort, BNL implemented a sixteen-month process to ensure the selection of the most relevant and user-friendly repository from among several commercially available and open source options.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A Reassessment of Complementary Access Tools for Chemical Indicators

The Complementary Access Working Group (CAWG) was set up as a multi-laboratory team with members from Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) under the direction and funding provided by National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) through NA-241, Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). During FY 13 the CAWG evaluated proliferation indicators based largely on a review of the 1996 version of the IAEA’s Physical Model (Phase 1). During FYs 13 and 14, the CAWG then selected technologies and specific portable and hand-held devices that could be used by the IAEA to identify the chemical compositions of materials found during complementary access (Phase 2). [Note that in this report “chemical” is used in a broad sense to include elements, metals, and alloys as well as chemical compounds.] In November 2014, the CAWG issued its Phase 3 report describing laboratory and field testing of three devices, each device representing a specific technology that the CAWG had selected as a result of the Phase 1 and Phase 2 activities. LANL and BNL continued measurements and analysis during FY15, leading to a reinterpretation of some of the Phase 3 results. This report serves a twofold purpose. The first section of the report compares and contrasts the Phase 3 testing with presently available preliminary results of the Karlsruhe workshop. The results of Phase 3 (and the reinterpretation of some of these results) as well as the preliminary results of the Karlsruhe workshop provide the rationale for the second section of this report. In Section 2 of this report, we revisit the combinations of signatures and technologies considered in Phases 2 and 3 of the CAWG effort. We do this to determine whether the three technologies and the matching instruments selected for the Phase 3 testing are more limited than initially thought. Based on this initial re-evaluation of the technologies considered under Phase 2, we provide a preliminary re-ranking of the suggested tools for detection of chemical indicators during complementary access.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Laboratory and Field Testing of Commercially Available Detectors for the Identification of Chemicals of Interest in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle for the Detection of Undeclared Activities

Traditionally, IAEA inspectors have focused on the detection of nuclear indicators as part of infield inspection activities. The ability to rapidly detect and identify chemical as well as nuclear signatures can increase the ability of IAEA inspectors to detect undeclared activities at a site. Identification of chemical indicators have been limited to use in the analysis of environmental samples. Although IAEA analytical laboratories are highly effective, environmental sample processing does not allow for immediate or real-time results to an IAEA inspector at a facility. During a complementary access inspection, under the Additional Protocol, the use of fieldable technologies that can quickly provide accurate information on chemicals that may be indicative of undeclared activities can increase the ability of IAEA to effectively and efficiently complete their mission. The Complementary Access Working Group (CAWG) is a multi-laboratory team with members from Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratory. The team identified chemicals at each stage of the nuclear fuel cycle that may provide IAEA inspectors with indications that proliferation activities may be occurring. The group eliminated all indicators related to equipment, technology and training, developing a list of by-products/effluents, non-nuclear materials, nuclear materials, and other observables. These proliferation indicators were prioritized based on detectability from a conduct of operations (CONOPS) perspective of a CA inspection (for example, whether an inspector actually can access the S&O or whether it is in process with no physical access), and the IAEA’s interest in the detection technology in conjunction with radiation detectors. The list was consolidated to general categories (nuclear materials from a chemical detection technique, inorganic chemicals, organic chemicals, halogens, and miscellaneous materials). The team then identified commercial off the shelf (COTS) chemical detectors that may detect the chemicals of interest. Three chemical detectors were selected and tested both in laboratory settings and in field operations settings at Idaho National Laboratory. The instruments selected are: Thermo Scientific TruDefender FT (FTIR), Thermo Scientific FirstDefender RM (Raman), and Bruker Tracer III SD (XRF). Functional specifications, operability, and chemical detectability, selectivity, and limits of detection were determined. Results from the laboratory and field tests will be presented. This work is supported by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, Office of Nonproliferation and International Security, National Nuclear Security Administration.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Building an Effective Nonproliferation Program: US Support of IAEA Safeguards

A central pillar of international efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. From the inception of the IAEA, the United States has supported the development and evolution of both the safeguards system itself and devices and systems approaches used by inspectors. The IAEA safeguards system comprises an extensive set of technical measures by which the IAEA Secretariat independently verifies the correctness and the completeness of the declarations made by States to the IAEA about their nuclear programs. From Iran to Syria, to the more than 190 other countries that accept IAEA safeguards, the IAEA safeguards system enhances international security, seeking to assure compliance with international nuclear agreements. The cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime is the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). IAEA safeguards largely have evolved to ensure non-nuclear weapon state compliance with the NPT.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗