Engineering topics

Skitka, Linda J.

Publications and source records attributed to Skitka, Linda J..

4 records

NASA NTRS1998

Automation: Decision Aid or Decision Maker?

This study clarified that automation bias is something unique to automated decision making contexts, and is not the result of a general tendency toward complacency. By comparing performance on exactly the same events on the same tasks with and without an automated decision aid, we were able to determine that at least the omission error part of automation bias is due to the unique context created by having an automated decision aid, and is not a phenomena that would occur even if people were not in an automated context. However, this study also revealed that having an automated decision aid did lead to modestly improved performance across all non-error events. Participants in the non- automated condition responded with 83.68% accuracy, whereas participants in the automated condition responded with 88.67% accuracy, across all events. Automated decision aids clearly led to better overall performance when they were accurate. People performed almost exactly at the level of reliability as the automation (which across events was 88% reliable). However, also clear, is that the presence of less than 100% accurate automated decision aids creates a context in which new kinds of errors in decision making can occur. Participants in the non-automated condition responded with 97% accuracy on the six "error" events, whereas participants in the automated condition had only a 65% accuracy rate when confronted with those same six events. In short, the presence of an AMA can lead to vigilance decrements that can lead to errors in decision making.

Skitka, Linda J.↗

NASA NTRS1997

Automation Bias and Countermeasures in Flight Crews

Results of recent research investigating the use of automated systems have indicated the presence of automation bias, a term describing errors made when decision makers rely on automated cues as a heuristic replacement for vigilant information seeking and processing. Automation commission errors, i.e., errors made when decision makers take inappropriate action because they over-attend to automated information or directives, and automation omission errors, i.e., errors made when decision makers do not take appropriate action because they are not informed of an imminent problem or situation by automated aids, can result from this tendency. In a series of studies, participants who perceived themselves as "accountable" for their strategies of interaction with automation were significantly more likely to verify its correct functioning, and committed significantly fewer automation-related errors than those who did not report this perception. In this study, we focus on two manipulations to encourage verification behaviors within cockpit crews. The first, an information/training manipulation, will focus on explicit information on automation bias, and training for verification of automated functioning. The second manipulation will consist of display prompts to verify automated functioning. Participants (glass-cockpit crews) will fly a series of approaches on the Mini-ACFS, a two-person pan-task flight simulator. Approach scenarios include several automation "events," that is, glitches, malfunctions, or inappropriate recommendations, that can be caught if cross-checked with other cockpit indicators. We anticipate that these manipulations will ameliorate automation bias. Final data analysis will be completed prior to the OSU symposium, and is expected to support the hypotheses that: a) reduced errors are associated with verification behaviors; b) crews will be more likely to verify under training/display conditions than when in the control condition; and c) effects will persist when subjects return for a follow-up exercise 6-9 weeks after their first session. Implications for training and automation design will be discussed.

Mosier, Kathleen, L.↗

NASA NTRS1997

Automation Bias: Decision Making and Performance in High-Tech Cockpits

Automated aids and decision support tools are rapidly becoming indispensible tools in high-technology cockpits, and are assuming increasing control of "cognitive" flight tasks, such as calculating fuel-efficient routes, navigating, or detecting and diagnosing system malfunctions and abnormalities. This study was designed to investigate "automation bias," a recently documented factor in the use of automated aids and decision support systems. The term refers to omission and commission errors resulting from the use of automated cues as a heuristic replacement for vigilant information seeking and processing. Glass-cockpit pilots flew flight scenarios involving automation "events," or opportunities for automation-related omission and commission errors. Pilots who perceived themselves as "accountable" for their performance and strategies of interaction with the automation were more likely to double-check automated functioning against other cues, and less likely to commit errors. Pilots were also likely to erroneously "remember" the presence of expected cues when describing their decision-making processes.

Mosier, Kathleen L.↗

NASA NTRS1996

Decision Making In A High-Tech World: Automation Bias and Countermeasures

Automated decision aids and decision support systems have become essential tools in many high-tech environments. In aviation, for example, flight management systems computers not only fly the aircraft, but also calculate fuel efficient paths, detect and diagnose system malfunctions and abnormalities, and recommend or carry out decisions. Air Traffic Controllers will soon be utilizing decision support tools to help them predict and detect potential conflicts and to generate clearances. Other fields as disparate as nuclear power plants and medical diagnostics are similarly becoming more and more automated. Ideally, the combination of human decision maker and automated decision aid should result in a high-performing team, maximizing the advantages of additional cognitive and observational power in the decision-making process. In reality, however, the presence of these aids often short-circuits the way that even very experienced decision makers have traditionally handled tasks and made decisions, and introduces opportunities for new decision heuristics and biases. Results of recent research investigating the use of automated aids have indicated the presence of automation bias, that is, errors made when decision makers rely on automated cues as a heuristic replacement for vigilant information seeking and processing. Automation commission errors, i.e., errors made when decision makers inappropriately follow an automated directive, or automation omission errors, i.e., errors made when humans fail to take action or notice a problem because an automated aid fails to inform them, can result from this tendency. Evidence of the tendency to make automation-related omission and commission errors has been found in pilot self reports, in studies using pilots in flight simulations, and in non-flight decision making contexts with student samples. Considerable research has found that increasing social accountability can successfully ameliorate a broad array of cognitive biases and resultant errors. To what extent these effects generalize to performance situations is not yet empirically established. The two studies to be presented represent concurrent efforts, with student and professional pilot samples, to determine the effects of accountability pressures on automation bias and on the verification of the accurate functioning of automated aids. Students (Experiment 1) and commercial pilots (Experiment 2) performed simulated flight tasks using automated aids. In both studies, participants who perceived themselves as accountable for their strategies of interaction with the automation were significantly more likely to verify its correctness, and committed significantly fewer automation-related errors than those who did not report this perception.

Mosier, Kathleen L.↗