Engineering topics

Jones, Harry W.

Publications and source records attributed to Jones, Harry W..

At least 55 records · Page 3

NASA NTRS2015

Comments on the MIT Assessment of the Mars One Plan

The MIT assessment of the Mars One mission plan reveals design assumptions that would cause significant difficulties. Growing crops in the crew chamber produces excessive oxygen levels. The assumed in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) equipment has too low a Technology Readiness Level (TRL). The required spare parts cause a large and increasing launch mass logistics burden. The assumed International Space Station (ISS) Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) technologies were developed for microgravity and therefore are not suitable for Mars gravity. Growing food requires more mass than sending food from Earth. The large number of spares is due to the relatively low reliability of ECLS and the low TRL of ISRU. The Mars One habitat design is similar to past concepts but does not incorporate current knowledge. The MIT architecture analysis tool for long-term settlements on the Martian surface includes an ECLS system simulation, an ISRU sizing model, and an analysis of required spares. The MIT tool showed the need for separate crop and crew chambers, the large spare parts logistics, that crops require more mass than Earth food, and that more spares are needed if reliability is lower. That ISRU has low TRL and ISS ECLS was designed for microgravity are well known. Interestingly, the results produced by the architecture analysis tool - separate crop chamber, large spares mass, large crop chamber mass, and low reliability requiring more spares - were also well known. A common approach to ECLS architecture analysis is to build a complex model that is intended to be all-inclusive and is hoped will help solve all design problems. Such models can struggle to replicate obvious and well-known results and are often unable to answer unanticipated new questions. A better approach would be to survey the literature for background knowledge and then directly analyze the important problems.

Mars mission↗

NASA NTRS2015

Diverse Redundant Systems for Reliable Space Life Support

Reliable life support systems are required for deep space missions. The probability of a fatal life support failure should be less than one in a thousand in a multi-year mission. It is far too expensive to develop a single system with such high reliability. Using three redundant units would require only that each have a failure probability of one in ten over the mission. Since the system development cost is inverse to the failure probability, this would cut cost by a factor of one hundred. Using replaceable subsystems instead of full systems would further cut cost. Using full sets of replaceable components improves reliability more than using complete systems as spares, since a set of components could repair many different failures instead of just one. Replaceable components would require more tools, space, and planning than full systems or replaceable subsystems. However, identical system redundancy cannot be relied on in practice. Common cause failures can disable all the identical redundant systems. Typical levels of common cause failures will defeat redundancy greater than two. Diverse redundant systems are required for reliable space life support. Three, four, or five diverse redundant systems could be needed for sufficient reliability. One system with lower level repair could be substituted for two diverse systems to save cost.

life support↗

NASA NTRS2015

Success Factors in Human Space Programs - Why Did Apollo Succeed Better Than Later Programs?

The Apollo Program reached the moon, but the Constellation Program (CxP) that planned to return to the moon and go on to Mars was cancelled. Apollo is NASA's greatest achievement but its success is poorly understood. The usual explanation is that President Kennedy announced we were going to the moon, the scientific community and the public strongly supported it, and Congress provided the necessary funding. This is partially incorrect and does not actually explain Apollo's success. The scientific community and the public did not support Apollo. Like Apollo, Constellation was announced by a president and funded by Congress, with elements that continued on even after it was cancelled. Two other factors account for Apollo's success. Initially, the surprise event of Uri Gagarin's first human space flight created political distress and a strong desire for the government to dramatically demonstrate American space capability. Options were considered and Apollo was found to be most effective and technically feasible. Political necessity overrode both the lack of popular and scientific support and the extremely high cost and risk. Other NASA human space programs were either canceled, such as the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI), repeatedly threatened with cancellation, such as International Space Station (ISS), or terminated while still operational, such as the space shuttle and even Apollo itself. Large crash programs such as Apollo are initiated and continued if and only if urgent political necessity produces the necessary political will. They succeed if and only if they are technically feasible within the provided resources. Future human space missions will probably require gradual step-by-step development in a more normal environment.

Success factors↗

NASA NTRS2015

Water System Architectures for Moon and Mars Bases

Water systems for human bases on the moon and Mars will recycle multiple sources of wastewater. Systems for both the moon and Mars will also store water to support and backup the recycling system. Most water system requirements, such as number of crew, quantity and quality of water supply, presence of gravity, and surface mission duration of 6 or 18 months, will be similar for the moon and Mars. If the water system fails, a crew on the moon can quickly receive spare parts and supplies or return to Earth, but a crew on Mars cannot. A recycling system on the moon can have a reasonable reliability goal, such as only one unrecoverable failure every five years, if there is enough stored water to allow time for attempted repairs and for the crew to return if repair fails. The water system that has been developed and successfully operated on the International Space Station (ISS) could be used on a moon base. To achieve the same high level of crew safety on Mars without an escape option, either the recycling system must have much higher reliability or enough water must be stored to allow the crew to survive the full duration of the Mars surface mission. A three loop water system architecture that separately recycles condensate, wash water, and urine and flush can improve reliability and reduce cost for a Mars base.

moon base↗

NASA NTRS2015

The Life Cycle Cost (LCC) of Life Support Recycling and Resupply

Brief human space missions supply all the crew's water and oxygen from Earth. The multiyear International Space Station (ISS) program instead uses physicochemical life support systems to recycle water and oxygen. This paper compares the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) of recycling to the LCC of resupply for potential future long duration human space missions. Recycling systems have high initial development costs but relatively low durationdependent support costs. This means that recycling is more cost effective for longer missions. Resupplying all the water and oxygen requires little initial development cost but has a much higher launch mass and launch cost. The cost of resupply increases as the mission duration increases. Resupply is therefore more cost effective than recycling for shorter missions. A recycling system pays for itself when the resupply LCC grows greater over time than the recycling LCC. The time when this occurs is called the recycling breakeven date. Recycling will cost very much less than resupply for long duration missions within the Earth-Moon system, such as a future space station or Moon base. But recycling would cost about the same as resupply for long duration deep space missions, such as a Mars trip. Because it is not possible to provide emergency supplies or quick return options on the way to Mars, more expensive redundant recycling systems will be needed.

recycling↗

NASA NTRS2014

Future Exponential Economic Growth in Space

The human population and economy are now limited by the land area, materials and energy available on Earth. As explained by Malthus, human effort can increase this population limit only gradually and linearly at any fixed level of technology. The unexpected exponential increase in population since Malthus time is due to the even greater exponential increase in agricultural and industrial productivity due to modern technology. Current opinion is divided between the limiters who see fast approaching unavoidable limits to growth and growthers who expect continuing innovation and expansion. Given the minimum energy and food needed to support each human, the population of Earth is necessarily bounded. The past human exponential expansions were based on the invention of agriculture and industry. Continued expansion could occur with future colonization of the solar system. The initial occupation of near-Earth space would probably be for immediate military and economic gains rather than to escape the limits to growth on Earth. Space habitats could exploit solar system energy, materials, and living space, first in the Earth-moon system and later throughout the solar system. Space habitats would be supported by robotic power stations, mining, manufacturing, and transportation. These could travel to the stars with the addition of propulsion and nuclear power. Human expansion into the galaxy would allow continuing exponential growth and could establish a vast interconnected galactic civilization.

Jones, Harry W.↗

NASA NTRS2014

Space and Industrial Brine Drying Technologies

This survey describes brine drying technologies that have been developed for use in space and industry. NASA has long considered developing a brine drying system for the International Space Station (ISS). Possible processes include conduction drying in many forms, spray drying, distillation, freezing and freeze drying, membrane filtration, and electrical processes. Commercial processes use similar technologies. Some proposed space systems combine several approaches. The current most promising candidates for use on the ISS use either conduction drying with membrane filtration or spray drying.

water recovery↗

NASA NTRS2014

Don't Trust a Management Metric, Especially in Life Support

Goodhart's law states that metrics do not work. Metrics become distorted when used and they deflect effort away from more important goals. These well-known and unavoidable problems occurred when the closure and system mass metrics were used to manage life support research. The intent of life support research should be to develop flyable, operable, reliable systems, not merely to increase life support system closure or to reduce its total mass. It would be better to design life support systems to meet the anticipated mission requirements and user needs. Substituting the metrics of closure and total mass for these goals seems to have led life support research to solve the wrong problems.

life support↗

NASA NTRS2014

Life Support for Deep Space and Mars

How should life support for deep space be developed? The International Space Station (ISS) life support system is the operational result of many decades of research and development. Long duration deep space missions such as Mars have been expected to use matured and upgraded versions of ISS life support. Deep space life support must use the knowledge base incorporated in ISS but it must also meet much more difficult requirements. The primary new requirement is that life support in deep space must be considerably more reliable than on ISS or anywhere in the Earth-Moon system, where emergency resupply and a quick return are possible. Due to the great distance from Earth and the long duration of deep space missions, if life support systems fail, the traditional approaches for emergency supply of oxygen and water, emergency supply of parts, and crew return to Earth or escape to a safe haven are likely infeasible. The Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU) maintenance approach used by ISS is unsuitable for deep space with ORU's as large and complex as those originally provided in ISS designs because it minimizes opportunities for commonality of spares, requires replacement of many functional parts with each failure, and results in substantial launch mass and volume penalties. It has become impractical even for ISS after the shuttle era, resulting in the need for ad hoc repair activity at lower assembly levels with consequent crew time penalties and extended repair timelines. Less complex, more robust technical approaches may be needed to meet the difficult deep space requirements for reliability, maintainability, and reparability. Developing an entirely new life support system would neglect what has been achieved. The suggested approach is use the ISS life support technologies as a platform to build on and to continue to improve ISS subsystems while also developing new subsystems where needed to meet deep space requirements.

life support↗

NASA NTRS2014

Reliability Growth in Space Life Support Systems

A hardware system's failure rate often increases over time due to wear and aging, but not always. Some systems instead show reliability growth, a decreasing failure rate with time, due to effective failure analysis and remedial hardware upgrades. Reliability grows when failure causes are removed by improved design. A mathematical reliability growth model allows the reliability growth rate to be computed from the failure data. The space shuttle was extensively maintained, refurbished, and upgraded after each flight and it experienced significant reliability growth during its operational life. In contrast, the International Space Station (ISS) is much more difficult to maintain and upgrade and its failure rate has been constant over time. The ISS Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly (CDRA) reliability has slightly decreased. Failures on ISS and with the ISS CDRA continue to be a challenge.

life support↗

NASA NTRS2012

Methods and Costs to Achieve Ultra Reliable Life Support

A published Mars mission is used to explore the methods and costs to achieve ultra reliable life support. The Mars mission and its recycling life support design are described. The life support systems were made triply redundant, implying that each individual system will have fairly good reliability. Ultra reliable life support is needed for Mars and other long, distant missions. Current systems apparently have insufficient reliability. The life cycle cost of the Mars life support system is estimated. Reliability can be increased by improving the intrinsic system reliability, adding spare parts, or by providing technically diverse redundant systems. The costs of these approaches are estimated. Adding spares is least costly but may be defeated by common cause failures. Using two technically diverse systems is effective but doubles the life cycle cost. Achieving ultra reliability is worth its high cost because the penalty for failure is very high.

deep space life support↗

NASA NTRS2012

Design and Analysis of a Flexible, Reliable Deep Space Life Support System

This report describes a flexible, reliable, deep space life support system design approach that uses either storage or recycling or both together. The design goal is to provide the needed life support performance with the required ultra reliability for the minimum Equivalent System Mass (ESM). Recycling life support systems used with multiple redundancy can have sufficient reliability for deep space missions but they usually do not save mass compared to mixed storage and recycling systems. The best deep space life support system design uses water recycling with sufficient water storage to prevent loss of crew if recycling fails. Since the amount of water needed for crew survival is a small part of the total water requirement, the required amount of stored water is significantly less than the total to be consumed. Water recycling with water, oxygen, and carbon dioxide removal material storage can achieve the high reliability of full storage systems with only half the mass of full storage and with less mass than the highly redundant recycling systems needed to achieve acceptable reliability. Improved recycling systems with lower mass and higher reliability could perform better than systems using storage.

reliability↗

NASA NTRS2012

Common Cause Failures and Ultra Reliability

A common cause failure occurs when several failures have the same origin. Common cause failures are either common event failures, where the cause is a single external event, or common mode failures, where two systems fail in the same way for the same reason. Common mode failures can occur at different times because of a design defect or a repeated external event. Common event failures reduce the reliability of on-line redundant systems but not of systems using off-line spare parts. Common mode failures reduce the dependability of systems using off-line spare parts and on-line redundancy.

reliability↗

NASA NTRS2010

Ultra Reliable Closed Loop Life Support for Long Space Missions

Spacecraft human life support systems can achieve ultra reliability by providing sufficient spares to replace all failed components. The additional mass of spares for ultra reliability is approximately equal to the original system mass, provided that the original system reliability is not too low. Acceptable reliability can be achieved for the Space Shuttle and Space Station by preventive maintenance and by replacing failed units. However, on-demand maintenance and repair requires a logistics supply chain in place to provide the needed spares. In contrast, a Mars or other long space mission must take along all the needed spares, since resupply is not possible. Long missions must achieve ultra reliability, a very low failure rate per hour, since they will take years rather than weeks and cannot be cut short if a failure occurs. Also, distant missions have a much higher mass launch cost per kilogram than near-Earth missions. Achieving ultra reliable spacecraft life support systems with acceptable mass will require a well-planned and extensive development effort. Analysis must determine the reliability requirement and allocate it to subsystems and components. Ultra reliability requires reducing the intrinsic failure causes, providing spares to replace failed components and having "graceful" failure modes. Technologies, components, and materials must be selected and designed for high reliability. Long duration testing is needed to confirm very low failure rates. Systems design should segregate the failure causes in the smallest, most easily replaceable parts. The system must be designed, developed, integrated, and tested with system reliability in mind. Maintenance and reparability of failed units must not add to the probability of failure. The overall system must be tested sufficiently to identify any design errors. A program to develop ultra reliable space life support systems with acceptable mass should start soon since it must be a long term effort.

Jones, Harry W.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Developing an Advanced Life Support System for the Flexible Path into Deep Space

Long duration human missions beyond low Earth orbit, such as a permanent lunar base, an asteroid rendezvous, or exploring Mars, will use recycling life support systems to preclude supplying large amounts of metabolic consumables. The International Space Station (ISS) life support design provides a historic guiding basis for future systems, but both its system architecture and the subsystem technologies should be reconsidered. Different technologies for the functional subsystems have been investigated and some past alternates appear better for flexible path destinations beyond low Earth orbit. There is a need to develop more capable technologies that provide lower mass, increased closure, and higher reliability. A major objective of redesigning the life support system for the flexible path is achieving the maintainability and ultra-reliability necessary for deep space operations.

Jones, Harry W.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Starship Life Support

The design and mass cost of a starship and its life support system are investigated. The mission plan for a multi generational interstellar voyage to colonize a new planet is used to describe the starship design, including the crew habitat, accommodations, and life support. Only current technology is assumed. Highly reliable life support systems can be provided with reasonably small additional mass, suggesting that they can support long duration missions. Bioregenerative life support, growing crop plants that provide food, water, and oxygen, has been thought to need less mass than providing stored food for long duration missions. The large initial mass of hydroponics systems is paid for over time by saving the mass of stored food. However, the yearly logistics mass required to support a bioregenerative system exceeds the mass of food solids it produces, so that supplying stored dehydrated food always requires less mass than bioregenerative food production. A mixed system that grows about half the food and supplies the other half dehydrated has advantages that allow it to breakeven with stored dehydrated food in about 66 years. However, moderate increases in the hydroponics system mass to achieve high reliability, such as adding spares that double the system mass and replacing the initial system every 100 years, increase the mass cost of bioregenerative life support. In this case, the high reliability half food growing, half food supplying system does not breakeven for 389 years. An even higher reliability half and half system, with three times original system mass and replacing the system every 50 years, never breaks even. Growing food for starship life support requires more mass than providing dehydrated food, even for multigeneration voyages of hundreds of years. The benefits of growing some food may justify the added mass cost. Much more efficient recycling food production is wanted but may not be possible. A single multigenerational interstellar voyage to colonize a new planet would have cost similar to that of the Apollo program. Cost is reduced if a small crew travels slowly and lands with minimal equipment. We can go to the stars!

Jones, Harry W.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Developing Ultra Reliable Life Support for the Moon and Mars

Recycling life support systems can achieve ultra reliability by using spares to replace failed components. The added mass for spares is approximately equal to the original system mass, provided the original system reliability is not very low. Acceptable reliability can be achieved for the space shuttle and space station by preventive maintenance and by replacing failed units, However, this maintenance and repair depends on a logistics supply chain that provides the needed spares. The Mars mission must take all the needed spares at launch. The Mars mission also must achieve ultra reliability, a very low failure rate per hour, since it requires years rather than weeks and cannot be cut short if a failure occurs. Also, the Mars mission has a much higher mass launch cost per kilogram than shuttle or station. Achieving ultra reliable space life support with acceptable mass will require a well-planned and extensive development effort. Analysis must define the reliability requirement and allocate it to subsystems and components. Technologies, components, and materials must be designed and selected for high reliability. Extensive testing is needed to ascertain very low failure rates. Systems design should segregate the failure causes in the smallest, most easily replaceable parts. The systems must be designed, produced, integrated, and tested without impairing system reliability. Maintenance and failed unit replacement should not introduce any additional probability of failure. The overall system must be tested sufficiently to identify any design errors. A program to develop ultra reliable space life support systems with acceptable mass must start soon if it is to produce timely results for the moon and Mars.

Jones, Harry W.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Lunar Base Life Support Failures

Dynamic simulation of the lunar outpost habitat life support was undertaken to investigate the impact of life support failures and to investigate responses. Some preparatory static analysis for the Lunar Outpost life support model, an earlier version of the model, and an investigation into the impact of Extravehicular Activity (EVA) were reported previously. (Jones, 2008-01-2184, 2008-01-2017) The earlier model was modified to include possible resupply delays, power failures, recycling system failures, and atmosphere and other material storage failures. Most failures impact the lunar outpost water balance and can be mitigated by reducing water usage. Food solids, nitrogen can be obtained only by resupply from Earth. The most time urgent failure is a lass of carbon dioxide removal capability. Life support failures might be survivable if effective operational solutions are provided in the system design.

Jones, Harry W.↗