Engineering topics

Ferragut, Erik M

Publications and source records attributed to Ferragut, Erik M.

6 records

DOE OSTI2016

CPAD: Cyber-Physical Attack Detection

The CPAD technology relates to anomaly detection and more specifically to cyber physical attack detection. It infers underlying physical relationships between components by analyzing the sensor measurements of a system. It then uses these measurements to detect signs of a non-physically realizable state, which is indicative of an integrity attack on the system. CPAD can be used on any highly-instrumented cyber-physical system to detect integrity attacks and identify the component or components compromised. It has applications to power transmission and distribution, nuclear and industrial plants, and complex vehicles.

Ferragut, Erik M↗

DOE OSTI2016

HackAttack: Game-Theoretic Analysis of Realistic Cyber Conflicts

Game theory is appropriate for studying cyber conflict because it allows for an intelligent and goal-driven adversary. Applications of game theory have led to a number of results regarding optimal attack and defense strategies. However, the overwhelming majority of applications explore overly simplistic games, often ones in which each participant s actions are visible to every other participant. These simplifications strip away the fundamental properties of real cyber conflicts: probabilistic alerting, hidden actions, unknown opponent capabilities. In this paper, we demonstrate that it is possible to analyze a more realistic game, one in which different resources have different weaknesses, players have different exploits, and moves occur in secrecy, but they can be detected. Certainly, more advanced and complex games are possible, but the game presented here is more realistic than any other game we know of in the scientific literature. While optimal strategies can be found for simpler games using calculus, case-by-case analysis, or, for stochastic games, Q-learning, our more complex game is more naturally analyzed using the same methods used to study other complex games, such as checkers and chess. We define a simple evaluation function and employ multi-step searches to create strategies. We show that such scenarios can be analyzed, and find that in cases of extreme uncertainty, it is often better to ignore one s opponent s possible moves. Furthermore, we show that a simple evaluation function in a complex game can lead to interesting and nuanced strategies.

botnets↗

DOE OSTI2015

Nonparametric Bayesian Modeling for Automated Database Schema Matching

The problem of merging databases arises in many government and commercial applications. Schema matching, a common first step, identifies equivalent fields between databases. We introduce a schema matching framework that builds nonparametric Bayesian models for each field and compares them by computing the probability that a single model could have generated both fields. Our experiments show that our method is more accurate and faster than the existing instance-based matching algorithms in part because of the use of nonparametric Bayesian models.

Bayesian↗

DOE OSTI2015

Multi-Level Anomaly Detection on Time-Varying Graph Data

This work presents a novel modeling and analysis framework for graph sequences which addresses the challenge of detecting and contextualizing anomalies in labelled, streaming graph data. We introduce a generalization of the BTER model of Seshadhri et al. by adding flexibility to community structure, and use this model to perform multi-scale graph anomaly detection. Specifically, probability models describing coarse subgraphs are built by aggregating probabilities at finer levels, and these closely related hierarchical models simultaneously detect deviations from expectation. This technique provides insight into a graph's structure and internal context that may shed light on a detected event. Additionally, this multi-scale analysis facilitates intuitive visualizations by allowing users to narrow focus from an anomalous graph to particular subgraphs or nodes causing the anomaly. For evaluation, two hierarchical anomaly detectors are tested against a baseline Gaussian method on a series of sampled graphs. We demonstrate that our graph statistics-based approach outperforms both a distribution-based detector and the baseline in a labeled setting with community structure, and it accurately detects anomalies in synthetic and real-world datasets at the node, subgraph, and graph levels. To illustrate the accessibility of information made possible via this technique, the anomaly detector and an associated interactive visualization tool are tested on NCAA football data, where teams and conferences that moved within the league are identified with perfect recall, and precision greater than 0.786.

anomaly detection↗

DOE OSTI2015

Finite Energy and Bounded Actuator Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems

As control system networks are being connected to enterprise level networks for remote monitoring, operation, and system-wide performance optimization, these same connections are providing vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious actors for attack, financial gain, and theft of intellectual property. Much effort in cyber-physical system (CPS) protection has focused on protecting the borders of the system through traditional information security techniques. Less effort has been applied to the protection of cyber-physical systems from intelligent attacks launched after an attacker has defeated the information security protections to gain access to the control system. In this paper, attacks on actuator signals are analyzed from a system theoretic context. The threat surface is classified into finite energy and bounded attacks. These two broad classes encompass a large range of potential attacks. The effect of theses attacks on a linear quadratic (LQ) control are analyzed, and the optimal actuator attacks for both finite and infinite horizon LQ control are derived, therefore the worst case attack signals are obtained. The closed-loop system under the optimal attack signals is given and a numerical example illustrating the effect of an optimal bounded attack is provided.

Djouadi, Seddik M↗

DOE OSTI2014

Cyberspace security system

A system evaluates reliability, performance and/or safety by automatically assessing the targeted system's requirements. A cost metric quantifies the impact of failures as a function of failure cost per unit of time. The metrics or measurements may render real-time (or near real-time) outcomes by initiating active response against one or more high ranked threats. The system may support or may be executed in many domains including physical domains, cyber security domains, cyber-physical domains, infrastructure domains, etc. or any other domains that are subject to a threat or a loss.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗