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Fesq, Lorraine

Publications and source records attributed to Fesq, Lorraine.

53 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2015

Fault Management Architectures and the Challenges of Providing Software Assurance

Fault Management (FM) is focused on safety, the preservation of assets, and maintaining the desired functionality of the system. How FM is implemented varies among missions. Common to most missions is system complexity due to a need to establish a multi-dimensional structure across hardware, software and spacecraft operations. FM is necessary to identify and respond to system faults, mitigate technical risks and ensure operational continuity. Generally, FM architecture, implementation, and software assurance efforts increase with mission complexity. Because FM is a systems engineering discipline with a distributed implementation, providing efficient and effective verification and validation (V&V) is challenging. A breakout session at the 2012 NASA Independent Verification & Validation (IV&V) Annual Workshop titled "V&V of Fault Management: Challenges and Successes" exposed this issue in terms of V&V for a representative set of architectures. NASA's Software Assurance Research Program (SARP) has provided funds to NASA IV&V to extend the work performed at the Workshop session in partnership with NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). NASA IV&V will extract FM architectures across the IV&V portfolio and evaluate the data set, assess visibility for validation and test, and define software assurance methods that could be applied to the various architectures and designs. This SARP initiative focuses efforts on FM architectures from critical and complex projects within NASA. The identification of particular FM architectures and associated V&V/IV&V techniques provides a data set that can enable improved assurance that a system will adequately detect and respond to adverse conditions. Ultimately, results from this activity will be incorporated into the NASA Fault Management Handbook providing dissemination across NASA, other agencies and the space community. This paper discusses the approach taken to perform the evaluations and preliminary findings from the research.

Fault Management↗
NASA NTRS2012

Managing Space System Faults: Coalescing NASA's Views

Managing faults and their resultant failures is a fundamental and critical part of developing and operating aerospace systems. Yet, recent studies have shown that the engineering "discipline" required to manage faults is not widely recognized nor evenly practiced within the NASA community. Attempts to simply name this discipline in recent years has been fraught with controversy among members of the Integrated Systems Health Management (ISHM), Fault Management (FM), Fault Protection (FP), Hazard Analysis (HA), and Aborts communities. Approaches to managing space system faults typically are unique to each organization, with little commonality in the architectures, processes and practices across the industry.

Muirhead, Brian↗
NASA NTRS2011

The Development of NASA's Fault Management Handbook

Disciplined approach to Fault Management (FM) has not always been emphasized by projects, contributing to major schedule and cost overruns. Progress is being made on a number of fronts outside of Handbook effort: (1) Processes, Practices and Tools being developed at some Centers and Institutions (2) Management recognition . Constellation FM roles, Discovery/New Frontiers mission reviews (3) Potential Technology solutions . New approaches could avoid many current pitfalls (3a) New FM architectures, including model ]based approach integrated with NASA fs MBSE efforts (3b) NASA fs Office of the Chief Technologist: FM identified in seven of NASA fs 14 Space Technology Roadmaps . opportunity to coalesce and establish thrust area to progressively develop new FM techniques FM Handbook will help ensure that future missions do not encounter same FM ]related problems as previous missions Version 1 of the FM Handbook is a good start.

Fault Management↗
NASA NTRS2011

The Development of NASA's Fault Management Handbook

Disciplined approach to Fault Management (FM) has not always been emphasized by projects, contributing to major schedule and cost overruns: (1) Often faults aren't addressed until nominal spacecraft design is fairly stable. (2) Design relegated to after-the-fact patchwork, Band-Aid approach. Progress is being made on a number of fronts outside of Handbook effort: (1) Processes, Practices and Tools being developed at some Centers and Institutions (2) Management recognition. Constellation FM roles, Discovery/New Frontiers mission reviews (3) Potential Technology solutions. New approaches could avoid many current pitfalls (3a) New FM architectures, including model-based approach integrated with NASA's MBSE (Model-Based System Engineering) efforts (3b) NASA's Office of the Chief Technologist: FM identified in seven of NASA's 14 Space Technology Roadmaps. Opportunity to coalesce and establish thrust area to progressively develop new FM techniques. FM Handbook will help ensure that future missions do not encounter same FM-related problems as previous missions. Version 1 of the FM Handbook is a good start: (1) Still need Version 2 Agency-wide FM Handbook to expand Handbook to other areas, especially crewed missions. (2) Still need to reach out to other organizations to develop common understanding and vocabulary. Handbook doesn't/can't address all Workshop recommendations. Still need to identify how to address programmatic and infrastructure issues.

Fault Management↗
NASA NTRS2011

The Development of NASA's Fault Management Handbook

Goal: (1) Ameliorate schedule, cost and predictability challenges that often are faced when testing and operating FM systems (2) Improve reliability and safety of NASA s flight and ground systems (3) Coalesce the FM field. Approach: (1) Identify qualified team of FM practitioners and systems engineers (2) Evaluate findings and recommendations from 2008 FM Workshop (3) Initial emphasis on foundational issues; e.g. establish common terminology (1) Capitalize on existing material

Fault Management↗
NASA NTRS2011

Fault Management Guiding Principles

Regardless of the mission type: deep space or low Earth orbit, robotic or human spaceflight, Fault Management (FM) is a critical aspect of NASA space missions. As the complexity of space missions grows, the complexity of supporting FM systems increase in turn. Data on recent NASA missions show that development of FM capabilities is a common driver for significant cost overruns late in the project development cycle. Efforts to understand the drivers behind these cost overruns, spearheaded by NASA's Science Mission Directorate (SMD), indicate that they are primarily caused by the growing complexity of FM systems and the lack of maturity of FM as an engineering discipline. NASA can and does develop FM systems that effectively protect mission functionality and assets. The cost growth results from a lack of FM planning and emphasis by project management, as well the maturity of FM as an engineering discipline, which lags behind the maturity of other engineering disciplines. As a step towards controlling the cost growth associated with FM development, SMD has commissioned a multi-institution team to develop a practitioner's handbook representing best practices for the end-to-end processes involved in engineering FM systems. While currently concentrating primarily on FM for science missions, the expectation is that this handbook will grow into a NASA-wide handbook, serving as a companion to the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook. This paper presents a snapshot of the principles that have been identified to guide FM development from cradle to grave. The principles range from considerations for integrating FM into the project and SE organizational structure, the relationship between FM designs and mission risk, and the use of the various tools of FM (e.g., redundancy) to meet the FM goal of protecting mission functionality and assets.

principles↗
NASA NTRS2010

NASA Spacecraft Fault Management Workshop Results

Fault Management is a critical aspect of deep-space missions. For the purposes of this paper, fault management is defined as the ability of a system to detect, isolate, and mitigate events that impact, or have the potential to impact, nominal mission operations. The fault management capabilities are commonly distributed across flight and ground subsystems, impacting hardware, software, and mission operations designs. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that 4 out of the 5 missions studied had significant overruns due to underestimating the complexity and support requirements for fault management. As a result of this and other recent experiences, the NASA Science Mission Directorate (SMD) Planetary Science Division (PSD) commissioned a workshop to bring together invited participants across government, industry, academia to assess the state of the art in fault management practice and research, identify current and potential issues, and make recommendations for addressing these issues. The workshop was held in New Orleans in April of 2008. The workshop concluded that fault management is not being limited by technology, but rather by a lack of emphasis and discipline in both the engineering and programmatic dimensions. Some of the areas cited in the findings include different, conflicting, and changing institutional goals and risk postures; unclear ownership of end-to-end fault management engineering; inadequate understanding of the impact of mission-level requirements on fault management complexity; and practices, processes, and tools that have not kept pace with the increasing complexity of mission requirements and spacecraft systems. This paper summarizes the findings and recommendations from that workshop, as well as opportunities identified for future investment in tools, processes, and products to facilitate the development of space flight fault management capabilities.

Newhouse, Marilyn↗
NASA NTRS1998

The Recovery of TOMS-EP

On December 13th 1998, the Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer - Earth Probe (TOMS-EP) spacecraft experienced a Single Event Upset which caused the system to reconfigure and enter a Safe Mode. This incident occurred two and a half years after the launch of the spacecraft which was designed for a two year life. A combination of factors, including changes in component behavior due to age and extended use, very unfortunate initial conditions and the safe mode processing logic prevented the spacecraft from entering its nominal long term storage mode. The spacecraft remained in a high fuel consumption mode designed for temporary use. By the time the onboard fuel was exhausted, the spacecraft was Sun pointing in a high rate flat spin. Although the uncontrolled spacecraft was initially in a power and thermal safe orientation, it would not stay in this state indefinitely due to a slow precession of its momentum vector. A recovery team was immediately assembled to determine if there was time to develop a method of despinning the vehicle and return it to normal science data collection. A three stage plan was developed that used the onboard magnetic torque rods as actuators. The first stage was designed to reduce the high spin rate to within the linear range of the gyros. The second stage transitioned the spacecraft from sun pointing to orbit reference pointing. The final stage returned the spacecraft to normal science operation. The entire recovery scenario was simulated with a wide range of initial conditions to establish the expected behavior. The recovery sequence was started on December 28th 1998 and completed by December 31st. TOMS-EP was successfully returned to science operations by the beginning of 1999. This paper describes the TOMS-EP Safe Mode design and the factors which led to the spacecraft anomaly and loss of fuel. The recovery and simulation efforts are described. Flight data are presented which show the performance of the spacecraft during its return to science. Finally, lessons learned are presented.

Robertson, Brent↗