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Smith, Curtis

Publications and source records attributed to Smith, Curtis.

At least 19 records

Human reliability analysis studies from simulator experiments using Bayesian inference

Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) of complex facilities is performed to arrive at the risk posed by them. PSA also accounts for the contribution of the human errors towards the overall risk through Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) in terms of Human Error Probability (HEP). Human operators are part of the system and do not work in isolation. Their performance is influenced by the context in which the actions are performed. As a result, quantification of HEP requires operator performance data under the given context. Some good sources of operator performance data are plant‘s operation data, simulator data and expert judgement. The plant operation data pertaining to HRA is generally sparse. In this situation, a full scope plant simulator provides a good alternative for operator performance data generation. Many of the currently practiced HRA methods have been developed by combining the empirical evidence with expert judgement and contain a lot of uncertainty in their estimates. Bayesian inference is suitable for updating the prior HRA estimates with the simulator evidence to obtain the posterior HEP. Here, posterior HEP has been calculated for postulated accident scenarios in advanced reactor (first of its kind) at design stage, using plant simulator.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Advanced Reactor Safeguards: 2022 Program Roadmap

The Advanced Reactor Safeguards (ARS) program was established in 2020 as part of appropriations for the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP) through the Office of Nuclear Energy in the Department of Energy. The goal of this program is to help address near term challenges that advanced nuclear reactor vendors face in meeting domestic Material Control and Accountancy (MC&A) and Physical Protection System (PPS) requirements for U.S. construction. The technical work in the program is meant to (1) support nuclear reactor vendors with advanced MC&A and PPS designs for next generation reactors, (2) provide technical bases for the regulator, and (3) promote the integration of Safeguards and Security by Design early in the design process. Existing domestic regulations for safeguards and security, as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, were written for large light water reactors, and rule-making efforts are underway to develop regulations more suited to different reactor designs. The ARS program seeks to remove roadblocks in the deployment of new and advanced reactors by solving regulatory challenges, reducing safeguards and security costs, and utilizing the latest technologies and approaches for robust plant monitoring and protection. This roadmap discusses the goals of the ARS program, current research, and program plan for the next five years.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

RAVEN Theory Manual

RAVEN is a software framework able to perform parametric and stochastic analysis based on the response of complex system codes. The initial development was aimed at providing dynamic risk analysis capabilities to the thermohydraulic code RELAP-7, currently under development at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Although the initial goal has been fully accomplished, RAVEN is now a multi-purpose stochastic and uncertainty quantification platform, capable of communicating with any system code. In fact, the provided Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) allow RAVEN to interact with any code as long as all the parameters that need to be perturbed are accessible by input files or via python interfaces. RAVEN is capable of investigating system response and explore input space using various sampling schemes such as Monte Carlo, grid, or Latin hypercube. However, RAVEN strength lies in its system feature discovery capabilities such as: constructing limit surfaces, separating regions of the input space leading to system failure, and using dynamic supervised learning techniques. The development of RAVEN started in 2012 when, within the Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) program, the need to provide a modern risk evaluation framework arose. RAVEN’s principal assignment is to provide the necessary software and algorithms in order to employ the concepts developed by the Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) program. RISMC is one of the pathways defined within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program. In the RISMC approach, the goal is not just to identify the frequency of an event potentially leading to a system failure, but the proximity (or lack thereof) to key safety-related events. Hence, the approach is interested in identifying and increasing the safety margins related to those events. A safety margin is a numerical value quantifying the probability that a safety metric (e.g. peak pressure in a pipe) is exceeded under certain conditions. Most of the capabilities, implemented having RELAP-7 as a principal focus, are easily deployable to other system codes. For this reason, several side activates have been employed (e.g. RELAP5-3D, any MOOSE-based App, etc.) or are currently ongoing for coupling RAVEN with several different software. The aim of this document is to provide a set of commented examples that can help the user to become familiar with the RAVEN code usage.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Continued Discussion of Failure Mode Modeling and Overall Component Reliability: Are the Data Missing or Censored?

This paper is the continuation of a paper presented at the 13th Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference, in which a methodology of modeling failure modes of complex components was presented; see Paulos and Smith (2016). This methodology is not particularly helpful in the space industry where there is a lack of failure data, but is more helpful in industries that see a lot of component repairs and improvements, such as in the aircraft or automotive industries. The previous paper demonstrated how the typical approach of treating failure modes as being exponential in nature may yield optimistic predictions when estimating how improvements to components will perform in the future. It is more accurate to model the failure modes as a race in time; unfortunately, this does not give a closed-form solution. This paper uses simulation to solve for the model of the world, and the results compared to the standard methodology of treating the failure modes as being exponential random failures. The standard method is shown to have optimistic predictions, which will lead to prediction errors when failure modes are removed or “fixed.” The failure mode methodology presented in the first paper treated the data as being censored when the test stopped. In this paper, we will compare the results from treating the data as both censored and missing.

Smith, Curtis↗

Mining data in a dynamic PRA framework

Computational (also known as Dynamic) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods employs system simulation codes coupled with stochastic analysis tools in order to determine probabilities of certain outcomes such as system failure. In contrast to classical PRA methods (i.e., Event-Tree and Fault-Tree) in which timing and sequencing of events is set by the analyst, accident progression is dictated by the system control logic and its interaction with system temporal evolution. Due to the nature of the problem, Simulation-Based PRA methods require large amount of computationally expensive simulation runs. In addition, these methods usually generate a large number of simulation runs (database storage may be on the order of gigabytes or higher). In this paper we investigate and apply several methods and algorithms to analyze these large amounts of time-dependent data. Furthermore, the scope of this article is to present a broad overview of methods and algorithms that can be used to improve data quality and to analyze and extract information from large data sets containing time dependent data. In this context, “extracting information” means constructing input-output correlations, finding commonalities, and identifying outliers.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Risk-Informed Safety Margins Characterization (RISMC) Pathway Technical Program Plan

Safety is central to the design, licensing, operation, and economics of nuclear power plants (NPPs). As the current Light Water Reactor (LWR) NPPs age beyond 60 years, there are possibilities for increased frequency of systems, structures, and components (SSCs) degradations or failures that initiate safety-significant events, reduce existing accident mitigation capabilities, or create new failure modes. Plant designers commonly “over-design” portions of NPPs and provide robustness in the form of redundant and diverse engineered safety features to ensure that, even in the case of well-beyond design basis scenarios, public health and safety will be protected with a very high degree of assurance. This form of defense-in-depth is a reasoned response to uncertainties and is often referred to generically as “safety margin.” Historically, specific safety margin provisions have been formulated, primarily based on “engineering judgment.” The ability to better characterize (i.e., describe and quantify) safety margin is important to improved decision making about LWR design and long-term operation. A systematic approach to characterizing safety margins and the subsequent risk informed margins management options represents a vital input to the licensee and regulatory analysis and decision making that will be involved. In addition, as research and development (R&D) in the LWRS Program and other collaborative efforts yield new data and improved scientific understanding of physical processes that govern the aging and degradation of plant SSCs (and concurrently support technological advances in nuclear reactor fuels and plant instrumentation and control systems), needs and opportunities to better optimize plant safety, economics, and performance will become known. The purpose of the Risk-Informed Safety Margins Characterization (RISMC) Pathway R&D is to support plant decisions for risk-informed margins management with the aim to improve economics, reliability, and sustain safety of current NPPs over periods of extended plant operations. The goals of the RISMC Pathway are twofold: (1) develop and demonstrate a risk-assessment method that is coupled to safety margin quantification that can be used by NPP decision makers as part of risk-informed margin management strategies; (2) create an advanced RISMC Toolkit that enables more accurate representation of NPP safety margins. The methods and tools provided by RISMC are essential to a comprehensive and integrated risk-informed margin management approach that supports effective preservation of margin for both active and passive SSCs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Convolution Correction Factor Adjustments on Static PRA Models for Event Assessment

Current probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models will contain cut sets that have time-constrained basic events such as switched components, recovery of failed components, and failures in time. For these cut sets that have multiple time-constrained events that interact (e.g., offsite power recover at the same time as multiple diesel generators fail to run), there is the possibility that the minimal cut set quantified result is too large. Since current PRA models typically assume that the accident scenario starts at “time zero,” the fails-to-run basic events use this starting time as the basis for their respective reliability models. Over time, the standard practice was to recognize this issue and accept it as part of the conservatism built into the event tree/fault tree PRA models. However, now that these same PRA models are being used in a regulatory forum, this conservatism needs to be addressed. Further, this issue exists not only for the baseline PRA results, but for deficiencies that have been observed or those that have the potential of occurrence, whether the deficiency is complete failure or just a degraded condition. We have found that this conservatism becomes very important when evaluating scenarios such as station blackout sequences and other loss of offsite power sequences. This paper will address the theory and implemented process used by the Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) PRA software. Starting with SAPHIRE version 8, the process that was developed is to calculate a “convolution correction factor” based on three distinct calculations. The first calculation is the cut set based frequency calculated via the standard event tree/fault tree PRA model (assuming all run failures start at time equal to zero). The second calculation is to perform the exact time-constrained calculation by integrating the component failure models over the time period of interest (e.g., time to recover, a mission time). For example, this exact calculation for the case of the diesel generators is to convolve their failure models with the offsite power recovery model to obtain the exact frequency. The third calculation is to produce the convolution correction factor by dividing the exact frequency calculation by the standard cut set frequency. This convolution correction factor is then applied to the PRA cut sets in order to remove the time-constrained conservatism. The process used to obtain the convolution correction factor for the baseline PRA is important; however, in this paper we also describe what happens when there is degradation of a component or a potential deficiency. These issues become very important in order to ensure that the convolution correction factor is re-calculated correctly. If the correction factor does not get re-calculated and the same baseline convolution correction factor is used, the final analysis result could be over conservative or under conservative. This paper will discuss how these issues are addressed and provide examples on how SAPHIRE automatically makes the necessary adjustments. MathCad verification results can be computed using the provided equations and input data.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Smooth Particle Hydrodynamics-based Wind Representation

As a result of the 2011 accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP and other operational NPP experience, there is an identified need to better characterize and evaluate the potential impacts of externally generated hazards on NPP safety. Due to the ubiquitous occurrence of high winds around the world and the possible extreme magnitude of the hazard that has been observed, the assessment of the impact of the high-winds hazard has been identified as an important activity by both NPP owner-operators and regulatory authorities. However, recent experience obtained from the conduct of high-winds risk assessments indicates that such activities have been both labor-intensive and expensive to perform. Additionally, the existing suite of methods and tools to conduct such assessments (which were developed decades ago) do not make use of modern computational architectures (e.g., parallel processing, object-oriented programming techniques, or simple user interfaces) or methods (e.g., efficient and robust numerical-solution schemes). As a result, the current suite of methods and tools will rapidly become obsolete. Physics-based 3D simulation methods can provide information to assist in the RISMC PRA methodology. This research is intended to determine what benefits SPH methods could bring to high-winds simulations for the purposes of assessing their potential impact on NPP safety. The initial investigation has determined that SPH can simulate key areas of high-wind events with reasonable accuracy, compared to other methods. Some problems, such as simulation voids, need to be addressed, but possible solutions have been identified and will be tested with continued work. This work also demonstrated that SPH simulations can provide a means for simulating debris movement; however, further investigations into the capability to determine the impact of high winds and the impacts of wind-driven debris that lead to SSC failures need to be done. SPH simulations alone would be limited in size and computation time. An advanced method of combing results from grid-based methods with SPH through a data-driven model is proposed. This method could allow for more accurate simulation of particle movement near rigid bodies even with larger SPH particle sizes. If successful, the data-driven model would eliminate the need for a SPH turbulence model and increase the simulation domain size. Continued research beyond the scope of this project will be needed in order to determine the viability of a data-driven model.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program: Risk-Informed Safety Margins Characterization (RISMC) Pathway Technical Program Plan

Safety is central to the design, licensing, operation, and economics of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). As the current Light Water Reactor (LWR) NPPs age beyond 60 years, there are possibilities for increased frequency of Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs) degradations or failures that initiate safety-significant events, reduce existing accident mitigation capabilities, or create new failure modes. Plant designers commonly “over-design” portions of NPPs and provide robustness in the form of redundant and diverse engineered safety features to ensure that, even in the case of well-beyond design basis scenarios, public health and safety will be protected with a very high degree of assurance. This form of defense-in-depth is a reasoned response to uncertainties and is often referred to generically as “safety margin.” Historically, specific safety margin provisions have been formulated, primarily based on “engineering judgment.”

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Integration of Human Reliability Analysis Models into the Simulation-Based Framework for the Risk-Informed Safety Margin Characterization Toolkit

This report presents an application of a computation-based human reliability analysis (HRA) framework called the Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER). HUNTER has been developed not as a standalone HRA method but rather as framework that ties together different HRA methods to model dynamic risk of human activities as part of an overall probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). While we have adopted particular methods to build an initial model, the HUNTER framework is meant to be intrinsically flexible to new pieces that achieve particular modeling goals. In the present report, the HUNTER implementation has the following goals: • Integration with a high fidelity thermal-hydraulic model capable of modeling nuclear power plant behaviors and transients • Consideration of a PRA context • Incorporation of a solid psychological basis for operator performance • Demonstration of a functional dynamic model of a plant upset condition and appropriate operator response This report outlines these efforts and presents the case study of a station blackout scenario to demonstrate the various modules developed to date under the HUNTER research umbrella.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Risk Assessment in Event Evaluation P-302

Incidents at locations such as nuclear power plants, waste repositories, and medical treatment facilities occur at many different times and under a variety of situations. Even the most modern, well run organizations may experience events that are precursors to more serious situations. Currently, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission evaluates a variety of such events at commercial nuclear plants via the Significance Determination Process (SDP), Management Directive 8.3, and the Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) program. In these programs, the analyst calculates a conditional risk measure (e.g., conditional core damage probability) for an initiating event situation or an unplanned equipment outage. This calculation is called an “event evaluation.” An “event evaluation” uses a probabilistic risk assessment model to obtain a risk measure that is conditional on the situation which existed during an incident. The Risk Assessment in Event Evaluation material is intended to address how this evaluation is performed using modern risk analysis tools.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Assessing the Adequacy of Models for Risk-Informed Decisions (P-109)

This report includes an overview of some ways to go wrong in making decisions – Common deficiencies in reasoning and in modeling, thinking clearly about uncertainty, Case Studies: 1: NASA Challenger 2: Davis-Besse vessel-head event, Interlude: Critical Thinking 3: NASA Columbia 4: Fukushima and concluding thoughts.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

SAPHIRE 8 Basics An Introduction to Probabilistic Risk Assessment via the Systems Analysis Program for Hands-On Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) Software P-201

The SAPHIRE Basics course material is intended to both (1) provide guidance for learning SAPHIRE during the Basics class and (2) become a stand-alone reference document after finishing the class. Thus, the format for the class material is a combination of the traditional “overhead-type” of presentation information with a structured, reference-type document.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Advanced SAPHIRE 8 Modeling Methods for Probabilistic Risk Assessment via the Systems Analysis Program for Hands-On Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) Software P-202

1.1. Overview of the Advanced SAPHIRE Material The Advanced SAPHIRE course material is intended to both (1) provide guidance for learning advanced SAPHIRE features during the class and (2) become a stand-alone reference document after finishing the class. Thus, the format for the class material is a combination of the traditional “overhead-type” of presentation information with a structured, reference-type document. Major topics that are covered in the Advanced SAPHIRE class include: Advanced data base concepts such as Model Type (e.g., random, seismic, fire, flood). Definition of house events and how they are used on a sequence-by-sequence basis to manipulate individual fault tree logic using sequence flag sets or fault tree flag sets. ? Basic event templates, compound basic event equation editors, and human error worksheets. A rule-based event tree top event substitution feature (called the Link Event Tree Rule Editor) which allows for top event substitutions. A rule-based cut set post-processing feature (called the Recovery Rules) which allows cut set manipulation. Cut set analysis based upon rule-based end state categories (called End State Analysis). Cut set generation options for both fault trees and event tree sequences. The large event tree methodology and how SAPHIRE can be used to generate sequence cut sets for this method. The transfer of data between SAPHIRE data bases and between other PRA codes (MAR-D).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Bayesian Inference in Risk Assessment (P-102)

This report includes the following sections: Section 1: Course Topics •Section 2: Review of Basic Probability Calculations •Section 3: Introduction to Bayesian Inference •Section 4: Introduction to Monte Carlo Sampling •Section 5: Uncertainty Propagation in Risk Assessment

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

3D Simulation of External Flooding Events for the RISMC Pathway

Incorporating 3D simulations as part of the Risk-Informed Safety Margins Characterization (RISMIC) Toolkit allows analysts to obtain a more complete picture of complex system behavior for events including external plant hazards. External events such as flooding have become more important recently – however these can be analyzed with existing and validated simulated physics toolkits. In this report, we describe these approaches specific to flooding-based analysis using an approach called Smoothed Particle Hydrodynamics. The theory, validation, and example applications of the 3D flooding simulation are described. Integrating these 3D simulation methods into computational risk analysis provides a spatial/visual aspect to the design, improves the realism of results, and can prove visual understanding to validate the analysis of flooding.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗