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Lear, D. M.

Publications and source records attributed to Lear, D. M..

11 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2019

Hypervelocity Impact Performance of 3D Printed Aluminum Panels

With the continued development of additive manufacturing methods, control over the shape of ligaments, cell regularity, and macroscopic shape can all be easily tuned. This capability allows for tailoring of component architecture and promotes potential mass savings in a space vehicle structure. Additionally, it allows one the flexibility of combining structural elements such as MMOD protection and vehicle stiffness for launch loads for an overall mass reduction. At NASA JSC this technology is being explored in many different ways with the goal being a multifunctional structural component. For this study, four different types of aluminum panels have been 3D printed for testing, three being of a body centric cubic (BCC) lattice structure core and one being kelvin cell structure core. All samples have a 5.33 cm (0.05”) nominally thick aluminum face sheet printed on the front and back side of each panel, with all core materials having a 5.08 cm (2.0”) nominal thickness (see Table 1 for test sample summary and Figures 1 – 2 for sample illustrations). These tests will evaluate the performance of 3D printed aluminum panels under hypervelocity impact (HVI) conditions. The hypervelocity impact tests are being conducted at the JSC White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) Remote Hypervelocity Test Laboratory (RHTL), located in Las Cruces, New Mexico. All tests will be conducted with a 3.4mm Al 2017-T4 sphere at 6.8 km/s impacting at 0° to surface normal (i.e., impacting with no obliquity). Each sample will be trapped between two metal frames, with gasket material residing between the sample and frame, which will be the shipping and testing configuration for all tests. There will be an Al 2017-T4 witness plate staged 5.08 cm (2.0”) from each sample to capture signature of debris, if the rear face sheet of the sample were to perforate from the HVI test event.

Davis, B. A.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Extravehicular Activity Micormeteoroid and Orbital Debris Risk Assessment Methodology

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of vehicle failure due to an impact from an micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. Among the vehicles of importance to NASA is the extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuit” used while performing a US extravehicular activity (EVA). An EMU impact is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching the airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. For this reason, a risk assessment is provided to the EVA office at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) prior to certification of readiness for each US EVA. To assess the risk of failure, a detailed finite element model (FEM) of the EMU has been created which has regions for the various shielding configurations. Each shielding configuration is based on the layers and materials over the innermost bladder layer that maintains the acceptable atmospheric environment for the astronaut. Ballistic limit equations (BLE) for each shielding configuration have been determined from hypervelocity impact testing of samples of the EMU layup.

Hoffman, K. D.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Failure Mechanisms of Ni-H2 and Li-Ion Batteries Under Hypervelocity Impacts

Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) batteries have yielded significant performance advantages for many industries, including the aerospace industry, and have been selected to replace nickel hydrogen (Ni-H2) batteries for the International Space Station (ISS) program to meet the energy storage demands. As the ISS uses its vast solar arrays to generate its power, the solar ar-rays meet their sunlit power demands and supply excess power to battery packs for power de-livery on the sun obscured phase of the approximate 90 minute low Earth orbit. These large battery packs are located on the exterior of the ISS, and as such, the battery packs are ex-posed to external environment threats like naturally occurring meteoroids and artificial orbital debris (MMOD). While the risks from these solid particle environments has been known and addressed to an acceptable risk of failure through shield design, it is not possible to completely eliminate the risk of loss of these assets on orbit due to MMOD, and as such, failure consequences to the ISS have been considered.

Miller, J. E.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Failure Mechanisms of Ni-H2 and Li-Ion Batteries Under Hypervelocity Impacts

Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) batteries have yielded significant performance advantages for many industries, including the aerospace industry, and have been selected to replace nickel hydrogen (Ni-H2) batteries for the International Space Station (ISS) program to meet the energy storage demands. As the ISS uses its vast solar arrays to generate its power, the solar arrays meet their sunlit power demands and supply excess power to battery packs for power delivery on the sun obscured phase of the approximate 90 minute low Earth orbit. These large battery packs are located on the exterior of the ISS, and as such, the battery packs are exposed to external environment threats like naturally occurring meteoroids and artificial orbital debris (MMOD). While the risks from these solid particle environments has been known and addressed to an acceptable risk of failure through shield design, it is not possible to completely eliminate the risk of loss of these assets on orbit due to MMOD, and as such, failure consequences to the ISS have been considered.

Miller, J. E.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Surveys of Returned ISS Hardware for MMMOD Impacts

Since February 2001, the Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) in Houston has performed 35 post-flight inspections on space exposed hardware returned from the International Space Station (ISS). Data on 1,188 observations of micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) damage have been collected from these inspections. Survey documentation typically includes impact feature location and size measurements as well as microscopic photography (25-200x). Sampling of impacts sites for projectile residue was performed for the largest features. Results of energy dispersive X-ray spectroscopic analysis to discern impactor source are included in the database when available. This paper will focus on two inspections, the Pressurized Mating Adapter 2 (PMA-2) cover returned in 2015 after 1.6 years exposure with 26 observed impact features, and two Airlock shield panels returned in 2010 after 8.75 years exposure with 58 MMOD impacts. Feature sizes from the observed data are compared to predictions using the Bumper 3 risk assessment code.

Hyde, J. L.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Final Results of Shuttle MMOD Impact Database

The Shuttle Hypervelocity Impact Database documents damage features on each Orbiter thought to be from micrometeoroids (MM) or orbital debris (OD). Data is divided into tables for crew module windows, payload bay door radiators and thermal protection systems along with other miscellaneous regions. The combined number of records in the database is nearly 3000. Each database record provides impact feature dimensions, location on the vehicle and relevant mission information. Additional detail on the type and size of particle that produced the damage site is provided when sampling data and definitive spectroscopic analysis results are available. Guidelines are described which were used in determining whether impact damage is from micrometeoroid or orbital debris impact based on the findings from scanning electron microscopy chemical analysis. Relationships assumed when converting from observed feature sizes in different shuttle materials to particle sizes will be presented. A small number of significant impacts on the windows, radiators and wing leading edge will be highlighted and discussed in detail, including the hypervelocity impact testing performed to estimate particle sizes that produced the damage.

Hyde, J. L.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Multi-Shock Shield Performance at 15 MJ for Catalogued Debris

While orbital debris of ten centimeters or more are tracked and catalogued, the difficulty of finding and accurately accounting for forces acting on the objects near the ten centimeter threshold results in both uncertainty of their presence and location. These challenges result in difficult decisions for operators balancing potential costly operational approaches with system loss risk. In this paper, the assessment of the feasibility of protecting a spacecraft from this catalogued debris is described using numerical simulations and a test of a multi-shock shield system against a cylindrical projectile impacting normal to the surface with approximately 15 MJ of kinetic energy. The hypervelocity impact test has been conducted at the Arnold Engineering Development Complex (AEDC) with a 598 g projectile at 6.905 km/s on a NASA supplied multi-shock shield. The projectile used is a hollow aluminum and nylon cylinder with an outside diameter of 8.6 cm and length of 10.3 cm. Figure 1 illustrates the multi-shock shield test article, which consisted of five separate bumpers, four of which are fiberglass fabric and one of steel mesh, and two rear walls, each consisting of Kevlar fabric. The overall length of the test article was 2.65 m. The test article was a 5X scaled-up version of a smaller multi-shock shield previously tested using a 1.4 cm diameter aluminum projectile for an inflatable module project. The distances represented by S1 and S1/2 in the figure are 61 cm and 30.5 cm, respectively. Prior to the impact test, hydrodynamic simulations indicated that some enhancement to the standard multi-shock system is needed to address the effects of the cylindrical shape of the projectile. Based on the simulations, a steel mesh bumper has been added to the shield configuration to enhance the fragmentation of the projectile. The AEDC test occurred as planned, and the modified NASA multi-shock shield successfully stopped 598 g projectile using 85.6 kg/m(exp 2). The fifth bumper layer remained in tact, although it was torn free from its support structure and thrown into the first rear wall. The outer Kevlar layer of the first rear wall tore likely from the impact of the fifth bumper's support structure, but the back of the rear wall was intact. No damage occurred to the second rear wall, or to the witness plate behind the target.

Miller, J. E.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Hypervelocity Impact Performance of Open Cell Foam Core Sandwich Panel Structures

Open cell metallic foam core sandwich panel structures are of interest for application in spacecraft micrometeoroid and orbital debris shields due to their novel form and advantageous structural and thermal performance. Repeated shocking as a result of secondary impacts upon individual foam ligaments during the penetration process acts to raise the thermal state of impacting projectiles ; resulting in fragmentation, melting, and vaporization at lower velocities than with traditional shielding configurations (e.g. Whipple shield). In order to characterize the protective capability of these structures, an extensive experimental campaign was performed by the Johnson Space Center Hypervelocity Impact Technology Facility, the results of which are reported in this paper. Although not capable of competing against the protection levels achievable with leading heavy shields in use on modern high-risk vehicles (i.e. International Space Station modules), metallic foam core sandwich panels are shown to provide a substantial improvement over comparable structural panels and traditional low weight shielding alternatives such as honeycomb sandwich panels and metallic Whipple shields. A ballistic limit equation, generalized in terms of panel geometry, is derived and presented in a form suitable for application in risk assessment codes.

Ryan, S.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Space Shuttle MMOD Threat Mitigation Techniques

Prior to each shuttle mission, threat assessments are performed to determine the risk of critical penetration, payload bay door radiator tube leak and crew module window replacement from Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD). Mission parameters, such as vehicle attitude, exposure time and altitude are used as inputs for the analysis. Ballistic limit equations, based on hypervelocity impact testing of shuttle materials are used to estimate the critical particle diameters of the outer surfaces of the vehicle. The assessments are performed using the BUMPER computer code at the NASA/JSC Hypervelocity Impact Technology Facility (HITF). The most critical involves the calculation of Loss of Crew and Vehicle (LOCV) risk. An overview of significant MMOD impacts on the Payload Bay Door radiators, wing leading edge reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) panels and crew module windows will be presented, along with a discussion of the techniques NASA has implemented to reduce the risk from MMOD impacts. This paper will describe on-orbit inspection of the RCC regions and the methods used discern hypervelocity impact damage. Impact damage contingency plans and on-orbit repair techniques will also be discussed. The wing leading edge impact detection system (WLEIDS) and it s role in the reduction of on-orbit risk reduction will be presented. Finally, an analysis of alternative shuttle flight attitudes on MMOD risk will be demonstrated.

Hyde, J. L.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Investigation of MMOD Impact on Shuttle Payload Bay Door Radiator

Post flight inspections on the Space Shuttle Atlantis conducted after the STS-115 mission revealed a 0.11 inch (2.8 mm) hole in the outer facesheet of the starboard payload bay door radiator panel #4. This hole is the possible result of micrometeoroid/orbiting debris (MMOD) impact. The payload bay door radiators in this region are 0.5 inch (12.7 mm) thick aluminum honeycomb with 0.011 in (0.279 mm) thick aluminum facesheets topped with 0.005 in (0.127 mm) silver-Teflon tape. Inner facesheet damage included a 0.267 in (6.78 mm) long through crack with measurable deformation in the area of 0.2 in (5.1 mm). There was also a 0.031 in (0.787 mm) diameter hole in the rear facesheet. A large approximately 1 in (25 mm) diameter region of honeycomb was also destroyed. Since the radiators are located on the inside of the shuttle payload bay doors which are closed during ascent and reentry, the damage could only have occurred during the on-orbit portion of the mission. This paper will document the data collected from the impact site and will include results of the SEM/EDX analysis. Evidence will be presented that suggests a source of the impact as well as an analysis of the impact site features that indicate projectile directionality. Results of hypervelocity impact testing on representative samples in an attempt to simulate the impact event will be presented and discussed. Finally, the results of a study showing the regions of the orbiter vehicle that would be vulnerable to an equivalent projectile will be given.

Hyde, J. L.↗