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Mack, Thomas Kimball

Publications and source records attributed to Mack, Thomas Kimball.

Sensored fiber reinforced polymer grate

Various technologies described herein pertain to a sensored grate that can be utilized for various security fencing applications. The sensored grate includes a grate framework and an embedded optical fiber. The grate framework is formed of a molded polymer such as, for instance, molded fiber reinforced polymer. Further, the grate framework includes a set of elongated elements, where the elongated elements are spaced to define apertures through the grate framework. The optical fiber is embedded in the elongated elements of the grate framework. Moreover, bending or breaking of one or more of the elongated elements can be detected based on a change in a characteristic of input light provided to the optical fiber compared to output light received from the optical fiber.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Summary of Technical Meeting To Compare US/French Approaches for Physical Protection Test Beds

In September 2015, representatives of the US Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration, including test bed professionals from Sandia National Laboratories, and representatives of the French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission participated in a one-week workshop to share best practices in design, organization, operations, utilization, improvement, and performance testing of physical protection test beds. The intended workshop outcomes were to (1) share methods of improving respective test bed methodologies and programs and (2) prepare recommendations for standards regarding creating and operating testing facilities for nations new to nuclear operations. At the workshop, the French and American subject matter experts compared best practices as developed at their respective test bed sites; discussed access delay test bed considerations; and presented the limitations/ constraints of physical protection test beds.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Analysis to determine the maximum dimensions of flexible apertures in sensored security netting products.

Although technological advances provide new capabilities to increase the robustness of security systems, they also potentially introduce new vulnerabilities. New capability sometimes requires new performance requirements. This paper outlines an approach to establishing a key performance requirement for an emerging intrusion detection sensor: the sensored net. Throughout the security industry, the commonly adopted standard for maximum opening size through barriers is a requirement based on square inches typically 96 square inches. Unlike standard rigid opening, the dimensions of a flexible aperture are not fixed, but variable and conformable. It is demonstrably simple for a human intruder to move through a 96-square-inch opening that is conformable to the human body. The longstanding 96-square-inch requirement itself, though firmly embedded in policy and best practice, lacks a documented empirical basis. This analysis concluded that the traditional 96-square-inch standard for openings is insufficient for flexible openings that are conformable to the human body. Instead, a circumference standard is recommended for these newer types of sensored barriers. The recommended maximum circumference for a flexible opening should be no more than 26 inches, as measured on the inside of the netting material.

Murton, Mark↗

Design of a physical security perimeter fencing system.

Design of a physical security perimeter fencing system requires that security designers provide effective detection, delay, and response functionalities with minimal nuisance alarms. In addition, the designers must take into considerations the security fence system life cycle cost (equipment and grounds maintenance), complexity of the terrain, safety, and environmental conditions (location of where the security fence will be installed). Often, these factors drive the security designers to design a perimeter intrusion detection and assessment system (PIDAS) that includes: (1) larger than desired footprint, (2) one or more animal control fences to minimize the nuisance alarm rate (NAR), and (3) clear zones and an isolation zone to facilitate intrusion detection and assessment by keeping the fence lines clear of vegetation, trash, and other objects that could impede the security system's performance. This paper presents a two-tier PIDAS design that focuses on effective performance specifically in high probability of detection and low NAR that minimizes cost and the footprint of the system.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Optimization of detection sensitivity for a Fiber Optic Intrusion Detection System (FOIDS) using design of experiments.

The Fiber Optic Intrusion Detection System (FOIDS)1 is a physical security sensor deployed on fence lines to detect climb or cut intrusions by adversaries. Calibration of detection sensitivity can be time consuming because, for example, the FiberSenSys FD-332 has 32 settings that can be adjusted independently to provide a balance between a high probability of detection and a low nuisance alarm rate. Therefore, an efficient method of calibrating the FOIDS in the field, other than by trial and error, was needed. This study was conducted to: x Identify the most significant settings for controlling detection x Develop a way of predicting detection sensitivity for given settings x Develop a set of optimal settings for validation The Design of Experiments (DoE) 2-4 methodology was used to generate small, planned test matrixes, which could be statistically analyzed to yield more information from the test data. Design of Experiments is a statistical methodology for quickly optimizing performance of systems with measurable input and output variables. DoE was used to design custom screening experiments based on 11 FOIDS settings believed to have the most affect on WKH types of fence perimeter intrusions were evaluated: simulated cut intrusions and actual climb intrusions. Two slightly different two-level randomized fractional factorial designed experiment matrixes consisting of 16 unique experiments were performed in the field for each type of intrusion. Three repetitions were conducted for every cut test; two repetitions were conducted for every climb test. Total number of cut tests analyzed was 51; the total number of climb tests was 38. This paper discusses the results and benefits of using Design of Experiments (DoE) to calibrate and optimize the settings for a FOIDS sensor

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Application of JMP and design of experiments to security system technology testing.

JMP and design of experiments (DOE) have been successfully applied to security system technologies from sensors to communication and display systems. In all cases, the technologies have been complex enough to warrant the need for a statistical determination of significant factors and/or the generation of predictive models. For the sensors, it was the task of calibrating a fiber optic intrusion detection sensor (FOIDS) with 32 adjustable settings. In addition to the numerous settings, the FOIDS also had two software processors for detecting different types of alarms. The problem was made more complex when the different types of alarms occurred on the wrong processors, causing nuisance alarms. JMP's ability to optimize several predictive models simultaneously with JMP's Prediction Profiler flash files was an important factor in producing field solutions. For the Communications and Display testbed system, numerous hardware and software network components had been integrated to build a functional system. Although the components of the system had been tested individually, the system's performance could not be piecewise evaluated. Through the application of JMP's design of experiments and data mining capabilities, it was possible to test some of the factors affecting the system's performance and to differentiate between some of the software and hardware contributors. This paper will discuss design of experiments and the JMP tools applied to the solutions for both security systems.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗