Engineering topics
Slenski, George
Publications and source records attributed to Slenski, George.
Spacecraft Electrical Connector Selection and Application Processes
This assessment was initiated by the NASA Engineering & Safety Center (NESC) after a number of recent "high profile" connector problems, the most visible and publicized of these being the problem with the Space Shuttle's Engine Cut-Off System cryogenic feed-thru connector. The NESC commissioned a review of NASA's connector selection and application processes for space flight applications, including how lessons learned and past problem records are fed back into the processes to avoid recurring issues. Team members were primarily from the various NASA Centers and included connector and electrical parts specialists. The commissioned study was conducted on spacecraft connector selection and application processes at NASA Centers. The team also compared the NASA spacecraft connector selection and application process to the military process, identified recent high profile connector failures, and analyzed problem report data looking for trends and common occurrences. The team characterized NASA's connector problem experience into a list of top connector issues based on anecdotal evidence of a system's impact and commonality between Centers. These top issues are as follows, in no particular rank order: electrically shorted, bent and/or recessed contact pins, contact pin/socket contamination leading to electrically open or intermittencies, connector plating corrosion or corrosion of connector components, low or inadequate contact pin retention forces, contact crimp failures, unmated connectors and mis-wiring due to workmanship errors during installation or maintenance, loose connectors due to manufacturing defects such as wavy washer and worn bayonet retention, damaged connector elastomeric seals and cryogenic connector failure. A survey was also conducted of SAE Connector AE-8C1 committee members regarding their experience relative to the NASA concerns on connectors. The most common responses in order of occurrence were contact retention, plating issues, worn-out or damaged coupling mechanisms, bent pins, contact crimp barrel cracking and torn seals. In addition to these common themes, responses included issues with markings, dimensional errors on the build, contact/socket damage (handling), manufacturing defects and customer misapplication and mishandling. The NESC team concluded that considering the large quantity and wide variety of connectors successfully flown on human and robotic space applications, the number of failures is quite low. However, "high profile" failures with significant cost, schedule, safety, and/or mission success impacts continue to occur. It was also concluded that connector failures occur throughout a system's life-cycle with the majority of connector issues application related. A number of recommendations were identified for improving NASA connector selection processes and overall space connector reliability and performance.
Evaluation Of Risk And Possible Mitigation Schemes For Previously Unidentified Hazards
This report presents the results of arc track testing conducted to determine if such a transfer of power to un-energized wires is possible and/or likely during an arcing event, and to evaluate an array of protection schemes that may significantly reduce the possibility of such a transfer. The results of these experiments may be useful for determining the level of protection necessary to guard against spurious voltage and current being applied to safety critical circuits. It was not the purpose of these experiments to determine the probability of the initiation of an arc track event only if an initiation did occur could it cause the undesired event: an inadvertent thruster firing. The primary wire insulation used in the Orbiter is aromatic polyimide, or Kapton , a construction known to arc track under certain conditions [3]. Previous Boeing testing has shown that arc tracks can initiate in aromatic polyimide insulated 28 volts direct current (VDC) power circuits using more realistic techniques such as chafing with an aluminum blade (simulating the corner of an avionics box or lip of a wire tray), or vibration of an aluminum plate against a wire bundle [4]. Therefore, an arc initiation technique was chosen that provided a reliable and consistent technique of starting the arc and not a realistic simulation of a scenario on the vehicle. Once an arc is initiated, the current, power and propagation characteristics of the arc depend on the power source, wire gauge and insulation type, circuit protection and series resistance rather than type of initiation. The initiation method employed for these tests was applying an oil and graphite mixture to the ends of a powered twisted pair wire. The flight configuration of the heater circuits, the fuel/oxider (or ox) wire, and the RCS jet solenoid were modeled in the test configuration so that the behavior of these components during an arcing event could be studied. To determine if coil activation would occur with various protection wire schemes, 145 tests were conducted using various fuel/ox wire alternatives (shielded and unshielded) and/or different combinations of polytetrafuloroethylene (PTFE), Mystik tape and convoluted wraps to prevent unwanted coil activation. Test results were evaluated along with other pertinent data and information to develop a mitigation strategy for an inadvertent RCS firing. The SSP evaluated civilian aircraft wiring failures to search for aging trends in assessing the wire-short hazard. Appendix 2 applies Weibull statistical methods to the same data with a similar purpose.
Evaluation of Risk and Possible Mitigation Schemes for Previously Unidentified Hazards
In April 2004, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was commissioned by NASA's Chief Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Officer to review and render a technical opinion on the probability of a catastrophic failure related to this scenario: The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) recognized a zero-fault-tolerant design related to an inadvertent firing of the primary reaction control system (RCS) jets on the Orbiter during mated operations with the International Space Station (ISS). It was determined that an un-commanded firing of an RCS jet could cause serious damage or loss of both the SSP Orbiter and the ISS. Several scenarios were suggested in which an un-commanded firing of the RCS jet is possible. These scenarios include an arc track event in the 28-volt heater circuits that could result in a wire-to-wire short to the adjacent reaction control jet wire. In this worst-case scenario, enough current and power could be applied to activate the reaction control jet valves and fire a thruster. The following report summarizes the work that was sponsored by the NESC as part of their assessment of the Orbiter inadvertent firing of a RCS thruster while attached to the ISS.
Life prediction of aging aircraft wiring systems
The program goal is to develop a computerized life prediction model capable of identifying present aging progress and predicting end of life for aircraft wiring. A summary is given in viewgraph format of progress made on phase 1 objectives, which were to identify critical aircraft wiring problems; relate most common failures identified to the wire mechanism causing the failure; assess wiring requirments, materials, and stress environment for fighter aircraft; and demonstrate the feasibility of a time-temperature-environment model.
New insulation constructions for aerospace wiring applications
Outlined in this presentation is the background to insulation constructions for aerospace wiring applications, the Air Force wiring policy, the purpose and contract requirements of new insulation constructions, the test plan, and the test results.