FY26 Efforts to Revive and Update the ANS-54.8 Liquid Metal Fire Protection Standard
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Risk-Informed Standard↗
Engineering topics
Henneke, Dennis
Publications and source records attributed to Henneke, Dennis.
Towards Risk-Informed Performance-Based Emergency Planning: Review of Regulation, Guidance, and Methods
At a fundamental level, nuclear facility safety is built upon the concept of defense-in-depth (DID), which entails multiple, independent layers of protection for public health and safety. Within the DID structure, emergency preparedness (EP) is the last layer of defense and provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Over several decades, the EP regulatory framework has evolved in response to lessons learned from actual events, experience with maintaining and testing EP capabilities, and advances in a wide range of technologies. Furthering this evolution, recent developments in risk-informed performance-based (RIPB) design and licensing approaches provide an opportunity to leverage insights regarding the attributes of the specific facility and site to inform EP.
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Passive Safety System Reliability Analysis: Methodology, Application, and Results
Many advanced reactor designs rely on passive systems to provide assurance that certain safety functions, such as reactivity control and reactor heat removal, are maintained during transient scenarios. The performance of these systems is sensitive to boundary and environmental conditions and can lead to functional failure, which is the inability of the system to perform as intended even without any physical failures. Additionally, conditions can cause the passive systems to operate in an intermediate or degraded state. These operational modes of passive systems and their overall reliability can be difficult to capture in traditional probabilistic frameworks where discrete operating modes are assumed or time-dependent boundary conditions are not accounted for. Novel strategies and methods are needed to be able to capture the reliability of these passive systems and their impact on facility safety. The current abstract provides a summary of such a methodology and examples of its use in a case study, the GE Hitachi (GEH) PRISM probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), and the U.S. Department of Energy (USDOE) Versatile Test Reactor (VTR) PSA.
Bucknor, M.↗
Passive Safety System Reliability Analysis: Lessons Learned and Open Items
Passive safety systems have multiple benefits, largely stemming from their high functional reliability due to their simplicity and lack of dependencies. However, accurately assessing the reliability of passive systems can be challenging due in large part to the possibility of functional failures. Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) has been involved in several recent efforts concerning the reliability assessment of passive safety systems for advanced, non-light water reactors (non-LWRs). These efforts have focused on the development and application of mechanistic methods for the evaluation of passive system reliability, which rely on system modelling and uncertainty analyses to derive reliability values for use in probabilistic safety assessments (PSAs). Further information on these efforts is provided in ref [1]. The current paper reviews key lessons learned through these projects, along with outstanding open items regarding the reliability assessment of passive systems.
Grabaskas, David↗
Development of the Versatile Test Reactor Probabilistic Risk Assessment
Not Available
Grabaskas, David↗
Utilization of the LMP Methodology in Support of the VTR Conceptual Safety Design Report
The Versatile Test Reactor (VTR) is a fast spectrum test reactor currently being developed in the United States under the direction of the US Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy. The VTR is utilizing a risk-informed performance-based (RIPB) approach for design support and authorization by the DOE, derived from recent efforts by the US industry led Licensing Modernization Project (LMP). This document contains an overview of the implementation of the LMP approach in support of the VTR Conceptual Safety Design Report (CSDR). The work reported here is the result of studies supporting a VTR conceptual design, cost, and schedule estimate for DOE-NE to make a decision on procurement. As such, it is preliminary. The VTR RIPB authorization approach utilizes information from the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), coupled with deterministic analyses, to aid in decision-making regarding the identification and categorization of safety basis events (SBEs), the classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs), and the evaluation of defense-in-depth (DID) adequacy. As part of initial reactor design efforts, a VTR conceptual design PRA was developed to support the RIPB process, which focused on at-power internal events, with scoping analyses for seismic and sodium fire hazards. In addition to supporting numerous design studies, preliminary results from the RIPB approach and the VTR conceptual design PRA were utilized as the basis of the VTR CSDR. The initial identification and categorization of SBEs, SSC classification, and DID evaluation were contained within the CSDR, which was submitted to DOE in 2019 as part of the CD-1 submittal package. Following review, DOE approved the CSDR in April 2020 and the CD-1 package in late 2020. Valuable experience was gained through the implementation of the RIPB approach for design and authorization during the VTR conceptual design phase, which is summarized in this document. To the extent possible, this experience has been shared with the advanced reactor industry, through publications and participation in licensing tabletops, in addition to informing DOE:NE advanced reactor regulatory development efforts. Furthermore, the approval of the CSDR by the DOE as part of CD-1 represents a significant milestone in the use of RIPB approaches for advanced reactor licensing.
21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
Structures, Systems, and Components Classification Criteria for the Versatile Test Reactor
The Versatile Test Reactor (VTR) is a fast spectrum test reactor currently being developed in the United States under the direction of the US Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy. The VTR mission is to enable accelerated testing of advanced reactor fuels and materials required for advanced reactor technologies. The conceptual design of the 300 MWth sodium-cooled metallic-fueled pool-type fast reactor has been led by the U.S. National Laboratories in collaboration with General Electric-Hitachi and Bechtel National Inc. As part of the VTR authorization process by the DOE, it is necessary to identify the safety classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) to determine the proper design, surveillance, operation, and incident-reporting requirements. Since VTR is utilizing a risk-informed, performance-based authorization process based on the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) described in NEI 18-04 [1], the criteria for SSC classification, which are reviewed here, includes both risk information from the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and prescriptive requirements.
Grabaskas, David↗