Engineering topics

Rosekind, Mark R.

Publications and source records attributed to Rosekind, Mark R..

At least 37 records · Page 2

NASA NTRS1996

Enhancing the Flight Safety Culture Through Training

In the 1970's, flight safety professionals became profoundly concerned about the prevalence of crew-caused accidents and incidents, and the role of human error in flight operations. As result, they initiated a change in the flight safety culture which has grown to significant proportions today. At the heart of the evolution were crew concepts such as flightdeck management, crew coordination, and cockpit resource management, concepts which seemed to target critical deficiencies. In themselves, the concepts were not new but their incorporation into training as a direct means of changing the flight safety culture was an untried, almost 'grassroots' approach. The targeted crew concepts and skills were not an integral part of the typical training program; the methods, curriculum, media, and even course content itself, would have to be developed and implemented from the bottom up. A familiar truism in the pilot culture is that you should 'Train the way you fly; Fly the way you train'. In short, training was expected to provide the pilot with practical operational skills that were consistent with the performance standards they were required to maintain and the operational demands they met on a daily basis. In short, one could not simply command crews to use good CRM; one would have to research and define these skills operationally as well as develop and implement a consistent and effective training program. Furthermore, one would need active support and collaboration among the research, industry and government communities in order to ensure acceptance and continued commitment. Additional information is contained in the original extended abstract.

Kanki, Barbara G.↗

NASA NTRS1996

Human Factors in Cabin Accident Investigations

Human factors has become an integral part of the accident investigation protocol. However, much of the investigative process remains focussed on the flight deck, airframe, and power plant systems. As a consequence, little data has been collected regarding the human factors issues within and involving the cabin during an accident. Therefore, the possibility exists that contributing factors that lie within that domain may be overlooked. The FAA Office of Accident Investigation is sponsoring a two-day workshop on cabin safety accident investigation. This course, within the workshop, will be of two hours duration and will explore relevant areas of human factors research. Specifically, the three areas of discussion are: Information transfer and resource management, fatigue and other physical stressors, and the human/machine interface. Integration of these areas will be accomplished by providing a suggested checklist of specific cabin-related human factors questions for investigators to probe following an accident.

Chute, Rebecca D.↗

NASA NTRS1996

Stress and Aeronautical Team Decision Making: Strengthening the Weak Links

A model that characterizes pilots'decision making in flight will be presented. Elements of the model that appear most vulnerable to stress will be examined in light of accidents and incidents. The model includes two major components: Situation assessment and choice of a course of action. While based on Klein's Recognition-Primed Decision Making, it is tailored to the aviation environment which includes certain features that may be common to other domains: Primarily, aviation is highly proceduralized and options are generally well known. What appears to make decisions difficult are ambiguity, time pressure, and risk. In addition, decisions must often be made while carrying out the standard procedures of flight, including checklists, review of approach plates, standard briefings, and communication with air traffic controllers or cabin crew. The effects of stressors on decision making by pilots with varying levels of expertise will be explored, along with strategies for strengthening the weak links.

Orasanu, Judith↗

NASA NTRS1996

A Framework for Modeling Human-Machine Interactions

Modern automated flight-control systems employ a variety of different behaviors, or modes, for managing the flight. While developments in cockpit automation have resulted in workload reduction and economical advantages, they have also given rise to an ill-defined class of human-machine problems, sometimes referred to as 'automation surprises'. Our interest in applying formal methods for describing human-computer interaction stems from our ongoing research on cockpit automation. In this area of aeronautical human factors, there is much concern about how flight crews interact with automated flight-control systems, so that the likelihood of making errors, in particular mode-errors, is minimized and the consequences of such errors are contained. The goal of the ongoing research on formal methods in this context is: (1) to develop a framework for describing human interaction with control systems; (2) to formally categorize such automation surprises; and (3) to develop tests for identification of these categories early in the specification phase of a new human-machine system.

Shafto, Michael G.↗

NASA NTRS1996

Evaluating Fatigue in Operational Settings: The NASA Ames Fatigue Countermeasures Program

In response to a 1980 Congressional request, NASA Ames initiated a program to examine fatigue in flight operations. The Program objectives are to examine fatigue, sleep loss, and circadian disruption in flight operations, determine the effects of these factors on flight crew performance, and the development of fatigue countermeasures. The NASA Ames Fatigue Countermeasures Program conducts controlled laboratory experiments, full-mission flight simulations, and field studies. A range of subjective, behavioral, performance, physiological, and environmental measures are used depending on study objectives. The Program has developed substantial expertise in gathering data during actual flight operations and in other work settings. This has required the development of ambulatory and other measures that can be carried throughout the world and used at 41,000 feet in aircraft cockpits. The NASA Ames Fatigue Countermeasures Program has examined fatigue in shorthaul, longhaul, overnight cargo, and helicopter operations. A recent study of planned cockpit rest periods demonstrated the effectiveness of a brief inflight nap to improve pilot performance and alertness. This study involved inflight reaction time/vigilance performance testing and EEG/EOG measures of physiological alertness. The NASA Ames Fatigue Countermeasures Program has applied scientific findings to the development of education and training materials on fatigue countermeasures, input to federal regulatory activities on pilot flight, duty, and rest requirements, and support of National Transportation Safety Board accident investigations. Current activities are examining fatigue in nonaugmented longhaul flights, regional/commuter flight operations, corporate/business aviation, and psychophysiological variables related to performance.

Rosekind, Mark R.↗

NASA NTRS1996

From Aeronautics to Space: Lessons in Human Automation

Civilian air flight continues on a growth curve, as more and more people utilize air travel to meet business and personal travel needs: This consumer-driven demand has resulted in the adoption of new methods to increase air system capacity and to make the air transportation system increasingly more efficient. As a consequence, civilian aviation, as an industry, has assumed a leading role in the use of automated systems, and, by implication, in the understanding of how human openers interact with these systems. Aeronautical automation systems serve a variety of roles. These include controlling aircraft and aiding, advising and monitoring numerous functions in the aircraft/airspace system. Experiences in the use of human/automation systems gathered from aviation are, in many cases, generalizable to other industries having similar requirements for human and non-human intelligent system interaction. However, the human/automation lessons learned from aviation have special relevance to the space application, where many of the same operational demands prevail. The application of aeronautical lessons of human-automated interaction to spaceflight is the subject of this paper. The discussion will address: the progress that has been made through aeronautically-based research and experience in understanding human/automation interaction, ways that this understanding can be applied to the needs of space, and the limits of our present understanding of human/automations systems. Suggestions will be offered related to human-automation research generally, and to the particular needs of the space endeavor.

Connors, Mary M.↗

NASA NTRS1996

A Risk Assessment Model for Reduced Aircraft Separation: A Quantitative Method to Evaluate the Safety of Free Flight

As new technologies and procedures are introduced into the National Airspace System, whether they are intended to improve efficiency, capacity, or safety level, the quantification of potential changes in safety levels is of vital concern. Applications of technology can improve safety levels and allow the reduction of separation standards. An excellent example is the Precision Runway Monitor (PRM). By taking advantage of the surveillance and display advances of PRM, airports can run instrument parallel approaches to runways separated by 3400 feet with the same level of safety as parallel approaches to runways separated by 4300 feet using the standard technology. Despite a wealth of information from flight operations and testing programs, there is no readily quantifiable relationship between numerical safety levels and the separation standards that apply to aircraft on final approach. This paper presents a modeling approach to quantify the risk associated with reducing separation on final approach. Reducing aircraft separation, both laterally and longitudinally, has been the goal of several aviation R&D programs over the past several years. Many of these programs have focused on technological solutions to improve navigation accuracy, surveillance accuracy, aircraft situational awareness, controller situational awareness, and other technical and operational factors that are vital to maintaining flight safety. The risk assessment model relates different types of potential aircraft accidents and incidents and their contribution to overall accident risk. The framework links accident risks to a hierarchy of failsafe mechanisms characterized by procedures and interventions. The model will be used to assess the overall level of safety associated with reducing separation standards and the introduction of new technology and procedures, as envisaged under the Free Flight concept. The model framework can be applied to various aircraft scenarios, including parallel and in-trail approaches. This research was performed under contract to NASA and in cooperation with the FAA's Safety Division (ASY).

Cassell, Rick↗

NASA NTRS1996

A Cross-Industry Analysis of LOFT Debriefings

Line Oriented Simulation (LOS) iss widely used to provide crews opportunities to practice Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) concepts in realistic, challenging simulated flight situations. LOS includes both Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT), the original "non-jeopardy" form in which the crews are not graded on their performance, and Line Oriented Evaluation (LOE). In LOE, crews are graded, which is required in those airlines that participate in the FAA's Advanced Qualification Program (ALP). How much crews learn in LOS arid take back to the line hinges on the effectiveness of the debriefing that follows the LOS. The simulation itself is a busy, intense experience, and thoughtful discussion afterwards is necessary for the crew to sort out and interpret what happened and why. Instructors are expected to lead briefings in a way that encourages crew members to analyze for themselves their performance in the LOS. Rather than lecturing the crew in the traditional manner on what they did right and wrong, the instructor is expected to facilitate self-discovery and self-critique by the crew. We have recently completed a study in which we observed 36 LOFT briefings at 5 major U.S. airlines. We audiotape recorded the briefings, transcribed the recordings, and coded for more than 70 variables. Our analysis addresses four broad questions: To what extent do instructors attempt to facilitate crew self-analysis? What techniques do instructors use to facilitate and how effective are these techniques? What is the character of crew participation? To what extent do briefings emphasize CRM and crew performance? We discuss the implications of our findings for ALP and LOE.

Dismukes, Key↗

NASA NTRS1996

Translating Research Into Airline Practice: Case Studies In Collaboration

Airline training departments are avid customers for research that will help them enhance the effectiveness of training and the safety of flight operations. However, various factors often make it difficult for training department managers to draw upon the large body of human factors research, e.g.: research may not address the specific questions facing the training departments, the research literature may not be in a form that training managers can readily interpret, researchers' recommendations may be too expensive or impractical to implement, etc. This panel will discuss ways in which researchers can work with training departments to design research and translate findings into products that airlines can use readily. This collaboration is most effective when it is an integral part of the study from its inception. To illustrate the process of collaboration we will use as a case study the recently completed LOFT (Line Oriented Flight Training) Debriefing research project. We will summarize the findings from that study and discuss how we translated those findings into two training tools: a manual on how to facilitate LOFT debriefings and a video that illustrates facilitation techniques in a realistically enacted debriefing. In some cases, instead of starting a new research project, training department needs can be addressed by reviewing the existing research literature and using expert opinion to develop products that specifically address those needs. To illustrate this approach we will discuss a recent informal working group of scientists and airline personnel that met to develop training material to enhance situation awareness. This group reviewed scientific literature and ASRS (Aviation Safety Reporting System) reports, analyzed contributing factors, and produced a model for managing situation awareness.

Dismukes, R. Key↗

NASA NTRS1996

Cross-Cultural Barriers to Effective Communication in Aviation

Communication is essential to safe flight, as evidenced by several accidents in which crew communicates was found to have contributed to the accidents. This chapter documents the essential role of explicit efficient communication to flight safety with a global context. It addresses communication between flight crews and air traffic controllers in regions a the world where pilots and controllers speak different native languages, as well as cases in which crew members within the flight deck represent different native languages and cultures. It also addresses problems associated with "exporting" crew resource management training programs to parts of the world which values and norms differ from those of the United States, where these programs were initially developed. This chapter is organized around several central questions: (1) What are various kinds of communication failures and what are their consequences; (2) What are the causes of communication failure; (3) What are features of effective crew communication; (4) What can be done to enhance communication success? To explore a wider range of communication failures than available from accident reports, we examined a set of incident reports from the Aviation Safety Reporting System. These could be classified into three major categories: those in which language actually interfered with transmission of a message; those in which transmission was adequate but the context was not expressed unambiguously and thus the message received was not the same as the message intended; and those in which the message was received as intended, but was not adequately understood or acted upon, mainly because of cultural factors. The consequences of failed communication can be flight errors (such as when a clearance is not received correctly), loss of situation awareness, or failure of crew members (or ATC and pilots) to build a shared understanding of a situation. Causes of misunderstanding can be traced to a number of sources, often grounded in faulty assumptions held by one or both parties to a conversation. Speakers and listeners often experience "illusionary understanding" in which they think they understand each other, but in fact do not. While this problem can exist within a single culture, it is much more serious across cultures. Training in effective explicit communication is a component of Crew Resource Management training programs developed in the U.S. These programs are being adopted by airlines around the world, with varying degrees of success. The level of success in part depends on how similar the conversational and social styles of those cultures are to those of the U.S. A factor that influences conversational style is a culture's relative positioned on two major dimensions that distinguish national cultural groups: individualism vs. collectivism and degree of power distance. The chapter concludes with a discussion of techniques for overcoming the various classes of communication failures and for effectively adapting training programs to fit the values and norms of cultures around the globe.

Fischer, U.↗

NASA NTRS1996

Decision Making In A High-Tech World: Automation Bias and Countermeasures

Automated decision aids and decision support systems have become essential tools in many high-tech environments. In aviation, for example, flight management systems computers not only fly the aircraft, but also calculate fuel efficient paths, detect and diagnose system malfunctions and abnormalities, and recommend or carry out decisions. Air Traffic Controllers will soon be utilizing decision support tools to help them predict and detect potential conflicts and to generate clearances. Other fields as disparate as nuclear power plants and medical diagnostics are similarly becoming more and more automated. Ideally, the combination of human decision maker and automated decision aid should result in a high-performing team, maximizing the advantages of additional cognitive and observational power in the decision-making process. In reality, however, the presence of these aids often short-circuits the way that even very experienced decision makers have traditionally handled tasks and made decisions, and introduces opportunities for new decision heuristics and biases. Results of recent research investigating the use of automated aids have indicated the presence of automation bias, that is, errors made when decision makers rely on automated cues as a heuristic replacement for vigilant information seeking and processing. Automation commission errors, i.e., errors made when decision makers inappropriately follow an automated directive, or automation omission errors, i.e., errors made when humans fail to take action or notice a problem because an automated aid fails to inform them, can result from this tendency. Evidence of the tendency to make automation-related omission and commission errors has been found in pilot self reports, in studies using pilots in flight simulations, and in non-flight decision making contexts with student samples. Considerable research has found that increasing social accountability can successfully ameliorate a broad array of cognitive biases and resultant errors. To what extent these effects generalize to performance situations is not yet empirically established. The two studies to be presented represent concurrent efforts, with student and professional pilot samples, to determine the effects of accountability pressures on automation bias and on the verification of the accurate functioning of automated aids. Students (Experiment 1) and commercial pilots (Experiment 2) performed simulated flight tasks using automated aids. In both studies, participants who perceived themselves as accountable for their strategies of interaction with the automation were significantly more likely to verify its correctness, and committed significantly fewer automation-related errors than those who did not report this perception.

Mosier, Kathleen L.↗

NASA NTRS1996

Evaluating Sleep Disturbance: A Review of Methods

There are three general approaches to evaluating sleep disturbance in regards to noise: subjective, behavioral, and physiological. Subjective methods range from standardized questionnaires and scales to self-report measures designed for specific research questions. There are two behavioral methods that provide useful sleep disturbance data. One behavioral method is actigraphy, a motion detector that provides an empirical estimate of sleep quantity and quality. An actigraph, worn on the non-dominant wrist, provides a 24-hr estimate of the rest/activity cycle. The other method involves a behavioral response, either to a specific probe or stimuli or subject initiated (e.g., indicating wakefulness). The classic, gold standard for evaluating sleep disturbance is continuous physiological monitoring of brain, eye, and muscle activity. This allows detailed distinctions of the states and stages of sleep, awakenings, and sleep continuity. Physiological delta can be obtained in controlled laboratory settings and in natural environments. Current ambulatory physiological recording equipment allows evaluation in home and work settings. These approaches will be described and the relative strengths and limitations of each method will be discussed.

Smith, Roy M.↗

NASA NTRS1995

Flight Schedule and the Circadian Clock Influence on Sleep Loss During Overnight Cargo Operations

Thirty-four flight crew members were monitored before, during, and after two 8-day overnight cargo duty patterns which involved multiple flights at night crossing no more than one time zone per 24 h. Rectal temperature, heart rate, and wrist activity were recorded every 2 min. Sleep quantity and quality, and nap timing, were noted in a logbook. To reduce the masking effects of physical activity on temperature, 0.28 C was added to each subject's raw temperature data whenever he reported being asleep. For both masked and unmasked data, daily temperature minima were estimated from the multiple complex demodulated waveform. The temperature minima did not show a progressive adaptation to night duty, which was interrupted by a night off after 5 nights on one trip pattern and after 3 nights on the other. On duty days, the average temperature minimum delayed by about 3 h, occurring near the end of the duty period. Daytime sleep episodes averaged 2.9 h shorter than nighttime sleep episodes, and were rated as lighter, less restorative, and poorer overall. Fifty-three percent of subjects slept more than once per 24 h while they were on night duty, compared to 17% when able to sleep at night. The total sleep per 24 h on duty days averaged 1.2 h less than pretrip. Twenty-nine percent of subjects lost more than 2 h of sleep per 24 h across the 8-day duty patterns. After night duty, subjects awoke around 1400 local time, even when they had slept 2-3 h less than a normal nocturnal sleep episode. Consequently, the duration of morning sleep episodes was correlated with the off-duty time (multiple r(sup 2)=0.44, F=37.23, p less than 0.0001). Anecdotally, crew members complained of being unable to sleep longer and not feeling well-rested. These wakeups were clustered 6 h after the temperature minimum, which suggests that they may have been a response to the circadian wakeup signal. Daytime layovers in which crew members were able to sleep again in the evening ended later (0200-0300) and were longer (average 19.2 h versus 14.8 h) than those in which they slept only once in the morning. Overnight cargo crew members are working around the time of the circadian nadir with an accumulating sleep debt. Two scheduling factors affect sleep loss during these operations: how long before the circadian wakeup signal crew members come off duty, and whether the layover lasts long enough to permit a second sleep episode in the early evening.

Gander, Philippa H.↗

NASA NTRS1995

Flight Crew Sleep in Long-Haul Aircraft Bunk Facilities: Survey Results

Modem long-haul aircraft can fly up to 16 continuous hours and provide a 24-hour, global capability. Extra (augmented) flight crew are available on long flights to allow planned rest periods, on a rotating basis, away from the flight deck in onboard crew rest facilities (2 bunks). A NASA/FAA study is under-way to examine the quantity and quality of sleep obtained in long-haul aircraft bunks and the factors that promote or interfere with that sleep. The first phase of the study involved a retrospective survey, followed by a second phase field study to collect standard polysomnographic data during inflight bunk sleep periods. A summary of the Phase I survey results are reported here. A multi-part 54-question retrospective survey was completed by 1,404 flight crew (37% return rate) at three different major US air carriers flying B747-100, 200, 400, and MD- 11 long-haul aircraft. The questions examined demographics, quantity and quality of sleep at home and in onboard bunks, factors that promote or interfere with sleep, and effects on subsequent performance and alertness. Flight crew reported a mean bunk sleep latency of 39.4 mins (SD=28.3 mins) (n=1,276) and a mean total sleep time of 2.2 hrs (SD=1.3 hrs) (n=603). (Different flight lengths could affect overall time available for sleep.) Crew rated 25 factors for their interference or promotion of bunk sleep. Figure I portrays the average ratings for each factor across all three carriers. A principal components analysis of the 25 factors revealed three areas that promoted bunk sleep: physiological (e.g., readiness for sleep), physical environment (e.g., bunk size, privacy), and personal comfort (e.g., blankets, pillows). Five areas were identified that interfered with sleep: environmental disturbance (e.g., background noise, turbulence), luminosity (e.g., lighting), personal disturbances (e.g., bathroom trips, random thoughts), environmental discomfort (e.g., low humidity, cold), and interpersonal disturbances (e.g., bunk partner).

Rosekind, Mark R.↗

NASA NTRS1994

Crew factors in flight operations 9: Effects of planned cockpit rest on crew performance and alertness in long-haul operations

This study examined the effectiveness of a planned cockpit rest period to improve alertness and performance in long-haul flight operations. The Rest Group (12 crew members) was allowed a planned 40 minute rest period during the low workload, cruise portion of the flight, while the No-Rest Group (9 crew members) had a 40 minute planned control period when they maintained usual flight activities. Measures used in the study included continuous ambulatory recordings of brain wave and eye movement activity, a reaction time/vigilance task, a wrist activity monitor, in-flight fatigue and alertness ratings, a daily log for noting sleep periods, meals, exercise, flight and duty periods, and the NASA Background Questionnaire. The Rest Group pilots slept on 93 percent of the opportunities, falling asleep in 5.6 minutes and sleeping for 25.8 minutes. This nap was associated with improved physiological alertness and performance compared to the No-Rest Group. The benefits of the nap were observed through the critical descent and landing phases of flight. The nap did not affect layover sleep or the cumulative sleep debt. The nap procedures were implemented with minimal disruption to usual flight operations and there were no reported or identified concerns regarding safety.

Rosekind, Mark R.↗

NASA NTRS1994

Fatigue in operational settings: Examples from the aviation environment

The need for 24-h operations creates nonstandard and altered work schedules that can lead to cumulative sleep loss and circadian disruption. These factors can lead to fatigue and sleepiness and affect performance and productivity on the job. The approach, research, and results of the NASA Ames Fatigue Countermeasures Program are described to illustrate one attempt to address these issues in the aviation environment. The scientific and operational relevance of these factors is discussed, and provocative issues for future research are presented.

Rosekind, Mark R.↗

NASA NTRS1994

Analysis of Crew Fatigue in AIA Guantanamo Bay Aviation Accident

Flight operations can engender fatigue, which can affect flight crew performance, vigilance, and mood. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) requested the NASA Fatigue Countermeasures Program to analyze crew fatigue factors in an aviation accident that occurred at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. There are specific fatigue factors that can be considered in such investigations: cumulative sleep loss, continuous hours of wakefulness prior to the incident or accident, and the time of day at which the accident occurred. Data from the NTSB Human Performance Investigator's Factual Report, the Operations Group Chairman's Factual Report, and the Flight 808 Crew Statements were analyzed, using conservative estimates and averages to reconcile discrepancies among the sources. Analysis of these data determined the following: the entire crew displayed cumulative sleep loss, operated during an extended period of continuous wakefulness, and obtained sleep at times in opposition to the circadian disposition for sleep, and that the accident occurred in the afternoon window of physiological sleepiness. In addition to these findings, evidence that fatigue affected performance was suggested by the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript as well as in the captain's testimony. Examples from the CVR showed degraded decision-making skills, fixation, and slowed responses, all of which can be affected by fatigue; also, the captain testified to feeling "lethargic and indifferent" just prior to the accident. Therefore, the sleep/wake history data supports the hypothesis that fatigue was a factor that affected crewmembers' performance. Furthermore, the examples from the CVR and the captain's testimony support the hypothesis that the fatigue had an impact on specific actions involved in the occurrence of the accident.

Rosekind, Mark R.↗

NASA NTRS1994

Flight controller alertness and performance during MOD shiftwork operations

Decreased alertness and performance associated with fatigue, sleep loss, and circadian disruption are issues faced by a diverse range of shiftwork operations. During STS operations, MOD personnel provide 24 hr. coverage of critical tasks. A joint JSC and ARC project was undertaken to examine these issues in flight controllers during MOD shiftwork operations. An initial operational test of procedures and measures was conducted during STS-53 in Dec. 1992. The study measures included a background questionnaire, a subjective daily logbook completed on a 24 hr. basis (to report sleep patterns, work periods, etc.), and an 8 minute performance and mood test battery administered at the beginning, middle, and end of each shift period. Seventeen Flight controllers representing the 3 Orbit shifts participated. The initial results clearly support further data collection during other STS missions to document baseline levels of alertness and performance during MOD shiftwork operations. These issues are especially pertinent for the night shift operations and the acute phase advance required for the transition of day shift personnel into the night for shuttle launch. Implementation and evaluation of the countermeasure strategies to maximize alertness and performance is planned. As STS missions extend to further extended duration orbiters, timelines and planning for 24 circadian disruption will remain highly relevant in the MOD environment.

Kelly, Sean M.↗