Development Testing and Subsequent Failure Investigation of a Spring Strut Mechanism
No abstract available
Engineering topics
Publications and source records attributed to Robertson, Brandan.
No abstract available
The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) and Lockheed Martin (LM) performed random vibration testing on a single spring strut development unit to assess its ability to withstand qualification level random vibration environments. Failure of the strut while exposed to random vibration resulted in a follow-on failure investigation, design changes, and additional development tests. This paper focuses on the results of the failure investigations referenced in detail in the NESC final report [1] including identified lessons learned to aid in future design iterations of the spring strut and to help other mechanism developers avoid similar pitfalls.
A document describes a low-impact mating system suitable for both docking (mating of two free-flying spacecraft) and berthing (in which a robot arm in one spacecraft positions an object for mating with either spacecraft). The low-impact mating system is fully androgynous: it mates with a copy of itself, i.e., all spacecraft and other objects to be mated are to be equipped with identical copies of the system. This aspect of the design helps to minimize the number of unique parts and to standardize and facilitate mating operations. The system includes a closed-loop feedback control subsystem that actively accommodates misalignments between mating spacecraft, thereby attenuating spacecraft dynamics and mitigating the need for precise advance positioning of the spacecraft. The operational characteristics of the mating system can be easily configured in software, during operation, to enable mating of spacecraft having various masses, center-of-gravity offsets, and closing velocities. The system design provides multi-fault tolerance for critical operations: for example, to ensure unmating at a critical time, a redundant unlatching mechanism and two independent pyrotechnic release subsystems are included.
Spaceflight mechanisms have a reputation for being difficult to develop and operate successfully. This reputation is well earned. Many circumstances conspire to make this so: the environments in which the mechanisms are used are extremely severe, there is usually limited or no maintenance opportunity available during operation due to this environment, the environments are difficult to replicate accurately on the ground, the expense of the mechanism development makes it impractical to build and test many units for long periods of time before use, mechanisms tend to be highly specialized and not prone to interchangeability or off-the-shelf use, they can generate and store a lot of energy, and the nature of mechanisms themselves, as a combination of structures, electronics, etc. designed to accomplish specific dynamic performance, makes them very complex and subject to many unpredictable interactions of many types. In addition to their complexities, mechanism are often counted upon to provide critical vehicle functions that can result in catastrophic events should the functions not be performed. It is for this reason that mechanisms are frequently subjected to special scrutiny in safety processes. However, a failure tolerant approach, along with good design and development practices and detailed design reviews, can be developed to allow such notoriously troublesome mechanisms to be utilized confidently in safety-critical applications.
The Mechanical Design and Analysis Branch at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) is responsible for the technical oversight of over 30 mechanical systems flying on the Space Shuttle Orbiter and the International Space Station (ISS). The branch also has the responsibility for reviewing all mechanical systems on all Space Shuttle and International Space Station payloads, as part of the payload safety review process, through the Mechanical Systems Working Group (MSWG). These responsibilities give the branch unique insight into a large number of mechanical systems, and problems encountered during their design, testing, and operation. This paper contains narrative descriptions of lessons learned from some of the major problems worked on by the branch during the last two years. The problems are grouped into common categories and lessons learned are stated.
The X-38 Vehicle 201 (V-201) is a space flight prototype lifting body vehicle that was designed to launch to orbit in the Space Shuttle orbiter payload bay. Although the project was cancelled in May 2003, many of the systems were nearly complete. This paper will describe the fin folding actuation mechanism flight subsystems and development units as well as lessons learned in the design, assembly, development testing, and qualification testing. The two vertical tail fins must be stowed (folded inboard) to allow the orbiter payload bay doors to close. The fin folding actuation mechanism is a remotely or extravehicular activity (EVA) actuated single fault tolerant system consisting of seven subsystems capable of repeatedly deploying or stowing the fins.