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MacArthur, Duncan W

Publications and source records attributed to MacArthur, Duncan W.

9 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2012

Field Trial of LANL On-Line Advanced Enrichment Monitor for UF6 GCEP

The outline of this presentation is: (1) Technology basis of on-line enrichment monitoring; (2) Timescale of trial; (3) Description of installed equipment; (4) Photographs; (5) Results; (6) Possible further development; and (7) Conclusions. Summary of the good things about the Advanced Enrichment Monitor (AEM) performance is: (1) High accuracy - normally better than 1% relative, (2) Active system as accurate as passive system, (3) Fast and accurate detection of enrichment changes, (4) Physics is well understood, (5) Elegant method for capturing pressure signal, and (6) Data capture is automatic, low cost and fast. A couple of negative things are: (1) Some jumps in measured passive enrichment - of around +2% relative (due to clock errors?); and (2) Data handling and evaluation is off-line, expensive and very slow. Conclusions are: (1) LANL AEM is being tested on E23 plant at Capenhurst; (2) The trial is going very well; (3) AEM could detect production of HEU at potentially much lower cost than existing CEMO; (4) AEM can measure {sup 235}U assay accurately; (5) Active system using X-Ray source would avoid need for pressure measurement; (6) Substantial work lies ahead to go from current prototype to a production instrument.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2012

Simultaneous Authentication and Certification of Arms-Control Measurement Systems

Most arms-control-treaty-monitoring scenarios involve a host party that makes a declaration regarding its nuclear material or items and a monitoring party that verifies that declaration. A verification system developed for such a use needs to be trusted by both parties. The first concern, primarily from the host party's point of view, is that any sensitive information that is collected must be protected without interfering in the efficient operation of the facility being monitored. This concern is addressed in what can be termed a 'certification' process. The second concern, of particular interest to the monitoring party, is that it must be possible to confirm the veracity of both the measurement system and the data produced by this measurement system. The monitoring party addresses these issues during an 'authentication' process. Addressing either one of these concerns independently is relatively straightforward. However, it is more difficult to simultaneously satisfy host party certification concerns and monitoring party authentication concerns. Typically, both parties will want the final access to the measurement system. We will describe an alternative approach that allows both parties to gain confidence simultaneously. This approach starts with (1) joint development of the measurement system followed by (2) host certification of several copies of the system and (3) random selection by the inspecting party of one copy to be use during the monitoring visit and one (or more) copy(s) to be returned to the inspecting party's facilities for (4) further hardware authentication; any remaining copies are stored under joint seal for use as spares. Following this process, the parties will jointly (5) perform functional testing on the selected measurement system and then (6) use this system during the monitoring visit. Steps (1) and (2) assure the host party as to the certification of whichever system is eventually used in the monitoring visit. Steps (1), (3), (4), and (5) increase the monitoring party's confidence in the authentication of the measurement system.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗