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Macwan, Richard

Publications and source records attributed to Macwan, Richard.

At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Cyber-Informed Engineering Research and Development Guide

This document provides guidance on incorporating Cyber Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into the research and development (R&D) of operational technology systems and tools, facilitating the creation and adoption of innovative technologies that are secure and resilient by design. As technological innovation and research are becoming pivotal for economic and national security, cybersecurity has emerged as a paramount concern across industries and sectors. The challenge of integrating robust cybersecurity measures is imperative to safeguard critical infrastructure, protect sensitive data, and preserve national security interests.

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DOE OSTI2024

Demystifying Cyberattacks: Potential for Securing Energy Systems With Explainable AI : Preprint

Modernization of energy systems has led to in- creased interactions among multiple critical infrastructures and diverse stakeholders making the challenge of operational decision making more complex and at times beyond cognitive capabilities of human operators. The state-of-the-art machine learning and deep learning approaches show promise of supporting users with complex decision-making challenges, such as those occurring in our rapidly transforming cyber-physical energy systems. However, successful adoption of data-driven decision support technology for critical infrastructure will be dependent on the ability of these technologies to be trustworthy and contextually interpretable. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of implementing XAI for interpretable detection of cyberattacks in the energy system. Leveraging a proof-of-concept simulation use case of detection of a data falsification attack on a photovoltaic system using XGBoost algorithm, we demonstrate how Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations (LIME), a flavor XAI approach, can help provide contextual and actionable interpretation of cyberattack detection.

artificial intelligence↗
DOE OSTI2024

Formally Verified ZTA Requirements for OT/ICS Environments with Isabelle/HOL

The clean energy transformation includes the integration of distributed energy resources with the power grid, which has led to a substantial increase in the complexity of power grids infrastructure and the underlying operational technology environment. Power grids infrastructure represents an operational technology environment that has become a system of systems, integrating heterogeneous devices which are both software-and hardware-intensive; as a result, there are increasing demands to exploit advances in the commodity of software-hardware infrastructures to improve energy systems requirements such as cybersecurity and resilience. In such a setting, system requirements at different levels mix, which leads to vulnerabilities and undesirable outcomes. The use of formal methods to characterize and prove system requirements removes ambiguity, increases automation, and provides high levels of assurance and reliability. In this paper, we contribute a methodology and a framework for the system-level verification of zero trust architecture requirements in operational technology environments. We define a formal specification for the core functionalities of operational technology environments, the corresponding invariants, and security proofs. Of particular note is our modular approach for the formal verification of asynchronous interactions in operational technology environments. The formal specification and the proofs have been mechanized using the interactive theorem proving environment Isabelle/HOL.

formal methods↗
DOE OSTI2023

Formally Verified ZTA Requirements for OT/ICS Environments with Isabelle/HOL: Preprint

The clean energy transformation led to the integration of distributed energy resources on a top of the grid, and so a substantial increase in the complexity of power grids infrastructure and the underlying operational technology environment. Operational technology environments are becoming a system of systems, integrating heterogeneous devices which are software/hardware intensive, have ever increasing demands to exploit advances in commodity of software/hardware infrastructures, and this for good reasons - improving energy systems requirements such as cybersecurity and resilience. In such a setting, system requirements at different levels mix, thus undesirable outcomes will surely happen. The use of formal methods will remove ambiguity, increase automation and provide high levels of assurance and reliability. In this paper, we contribute a methodology and a framework for the system level verification of zero trust architecture requirements in operational technology environments. We define a formal specification for the core functionalities of operational technology environments, the corresponding invariants, and security proofs. Of particular note is our modular approach for the formal verification of asynchronous interactions in operational technology environments. The formal specification and the proofs have been mechanized using the interactive theorem proving environment Isabelle/HOL.

formal methods↗
DOE OSTI2023

A Randomization-Based, Zero-Trust Cyberattack Detection Method for Hierarchical Systems

This paper demonstrates a novel randomization-based approach for verifying power system control signals with application to detecting cyberattacks. We consider fully connected hierarchical systems containing multiple local agents and a global "trust" agent. The global agent uses a time-varying randomized assignment scheme to identify corrupt network links based on principles of zero trust and majority rule. To evaluate the performance of this detection approach, we implement our algorithm in MATLAB and run it against nearly 43 million unique attack scenarios spanning a range of system sizes. For each scenario, the algorithm determines whether the identified corruptions satisfy a set of validity constraints reflecting network topology and uses that result to say whether the recovered state value for one or more local agents is malicious. We compare the algorithm's determination to the true state of the system to assess performance and find that classification accuracy converges to 100% as system size increases, suggesting that the validity constraints become more difficult to satisfy for larger systems. We further explore the scenarios that evade detection to understand practical implications for employing this detection approach.

cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2023

Verifying the Computational Integrity of Power Grid Controls with Zero-Knowledge Proof

The control of future power grids is migrating from a centralized to a distributed/decentralized scheme to enable a massive penetration of distributed energy resources with rising dependence on communication infrastructure. A common assumption made for most existing distributed/decentralized controllers is that local controllers would faithfully follow the designated controller dynamics based on the data received from communication channels. However, with increased probability of cyberattacks on Operational Technology infrastructure, such an assumption could be risky because proper execution of the controller dynamics is then built on trust in secure communication and computation. In this work, we leverage a cryptography technology known as zero-knowledge scalable transparent arguments of knowledge (zk-STARK) to verify the computational integrity of power grid control algorithms, with projected linear dynamics-based control schemes as the initial proof-of-concept test case. The method presented here converts the cybersecurity challenge of data integrity for grid control into a subset of computational integrity.

computational integrity↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cyber-Informed Engineering Implementation Guide

This Implementation Guide describes the principles of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and outlines questions that engineering teams should consider during each phase of a system’s lifecycle to effectively employ these principles. It describes what it means to engineer systems in a cyber-informed way, rather than offering a comprehensive, step-by-step process or procedure for CIE implementation. This guide complements—but does not replace—the application of cybersecurity standards or practices currently in place within an organization. Engineers and technicians that design critical energy infrastructure installations can use this Implementation Guide to integrate the 12 principles of CIE into each phase of the engineering lifecycle, from concept to retirement. The guide is aimed at system or design engineers, rather than software engineers or operational cybersecurity practitioners. The engineers who design, build, operate, and maintain the physical infrastructure are best positioned to leverage a system’s engineering design to diminish the severity of cyber attacks or digital technology failures. CIE expands cybersecurity decisions into the engineering space, not by asking engineers to become cyber experts, but by calling on engineers to apply engineering tools and make engineering decisions that improve cybersecurity outcomes. CIE examines the engineering consequences that a sophisticated cyber attacker could achieve and drives engineering changes that may provide deterministic mitigations to limit or eliminate those consequences.

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DOE OSTI2023

Cyber-Informed Engineering Implementation Guide: Version 1.0 [Slides]

This Implementation Guide describes the principles of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and outlines questions that engineering teams should consider during each phase of a system's lifecycle to effectively employ these principles. It describes what it means to engineer systems in a cyber-informed way, rather than offering a comprehensive, step-by-step process or procedure for CIE implementation. This guide complements - but does not replace - the application of cybersecurity standards or practices currently in place within an organization. Engineers and technicians that design critical energy infrastructure installations can use this Implementation Guide to integrate the 12 principles of CIE into each phase of the engineering lifecycle, from concept to retirement. The guide is aimed at system or design engineers, rather than software engineers or operational cybersecurity practitioners. The engineers who design, build, operate, and maintain the physical infrastructure are best positioned to leverage a system's engineering design to diminish the severity of cyber attacks or digital technology failures. CIE expands cybersecurity decisions into the engineering space, not by asking engineers to become cyber experts, but by calling on engineers to apply engineering tools and make engineering decisions that improve cybersecurity outcomes. CIE examines the engineering consequences that a sophisticated cyber attacker could achieve and drives engineering changes that may provide deterministic mitigations to limit or eliminate those consequences.

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DOE OSTI2023

Assessing the Impact of Cybersecurity Attacks on Energy Systems

This paper investigates the cyber resiliency of future power systems with high penetration of distributed energy resources using advanced distributed and (or) hierarchical control architectures. Specifically, we simulate cyberattacks on three prototypical use cases, and we identify attack scenarios that are the most damaging to the overall system performance. We show that these attacks can have a significant impact on grid operation. Results provide additional insights into the robustness of the system to the most common cyberattacks.

buildings↗
DOE OSTI2023

DSS-SimPy-RL (Open-DSS and SimPy based Cyber-Physical RL environment) [SWR-23-29]

Recently, numerous data-driven approaches to control an electric grid using machine learning techniques have been investigated. With the advancement of reinforcement learning (RL) based techniques, gradually the conventional optimization based solvers are being replaced with RL approach where there is uncertainty in the environment such as renewable generation or cyber system emulation. However, to train an agent efficiently, it requires numerous interactions with an environment to learn the best policies. There are numerous RL environments for the power systems based on some well-known simulators, similarly there are environment for communication domains. While majority of the cyber emulators are based in an UNIX environment, the power simulators are based in the Windows-based operating system, the generation of cyber-physical mixed domain RL environment has been challenging. Existing co-simulation methods are efficient but resource and time intensive to generate large scale data set for training RL agents. Hence, this software focuses on development and validation of a mixed domain RL environment using Open DSS for the physical side and leverages a discrete event simulator python package, SimPy, for cyber-side emulation which is Operating Systems agnostic. Further utilizing this software co-simulation and training RL agents for re-routing based resilient control for network reconfiguration and volt-var control in power distribution feeder are performed.

Sahu, Abhijeet↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cyber-Resilient Distributed Autonomous Energy Grid

The DARPA Assured Micropatching (AMP) program focuses on creating the capability for rapid patching of legacy binaries in mission critical systems leveraging the field of formal methods. NREL's Cyber Resilient TLDRD effort, focuses on leveraging the field of formal methods to develop tools and methods for formally verifiable implementations of security architectures such as Zero Trust Architecture. The presentation at the DARPA AMP PI meeting is primarily inspired by common interests and ongoing work on leveraging Formal Methods for OT cybersecurity.

cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber Resilient Design and Controls for Energy Systems

As the grid of today is evolving into a highly distributed and autonomous cyber-physical system with higher penetration of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) and autonomous controls that are dependent on the cyber infrastructure, there are novel and increasing challenges to cyber-resilient operation of the grid. While the traditional mechanisms take a "bolt on" approach to cybersecurity and resiliency, this talk presents two novel technologies developed at NREL that "bake in" security and resilience into the design and control of the grid. An Adaptive Resilience Metrics framework is a novel mechanism for system owners and operators to understand the impact of cyber and physical system design and topology on the resilient operation, while also helping determine optimal policies in response to adverse cyber events. Along with that a zero-knowledge proof-based technique helps incorporate security into the controls layer by focusing on computational integrity rather than data integrity. By leveraging design and control properties unique to Operational Technology systems these technologies will not only help enhance cyber-resilience for the grid of today, but a highly distributed and autonomous grid of tomorrow.

cyber resilience↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber-Resilient Design Methodology for Microgrids

Recent advancement in tools has helped with microgrid design, development, planning and operation. Microgrids offer a unique application based on users with different requirements for tools. The process of designing, constructing, commissioning, and assessing a microgrid is not always straightforward due to these distinct requirements. Additionally, metrics are needed for performance evaluation. This panel will offer an overview and description of tools that helps with microgrid design, construction, planning, operation, cyber security, and metrics-driven performance assessment driven by multiple diverse applications and use cases.

CCE↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber-Resilient Distributed Autonomous Energy Grid

The aim of Cyber-Resilient Distributed Autonomous Grid research initiative is to advance fundamental science and engineering approaches for cyber-resilient design, control, and operation of a distributed, highly interconnected, and autonomous energy grid of the future. From increasing penetration of DERs, smart homes and building with highly controllable loads at the distribution layer, to the interconnection of bulk renewables at the transmission layer the fundamental nature of the energy grid is changing, and these changes are enabled by rapid increase in dependence on the communication infrastructure and independent third parties for control and operation of the grid. NREL's Integrated Energy Pathways critical objective correctly identifies that there are fundamental cyber-resilience challenges inherent in the grid's evolution, and this effort is establishing strong and novel integrated cyber-resilience framework and approaches to address these new and fundamental challenges.

controls↗
DOE OSTI2021

Artificial Intelligence for Energy Systems Cybersecurity

Artificial intelligence and machine learning systems have the potential to influence the future design and implementation of cybersecurity systems for the power grid. These systems may enhance the overall operation of the power system by leveraging and making sense of massive amounts of data. However, we must also understand how AI/ML will need to be protected from cyber threat actors. We discuss the existing insights the NREL team has developed using AI/ML systems and then present resources including ESIF and the Cyber Energy Emulation Platform that can be used to generate training data and insights. We end by offering suggestions on priority research paths for AI in cybersecurity.

artificial intelligence↗
DOE OSTI2020

Cyber-physical Resilient Interoperable Microgrid Networks

The paper presents the results of an industry-academic collaboration between ABB, Duke Energy and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) that has developed and demonstrated a cyberphysical resilient control and communication architecture for deployment of multiple microgrid networks, as well as retrofitting the existing distribution grids by increasing DER penetration levels.

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