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Reyes, Gustavo A.

Publications and source records attributed to Reyes, Gustavo A..

Utilizing Advanced Statistics to Determine Anomalistic Conditions in Pebble-Bed Reactors

Pebble-bed reactors (PBRs) utilize hundreds of thousands of fuel pebbles, which continuously circulate through the core, in lieu of traditional fuel assemblies to generate fissions and produce power. The use of unmarked fuel pebbles presents a challenge for international safeguards verification that nuclear material is not being diverted. To ensure pebble diversion is not taking place, new methods for accounting for and monitoring the pebbles should be examined to determine an appropriate methodology for performing bulk accountancy with pebbles. Here, this work examines the use of statistical methods for determining if the reactor is within a declared range of operation by examining the statistical distribution of pebble burnup as they are discharged from the core. Using this methodology, we created a model that detects diversion over 95% of the time, over multiple diversion pathways, if the reactor core maintains a constant power density during the diversion process and only falsely labels a diversion case nominal 2% of the time. For a diversion scenario where the reactor is maintained at a constant power, the statistical analysis can correctly identify if diversion is occurring over 80% of the time; however, nearly 20% of specific diversion pathways are mislabeled nominal. These results provide a basis and framework for exploring the further use of statistical methods to determine where these methods could be most useful and where additional methods, such as machine learning, could be used to capture if diversion is occurring in pebble-bed reactors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The research challenges in security and safeguards for nuclear fission batteries

This paper discusses the nuclear security and safeguards research challenges presented by the development and deployment of nuclear fission batteries. These are defined as easily transportable and deployable nuclear systems which are designed to operate either unattended or autonomously. We start by defining the current landscape of domestic and international safeguards and security and discuss how it can be affected by the introduction these new nuclear systems. We then specifically discuss the technology gaps and technologies to be developed to facilitate their practical deployment. We find that, as expected, we can leverage conclusions from existing security and safeguards studies for small modular rectors and develop bespoke target set analyses to inform security postures based on probabilistic risk assessment. We find also that specific fission battery security economic analysis tools are needed and security by design must be applied early. However, the most important finding is that these new systems will require a new comprehensive set of cyber tools covering transportation, installation, operation, maintenance security of the fission battery systems. Altogether, we find that the development of the necessary security and safeguards requirements at the design phase of such a technology will be of great benefit in the smooth deployment of this modern nuclear energy system.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Security by Design Economics Analysis for Advanced Reactors and Small Modular Reactors Project Interim Report for FY2021

Advanced Reactor and Small Modular Reactor (AR/SMR) designs have the potential to provide clean, reliable baseload energy. Ensuring the capability to deploy these reactors in an economically viable fashion is of interest to industry. A large portion of the expected operating costs of AR/SMRs involves the security of the plant. Security by Design (SeBD) is the practice of including features in the design and construction of the site, with the intent to decrease the operating costs related to security. Quantifying the increase or decrease in the overall lifetime cost to the plant as a result of SeBD is of paramount importance in understanding the disadvantages and benefits of such activities. The National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of International Nuclear Security (INS) is funding the development of a methodology whereby the capital expenses and operating expenses, as well as the physical security effectiveness, of SeBD can be quantified for AR/SMRs. This report is an interim report on the progress of the work performed by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Idaho National Laboratory, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). It is the second annual report on this work.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗