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Poolla, Kameshwar

Publications and source records attributed to Poolla, Kameshwar.

Selling Demand Response Using Options

Wholesale electricity markets in many jurisdictions use a two-settlement structure: a day-ahead market for bulk power transactions and a real-time market for fine-grain supply-demand balancing. This paper explores trading demand response assets within this two-settlement market structure. Here, we consider two approaches for trading demand response assets: (a) an intermediate spot market with contingent pricing, and (b) an over-the-counter options contract. In the first case, we characterize the competitive equilibrium of the spot market, and show that it is socially optimal. Economic orthodoxy advocates spot markets, but these require expensive infrastructure and regulatory blessing. In the second case, we characterize competitive equilibria and compare its efficiency with the idealized spot market. Options contract are private bilateral over-the-counter transactions and do not require regulatory approval. We show that the optimal social welfare is, in general, not supported. We then design optimal option prices that minimize the social welfare gap. This optimal design serves to approximate the ideal spot market for demand response using options with modest loss of efficiency. Our results are validated through numerical simulations.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Regulating TNCs: Should Uber and Lyft set their own rules?

We evaluate the impact of three proposed regulations of transportation network companies (TNCs) like Uber, Lyft and Didi: (1) A minimum wage for drivers, (2) a cap on the number of drivers or vehicles, and (3) a per-trip congestion tax. The impact is assessed using a queuing theoretic equilibrium model which incorporates the stochastic dynamics of the app-based ride-hailing matching platform, the ride prices and driver wages established by the platform, and the incentives of passengers and drivers. We show that a floor placed under driver earnings can push the ride-hailing platform to hire more drivers and offer more rides, at the same time that passengers enjoy faster rides and lower total cost, while platform rents are reduced. Contrary to standard competitive labor market theory, enforcing a minimum wage for drivers benefits both drivers and passengers, and promotes the efficiency of the entire system. This surprising outcome holds for almost all model parameters, and it occurs because the wage floor curbs TNC labor market power. In contrast to a wage floor, imposing a cap on the number of vehicles hurts drivers, because the platform reaps all the benefits of limiting supply. The congestion tax has the expected impact: fares increase, wages and platform revenue decrease. Here, we also construct variants of the model to briefly discuss platform subsidy, platform competition, and autonomous vehicles.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

A One-Class Support Vector Machine Calibration Method for Time Series Change Point Detection

Identifying the change point of a system’s health status is critical. Indeed, a change point usually signifies an incipient fault under development. The One-Class Support Vector Machine (OC-SVM) is a popular machine learning model for anomaly detection that could be used for identifying change points; yet, it is sometimes difficult to obtain a good OC-SVM model that can be used on sensor measurement time series to identify the change points in system health status. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for calibrating OC-SVM models. Our method uses a heuristic search method to find a good set of input data and hyperparameters that yield a well-performing model. Our results on the C-MAPSS dataset demonstrate that OC-SVM can achieve satisfactory accuracy in detecting change point in time series with fewer training data, compared to state-of-the-art deep learning approaches. In our case study, the OC-SVM calibrated by the proposed model is shown to be useful especially in scenarios with limited amount of training data.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Detecting and Diagnosing Incipient Building Faults Using Uncertainty Information from Deep Neural Networks

Early detection of incipient faults is of significant importance to reducing maintenance costs, saving energy, and enhancing occupant comfort in buildings. Popular supervised learning models such as deep neural networks are considered promising due to their ability to directly learn from labeled fault data; however, it is known that the performance of supervised learning approaches highly relies on the availability and quality of labeled training data. In Fault Detection and Diagnosis (FDD) applications, the lack of labeled incipient fault data has posed a major challenge to applying these supervised learning techniques to commercial buildings. To address this concern, this paper proposes using Monte Carlo dropout (MC-dropout) to enhance the supervised learning pipeline, so that the resulting neural network is able to detect and diagnose unseen incipient fault examples. We also examine the proposed MC-dropout method on the RP-1043 dataset to demonstrate its effectiveness in indicating the most likely incipient fault types.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Mechanism Design for Demand Response Programs

Demand response (DR) programs serve to reduce the consumption of electricity at times when the supply is scarce and expensive. Consumers or agents with flexible consumption profiles are recruited by an aggregator who manages the DR program. The aggregator calls on a subset of its pool of recruited agents to reduce their electricity use during DR events. Agents are paid for reducing their energy consumption from contractually established baselines. Baselines are counter-factual consumption estimates of the energy an agent would have consumed if they were not participating in the DR program. Baselines are used to determine payments to agents. This creates an incentive for agents to inflate their baselines in order to increase the payments they receive. There are several newsworthy cases of agents gaming their baseline for economic benefit. We propose a novel self-reported baseline mechanism (SRBM) where each agent reports its baseline and marginal utility. These reports are strategic and need not be truthful. Based on the reported information, the aggregator selects or calls on agents with a certain probability to meet the load reduction target. Called agents are paid for observed reductions from their self-reported baselines. Agents who are not called face penalties for consumption shortfalls below their baselines. Under SRBM, we show that truthful reporting of baseline consumption and marginal utility is a dominant strategy. Thus, SRBM eliminates the incentive for agents to inflate baselines. SRBM is assured to meet the load reduction target. To conclude, we show that SRBM is almost optimal in the metric of average cost of DR provision faced by the aggregator.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

On the marginal value of electricity storage

We investigate the problem of characterizing the economic value of energy storage capacity to a wind power producer (WPP) that sells its energy in a conventional two-settlement electricity market. The WPP can offer a forward contract to supply power in the day-ahead market, subject to financial penalties for imbalances between the contracted power and the power that is delivered in real-time. We consider the setting in which the WPP has access to a co-located energy storage system, and can thus reshape its wind power production subject to its storage capacity constraints. Modeling wind power as a random process, we show that the problem of determining optimal forward contract offerings—given recourse with storage—is convex. We further establish that the maximum expected profit is concave and non-decreasing in the energy storage capacity, which reveals that the greatest marginal benefit from energy storage is derived from initial investment in small storage capacity. We provide a characterization of the marginal value of small energy storage capacity to the WPP. The formulae we derive shed light on the relationship between the value of storage and certain statistical measures of variability in the underlying wind power process.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Sharing Storage in a Smart Grid: A Coalitional Game Approach

Sharing economy is a transformative socio-economic phenomenon built around the idea of sharing underused resources and services, e.g., transportation and housing, thereby reducing costs and extracting value. Anticipating continued reduction in the cost of electricity storage, we look into the potential opportunity in electrical power system where consumers share storage with each other. We consider two different scenarios. In the first scenario, consumers are assumed to already have individual storage devices and they explore cooperation to minimize the realized electricity consumption cost. In the second scenario, a group of consumers is interested to invest in joint storage capacity and operate it cooperatively. The resulting system problems are modeled using cooperative game theory. Finally, in both cases, the cooperative games are shown to have non-empty cores and we develop efficient cost allocations in the core with analytical expressions. Thus, sharing of storage in cooperative manner is shown to be very effective for the electric power system.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Analysis of Solar Energy Aggregation Under Various Billing Mechanisms

Ongoing reductions in the cost of solar photovoltaic (PV) systems are driving increased installations by residential households. Various incentive programs such as feed-in tariff, net metering, net purchase, and sale that allow the prosumers to sell their generated electricity to the grid are also powering this trend. In this paper, we investigate sharing of PV systems among a community of households, who can also benefit further by pooling their production. Using cooperative game theory, we find conditions under which such sharing decreases their net total cost. We also develop allocation rules such that the joint net electricity consumption cost is allocated to the participants. These cost allocations are based on the cost causation principle. The allocations also satisfy the standalone cost principle and promote PV solar aggregation. Here, we also perform a comparative analytical study on the benefit of sharing under the mechanisms favorable for sharing, namely net metering, and net purchase and sale. The results are illustrated in a case study using real consumption data from a residential community in Austin, TX, USA.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Metrics for Assessment of Smart Grid Data Integrity Attacks

There is an emerging consensus that the nation’s electricity grid is vulnerable to cyber attacks. This vulnerability arises from the increasing reliance on using remote measurements, transmitting them over legacy data networks to system operators who make critical decisions based on available data. Data integrity attacks are a class of cyber attacks that involve a compromise of information that is processed by the grid operator. This information can include meter readings of injected power at remote generators, power flows on transmission lines, and relay states. These data integrity attacks have consequences only when the system operator responds to compromised data by redispatching generation under normal or contingency protocols. These consequences include (a) financial losses from sub-optimal economic dispatch to service loads, (b) robustness/resiliency losses from placing the grid at operating points that are at greater risk from contingencies, and (c) systemic losses resulting from cascading failures induced by poor operational choices. This paper is focused on understanding the connections between grid operational procedures and cyber attacks. We first offer two examples to illustrate how data integrity attacks can cause economic and physical damage by misleading operators into taking inappropriate decisions. We then focus on unobservable data integrity attacks involving power meter data. These are coordinated attacks where the compromised data are consistent with the physics of power flow, and are therefore passed by any bad data detection algorithm. We develop metrics to assess the economic impact of these attacks under re-dispatch decisions using optimal power flow methods. These metrics can be use to prioritize the adoption of appropriate countermeasures including PMU placement, encryption, hardware upgrades, and advance attack detection algorithms.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Smart Grid Integrity Attacks: Characterizations and Countermeasures

Real power injections at loads and generators, and real power flows on selected lines in a transmission network are monitored, transmitted over a SCADA network to the system operator, and used in state estimation algorithms to make dispatch, re-balance and other energy management system [EMS] decisions. Coordinated cyber attacks of power meter readings can be arranged to be undetectable by any bad data detection algorithm. These unobservable attacks present a serious threat to grid operations. Of particular interest are sparse attacks that involve the compromise of a modest number of meter readings. An efficient algorithm to find all unobservable attacks [under standard DC load flow approximations] involving the compromise of exactly two power injection meters and an arbitrary number of power meters on lines is presented. This requires O(n2m) flops for a power system with n buses and m line meters. If all lines are metered, there exist canonical forms that characterize all 3, 4, and 5-sparse unobservable attacks. These can be quickly detected in power systems using standard graph algorithms. Known secure phase measurement units [PMUs] can be used as countermeasures against an arbitrary collection of cyber attacks. Finding the minimum number of necessary PMUs is NP-hard. It is shown that p + 1 PMUs at carefully chosen buses are sufficient to neutralize a collection of p cyber attacks.

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