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Lopez, Carlos

Publications and source records attributed to Lopez, Carlos.

At least 19 records

Deep Borehole Disposal Safety Case

The safety case for deep borehole disposal of nuclear wastes contains a safety strategy, an assessment basis, and a safety assessment. The safety strategy includes strategies for management, siting and design, and assessment. The assessment basis considers site selection, pre-closure, and post-closure, which includes waste and engineered barriers, the geosphere/natural barriers, and the biosphere and surface environment. The safety assessment entails a pre-closure safety analysis, a post-closure performance assessment, and confidence enhancement analyses. This work outlines the assessment basis and safety assessment aspects of a deep borehole disposal safety case. The safety case presented here is specific to deep borehole disposal of Cs and Sr capsules, but is generally applicable to other waste forms, such as spent nuclear fuel. The safety assessments for pre-closure and post-closure are briefly summarized from other sources; key issues for confidence enhancement are described in greater detail. These confidence enhancement analyses require building the technical basis for geologically old, reducing, highly saline brines at the depth of waste emplacement, and using reactive-transport codes to predict their movement in post-closure. The development and emplacement of borehole seals above the waste emplacement zone is also important to confidence enhancement.

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Pipe Overpack Container Fire Testing: Phase I II & III.

The Pipe Overpack Container (POC) was developed at Rocky Flats to transport plutonium residues with higher levels of plutonium than standard transuranic (TRU) waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal. In 1996 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) conducted a series of tests to determine the degree of protection POCs provided during storage accident events. One of these tests exposed four of the POCs to a 30-minute engulfing pool fire, resulting in one of the 7A drum overpacks generating sufficient internal pressure to pop off its lid and expose the top of the pipe container (PC) to the fire environment. The initial contents of the POCs were inert materials, which would not generate large internal pressure within the PC if heated. POCs are now being used to store combustible TRU waste at Department of Energy (DOE) sites. At the request of DOE’s Office of Environmental Management (EM) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), starting in 2015 SNL conducted a series of fire tests to examine whether PCs with combustibles would reach a temperature that would result in (1) decomposition of inner contents and (2) subsequent generation of sufficient gas to cause the PC to over-pressurize and release its inner content. Tests conducted during 2015 and 2016 were done in three phases. The goal of the first phase was to see if the PC would reach high enough temperatures to decompose typical combustible materials inside the PC. The goal of the second test phase was to determine under what heating loads (i.e., incident heat fluxes) the 7A drum lid pops off from the POC drum. The goal of the third phase was to see if surrogate aerosol gets released from the PC when the drum lid is off. This report will describe the various tests conducted in phase I, II, and III, present preliminary results from these tests, and discuss implications for the POCs.

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Thermal Testing of Waste Packages for a Storage Environment

The Pipe Overpack Container (POC) was developed at Rocky Flats to transport plutonium residues with higher levels of plutonium than standard TRU waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal. The POC consists of an inner Pipe Container (PC) surrounded by organic fiber dunnage inside of a 7A drum. The PC was design to maintain separation of fissile material and to provide shielding from radiation. The POC has many design features that are similar to Type B packages that do provide protection from engulfing fires. However, it was not specifically designed to prevent release of stored material during a long-duration fire. POCs are now being used to store combustible TRU waste at Department of Energy (DOE) sites (e.g., Waste Isolation Pilot Plant). Radioactive waste storage operators would like to be able to claim some level of protection is provided by the POCs for thermal assaults that could occur within storage facilities when these POCs contain PCs with combustibles. In 1997 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) conducted a series of tests to determine the degree of protection POCs provide during storage accident events. One of these tests exposed four of the POCs to a 30-minute engulfing pool fire, resulting in one of the 7A drums generating sufficient internal pressure to pop off its lid and expose the top of the PC to the fire environment. However, these tests are not bounding for POC/PC containing combustibles. With the addition of combustible materials in the PC, the possibility exists for generation of higher quantities of gases and much higher pressures inside the PC, which can lead to early rupture of the PC filter and higher radioactive aerosol release fractions. Therefore, a new series of tests was required to determine the temperature response of the exposed PC and determine the amount of material that could be released. DOE contacted SNL in 2015 to discuss the 1997 SNL tests and came to the conclusion that those tests were not bounding for POC/PC containing combustibles Therefore, DOE commission a new set of tests at SNL. Starting in 2015, SNL conducted fire tests to examine whether the contents of the PC would reach a temperature that would result in generation of sufficient gas to cause overpressurization of the PC, and subsequent release of its content. This paper will describe the various test conducted thus far, and present preliminary results from these tests.

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Pipe Overpack Container Fire Testing: Phase I & II

The Pipe Overpack Container (POC) was developed at Rocky Flats to transport plutonium residues with higher levels of plutonium than standard transuranic (TRU) waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal. In 1996 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) conducted a series of tests to determine the degree of protection POCs provided during storage accident events. One of these tests exposed four of the POCs to a 30-minute engulfing pool fire, resulting in one of the 7A drum overpacks generating sufficient internal pressure to pop off its lid and expose the top of the pipe container (PC) to the fire environment. The initial contents of the POCs were inert materials, which would not generate large internal pressure within the PC if heated. However, POCs are now being used to store combustible TRU waste at Department of Energy (DOE) sites. At the request of DOE’s Office of Environmental Management (EM) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), starting in 2015 SNL conducted a new series of fire tests to examine whether PCs with combustibles would reach a temperature that would result in (1) decomposition of inner contents and (2) subsequent generation of sufficient gas to cause the PC to over-pressurize and release its inner content. Tests conducted during 2015 and 2016, and described herein, were done in two phases. The goal of the first phase was to see if the PC would reach high enough temperatures to decompose typical combustible materials inside the PC. The goal of the second test phase was to determine under what heating loads (i.e., incident heat fluxes) the 7A drum lid pops off from the POC drum. This report will describe the various tests conducted in phase I and II, present preliminary results from these tests, and discuss implications for the POCs.

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