Engineering Papers⌕ Search

Engineering topics

Garner, James R

Publications and source records attributed to Garner, James R.

At least 19 records

Cylinder Occupancy and Measurement Suite

This software automatically records data from the Unattended Cylinder Verification Station, determines the state of the instrument, captures images of uranium hexafluoride shipment cylinders, and determines their weight. The code has been developed primarily for the International Atomic Energy Agency, but this type of instrument could be of interest to any facility operator in the uranium supply chain that handles uranium hexafluoride shipment cylinders (e.g. the 30B and 48Y cylinder). Operators may be interested in having this instrument confirm shipper declared measurement values upon receipt of a cylinder. They may also use it to aid in process monitoring if the quantity of material in the cylinder changes due to a processing activity.

Stewart, Scott L↗

A Monte Carlo Analysis of Weight Data from UF 6 Cylinder Feed and Withdrawal Stations

As the number of nuclear facilities handling uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) cylinders (e.g., UF 6 production, enrichment, and fuel fabrication) increase in number and throughput, more automated safeguards measures will likely be needed to enable the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to achieve its safeguards objectives in a fiscally constrained environment. Monitoring the process data from the load cells built into the cylinder feed and withdrawal (F/W) stations (i.e., cylinder weight data) can significantly increase the IAEA’s ability to efficiently achieve the fundamental safeguards task of confirming operations as declared (i.e., no undeclared activities). Researchers at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Joint Research Center (in Ispra, Italy), and University of Glasgow are investigating how this weight data can be used for IAEA safeguards purposes while fully protecting the operator’s proprietary and sensitive information related to operations. A key question that must be resolved is, what is the necessary frequency of recording data from the process F/W stations to achieve safeguards objectives? This paper summarizes Monte Carlo simulations of typical feed, product, and tails withdrawal cycles and evaluates longer sampling frequencies to determine the expected errors caused by low-frequency sampling and its impact on material balance calculations.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Opportunities to more fully utilize safeguards information reported to the IAEA at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

In an effort to increase transparency and to strengthen IAEA safeguards, more countries are adopting practices that provide the IAEA with more timely, safeguards-relevant information to confirm nuclear operations are as declared. At Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) potential examples include installing unattended IAEA instruments that transmit selected information back to Vienna, instruments that collect and store measurement information on-site, and daily facility operator submissions of material receipts, shipments, or utilization of key operational systems (e.g., UF6 feed stations) to on-site mail boxes. Recently the IAEA has implemented the use of on-site mailbox systems supplemented with short notice or unannounced inspections to maintain effectiveness without significantly increasing the number of inspection days. While these measures significantly improves the IAEA’s effectiveness, we have identified several opportunities for how the use of this information could be improved and how some additional information would further improve safeguards. This paper presents concepts for how the safeguards information currently collected at GCEPs could be more effectively utilized through enhancing the way that raw data is displayed visually so that it is more intuitive to the inspector and provides for more effective inspection planning and execution, comparing information with previous IAEA inspection activities (lists of previous verified inventory), through comparing data with operator supplied data when inspectors arrive (notional inventory change reports), and through evaluating the data over time to provide even greater confidence in the data and operations as declared in between inspections. This paper will also discuss several potential improvements to the submissions themselves, such as including occupancy information about product and tails stations and including weight information for each station.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The World Nuclear University Alumni Assembly

The World Nuclear University Summer Institute was established by the World Nuclear Association in 2005 as a program for future leaders in the nuclear field. Since the Summer Institute s inception in 2005, a total of some 800 fellows from more than 70 countries have participated in the program. In 2012, the World Nuclear University held its first ever alumni event at the IAEA in Vienna, Austria, and at that time, the precedent was set that the reunion would be held biennially. The 2014 alumni assembly was held at Oak Ridge National Laboratory from March 31 April 4, 2014. The event offered three separate areas of opportunities for the participating alumni: professional development, leadership, and peer-to-peer engagement. The professional development consisted of training groups, while the leadership will involve discussions with invited leaders, including members of the Blue Ribbon Commission. The peer-to-peer engagement not only give past fellows a chance to reconnect with their own classmates, but it allowed for further international engagement, between the speakers and alumni, as well as between the classes themselves.

White-Horton, Jessica L↗

A Monte Carlo Analysis of Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant Process Load Cell Data

As uranium enrichment plants increase in number, capacity, and types of separative technology deployed (e.g., gas centrifuge, laser, etc.), more automated safeguards measures are needed to enable the IAEA to maintain safeguards effectiveness in a fiscally constrained environment. Monitoring load cell data can significantly increase the IAEA s ability to efficiently achieve the fundamental safeguards objective of confirming operations as declared (i.e., no undeclared activities), but care must be taken to fully protect the operator s proprietary and classified information related to operations. Staff at ORNL, LANL, JRC/ISPRA, and University of Glasgow are investigating monitoring the process load cells at feed and withdrawal (F/W) stations to improve international safeguards at enrichment plants. A key question that must be resolved is what is the necessary frequency of recording data from the process F/W stations? Several studies have analyzed data collected at a fixed frequency. This paper contributes to load cell process monitoring research by presenting an analysis of Monte Carlo simulations to determine the expected errors caused by low frequency sampling and its impact on material balance calculations.

Garner, James R↗

A Robust and Flexible Design for GCEP Unattended Online Enrichment Monitoring: An OLEM Collection Node Network

Oak Ridge National Laoratory (ORNL) has engineered an on-line enrichment monitor (OLEM) to continuously measure U-235 emissions from the UF6 gas flowing through a unit header pipe of a gas centrifuge enrichment plant (GCEP) as a component of the International Atomic Energy Agency s (IAEA) new generation of technology to support enrichment plant safeguards1. In contrast to other enrichment monitoring approaches, OLEM calibrates and corrects for the pressure and temperature dependent UF6 gas-density without external radiation sources by using the inherent unit header pipe pressure dynamics and combining U-235 gamma-ray spectrometery using a shielded NaI detector with gas pressure and temperature data near the spectrum measurement point to obtain the enrichment of the gas as a function of time. From a safeguards perspective, OLEM can provide early detection of a GCEP being misused for production of highly enriched uranium, but would not detect directly the isolation and use of a cascade within the production unit to produce HEU. OLEM may also reduce the number of samples collected for destructive assay and, if coupled with load cell monitoring, could support isotope mass balance verification and unattended cylinder verification. The earlier paper presented OLEM as one component along with shared load cells and unattended cylinder verification, in the IAEA emering toolbox for unattended instruments at GCEPs1 and described the OLEM concept and how previous modeling studies and field measurements helped confirm the viability of a passive on-line enrichment monitor for meeting IAEA objectives and to support the development of performance targets. Phase I of the United States Support Program (USSP) OLEM project completed a preliminary hardware, software and communications design; phase II will build and test field prototypes in controlled laboratory settings and then at an operational facility. That paper also discussed many of the OLEM collection node commercial off the shelf (COTS) components and summarized the OLEM collection node data security provisions. This paper will discuss a secure and redundant network of OLEM collection nodes, auxiliary detection units and supporting junction boxes distributed throughout a facility for monitoring enrichment on product, feed and tails unit header pipes; the purpose and capability of the built-in Electronic Optical Sealing System (EOSS) network gateway; and a network approach for obtaining reliable and authenticated pressure measurements.

Younkin, James R↗

A Robust Infrastructure Design for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant Unattended Online Enrichment Monitoring

An online enrichment monitor (OLEM) is being developed to continuously measure the relative isotopic composition of UF6 in the unit header pipes of a gas centrifuge enrichment plant (GCEP). From a safeguards perspective, OLEM will provide early detection of a facility being misused for production of highly enriched uranium. OLEM may also reduce the number of samples collected for destructive assay and if coupled with load cell monitoring can provide isotope mass balance verification. The OLEM design includes power and network connections for continuous monitoring of the UF6 enrichment and state of health of the instrument. Monitoring the enrichment on all header pipes at a typical GCEP could require OLEM detectors on each of the product, tails, and feed header pipes. If there are eight process units, up to 24 detectors may be required at a modern GCEP. Distant locations, harsh industrial environments, and safeguards continuity of knowledge requirements all place certain demands on the network robustness and power reliability. This paper describes the infrastructure and architecture of an OLEM system based on OLEM collection nodes on the unit header pipes and power and network support nodes for groupings of the collection nodes. A redundant, self-healing communications network, distributed backup power, and a secure communications methodology. Two candidate technologies being considered for secure communications are the Object Linking and Embedding for Process Control Unified Architecture cross-platform, service-oriented architecture model for process control communications and the emerging IAEA Real-time And INtegrated STream-Oriented Remote Monitoring (RAINSTORM) framework to provide the common secure communication infrastructure for remote, unattended monitoring systems. The proposed infrastructure design offers modular, commercial components, plug-and-play extensibility for GCEP deployments, and is intended to meet the guidelines and requirements for unattended and remotely monitored safeguards systems.

On Line Enrichment Monitor GCEP↗