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Karri, Ramesh

Publications and source records attributed to Karri, Ramesh.

MaDEVIoT: Cyberattacks on EV Charging Can Disrupt Power Grid Operation

Extensive roll-out of electric vehicles (EVs) requires large-scale deployment of high-power EV Charging Stations (EVCSs). EVCSs are connected to the internet using Internetof- Things (IoT) such as smartphones, to improve the charging experience of users and increase their profitability. This paper studies the feasibility of demand-side cyberattacks launched on power grids via such internet-connected highpower EVCSs. The attack mechanism distorts power grid frequency and voltage, and has the potential to trigger systemwide outages. The case study, based on the power grid and EV deployment plans in Manhattan, New York, illustrates potential impacts of such attacks. The results show that such attacks will become feasible in Manhattan, New York in 2030, as EV adoption increases. Furthermore, the attacks in 2030 are feasible even compromising a single company’s EVCS server in Manhattan, New York. The attacks can cause line overloads and trip over-frequency protection relays, causing system-side blackout in the power grid in Manhattan, New York. The paper informs planning authorities and power grid operators involved with the roll-out of EV charging infrastructure about potential cyberthreats to power grids via manipulating internet-connected high-power EVCSs.

Acharya, Samrat S.↗

An Integrated Testbed for Trojans in Printed Circuit Boards with Fuzzing Capabilities

This paper showcases an all-in-one testing environment that combines Trojan detection and fuzzing capabilities for printed circuit boards using the OpenPLC “NYU Trojan Edition” and a dedicated Trojan detection framework. The demo system is self-contained and equipped with two OpenPLC-based boards (one with a Trojan and one without), and automated tools for inserting the Trojan and collecting side-channel data. We developed a graphical user interface for interactive Trojan selection, data visualization, and anomaly detection analysis.

Trojan detection, anomaly detection, PCB, timing l↗

Detecting Hardware Trojans in PCBs Using Side Channel Loopbacks

Malicious modifications to printed circuit boards (PCBs) are known as hardware Trojans. These may arise when malafide third parties alter PCBs premanufacturing or postmanufacturing and are a concern in safety-critical applications, such as industrial control systems. In this research, we examine how data-driven detection can be utilized to detect such Trojans at run-time. We develop a flexible and reconfigurable PCB test bed derived from the popular open-source programmable logic controller (PLC) platform “OpenPLC.” We then develop a Trojan detection framework, which utilizes and analyzes multimodal side channels (e.g., timing, magnetic signals, power, and hardware performance counters). We consider defender-configurable input/output (I/O) loopback test, comparison with design-document baselines, and magnetometer-aided monitoring of system behavior under defender-chosen excitations. Our approach can extend to golden-free environments. Golden (known-good) versions of the PCBs are assumed not available, but design information, datasheets, and component-level data are available. We demonstrate the efficacy of our approach on a range of Trojans instantiated in the test bed.

42 ENGINEERING↗