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Maggio, Gaspare

Publications and source records attributed to Maggio, Gaspare.

14 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2011

NASA Risk Management Handbook

The purpose of this handbook is to provide guidance for implementing the Risk Management (RM) requirements of NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) document NPR 8000.4A, Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements [1], with a specific focus on programs and projects, and applying to each level of the NASA organizational hierarchy as requirements flow down. This handbook supports RM application within the NASA systems engineering process, and is a complement to the guidance contained in NASA/SP-2007-6105, NASA Systems Engineering Handbook [2]. Specifically, this handbook provides guidance that is applicable to the common technical processes of Technical Risk Management and Decision Analysis established by NPR 7123.1A, NASA Systems Engineering Process and Requirements [3]. These processes are part of the \Systems Engineering Engine. (Figure 1) that is used to drive the development of the system and associated work products to satisfy stakeholder expectations in all mission execution domains, including safety, technical, cost, and schedule. Like NPR 7123.1A, NPR 8000.4A is a discipline-oriented NPR that intersects with product-oriented NPRs such as NPR 7120.5D, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements [4]; NPR 7120.7, NASA Information Technology and Institutional Infrastructure Program and Project Management Requirements [5]; and NPR 7120.8, NASA Research and Technology Program and Project Management Requirements [6]. In much the same way that the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook is intended to provide guidance on the implementation of NPR 7123.1A, this handbook is intended to provide guidance on the implementation of NPR 8000.4A. 1.2 Scope and Depth This handbook provides guidance for conducting RM in the context of NASA program and project life cycles, which produce derived requirements in accordance with existing systems engineering practices that flow down through the NASA organizational hierarchy. The guidance in this handbook is not meant to be prescriptive. Instead, it is meant to be general enough, and contain a sufficient diversity of examples, to enable the reader to adapt the methods as needed to the particular risk management issues that he or she faces. The handbook highlights major issues to consider when managing programs and projects in the presence of potentially significant uncertainty, so that the user is better able to recognize and avoid pitfalls that might otherwise be experienced.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗
NASA NTRS2010

Risk-Informed Decision Making: Application to Technology Development Alternative Selection

NASA NPR 8000.4A, Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements, defines risk management in terms of two complementary processes: Risk-informed Decision Making (RIDM) and Continuous Risk Management (CRM). The RIDM process is used to inform decision making by emphasizing proper use of risk analysis to make decisions that impact all mission execution domains (e.g., safety, technical, cost, and schedule) for program/projects and mission support organizations. The RIDM process supports the selection of an alternative prior to program commitment. The CRM process is used to manage risk associated with the implementation of the selected alternative. The two processes work together to foster proactive risk management at NASA. The Office of Safety and Mission Assurance at NASA Headquarters has developed a technical handbook to provide guidance for implementing the RIDM process in the context of NASA risk management and systems engineering. This paper summarizes the key concepts and procedures of the RIDM process as presented in the handbook, and also illustrates how the RIDM process can be applied to the selection of technology investments as NASA's new technology development programs are initiated.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗
NASA NTRS2010

Design for Safety - The Ares Launch Vehicles Paradigm Change

The lessons learned from the S&MA early involvement in the Ares I launch vehicle design phases proved that performing an in-line function jointly with engineering is critical for S&MA to have an effective role in supporting the system, element, and component design. These lessons learned were used to effectively support the Ares V conceptual design phase and planning for post conceptual design phases. The Top level Conceptual LOM assessment for Ares V performed by the S&MA community jointly with the engineering Advanced Concept Office (ACO) was influential in the final selection of the Ares V system configuration. Post conceptual phase, extensive reliability effort should be planned to support future Heavy Lift Launch Vehicles (HLLV) design. In-depth reliability analysis involving the design, manufacturing, and system engineering communities is critical to understand design and process uncertainties and system integrated failures.

Safie, Fayssal M.↗
NASA NTRS2010

NASA Risk-Informed Decision Making Handbook

This handbook provides guidance for conducting risk-informed decision making in the context of NASA risk management (RM), with a focus on the types of direction-setting key decisions that are characteristic of the NASA program and project life cycles, and which produce derived requirements in accordance with existing systems engineering practices that flow down through the NASA organizational hierarchy. The guidance in this handbook is not meant to be prescriptive. Instead, it is meant to be general enough, and contain a sufficient diversity of examples, to enable the reader to adapt the methods as needed to the particular decision problems that he or she faces. The handbook highlights major issues to consider when making decisions in the presence of potentially significant uncertainty, so that the user is better able to recognize and avoid pitfalls that might otherwise be experienced.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗
NASA NTRS2010

Development of NASA's Accident Precursor Analysis Process Through Application on the Space Shuttle Orbiter

Accident Precursor Analysis (APA) serves as the bridge between existing risk modeling activities, which are often based on historical or generic failure statistics, and system anomalies, which provide crucial information about the failure mechanisms that are actually operative in the system. APA docs more than simply track experience: it systematically evaluates experience, looking for under-appreciated risks that may warrant changes to design or operational practice. This paper presents the pilot application of the NASA APA process to Space Shuttle Orbiter systems. In this effort, the working sessions conducted at Johnson Space Center (JSC) piloted the APA process developed by Information Systems Laboratories (ISL) over the last two years under the auspices of NASA's Office of Safety & Mission Assurance, with the assistance of the Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) Shuttle & Exploration Analysis Branch. This process is built around facilitated working sessions involving diverse system experts. One important aspect of this particular APA process is its focus on understanding the physical mechanism responsible for an operational anomaly, followed by evaluation of the risk significance of the observed anomaly as well as consideration of generalizations of the underlying mechanism to other contexts. Model completeness will probably always be an issue, but this process tries to leverage operating experience to the extent possible in order to address completeness issues before a catastrophe occurs.

Maggio, Gaspare↗
NASA NTRS2010

An Accident Precursor Analysis Process Tailored for NASA Space Systems

Accident Precursor Analysis (APA) serves as the bridge between existing risk modeling activities, which are often based on historical or generic failure statistics, and system anomalies, which provide crucial information about the failure mechanisms that are actually operative in the system and which may differ in frequency or type from those in the various models. These discrepancies between the models (perceived risk) and the system (actual risk) provide the leading indication of an underappreciated risk. This paper presents an APA process developed specifically for NASA Earth-to-Orbit space systems. The purpose of the process is to identify and characterize potential sources of system risk as evidenced by anomalous events which, although not necessarily presenting an immediate safety impact, may indicate that an unknown or insufficiently understood risk-significant condition exists in the system. Such anomalous events are considered accident precursors because they signal the potential for severe consequences that may occur in the future, due to causes that are discernible from their occurrence today. Their early identification allows them to be integrated into the overall system risk model used to intbrm decisions relating to safety.

Groen, Frank↗
NASA NTRS2010

An Extreme-Value Approach to Anomaly Vulnerability Identification

The objective of this paper is to present a method for importance analysis in parametric probabilistic modeling where the result of interest is the identification of potential engineering vulnerabilities associated with postulated anomalies in system behavior. In the context of Accident Precursor Analysis (APA), under which this method has been developed, these vulnerabilities, designated as anomaly vulnerabilities, are conditions that produce high risk in the presence of anomalous system behavior. The method defines a parameter-specific Parameter Vulnerability Importance measure (PVI), which identifies anomaly risk-model parameter values that indicate the potential presence of anomaly vulnerabilities, and allows them to be prioritized for further investigation. This entails analyzing each uncertain risk-model parameter over its credible range of values to determine where it produces the maximum risk. A parameter that produces high system risk for a particular range of values suggests that the system is vulnerable to the modeled anomalous conditions, if indeed the true parameter value lies in that range. Thus, PVI analysis provides a means of identifying and prioritizing anomaly-related engineering issues that at the very least warrant improved understanding to reduce uncertainty, such that true vulnerabilities may be identified and proper corrective actions taken.

Everett, Chris↗
NASA NTRS2003

A Dynamic Risk Model for Evaluation of Space Shuttle Abort Scenarios

The Space Shuttle is an advanced manned launch system with a respectable history of service and a demonstrated level of safety. Recent studies have shown that the Space Shuttle has a relatively low probability of having a failure that is instantaneously catastrophic during nominal flight as compared with many US and international launch systems. However, since the Space Shuttle is a manned. system, a number of mission abort contingencies exist to primarily ensure the safety of the crew during off-nominal situations and to attempt to maintain the integrity of the Orbiter. As the Space Shuttle ascends to orbit it transverses various intact abort regions evaluated and planned before the flight to ensure that the Space Shuttle Orbiter, along with its crew, may be returned intact either to the original launch site, a transoceanic landing site, or returned from a substandard orbit. An intact abort may be initiated due to a number of system failures but the highest likelihood and most challenging abort scenarios are initiated by a premature shutdown of a Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). The potential consequences of such a shutdown vary as a function of a number of mission parameters but all of them may be related to mission time for a specific mission profile. This paper focuses on the Dynamic Abort Risk Evaluation (DARE) model process, applications, and its capability to evaluate the risk of Loss Of Vehicle (LOV) due to the complex systems interactions that occur during Space Shuttle intact abort scenarios. In addition, the paper will examine which of the Space Shuttle subsystems are critical to ensuring a successful return of the Space Shuttle Orbiter and crew from such a situation.

Henderson, Edward M.↗
NASA NTRS1999

A Design Heritage-Based Forecasting Methodology for Risk Informed Management of Advanced Systems

The development of next generation systems often carries with it the promise of improved performance, greater reliability, and reduced operational costs. These expectations arise from the use of novel designs, new materials, advanced integration and production technologies intended for functionality replacing the previous generation. However, the novelty of these nascent technologies is accompanied by lack of operational experience and, in many cases, no actual testing as well. Therefore some of the enthusiasm surrounding most new technologies may be due to inflated aspirations from lack of knowledge rather than actual future expectations. This paper proposes a design heritage approach for improved reliability forecasting of advanced system components. The basis of the design heritage approach is to relate advanced system components to similar designs currently in operation. The demonstrated performance of these components could then be used to forecast the expected performance and reliability of comparable advanced technology components. In this approach the greater the divergence of the advanced component designs from the current systems the higher the uncertainty that accompanies the associated failure estimates. Designers of advanced systems are faced with many difficult decisions. One of the most common and more difficult types of these decisions are those related to the choice between design alternatives. In the past decision-makers have found these decisions to be extremely difficult to make because they often involve the trade-off between a known performing fielded design and a promising paper design. When it comes to expected reliability performance the paper design always looks better because it is on paper and it addresses all the know failure modes of the fielded design. On the other hand there is a long, and sometimes very difficult road, between the promise of a paper design and its fulfillment; with the possibility that sometimes the reliability promise is not fulfilled at all. Decision makers in advanced technology areas have always known to discount the performance claims of a design to a degree in proportion to its stage of development, and at times have preferred the more mature design over the one of lesser maturity even with the latter promising substantially better performance once fielded. As with the broader measures of performance this has also been true for projected reliability performance. Paper estimates of potential advances in design reliability are to a degree uncertain in proportion to the maturity of the features being proposed to secure those advances. This is especially true when performance-enhancing features in other areas are also planned to be part of the development program.

Maggio, Gaspare↗
NASA NTRS1995

Probabilistic risk assessment of the Space Shuttle. Phase 3: A study of the potential of losing the vehicle during nominal operation, volume 1

This document is the Executive Summary of a technical report on a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of the Space Shuttle vehicle performed under the sponsorship of the Office of Space Flight of the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration. It briefly summarizes the methodology and results of the Shuttle PRA. The primary objective of this project was to support management and engineering decision-making with respect to the Shuttle program by producing (1) a quantitative probabilistic risk model of the Space Shuttle during flight, (2) a quantitative assessment of in-flight safety risk, (3) an identification and prioritization of the design and operations that principally contribute to in-flight safety risk, and (4) a mechanism for risk-based evaluation proposed modifications to the Shuttle System. Secondary objectives were to provide a vehicle for introducing and transferring PRA technology to the NASA community, and to demonstrate the value of PRA by applying it beneficially to a real program of great international importance.

Fragola, Joseph R.↗
NASA NTRS1995

Probabilistic risk assessment of the Space Shuttle. Phase 3: A study of the potential of losing the vehicle during nominal operation. Volume 2: Integrated loss of vehicle model

The application of the probabilistic risk assessment methodology to a Space Shuttle environment, particularly to the potential of losing the Shuttle during nominal operation is addressed. The different related concerns are identified and combined to determine overall program risks. A fault tree model is used to allocate system probabilities to the subsystem level. The loss of the vehicle due to failure to contain energetic gas and debris, to maintain proper propulsion and configuration is analyzed, along with the loss due to Orbiter, external tank failure, and landing failure or error.

Fragola, Joseph R.↗
NASA NTRS1995

Probabilistic risk assessment of the Space Shuttle. Phase 3: A study of the potential of losing the vehicle during nominal operation. Volume 5: Auxiliary shuttle risk analyses

Volume 5 is Appendix C, Auxiliary Shuttle Risk Analyses, and contains the following reports: Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Space Shuttle Phase 1 - Space Shuttle Catastrophic Failure Frequency Final Report; Risk Analysis Applied to the Space Shuttle Main Engine - Demonstration Project for the Main Combustion Chamber Risk Assessment; An Investigation of the Risk Implications of Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Chamber Pressure Excursions; Safety of the Thermal Protection System of the Space Shuttle Orbiter - Quantitative Analysis and Organizational Factors; Space Shuttle Main Propulsion Pressurization System Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Final Report; and Space Shuttle Probabilistic Risk Assessment Proof-of-Concept Study - Auxiliary Power Unit and Hydraulic Power Unit Analysis Report.

Fragola, Joseph R.↗