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Peczeli, Anna

Publications and source records attributed to Peczeli, Anna.

11 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Nuclear decisionmaking, complexity and emerging and disruptive technologies: A comprehensive assessment

The complex interactions of emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) could significantly impact nuclear decision-making, particular in an escalating regional conventional conflict. Such conflicts may present governments with a range of nuclear decisions: whether to introduce a nuclear dimension to a crisis, whether to cross the nuclear threshold through limited nuclear use, how to respond to a limited nuclear attack, whether to expand the scope and intensity of initial limited attacks, and whether to escalate to an all-out nuclear war. At each decision point, EDTs create potential risks as well as rewards. EDTs are likely to influence the context for nuclear decision-making and the choices between different courses of action. EDTs could impact the context of nuclear decision-making by improving or degrading situational assessment, the ability to deliberate, and the ability to manage one’s nuclear forces. EDTs could influence the choice between nuclear restraint or escalation by affecting the perceived strategic benefits, escalatory risks, and operational requirements associated with different courses of action. Even though particular combinations of EDTs could precipitate nuclear use in some scenarios, they could encourage restraint in others. The impact and relevance of the same combinations of EDTs might be different at various nuclear decision points. The availability of specific combinations of EDTs at different stages of a conflict would also vary because of the attrition and one-time-use nature of some capabilities. In later stages of a conflict, the decision maker’s confidence in different combinations of EDTs would depend on their previous experience in using them. While the interactions of EDTs are likely to bring additional complexity to a nuclear decision-making process, EDTs are also not the only source of complexity. Broader strategic, military, operational, legal, moral, and emotional factors are also likely to play an important role. These factors may dominate decision-making in a range of potential cases.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century The U.S. Nuclear Deterrent in 2030 and Beyond: Fit for Purpose?

The 13th annual Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century (SW21) workshop brought together a mixture of senior officials from the laboratory, policy, military, and expert communities to promote a high-level focus and well-informed discussion on key deterrence challenges for the U.S. nuclear deterrent over the coming decade and beyond. It brought together interested stakeholders from the national security laboratories, federal government, military, think tank, and academic communities, as well as allied counterparts, to share perspectives in an unclassified setting.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

The Next U.S. Strategic Posture - And The Posture After Next (Bibliography)

What will be the main attributes of the US strategic posture in 2030? Relative to the predicted Russian and Chinese strategic postures of 2030, will the US position have improved, stayed the same, or eroded? Why? What factors should guide the development of capabilities beyond 2030?

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

U.S. Nuclear Declaratory Policy 2021: the Renewed Debate about Sole Purpose and No-First-Use. Annotated Bibliography

Declaratory policy and public statements about the potential use of nuclear weapons serve many important roles. They provide an assessment of the security environment, and inform the public debate. These statements also enhance deterrence messages and signals towards adversaries, and reassure allies and partners. On the global level, U.S. declaratory policy has the potential to shape international trends and norms, influence nuclear proliferation, and it may also affect the policy decisions of other nuclear possessors. As the Biden administration reviews the elements of U.S. nuclear declaratory policy, the issue of sole purpose and no-first-use is likely to resurface. Previous administrations have examined these policies in multiple rounds of review, and they decided that the time was not right for such declarations. This literature review was prepared to inform the debate by collecting some of the most prominent articles on the topic that highlight the potential risks and benefits of these policies.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Europe's Evolving Deterrence Discourse

Over the last decade, a deteriorating security environment has brought into sharp focus the atrophy of strategic thought that occurred after the Cold War. At a time of intensifying major power rivalry, renewed urgency about the effectiveness of deterrence and the reliability of strategic stability, and mounting threats by nuclear armed and -arming “rogue states,” the need for new intellectual capital has become more pressing. But the U.S. analytical community shed a great deal of capability and capacity in the 1990s and after the 9/11 attacks was long focused on other problems. In recent years, the United States has slowly begun to rebuild institutional capacity and to reinvest in the development of the necessary human capital and analytical tools. One symptom of past atrophy was the near-complete collapse of transatlantic dialogue on these matters. One indicator of the nascent renewal is the reemergence of transatlantic collaboration, especially among early career professionals. In recent years it has also become clear that European institutions too are beginning to rebuild capacity and reinvest in human capital. This small volume is the result of a collective effort by four institutions to take stock of the state of strategic thought in Europe as it relates to deterrence and to advance transatlantic dialogue on deterrence. As a co-organizer of this process, CGSR is pleased to produce this edited collection of papers on behalf of the group. I am especially grateful to Amelia Morgan and Anna Péczeli for their role as coeditors. Please note that the views expressed here are the personal views of the authors and should not be attributed to the Laboratory, its sponsors, or any of the institutions with which the authors are or have been affiliated. Please also note that the Laboratory assumes no responsibility for the validity of the information used by the authors, who have drawn on information in common usage in Europe to inform their thinking.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

The 2021 Defense Strategy Review and Modern Strategic Conflict (Workshop Summary)

On December 15-17, 2020, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted a workshop titled “The 2021 Defense Strategy Review and Modern Strategic Conflict.” This session was the 7 th Annual Deterrence Workshop that CGSR organized, bringing together participants drawn across the policy, military, and technical communities of the United States and its allies. The workshop examined the challenges of regional wars and multi-domain competition and how a potential 2021 defense strategy review should address them. A special attention was paid to the question of escalation and how it can be controlled at various levels of conflict.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Technical Issues in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Ratification Debate: A 20 Year Retrospective

Two decades after the U.S. Senate declined in 1999 to give its consent to ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the treaty remains in legal and political limbo. Legally, the treaty cannot enter into force without U.S. ratification. However, the Senate’s rejection does not strip the treaty of its force as an element of customary international law or alter the will of other signatories to see it enter into force. Politically, the debate over the virtues and flaws of the treaty remains as strong as ever, with some CTBT advocates pushing energetically for U.S. re-review while some opponents seek ways to “un-sign” the treaty. Meanwhile, despite the Senate’s rejection of the treaty, the United States acts in a manner consistent with its main obligations by maintaining a moratorium on explosive nuclear testing and providing financial support (as well as technical expertise) to the CTBT Organization (CTBTO)—in particular the CTBTO’s International Monitoring System (IMS). The CTBT may well remain in such limbo for a long time to come, unless some catalytic event comes along to re-shape national perceptions and priorities, one way or the other. The treaty’s future, whatever it might be, will be determined in part by how much perspectives might have changed in light of interim developments. Our purpose is to shed light on some of those developments and to assess their relevance. The 1999 ratification debate addressed a large number of issues. Rejection was driven by various policy and technical judgments. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine those technical judgments in light of what has been learned over the following two decades. On some technical matters, there was explicit recognition of extant uncertainties, as well as a conviction and hope that time would dispel them. To be doubly clear, our purpose is not to recommend a way forward on CTBT ratification. The policy judgments of 1999 and 2020 are beyond the scope of this paper. This technical re-examination proceeds as follows. It begins with a short background section to introduce the key technical matters in discussion in the U.S. ratification process. Then it moves systematically through each of those topics with a review of relevant background information, a discussion of key points in debate, an analysis of subsequent experience, and a current assessment. The historical analysis draws on many sources including the primary documents of the Congressional debate, the official article-by-article interpretation by the Department of State, and the statements of key players in the process. We also relied on key technical reports and publications by subject matter experts that have addressed in more detail many of the issues in our focus. These sources include the 2002 and 2012 reports of the National Academy of Sciences as well as publications by senior technical staff of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) who were actively involved in the ratification debate, including then-Laboratory Director Bruce Tarter. We also conducted several interviews with government officials from the 1990s, past laboratory directors, and other members of the scientific community. But, except where individuals are specifically cited by name, the judgments offered here are our own and should not be attributed to any other individual or to LLNL as such.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Next U.S. Strategic Posture - and the Posture After Next (Workshop Summary)

On July 8-10, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted a workshop titled “The Next U.S. Strategic Posture – And the Posture After Next.” This session brought together participants drawn across the policy, military, and technical communities in the United States and among allies. The event was a follow-up discussion to CGSR’s last meeting titled “Fit for Purpose? The U.S. Nuclear Posture in 2030 and Beyond.” The July workshop had a broader scope and looked at the different elements of U.S. strategic posture, including not just nuclear capabilities but missile defense, conventional prompt global strike, and space and cyberspace. Participants assessed the 2030 U.S. posture relative to the predicted Russian and Chinese postures, and they examined what capabilities will be crucial beyond 2030.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Fit for Purpose? The U.S. Nuclear Posture in 2030 and Beyond (Workshop Summary)

On June 8-10, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted a workshop titled “Fit for Purpose? The U.S. Nuclear Posture in 2030 and Beyond.” This session brought together participants drawn across the policy, military, and technical communities. The workshop aimed to examine the existing modernization plans, the challenges that might obstruct their implementation, and the new deterrence requirements that might emerge in the future, in light of the modernization efforts of Russia and China.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗