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Loverro, Caleb

Publications and source records attributed to Loverro, Caleb.

Automated platform to assess commercial off the shelf (COTS) software assurance

A computer-implemented method of verifying software is provided. The method comprises creating a number of virtual machines that simulate computing environments and running a number of software program on the virtual machines. The software programs have full access to the simulated computing environments, but the source code of the software program is unavailable. A hypervisor performs virtual machine introspection as the software programs run on the virtual machines, wherein the virtual machines and software programs are unaware the virtual machine introspection is being performed. Telemetry data is collected about the software programs, including any identified threats posed by the software programs to the simulated computing environments, and presented to a user via an interface.

Urias, Vincent↗

Threat emulation framework

A method for emulating threats in virtual network computing environment is provided. The method comprises creating a number of virtual machines in the virtual network computing environment. A number of threat actors are emulated, wherein each threat actor comprises a number of threat artifacts that form a sequence of attack steps against the virtual network computing environment. The threat actors are then deployed against the virtual network computing environment. Behavioral data about actions of the threat actors in the virtual network computing environment is collected, as is performance data about the virtual network computing environment in response to the threat actors. The collected behavioral and performance data is then presented to a user via an interface.

Urias, Vincent↗

Cloud forensics and incident response platform

A system, method, and device for cloud forensics and incident response is provided. In an embodiment, a computer-implemented method for performing cloud forensics and incident response includes intercepting, by a cloud incident response module (CIRM), communication between a virtual machine (VM) and a hypervisor. The method also includes extracting, by the CIRM, data from the communication between the VM and the hypervisor according to a forensic policy. Intercepting and extracting the data are transparent to the VM and to the hypervisor. Intercepting and extracting the data are independent of the VM and the hypervisor.

Urias, Vincent↗

Sandia Cloud Forensics and Incident Response Platform v 1.0

As systems and devices become virtualized and deployed in the cloud, the hypervisor becomes an increasingly appropriate place to collect performance data, system state, system landscape, function calls, transaction traces, and other characteristics. We developed a method by which an introspection application may be coupled with a hypervisor to “reach into” the VM with minimal intrusiveness to collect data critical to the reconstruction of events, files, and operations. Such a capability is required to take advantage of the hypervisor as an instrumentation platform and to integrate that data with more traditional collection mechanisms. The concept of a VM serviced by a lightweight hypervisor is a relatively new paradigm for forensic practitioners. Traditional forensic techniques, based on assumptions that the filesystem was directly interacting with the hardware through an abstraction, afforded the forensic practitioner the assumption that there was nothing controlling the application below the filesystem. This is not the case when using virtualized technologies. Hypervisors can covertly monitor, introspect and interact with the guest in a transparent fashion. The problems of storage and collection of actionable data are exhausting. The current challenge is most hypervisors do not expose a useful application programming interface (API) at a sufficient level to do transparent, fine-grained and customizable introspection. Scalable VM instrumentation and introspection at an in-depth level requires fast handling of events, as well as direct access to VM state. Furthermore, deep introspection benefits greatly from the ability to gather data from the hardware during the VM’s exit to the hypervisor. All of this requires identical access to the system as the hypervisor itself; improper use of this ability could easily cause system instability. It is for this reason we believe that the hypervisor developers have been hesitant to grant this much control through their APIs. However, our approach leverages other means to collect and monitor the guests in a targeted fashion. Virtual machine introspection (VMI) is a technique used to monitor the runtime state of a system-level virtual machine. The runtime state can be may include processor registers, memory, disk, network, and any other hardware-level events A review of research literature and current VMI technologies exposed several limitations and tradeoffs in VMI approaches, including: the use of in-guest agents; kernel to user space transitions (dramatically slowing down processing); VMI tool pre-configuration requirements; hypervisor version lock-in or source code patching; reliance on operating system symbols; limited processor features due to hypervisor (even if the hardware could do more). To address these constraints, a VMI tool was envisioned to provide the cloud forensic capabilities while having as few of these limitations as possible. The Kernel-based Virtual Machine Introspection (KVMi) tool was developed for hypervisors on Intel’s x86-64 architecture. To meet performance, scoping and use-case demands, the follow criteria were applied to KVMi to support live, forensic data collection: • Shall not require in-guest agents. • Shall work with any recent version of modern hypervisors. • Shall introspect upon any guest (VM) running modern versions of Windows, Linux and OS X. • Shall have the ability to find and track operating system artifacts • Shall not require operating system symbol files. • Shall be able to fully handle VM-exits, bypassing execution of the hypervisor if necessary, to facilitate new features the hypervisor may not support. • Shall be compilable/loadable on a running system with standard build tools.

Stout, WilliamM.S.↗

R&D 100 Winner 2017 HADES Platform

The HADES Platform radically changes the way cyber defenders protect their networks and gain insight by gathering information on the adversary's tools, tactics and procedures. The High-fidelity Adaptive Deception & Emulation System being developed at Sandia National Labs creates complex and realistic environments that an actor can interact with - something current honeypots and other deceptive techniques do no offer.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Computer network defense system

A method and apparatus for protecting virtual machines. A computer system creates a copy of a group of the virtual machines in an operating network in a deception network to form a group of cloned virtual machines in the deception network when the group of the virtual machines is accessed by an adversary. The computer system creates an emulation of components from the operating network in the deception network. The components are accessible by the group of the cloned virtual machines as if the group of the cloned virtual machines was in the operating network. The computer system moves network connections for the group of the virtual machines in the operating network used by the adversary from the group of the virtual machines in the operating network to the group of the cloned virtual machines, enabling protecting the group of the virtual machines from actions performed by the adversary.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗