Engineering topics

O'Neil, Lori Ross

Publications and source records attributed to O'Neil, Lori Ross.

4 records

DOE OSTI2024

EV SALaD 2023 Demonstration: Best Practices and Mitigations for Protecting EVSE Infrastructure

The Electric Vehicle Secure Architecture Laboratory Demonstration (EV SALaD) program is a demonstration of cybersecurity best practices for high-power electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure led by Idaho National Laboratory (INL), in collaboration with other DOE National Laboratories participating in the EVs at Scale Consortium.a Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) participated in the first 2-year (FY22-23) demonstration cycle for EV SALaD. This report documents the FY23 demonstration, the second in a series of demonstrations and collaborations in deploying and operating cybersecure EV charging infrastructure. It includes a summary of improvements from the FY22 demonstration, technical analysis of the FY23 demonstration, how the research demonstrates cyber-physical and cybersecurity best practices for high-power EV charging infrastructure, and related impacts to national and energy security. For EV SALaD, the FY22 demonstration focused on the detection, ranking, and prioritization of anomalous events for high-power EV charging. The FY23 demonstration additionally included the demonstration of cybersecurity best practices, which included protection and mitigation solutions to prevent, respond, and recover from anomalous events. During the demonstrations, the multi-lab EV SALaD team conducted a Test Effect Payload (TEP)b evaluation on extreme fast charger (XFC) hardware equipped with Cerberus, a detection and response solution, to demonstrate anomaly detection and mitigation cybersecurity best practices against cyber-enabled events.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state,1 and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack.2 The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.”3 As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2023

Sample Cybersecurity Clauses for EV Charging Infrastructure Procurements

This is the final version of PNNL-34373, with sponsor updates. The proposed sample cybersecurity clauses for EVCI procurements are designed to assist in managing the risk of cyberattacks that may degrade the safety, security, and reliability of EVCI. The sample clauses are intended to be tailored and incorporated into procurement specifications for equipment and services related to the National EV Infrastructure Formula Program deployments. Widespread adoption of the sample cybersecurity procurement language will integrate cybersecurity throughout the life cycle of the infrastructure.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

DOE OSTI2023

CyTRICS Impact-Based Prioritization Process

Cyber Testing for Resilient Industrial Control Systems™ (CyTRICS™) is the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) program for cybersecurity vulnerability testing, digital subcomponent enumeration, and forensic assessment. CyTRICS leverages best-in-class test facilities and analytic capabilities at six DOE National Laboratories and strategic partnerships with key stakeholders including technology developers, manufacturers, asset owners and operators, and interagency partners. During the program’s development, CyTRICS established a unique methodology for prioritizing digital components within operational technology (OT) and industrial control systems (ICS) in the Energy Sector Industrial Base (ESIB) for cyber vulnerability testing. The CyTRICS prioritization process leverages multiple characteristics of systems, components, and their contextual deployment to calculate a quantification of individual digital components for CyTRICS testing. The initial version of the CyTRICS prioritization process was premised largely upon the impact which could result to an energy sector industrial control system if the digital component under testing was compromised, either through malicious means, faulty engineering, or other modes. CyTRICS has termed this process the “CyTRICS Impact-based Prioritization Process.” This paper describes the factors identified for use in the Impact-based Prioritization process and identifies the rationale for inclusion. During development, three National Laboratories piloted this prioritization process and generated prioritization scores for seven systems. Following the piloting of the process, laboratory subject matter experts (SME) validated that the numerical scores generated by the prioritization process were consistent with their knowledge of the impact that may occur should any of these systems be disrupted. The following document explains how to perform the prioritization process to generate prioritization scores for energy sector systems. After outlining assumptions required to conduct the process, it describes how to identify and elicit data which can be leveraged to evaluate a system and assign numerical values for each factor. The prioritization process uses different weights on different factors; rationale for each weight is included within the paper. Additionally, the paper includes some recommendations for future enhancements to prioritization, including lessons learned from developing and piloting the process. Finally, a comprehensive appendix includes example documents to be leveraged by those looking to execute the prioritization process.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗