Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) Capabilities Application and Integration.
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Engineering topics
Publications and source records attributed to Shoman, Nathan.
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The Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program is working toward a 2020 demonstration of Safeguards and Security by Design for advanced fuel cycle facilities. This milestone ties together modeling and experimental work and will initially demonstrate the concept for electrochemical processing facilities. The safeguards modeling tool used is the Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM). This report outlines the baseline model design that will be used for the 2020 milestone analysis, which was updated to represent a new baseline flowsheet developed for the MPACT program. The model was also used to generate simulation data for other labs to use as part of their safeguards analysis. Finally, this report describes how the 2020 milestone will be met. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work was funded by the Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) working group as part of the Nuclear Technology Research and Development Program under the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy.
This work describes the ongoing work to develop a molten salt reactor (MSR) model and associated tools for safeguards analysis. A new flowsheet was developed in collaboration with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for the Molten Salt Demonstration Reactor (MSDR). This design was chosen by ORNL as a generic baseline design that could be used for safeguards research. The model has simple chemical processing that is less extensive than the two-fluid flowsheet developed in the last year. A detailed TRITON reactor physics model, provided by ORNL, was implemented into the process model. The process model now includes reactor parameters such as K-eff and decay heat, which could be used as part of an advanced safeguards approach. Finally, a set of generic safeguards tools based on current safeguards approaches were developed. These tools are flexible and can be used with most MSR flowsheets. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work was funded by the Materials Protection Accounting and Control Technologies (MPACT) working group as part of the Fuel Cycle Technologies Program under the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy. The authors would also like to acknowledge Ben Betz ler for his work on the reactor physics models that were incorporated into the work and the continued collaboration with ORNL staff.
Access points at a deep, mined geological repository (GR) for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and other nuclear wastes present potential diversion paths for nuclear material. Because C/S measures are not likely to be used underground, access to a GR will require unprecedented reliance on C/S measures to maintain continuity of knowledge (CoK) on SNF buried underground. We develop a model GR based on common features of GR designs from national programs in order to develop and optimize C/S measures for GR access points that maximize confidence that CoK is maintained on SNF underground. Critical access points identified in this study are surface entrances to (1) the GR ramp (2) the excavation shaft, (3) the main elevator shaft, and (4) the ventilation shaft. The first three are considered critical detection points (DPs), whereas the fourth is considered a non-critical DP. The reason for the distinction is due to the different design capabilities of shaft components: the first three (ramp, excavation shaft, main elevator) are all capable of being used to move material from the underground to the surface, whereas the ventilation shaft is not. Such capabilities are verified during periodic design information verification (DIV) inspections.
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The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) uses MATLAB/Simulink to provide a tool for safeguards analysis of bulk handling nuclear processing facilities. Models of aqueous and electrochemical reprocessing, enrichment, fuel fabrication, and molten salt reactor facilities have been developed to date. These models are used for designing the overall safeguards system, examining new safeguards approaches, virtually testing new measurement instrumentation, and analyzing diversion scenarios. The key metrics generated by the models include overall measurement uncertainty and detection probability for various material diversion or facility misuse scenarios. Safeguards modeling allows for rapid and cost-effective analysis for Safeguards by Design. The models are currently being used to explore alternative safeguards approaches, including more reliance on process monitoring data to reduce the need for destructive analysis that adds considerable burden to international safeguards. Machine learning techniques are being applied, but these techniques need large amounts of data for training and testing the algorithms. The SSPM can provide that training data. This paper will describe the SSPM and its use for applying both traditional nuclear material accountancy and newer machine learning options.
This work outlines the development of a two-fluid molten salt reactor process and safeguards model. The model is split into two parts consisting of a process model and a safeguards model. The process model is based on a design by Flibe Energy, the Liquid-Fluoride Thorium Reactor, which is a two-fluid molten salt reactor that performs full salt processing on-site to remove fission products and re-fuel the reactor. The model simulates feed and consumption rates of the reactor fuel and blanket salts. The process model includes the reactor core and salt processing loops. The reactor core model has a robust architecture that allows for integration with other tools and data sets as they become available. A majority of the effort to date has been focused on the process model, and the safeguards model will be developed in detail in future work. A preliminary safeguards analysis was performed based on actinide inventories, and a preliminary materials accountancy approach was initialized. The results of this analysis are presented along with a description of the model development.
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The Material Protection Accounting and Control Technologies (MPACT) program within DOE NE is working toward a 2020 milestone to demonstrate a Virtual Facility Distributed Test Bed. The goal of the Virtual Test Bed is to link all MPACT modeling tools, technology development, and experimental work to create a Safeguards and Security by Design capability for fuel cycle facilities. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) forms the core safeguards analysis tool, and the Scenario Toolkit and Generation Environment (STAGE) code forms the core physical security tool. These models are used to design and analyze safeguards and security systems and generate performance metrics. Work over the past year has focused on how these models will integrate with the other capabilities in the MPACT program and specific model changes to enable more streamlined integration in the future. This report describes the model changes and plans for how the models will be used more collaboratively. The Virtual Facility is not designed to integrate all capabilities into one master code, but rather to maintain stand-alone capabilities that communicate results between codes more effectively.