Engineering topics

Kichak, Robert A.

Publications and source records attributed to Kichak, Robert A..

8 records

NASA NTRS2009

Spacecraft Electrical Connector Selection and Application Processes

This assessment was initiated by the NASA Engineering & Safety Center (NESC) after a number of recent "high profile" connector problems, the most visible and publicized of these being the problem with the Space Shuttle's Engine Cut-Off System cryogenic feed-thru connector. The NESC commissioned a review of NASA's connector selection and application processes for space flight applications, including how lessons learned and past problem records are fed back into the processes to avoid recurring issues. Team members were primarily from the various NASA Centers and included connector and electrical parts specialists. The commissioned study was conducted on spacecraft connector selection and application processes at NASA Centers. The team also compared the NASA spacecraft connector selection and application process to the military process, identified recent high profile connector failures, and analyzed problem report data looking for trends and common occurrences. The team characterized NASA's connector problem experience into a list of top connector issues based on anecdotal evidence of a system's impact and commonality between Centers. These top issues are as follows, in no particular rank order: electrically shorted, bent and/or recessed contact pins, contact pin/socket contamination leading to electrically open or intermittencies, connector plating corrosion or corrosion of connector components, low or inadequate contact pin retention forces, contact crimp failures, unmated connectors and mis-wiring due to workmanship errors during installation or maintenance, loose connectors due to manufacturing defects such as wavy washer and worn bayonet retention, damaged connector elastomeric seals and cryogenic connector failure. A survey was also conducted of SAE Connector AE-8C1 committee members regarding their experience relative to the NASA concerns on connectors. The most common responses in order of occurrence were contact retention, plating issues, worn-out or damaged coupling mechanisms, bent pins, contact crimp barrel cracking and torn seals. In addition to these common themes, responses included issues with markings, dimensional errors on the build, contact/socket damage (handling), manufacturing defects and customer misapplication and mishandling. The NESC team concluded that considering the large quantity and wide variety of connectors successfully flown on human and robotic space applications, the number of failures is quite low. However, "high profile" failures with significant cost, schedule, safety, and/or mission success impacts continue to occur. It was also concluded that connector failures occur throughout a system's life-cycle with the majority of connector issues application related. A number of recommendations were identified for improving NASA connector selection processes and overall space connector reliability and performance.

Iannello, Chris↗

NASA NTRS2009

Shuttle Ground Support Equipment (GSE) T-0 Umbilical to Space Shuttle Program (SSP) Flight Elements Consultation

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was tasked with assessing the validity of an alternate opinion that surfaced during the investigation of recurrent failures at the Space Shuttle T-0 umbilical interface. The most visible problem occurred during the Space Transportation System (STS)-112 launch when pyrotechnics used to separate Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Hold-Down Post (HDP) frangible nuts failed to fire. Subsequent investigations recommended several improvements to the Ground Support Equipment (GSE) and processing changes were implemented, including replacement of ground-half cables and connectors between flights, along with wiring modifications to make critical circuits quad-redundant across the interface. The alternate opinions maintained that insufficient data existed to exonerate the design, that additional data needed to be gathered under launch conditions, and that the interface should be further modified to ensure additional margin existed to preclude failure. The results of the assessment are contained in this report.

Wilson, Timmy R.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Deep Impact Delta II Launch Vehicle Cracked Thick Film Coating on Electronic Packages Technical Consultation Report

The Deep Impact spacecraft was launched on a Boeing Delta II rocket from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) on January 12, 2005. Prior to the launch, the Director of the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OS&MA) requested the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) lead a team to render an independent opinion on the rationale for flight and the risk code assignments for the hazard of cracked Thick Film Assemblies (TFAs) in the E-packages of the Delta II launch vehicle for the Deep Impact Mission. The results of the evaluation are contained in this report.

Cameron, Kenneth D.↗

NASA NTRS2009

STS-114 Engine Cut-off Sensor Anomaly Technical Consultation Report

The NESC consultation team participated in real-time troubleshooting of the Main Propulsion System (MPS) Engine Cutoff (ECO) sensor system failures during STS-114 launch countdown. The team assisted with External Tank (ET) thermal and ECO Point Sensor Box (PSB) circuit analyses, and made real-time inputs to the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) problem resolution teams. Several long-term recommendations resulted. One recommendation was to conduct cryogenic tests of the ECO sensors to validate, or disprove, the theory that variations in circuit impedance due to cryogenic effects on swaged connections within the sensor were the root cause of STS-114 failures.

Wilson, Timmy R.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Failure Analysis Study and Long-Term Reliability of Optical Assemblies with End-Face Damage

In June 2005, the NESC received a multi-faceted request to determine the long term reliability of fiber optic termini on the ISS that exhibited flaws not manufactured to best workmanship practices. There was a lack of data related to fiber optic workmanship as it affects the long term reliability of optical fiber assemblies in a harsh environment. A fiber optic defect analysis was requested which would find and/or create various types of chips, spalls, scratches, etc., that were identified by the ISS personnel. Once the defects and causes were identified the next step would be to perform long term reliability testing of similar assemblies with similar defects. The goal of the defect analysis would be for the defects to be observed and documented for deterioration of fiber optic performance. Though this report mostly discusses what has been determined as evidence of poor manufacturing processes, it also concludes the majority of the damage could have been avoided with a rigorous process in place.

Kichak, Robert A.↗

NASA NTRS2008

International Space Station (ISS) S-Band Corona Discharge Anomaly Consultation

The Assembly and Contingency Radio Frequency Group (ACRFG) onboard the International Space Station (ISS) is used for command and control communications and transmits (45 dBm or 32 watts) and receives at S-band. The system is nominally pressurized with gaseous helium (He) and nitrogen (N2) at 8 pounds per square inch absolute (psia). MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. (MDA) was engaged to analyze the operational characteristics of this unit in an effort to determine if the anomalous behavior was a result of a corona event. Based on this analysis, MDA did not recommend continued use of this ACRFG. The NESC was requested to provide expert support in the area of high-voltage corona and multipactoring in an S-Band RF system and to assess the probability of corona occurring in the ACRFG during the planned EVA. The NESC recommended minimal continued use of S/N 002 ACRFG until a replacement unit can be installed. Following replacement, S/N 002 will be subjected to destructive failure analysis in an effort to determine the proximate and root cause(s) of the anomalous behavior.

Kichak, Robert A.↗

NASA NTRS2007

DAWN Mission Bus and Waveguide Venting Analysis Review

A concern was raised regarding the time after launch when the DAWN Mission Communications Subsystem, which contains a 100 Watt X-Band Traveling Wave Tube Amplifier (TWTA) with a high voltage ((approximately 7 Kilo Volt (KV)) Electronic Power Converter (EPC), will be powered on for the first post-launch downlink. This activation is planned to be approximately one hour after launch. Orbital Sciences (the DAWN Mission spacecraft contractor) typically requires a 24-hour wait period prior to high voltage initiation for Earth-orbiting Science and GEO spacecraft. The concern relates to the issue of corona and/or radio frequency (RF) breakdown of the TWTA ((high voltage direct current (DC) and RF)), and of the microwave components (high voltage RF) in the presence of partial atmospheric pressures or outgassing constituents. In particular, generally the diplexer and circulator are susceptible to RF breakdown in the corona region due to the presence of small physical gaps ((~ 2.5 millimeter (mm)) between conductors that carry an RF voltage. The NESC concurred the DAWN Mission communication system is safe for activation.

Cragg, Clinton H.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Space Shuttle Orbiter Reaction Jet Driver (RJD): Independent Technical Assessment/Inspection (ITA/I) Report, Version 1.0

The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) has a zero-fault-tolerant design related to an inadvertent firing of the primary reaction control jets on the Orbiter during mated operations with the International Space Station (ISS). Failure modes identified by the program as a wire-to-wire "smart" short or a Darlington transistor short resulting in a failed-on primary thruster during mated operations with ISS can drive forces that exceed the structural capabilities of the docked Shuttle/ISS structure. The assessment team delivered 17 observations, 6 findings and 15 recommendations to the Space Shuttle Program.

Gilbrech, Richard J.↗