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Pilat, Joseph F

Publications and source records attributed to Pilat, Joseph F.

Prioritizing Acquisition Pathways in the State Level Concept

The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Department of Safeguards has launched a project to further develop the State-level concept for the planning, implementation, and evaluation of safeguards activities. In order to further evolve the safeguards system an emphasis is placed on integrating inspection-related activities and the State evaluation process to draw safeguards conclusions in the most efficient way. The credible implementation of acquisition pathway analysis is central to the success of the IAEA's State-level concept. NNSA's Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security (NA-241) The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) is sponsoring Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to produce a study that will examine the use of acquisition pathway analysis in: (1) Developing a State-specific, State-level approach (SLA) and Annual Implementation Plan (AIP); (2) Maximizing the utility of the physical model; and (3) Supporting resource allocation decisions through a pathway prioritization. To deal with the challenge of developing an effective and efficient SLA, this study looks at: (1) Prioritizing proliferation pathways based on an assessment of a State's capabilities and assumed proliferation strategies; and (2) Relevant State behavior (e.g., transparency, cooperation, etc.) while avoiding subjective judgments about States themselves. The study makes use of case studies and concrete examples in order to illustrate how new concepts and approaches will be implemented, and how they may differ from more traditional safeguards approaches.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Monitoring and verification R&D

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report outlined the Administration's approach to promoting the agenda put forward by President Obama in Prague on April 5, 2009. The NPR calls for a national monitoring and verification R&D program to meet future challenges arising from the Administration's nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament agenda. Verification of a follow-on to New START could have to address warheads and possibly components along with delivery capabilities. Deeper cuts and disarmament would need to address all of these elements along with nuclear weapon testing, nuclear material and weapon production facilities, virtual capabilities from old weapon and existing energy programs and undeclared capabilities. We only know how to address some elements of these challenges today, and the requirements may be more rigorous in the context of deeper cuts as well as disarmament. Moreover, there is a critical need for multiple options to sensitive problems and to address other challenges. There will be other verification challenges in a world of deeper cuts and disarmament, some of which we are already facing. At some point, if the reductions process is progressing, uncertainties about past nuclear materials and weapons production will have to be addressed. IAEA safeguards will need to continue to evolve to meet current and future challenges, and to take advantage of new technologies and approaches. Transparency/verification of nuclear and dual-use exports will also have to be addressed, and there will be a need to make nonproliferation measures more watertight and transparent. In this context, and recognizing we will face all of these challenges even if disarmament is not achieved, this paper will explore possible agreements and arrangements; verification challenges; gaps in monitoring and verification technologies and approaches; and the R&D required to address these gaps and other monitoring and verification challenges.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R&D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the ongoing transformation of safeguards by the Agency.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Report of a workshop on nuclear forces and nonproliferation Woodrow Wilson international center for scholars, Washington, DC October 28, 2010

A workshop sponsored by the Los Alamos National Laboratory in cooperation with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars was held at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC, on October 28, 2010. The workshop addressed evolving nuclear forces and their impacts on nonproliferation in the context of the new strategic environment, the Obama Administration's Nuclear Posture Review and the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The discussions reflected the importance of the NPR for defining the role of US nuclear forces in dealing with 21st century threats and providing guidance for National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Department of Defense (DoD) programs and, for many but not all participants, highlighted its role in the successful outcome of the NPT RevCon. There was widespread support for the NPR and its role in developing the foundations for a sustainable nuclear-weapon program that addresses nuclear weapons, infrastructure and expertise in the broader nonproliferation, disarmament and international security contexts. However, some participants raised concerns about its implementation and its long-term effectiveness and sustainability.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

The evolution of information-driven safeguards

From the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol and integrated safeguards in the 1990s, to current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) efforts to deal with cases of noncompliance, the question of how the Agency can best utilize all the information available to it remains of great interest and increasing importance. How might the concept of 'information-driven' safeguards (IDS) evolve in the future? The ability of the Agency to identify and resolve anomalies has always been important and has emerged as a core Agency function in recent years as the IAEA has had to deal with noncompliance in Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Future IAEA safeguards implementation should be designed with the goal of facilitating and enhancing this vital capability. In addition, the Agency should utilize all the information it possesses, including its in-house assessments and expertise, to direct its safeguards activities. At the State level, knowledge of proliferation possibilities is currently being used to guide the analytical activities of the Agency and to develop inspection plans. How far can this approach be extended? Does it apply across State boundaries? Should it dictate a larger fraction of safeguards activities? Future developments in IDS should utilize the knowledge resident within the Agency to ensure that safeguards resources flow to where they are most needed in order to address anomalies first and foremost, but also to provide greater confidence in conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. The elements of such a system and related implementation issues are assessed in this paper.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The NPR, NPT and the prospects for disarmament

In Prague's Hradcany Square on April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama offered a bold vision of the nuclear future that encompasses both reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons while maintaining, as long as nuclear weapons remain, a safe secure, and effective arsenal, to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America's security commitments. The agenda put forward in Prague involves the full range of issues from deterrence to nonproliferation and disarmament. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report, reflecting the twin objectives of the Prague speech, for the first time places the United States effort to lead expanded international efforts to rebuild and strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime at the top the U.S. nuclear agenda. This attention underscores the fact that the top priority of the United States is to discourage additional states from acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities and to stop terrorist groups from acquiring weapon-usable nuclear materials. It also reinforced the view that positively influencing the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was a key objective of the Obama Administration. The NPR developed both the vision and the policy, but details of implementation will need to be developed and better understood. This paper will address the Nuclear Posture Review and its implementation, as well as it's relation to, and impact on, the NPT RevCon and the long term prospects for nonproliferation and disarmament.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Report of a workshop on nuclear power growth and nonproliferation held at the Woodrow Wilson international center for scholars, Washington, DC, April 21, 2010

The workshop addressed the future of nuclear power and nonproliferation in light of global nuclear energy developments, changing US policy and growing concerns about nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The discussion reflected wide agreement on the need for nuclear power, the necessity of mitigating any proliferation and terrorism risks and support for international cooperation on solutions. There were considerable differences on the nature and extent of the risks of differing fuel cycle choices. There was some skepticism about the prospects for a global nuclear energy renaissance, but there was a recognition that nuclear power would expand somewhat in the decades ahead with some states expanding capacity dramatically (e.g., China) and at least a few new states developing nuclear power programs. It was also argued by some participants that under the right conditions, a genuine renaissance could occur some decades from now. The prospects for a dramatic growth in nuclear power will depend on the ability of governments and industry to address these concerns, including the effectiveness of, and the resources devoted to, plans to develop and implement technologies and approaches that strengthen nonproliferation, nuclear materials accountability and nuclear security Several participants noted that the United States will not be able to continue to lead global nonproliferation efforts and to shape the growth of nuclear power as well as the global environment and energy debates without a robust US nuclear energy program. Some participants argued that fully integrating nuclear energy growth and nonproliferation, proliferation resistance and physical protection objectives was possible. The growing consensus on these objectives and the growing concern about the potential impact of further proliferation on the industry was one reason for optimism. The Blue Ribbon commission led by Scowcroft and Hamilton was seen as going far beyond the need to find an alternative to Yucca Mountain, and the preeminent forum in the next years to address the back end of the fuel cycle and other issues. Some argued that addressing these issues is the critical missing element, or the final piece of the puzzle to ensure the benefits of nuclear power and to promote nonproliferation. In this context, many argued that R&D on closed as well as open fuel cycle options in order to ensure a suite of long-term options was essential.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Workshop on nuclear power growth and nonproliferation

It is widely viewed that an expansion of nuclear power would have positive energy, economic and environmental benefits for the world. However, there are concerns about the economic competitiveness, safety and proliferation and terrorism risks of nuclear power. The prospects for a dramatic growth in nuclear power will depend on the ability of governments and industry to address these concerns, including the effectiveness of, and the resources devoted to, plans to develop and implement technologies and approaches that strengthen nonproliferation, nuclear materials accountability and nuclear security. In his Prague speech, President Obama stated: 'we should build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including an international fuel bank, so that countries can access peaceful power without increasing the risks of proliferation. That must be the right of every nation that renounces nuclear weapons, especially developing countries embarking on peaceful programs. And no approach will succeed if it's based on the denial of rights to nations that play by the rules. We must harness the power of nuclear energy on behalf of our efforts to combat climate change, and to advance peace opportunity for all people.' How can the President's vision, which will rekindle a vigorous public debate over the future of nuclear power and its relation to proliferation, be realized? What critical issues will frame the reemerging debate? What policies must be put into place to address these issues? Will US policy be marked more by continuity or change? To address these and other questions, the Los Alamos National Laboratory in cooperation with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars will host a workshop on the future of nuclear power and nonproliferation.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Implementation of the PR&PP methodology: the role of formal expert elicitations

The application of the methodology developed by the GenIV International Forum's (GIF's) Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) Working Group is an expert elicitation. Although the framework of the methodology is structured and systematic, it does not by itself constitute or require a formal elicitation. However, formal elicitation can be utilized in the PR&PP context to provide a systematic, credible and transparent qualitative analysis and develop input for quantitative analyses. This section provides an overview of expert elicitations, a discussion of the role formal expert elicitations can play in the PR&PP methodology, an outline of the formal expert elicitation process and a brief practical guide to conducting formal expert elicitations. Expert elicitation is a process utilizing knowledgeable people in cases, for example, when an assessment is needed but physically based data is absent or open to interpretation. More specifically, it can be used to: (1) predict future events; (2) provide estimates on new, rare, complex or poorly understood phenomena; (3) integrate or interpret existing information; or (4) determine what is currently known, how well it is known or what is worth learning in a field. Expert elicitation can be informal or formal. The informal application of expert judgment is frequently used. Although it can produce good results, it often provides demonstrably biased or otherwise flawed answers to problems. This along with the absence of transparency can result in a loss of confidence when experts speak on issues. More formal expert elicitation is a structured process that makes use of people knowledgeable in certain areas to make assessments. The reason for advocating formal use is that the quality and accuracy of expert judgment comes from the completeness of the expert's understanding of the phenomena and the process used to elicit and analyze the data. The use of a more formal process to obtain, lU1derstand and analyze expert judgment has led to an improved acceptance of expert judgment because of the rigor and transparency of the results.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Proliferation resistance for fast reactors and related fuel cycles: issues and impacts

The prospects for a dramatic growth in nuclear power may depend to a significant degree on the effectiveness of, and the resources devoted to, plans to develop and implement technologies and approaches that strengthen proliferation resistance and nuclear materials accountability. The challenges for fast reactors and related fuel cycles are especially critical. They are being explored in the Generation IV Tnternational Forum (GIF) and the Tnternational Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) initiative, as well as by many states that are looking to these systems for the efficient lise of uranium resources and long-term energy security. How do any proliferation risks they may pose compare to other reactors, both existing and under development, and their fuel cycles? Can they be designed with intrinsic (technological) features to make these systems more proliferation resistant? What roles can extrinsic (institutional) features play in proliferation resistance? What are the anticipated safeguards requirements, and will new technologies and approaches need to be developed? How can safeguards be facilitated by the design process? These and other questions require a rethinking of proliferation resistance and the prospects for new technologies and other intrinsic and extrinsic features being developed that are responsive to specific issues for fast reactors and related fuel cycles and to the broader threat environment in which these systems will have to operate. There are no technologies that can wholly eliminate the risk of proliferation by a determined state, but technology and design can playa role in reducing state threats and perhaps in eliminating non-state threats. There will be a significant role for extrinsic factors, especially the various measures - from safeguards and physical protection to export controls - embodied in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. This paper will offer an assessment of the issues surrounding, and the prospects for, efforts to develop proliferation resistance for fast reactors and related fuel cycles in the context of a nuclear renaissance. The focus of the analysis is on fast reactors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Proliferation resistance: issues, initiatives and evaluation

The vision of a nuclear renaissance has highlighted the issue of proliferation resistance. The prospects for a dramatic growth in nuclear power may depend on the effectiveness of, and the resources devoted to, plans to develop and implement technologies and approaches that strengthen proliferation resistance. The GenIV International Forum (GIF) and others have devoted attention and resources to proliferation resistance. However, the hope of finding a way to make the peaceful uses of nuclear energy resistant to proliferation has reappeared again and again in the history of nuclear power with little practical consequence. The concept of proliferation resistance has usually focused on intrinsic (technological) as opposed to extrinsic (institutional) factors. However, if there are benefits that may yet be realized from reactors and other facilities designed to minimize proliferation risks, it is their coupling with effective safeguards and other nonproliferation measures that likely will be critical. Proliferation resistance has also traditionally been applied only to state threats. Although there are no technologies that can wholly eliminate the risk of proliferation by a determined state, technology can play a limited role in reducing state threats and perhaps in eliminating many non-state threats. These and other issues are not academic. They affect efforts to evaluate proliferation resistance, including the methodology developed by GIF's Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) Working Group as well as the proliferation resistance initiatives that are being pursued or may be developed in the future. This paper will offer a new framework for thinking about proliferation resistance issues, including the ways the output of the methodology could be developed to inform the decisions that states, the International Atomic Energy (IAEA) and others will have to make in order to fully realize the promise of a nuclear renaissance.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Report of a Workshop in Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC

The workshop addressed evolving nuclear forces and their impacts on nonproliferation in the context of the new strategic environment, the Obama Administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Review and the 2010 Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The issues discussed are at the heart of the debate on nuclear policy issues such asfuture nuclear weapons requirements and nonproliferation, but also the stockpile stewardship program and infrastructure modernization. The workshop discussions reflected the importance of the NPRfor defining the role of US nuclear forces in dealing with 21s1 century threats and providing guidance that will shape NNSA and DoD programs. They also highlighted its importancefor NPT diplomacy. The discussion noted the report of the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, and the expectation that the NPR would likely reflect its consensus to a large degree (although the Administration was not bound by the report). There was widespread support for developing thefoundationsfor a sustainable nuclear-weapon program that addresses nuclear weapons, infrastructure and expertise in the broader nonproliferation, disarmament and international security contexts. The discussion also revealed a convergence of views, but no consensus, on a number of important issues, including the diminished role but continued importance of nuclear weapons; the need to take action to ensure the sustainability of the stockpile, and the recapitalization of the infrastructure and expertise; and the need to take action to promote nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament objectives.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament and extended deterrence in the new security environment

With the end of the Cold War, in a dramatically changed security environment, the advances in nonnuclear strategic capabilities along with reduced numbers and roles for nuclear forces has altered the calculus of deterrence and defense, at least for the United States. For many, this opened up a realistic possibility of a nuclear-free world. It soon became clear that the initial post-Cold War hopes were exaggerated. The world did change fundamentally, but it did not become more secure and stable. In place of the old Soviet threat, there has been growing concern about proliferation and terrorism involving nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, global instability and increasingly serious new and emerging threats, including cyber attacks and attacks on satellites. For the United States at least, in this emerging environment, the political rationales for nuclear weapons, from deterrence to reassurance to alliance management, are changing and less central than during the Cold War to the security of the United States, its friends and allies. Nuclear weapons remain important for the US, but for a far more limited set of roles and missions. As the Perry-Schlesinger Commission report reveals, there is a domestic US consensus on nuclear policy and posture at the highest level and for the near term, including the continued role of nuclear arms in deterring WMD use and in reassuring allies. Although the value of nuclear weapons has declined for the United States, the value of these weapons for Russia, China and so-called 'rogue' states is seen to be rising. The nuclear logic of NATO during Cold War - the need for nuclear weapons to counter vastly superior conventional capabilities of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact - is today heard from Russians and even some proliferants. Moreover, these weapons present a way for rogues to achieve regional hegemony and possibly to deter interventions by the United States or others. While the vision of a nuclear-free world is powerful, both existing nuclear powers and proliferators are unlikely to forego nuclear weapons entirely in a world that is dangerous and uncertain. And the emerging world would not necessarily be more secure and stable without nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear weapons were given up by the United States and other nuclear-weapon states, there would continue to be concerns about the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which would not disappear and could worsen. WMD terrorism would remain a concern that was largely unaffected by US and other nuclear-weapon decisions. Conventional capabilities would not disappear and the prospects for warfare could rise. In addition, new problems could arise if rogue states or other non-status-quo powers attempted to take advantage of moves toward disarmament, while friends and allies who are not reassured as in the past could reconsider their options if deterrence declined. To address these challenges, non- and counter-proliferation and counterterrorismincluding defenses and consequence management-are priorities, especially in light of an anticipated 'renaissance' in civil nuclear power. The current agenda of the United States and others includes efforts to: (1) Strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system; (2) Strengthen export controls, especially for sensitive technologies, by limiting the development of reprocessing and enrichment technologies and by requiring the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply; (3) Establish a reliable supply regime, including the possibility of multilateral or multinational ownership of fuel cycle facilities, as a means to promote nuclear energy without increasing the risks of proliferation or terrorism; (4) Implement effectively UN Security Council Resolution 1540; and (5) Strengthen and institutionalize the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. These and other activities are important in themselves, and are essential to maintaining and strengthening the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) bargain by bolstering two of its pillars - nonproliferation and peaceful nuclear energy cooperation. There is no alternative, and little prospect for a better deal.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗