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Glaser, Alexander

Publications and source records attributed to Glaser, Alexander.

36 records · Page 2

On the Origins and Significance of the Limit Demarcating Low-Enriched Uranium from Highly Enriched Uranium

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines uranium with a 235 U isotope concentration of 20 percent as the threshold between low-enriched uranium (LEU) and highly enriched uranium (HEU), and as a significant waypoint on the path towards weapon-grade uranium (typically above 90 percent 235 U enrich-ment). Furthermore, the distinction between LEU and HEU is widely used in shaping nonproliferation policy, and it has featured prominently in commentary over Iran’s nuclear program and the series of Nuclear Security Summits that since 2010 have sought to minimize civilian stockpiles and use of HEU. Yet the origin of this threshold is obscure, dating back 6 decades. Our research note traces the political origin and the technical basis for this limit.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Present and future potential of krypton-85 for the detection of clandestine reprocessing plants for treaty verification

Burnup calculations are applied to determine the amount of krypton-85 that is produced during the irradiation of nuclear fuel. Since krypton-85 is most likely released into the atmosphere during reprocessing to separate plutonium, atmospheric transport modeling is used to calculate the worldwide distribution of krypton-85 concentrations stemming from emissions from declared reprocessing plants. Our results are the basis for scenarios in which emissions from clandestine reprocessing facilities have to be detected against various background levels. We conclude that today’s background imposes heavily on the ability to detect small and medium plutonium separation rates; only high separation rates of 1 SQ per week and higher have a chance to be detected with feasible outlay. A fixed network of monitoring stations seems too costly; instead the high number of samples that are required rather calls for mobile sampling procedures, where air samples are collected at random locations over the world and are analyzed in regional laboratories for their krypton-85 concentration. Furthermore, it is argued that krypton-85 emissions from declared reprocessing activities have to be significantly lowered to enable a worldwide verification of the absence of even smaller clandestine reprocessing. For each scenario the number of samples that have to be taken for probable detection is calculated.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Building on the Iran Deal: Steps Toward a Middle Eastern Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone

Approved unanimously by the UN Security Council on July 20, the agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, aims "to ensure that Iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful" and thus to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. Other states in the Middle East, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are planning to establish their own nuclear power programs during the period that the Iran deal is expected to be in force. Furthermore, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action provides an unprecedented opportunity for an international effort to make progress toward a Middle Eastern nuclear-weapon-free zone, possibly as part of WMD-free zone in that region. In building on the foundation created by that agreement, the measures proposed here constitute the essential technical steps toward a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Although it is unlikely that such a zone can be established anytime soon, it should be possible to make progress on a number of the building blocks for it.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nuclear Warhead Verification: A Review of Attribute and Template Systems

Verification of current nuclear arms control treaties between United States and Russia relies primarily on the verification of delivery vehicles. Warheads are counted indirectly via the delivery vehicles that they are associated with. As states move to lower numbers of nuclear weapons in their arsenals, verification will likely pose complex challenges. Most importantly, future nuclear disarmament treaties may place limits on the total number of nuclear weapons in the arsenals. Their verification would require inspections of individual nuclear warheads without revealing secret information. By confirming the authenticity of nuclear warheads and perhaps also of warhead components we show the verification challenge for future reductions in the nuclear arsenals. Our paper provides an overview of the development of verification systems, and highlights the challenges and the opportunities for future research in this area.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

After the Iran deal: Multinational enrichment

Iran and the E3+3 nations (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, plus China, Russia, and the United States) negotiated a framework, in April 2015, for a “comprehensive solution that will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program” (1, 2). The final settlement, expected by July 2015 or soon after, would constrain Iran's activities for various extended periods in return for the lifting of sanctions and affirm Iran's right to pursue its nuclear program free of the limits on its uranium enrichment capacity a decade or more from now. What happens when these restrictions begin to phase out? Here, we outline one approach to limit the long-term risk by using the next 10 years to convert Iran's national enrichment plant into a multinational one, possibly including as partners some of Iran's neighbors and one or more of the E3+3 countries.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Policy and Technical Issues Facing a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty. Chapter 14

We report the largest obstacle to creating nuclear weapons, starting with the ones that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has been to make sufficient quantities of fissile materials – highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium – to sustain an explosive fission chain reaction.1 Recognition of this fact has, for more than fifty years, underpinned both the support for and the opposition to adoption of an international treaty banning at a minimum the production of more fissile materials for nuclear weapons, commonly referred to as a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A Conversion Proposal for Iran's IR-40 Reactor with Reduced Plutonium Production

Our article examines possible modifications of Iran’s IR-40 (Arak) heavy-water reactor that would limit its plutonium production without compromising its usefulness for civilian purposes. The proposed modifications only involve the fuel composition, avoid changes to the fuel and core geometry, and therefore have the advantage of minimizing the overall complexity and cost of conversion as well as shortening the time period required to implement these modifications. The suggested changes would significantly reduce the reactor’s production of plutonium from 7–9 kilograms to less than 1 kilogram per year. This article also examines key safety parameters, medical isotope production rates, and uranium resource requirements for all modifications considered. Our analysis is relevant beyond the case of Iran’s Arak reactor and may provide some future guidance for converting other heavy-water reactors that continue to operate today.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Unmaking the Bomb: A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation

Achieving nuclear disarmament, stopping nuclear proliferation, and preventing nuclear terrorism are among the most critical challenges facing the world today. Unmaking the Bomb proposes a new approach to reaching these long-held goals. Rather than considering them as separate issues, the authors—physicists and experts on nuclear security—argue that all three of these goals can be understood and realized together if we focus on the production, stockpiling, and disposal of plutonium and highly enriched uranium—the fissile materials that are the key ingredients used to make nuclear weapons. The authors describe the history, production, national stockpiles, and current military and civilian uses of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and propose policies aimed at reducing and eventually eliminating these fissile materials worldwide. These include an end to the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons, an end to their use as reactor fuels, and the verified elimination of all national stockpiles.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A zero-knowledge protocol for nuclear warhead verification

The verification of nuclear warheads for arms control involves a paradox: international inspectors will have to gain high confidence in the authenticity of submitted items while learning nothing about them. Proposed inspection systems featuring ‘information barriers’, designed to hide measurements stored in electronic systems, are at risk of tampering and snooping. Here we show the viability of a fundamentally new approach to nuclear warhead verification that incor-porates a zero-knowledge protocol, which is designed in such a way that sensitive information is never measured and so does not need to be hidden. We interrogate submitted items with energetic neutrons, making, in effect, differential measurements of both neutron transmission and emission. Calculations for scenarios in which material is diverted from a test object show that a high degree of discrimination can be achieved while revealing zero information. Our ideas for a physical zero-knowledge system could have applications beyond the context of nuclear disarmament. The proposed technique suggests a way to perform comparisons or computations on personal or confidential data without measuring the data in the first place.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A Win-Win Solution For Iran’s Arak Reactor

In November 2013, Iran and the P5+1 group of countries (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) agreed on a six-month Joint Plan of Action to enable negotiations on a final settlement to contain the proliferation risks from Iran’s nuclear program.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A Zero Knowledge Protocol For Nuclear Warhead Verification

The verification of nuclear warheads for arms control faces a paradox: International inspectors must gain high confidence in the authenticity of submitted items while learning nothing about them. Conventional inspection systems featuring ''information barriers'', designed to hide measurments stored in electronic systems, are at risk of tampering and snooping. Here we show the viability of fundamentally new approach to nuclear warhead verification that incorporates a zero-knowledge protocol, designed such that sensitive information is never measured so does not need to be hidden. We interrogate submitted items with energetic neutrons, making in effect, differential measurements of neutron transmission and emission. Calculations of diversion scenarios show that a high degree of discrimination can be achieved while revealing zero information. Timely demonstration of the viability of such an approach could be critical for the nexxt round of arms-control negotiations, which will likely require verification of individual warheads, rather than whole delivery systems.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Nuclear Archaeology for Gaseous Diffusion Enrichment Plants

Gaseous diffusion was historically the most widely used technology for military production of highly enriched uranium. Since June 2013, all gaseous diffusion enrichment plants worldwide are permanently shut down. The experience with decommissioning some of these plants has shown that they contain large amounts of uranium particles deposited in the cascade equipment. This article evaluates the potential of using uranium particle deposition to understand and reconstruct the operating histories of gaseous diffusion enrichment plants. First, a squared-off cascade enrichment model is derived to estimate the enrichment capacity of a reference plant. Then, using a cross-flow filtration model, the mass of solid uranium particles deposited over time in the tubular separation membranes of the stage diffusers is calculated. Lastly, potential techniques to characterize these uranium deposits and help reconstruct the operating history of the plant are assessed.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Safeguard Requirements for Fusion Power Plants

Nuclear proliferation risks from magnetic fusion energy associated with access to fissile materials can be divided into three main categories: 1) clandestine production of fissile material in an undeclared facility, 2) covert production and diversion of such material in a declared and safeguarded facility, and 3) use of a declared facility in a breakout scenario, in which a state openly produces fissile material in violation of international agreements. The degree of risk in each of these categories is assessed, taking into account both state and non-state actors, and it is found that safeguards are required for fusion energy to be highly attractive from a non-proliferation standpoint. Specific safeguard requirements and R&D needs are outlined for each category of risk, and the technical capability of the ITER experiment, under construction, to contribute to this R&D is noted. A preliminary analysis indicates a potential legal pathway for fusion power systems to be brought under the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. "Vertical" proliferation risks associated with tritium and with the knowledge that can be gained from inertial fusion energy R&D are outlined.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Performance gain with low-enriched fuel and optimized use of neutrons

The most challenging type of reactors to convert to low-enriched fuel are high-flux research reactors, which, along with some spallation sources, are the most important neutron sources for modern neutron scattering experiments. Advanced Monte-Carlo computer codes are now available that make it possible to track neutrons from the reactor core, through neutron guides, to instruments and detectors. These 'virtual experiments' allow optimizing the performance of a research facility as a whole instead of the reactor alone. This article briefly reviews performance gains obtained for high-flux reactors during previous facility-upgrades. The Monte-Carlo code VITESS is used to compare results for typical neutron scattering experiments using obsolete versus state-of-the-art technologies. The analysis shows that performance gains due to instrument upgrades or neutron guide renewals dwarf potential neutron flux losses due to conversion to low-enriched fuel. Combined convert-and-upgrade strategies therefore offer unique opportunities for reactor operators and neutron instrument groups to significantly improve the overall performance of research facilities. (author)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗