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Smith, Curtis

Publications and source records attributed to Smith, Curtis.

68 records · Page 4

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program: Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) Advanced Test Reactor Demonstration Case Study

Safety is central to the design, licensing, operation, and economics of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). Consequently, the ability to better characterize and quantify safety margin holds the key to improved decision making about LWR design, operation, and plant life extension. A systematic approach to characterization of safety margins and the subsequent margins management options represents a vital input to the licensee and regulatory analysis and decision making that will be involved. The purpose of the RISMC Pathway R&D is to support plant decisions for risk-informed margins management with the aim to improve economics, reliability, and sustain safety of current NPPs. Goals of the RISMC Pathway are twofold: (1) Develop and demonstrate a risk-assessment method coupled to safety margin quantification that can be used by NPP decision makers as part of their margin recovery strategies. (2) Create an advanced “RISMC toolkit” that enables more accurate representation of NPP safety margin. This report describes the RISMC methodology demonstration where the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) was used as a test-bed for purposes of determining safety margins. As part of the demonstration, we describe how both the thermal-hydraulics and probabilistic safety calculations are integrated and used to quantify margin management strategies.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Fukushima Daiichi accident study: status as of April 2012

Japan suffered an immense tragedy as a result of the 2011 Tohuku earthquake and resulting tsunami that caused widespread damage to the infrastructure of the country and more than 20,000 deaths, most from the tsunami. The magnitude 9 (Mw)1 earthquake, centered roughly 20 miles deep and 43 miles east of Japan, took place at 14:46 (JST) on March 11, 2011, and produced catastrophic damage to buildings, roads, communications, and regional electrical power. Damage to the Sendai region was especially large owing to its proximity to the epicenter of the seismic event that produced a tsunami with an estimated height that exceeded 14 meters at the site of the Fukushima reactors. The earthquake at 14:46 JST resulted in a scram and a regional loss of electrical power, requiring the Fukushima Daiichi power plants (Units 1, 2, and 3) to start emergency on-site diesel powered generators to maintain cooling at the plants. Unit 4 was defueled at the time for maintenance, and Units 5 and 6 were in a state of cold shutdown for maintenance.

Gauntt, Randall O.↗

Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners (Second Edition)

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive, structured, and logical analysis method aimed at identifying and assessing risks in complex technological systems for the purpose of cost-effectively improving their safety and performance. NASA's objective is to better understand and effectively manage risk, and thus more effectively ensure mission and programmatic success, and to achieve and maintain high safety standards at NASA. NASA intends to use risk assessment in its programs and projects to support optimal management decision making for the improvement of safety and program performance. In addition to using quantitative/probabilistic risk assessment to improve safety and enhance the safety decision process, NASA has incorporated quantitative risk assessment into its system safety assessment process, which until now has relied primarily on a qualitative representation of risk. Also, NASA has recently adopted the Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM) process [1-1] as a valuable addition to supplement existing deterministic and experience-based engineering methods and tools. Over the years, NASA has been a leader in most of the technologies it has employed in its programs. One would think that PRA should be no exception. In fact, it would be natural for NASA to be a leader in PRA because, as a technology pioneer, NASA uses risk assessment and management implicitly or explicitly on a daily basis. NASA has probabilistic safety requirements (thresholds and goals) for crew transportation system missions to the International Space Station (ISS) [1-2]. NASA intends to have probabilistic requirements for any new human spaceflight transportation system acquisition. Methods to perform risk and reliability assessment in the early 1960s originated in U.S. aerospace and missile programs. Fault tree analysis (FTA) is an example. It would have been a reasonable extrapolation to expect that NASA would also become the world leader in the application of PRA. That was, however, not to happen. Early in the Apollo program, estimates of the probability for a successful roundtrip human mission to the moon yielded disappointingly low (and suspect) values and NASA became discouraged from further performing quantitative risk analyses until some two decades later when the methods were more refined, rigorous, and repeatable. Instead, NASA decided to rely primarily on the Hazard Analysis (HA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) methods for system safety assessment.

Stamatelatos,Michael↗

NASA Risk Management Handbook

The purpose of this handbook is to provide guidance for implementing the Risk Management (RM) requirements of NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) document NPR 8000.4A, Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements [1], with a specific focus on programs and projects, and applying to each level of the NASA organizational hierarchy as requirements flow down. This handbook supports RM application within the NASA systems engineering process, and is a complement to the guidance contained in NASA/SP-2007-6105, NASA Systems Engineering Handbook [2]. Specifically, this handbook provides guidance that is applicable to the common technical processes of Technical Risk Management and Decision Analysis established by NPR 7123.1A, NASA Systems Engineering Process and Requirements [3]. These processes are part of the \Systems Engineering Engine. (Figure 1) that is used to drive the development of the system and associated work products to satisfy stakeholder expectations in all mission execution domains, including safety, technical, cost, and schedule. Like NPR 7123.1A, NPR 8000.4A is a discipline-oriented NPR that intersects with product-oriented NPRs such as NPR 7120.5D, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements [4]; NPR 7120.7, NASA Information Technology and Institutional Infrastructure Program and Project Management Requirements [5]; and NPR 7120.8, NASA Research and Technology Program and Project Management Requirements [6]. In much the same way that the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook is intended to provide guidance on the implementation of NPR 7123.1A, this handbook is intended to provide guidance on the implementation of NPR 8000.4A. 1.2 Scope and Depth This handbook provides guidance for conducting RM in the context of NASA program and project life cycles, which produce derived requirements in accordance with existing systems engineering practices that flow down through the NASA organizational hierarchy. The guidance in this handbook is not meant to be prescriptive. Instead, it is meant to be general enough, and contain a sufficient diversity of examples, to enable the reader to adapt the methods as needed to the particular risk management issues that he or she faces. The handbook highlights major issues to consider when managing programs and projects in the presence of potentially significant uncertainty, so that the user is better able to recognize and avoid pitfalls that might otherwise be experienced.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗

Augmenting Probabilistic Risk Assesment with Malevolent Initiators

As commonly practiced, the use of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in nuclear power plants only considers accident initiators such as natural hazards, equipment failures, and human error. Malevolent initiators are ignored in PRA, but are considered the domain of physical security, which uses vulnerability assessment based on an officially specified threat (design basis threat). This paper explores the implications of augmenting and extending existing PRA models by considering new and modified scenarios resulting from malevolent initiators. Teaming the augmented PRA models with conventional vulnerability assessments can cost-effectively enhance security of a nuclear power plant. This methodology is useful for operating plants, as well as in the design of new plants. For the methodology, we have proposed an approach that builds on and extends the practice of PRA for nuclear power plants for security-related issues. Rather than only considering 'random' failures, we demonstrated a framework that is able to represent and model malevolent initiating events and associated plant impacts.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

INCORPORATING DYNAMIC 3D SIMULATION INTO PRA

Through continued advancement in computational resources, development that was previously done by trial and error production is now performed through computer simulation. These virtual physical representations have the potential to provide accurate and valid modeling results and are being used in many different technical fields. Risk assessment now has the opportunity to use 3D simulation to improve analysis results and insights, especially for external event analysis. By using simulations, the modeler only has to determine the likelihood of an event without having to also predict the results of that event. The 3D simulation automatically determines not only the outcome of the event, but when those failures occur. How can we effectively incorporate 3D simulation into traditional PRA? Most PRA plant modeling is made up of components with different failure modes, probabilities, and rates. Typically, these components are grouped into various systems and then are modeled together (in different combinations) as a “system” with logic structures to form fault trees. Applicable fault trees are combined through scenarios, typically represented by event tree models. Though this method gives us failure results for a given model, it has limitations when it comes to time-based dependencies or dependencies that are coupled to physical processes which may themselves be space- or time-dependent. Since, failures from a 3D simulation are naturally time related, they should be used in that manner. In our simulation approach, traditional static models are converted into an equivalent state diagram representation with start states, probabilistic driven movements between states and terminal states. As the state model is run repeatedly, it converges to the same results as the PRA model in cases where time-related factors are not important. In cases where timing considerations are important (e.g., when events are dependent upon each other), then the simulation approach will typically provide superior results and insights. We also couple the state model with the dynamic 3D simulation analysis representing events (such as flooding) to determine which (if any) components fail. Not only does the simulation take into account any failed items from the state model, but any failures caused by the simulation are incorporated back into the state model and factored into the overall results. Using this method we incorporate accurate 3D simulation results, eliminate static-based PRA issues, and have time ordered failure information.

3D Simulation↗

Comparing Simulation Results with Traditional PRA Model on a Boiling Water Reactor Station Blackout Case Study

A previous study used RELAP and RAVEN to conduct a boiling water reactor station black-out (SBO) case study in a simulation based environment to show the capabilities of the risk-informed safety margin characterization methodology. This report compares the RELAP/RAVEN simulation results with traditional PRA model results. The RELAP/RAVEN simulation run results were reviewed for their input parameters and output results. The input parameters for each simulation run include various timing information such as diesel generator or offsite power recovery time, Safety Relief Valve stuck open time, High Pressure Core Injection or Reactor Core Isolation Cooling fail to run time, extended core cooling operation time, depressurization delay time, and firewater injection time. The output results include the maximum fuel clad temperature, the outcome, and the simulation end time. A traditional SBO PRA model in this report contains four event trees that are linked together with the transferring feature in SAPHIRE software. Unlike the usual Level 1 PRA quantification process in which only core damage sequences are quantified, this report quantifies all SBO sequences, whether they are core damage sequences or success (i.e., non core damage) sequences, in order to provide a full comparison with the simulation results. Three different approaches were used to solve event tree top events and quantify the SBO sequences: “W” process flag, default process flag without proper adjustment, and default process flag with adjustment to account for the success branch probabilities. Without post-processing, the first two approaches yield incorrect results with a total conditional probability greater than 1.0. The last approach accounts for the success branch probabilities and provides correct conditional sequence probabilities that are to be used for comparison. To better compare the results from the PRA model and the simulation runs, a simplified SBO event tree was developed with only four top events and eighteen SBO sequences (versus fifty-four SBO sequences in the original SBO model). The estimated SBO sequence conditional probabilities from the original SBO model were integrated to the corresponding sequences in the simplified SBO event tree. These results were then compared with the simulation run results.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

NASA Risk-Informed Decision Making Handbook

This handbook provides guidance for conducting risk-informed decision making in the context of NASA risk management (RM), with a focus on the types of direction-setting key decisions that are characteristic of the NASA program and project life cycles, and which produce derived requirements in accordance with existing systems engineering practices that flow down through the NASA organizational hierarchy. The guidance in this handbook is not meant to be prescriptive. Instead, it is meant to be general enough, and contain a sufficient diversity of examples, to enable the reader to adapt the methods as needed to the particular decision problems that he or she faces. The handbook highlights major issues to consider when making decisions in the presence of potentially significant uncertainty, so that the user is better able to recognize and avoid pitfalls that might otherwise be experienced.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗

SAPHIRE 8 Software Quality Assurance Plan

This Quality Assurance (QA) Plan documents the QA activities that will be managed by the INL related to JCN N6423. The NRC developed the SAPHIRE computer code for performing probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) using a personal computer (PC) at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) under Job Code Number (JCN) L1429. SAPHIRE started out as a feasibility study for a PRA code to be run on a desktop personal PC and evolved through several phases into a state-of-the-art PRA code. The developmental activity of SAPHIRE was the result of two concurrent important events: The tremendous expansion of PC software and hardware capability of the 90s and the onset of a risk-informed regulation era.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

SAPHIRE Change Design and Testing Procedure

This document describes the procedure software developers of SAPHIRE follow when adding a new feature or revising an existing capability. This procedure first describes the general approach to changes, and then describes more specific processes. The process stages include design and development, testing, and documentation.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

SAPHIRE 8 Software Configuration Management Plan

The INL software developers use version control for both the formally released SAPHIRE versions, as well as for source code. For each formal release of the software, the developers perform an acceptance test: the software must pass a suite of automated tests prior to official release. Each official release of SAPHIRE is assigned a unique version identifier. The release is bundled into a standard installation package for easy and consistent set-up by individual users. Included in the release is a list of bug fixes and new features for the current release, as well as a history of those items for past releases. Each formal release of SAPHIRE will have passed an acceptance test. In addition to assignment of a unique version identifier for an official software release, each source code file is kept in a controlled library. Source code is a collection of all the computer instructions written by developers to create the finished product. The library is kept on a server, where back-ups are regularly made. This document describes the configuration management approach used as part of the SAPHIRE development.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Constellation Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA): Design Consideration for the Crew Exploration Vehicle

Managed by NASA's Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, a pilot probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) of the NASA Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) was performed in early 2006. The PRA methods used follow the general guidance provided in the NASA PRA Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners'. Phased-mission based event trees and fault trees are used to model a lunar sortie mission of the CEV - involving the following phases: launch of a cargo vessel and a crew vessel; rendezvous of these two vessels in low Earth orbit; transit to th$: moon; lunar surface activities; ascension &om the lunar surface; and return to Earth. The analysis is based upon assumptions, preliminary system diagrams, and failure data that may involve large uncertainties or may lack formal validation. Furthermore, some of the data used were based upon expert judgment or extrapolated from similar components~systemsT. his paper includes a discussion of the system-level models and provides an overview of the analysis results used to identify insights into CEV risk drivers, and trade and sensitivity studies. Lastly, the PRA model was used to determine changes in risk as the system configurations or key parameters are modified.

Prassinos, Peter G.↗

Bayesian Inference for NASA Probabilistic Risk and Reliability Analysis

This document, Bayesian Inference for NASA Probabilistic Risk and Reliability Analysis, is intended to provide guidelines for the collection and evaluation of risk and reliability-related data. It is aimed at scientists and engineers familiar with risk and reliability methods and provides a hands-on approach to the investigation and application of a variety of risk and reliability data assessment methods, tools, and techniques. This document provides both: A broad perspective on data analysis collection and evaluation issues. A narrow focus on the methods to implement a comprehensive information repository. The topics addressed herein cover the fundamentals of how data and information are to be used in risk and reliability analysis models and their potential role in decision making. Understanding these topics is essential to attaining a risk informed decision making environment that is being sought by NASA requirements and procedures such as 8000.4 (Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements), NPR 8705.05 (Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures for NASA Programs and Projects), and the System Safety requirements of NPR 8715.3 (NASA General Safety Program Requirements).

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗