Engineering topics

Eldridge, Brent C.

Publications and source records attributed to Eldridge, Brent C..

12 records

DOE OSTI2024

Large-scale Hydrogen Storage Risk Assessment

This project investigated risks involved in deploying a large-scale hydrogen storage system at the Port of Seattle (hereafter, the Port) for its on-terminal and maritime applications in an urban industrial setting. Alongside, the project attempted to address some of the barriers to risk assessment such as need for an exact system design for a systematic investigation, direct access to surrounding communities to gauge their perceptions, and an integrated software required to undertake a full-fledged risk assessment. These barriers were overcome using illustrative reference station designs, engaging with community-facing agencies through Port support, and pooling national laboratory capabilities available for risk assessments. The project identified relevant public safety risk metrics, compared various hydrogen carriers, engaged with community-facing agencies, and explored potential gaps in existing safety codes and standards. The primary impacts of this project include the development of risk assessment guidance for ports and utilities, informing them of the trade-offs in the choice of hydrogen carriers, and the ability to increase public capacity for dialog and engagement. This paves the way toward decarbonization of the Port activities, bringing about awareness around jobs in the market for risk assessments, and the need to ramp up community engagement long before any hydrogen system deployment is undertaken.

08 HYDROGEN↗

DOE OSTI2024

Model Formulations: Integrating Distributed Energy Resources (DER) using Advanced Unit Commitment Models and DER Aggregation Methodologies

A distribution energy resource aggregator (DERA) constitutes a group of distribution energy resources with small generation capacities which meet the threshold to participate in the electricity wholesale market. This document provides the proposed DERA model formulation that will be implemented in the SCUC simulation’s architecture for the SCUC-DER project. Different economical assessment methodologies have been developed to incorporated bids for individual distributed resources, which include solar cost dispatch and cost model, BESS opportunity cost offer algorithm, and price sensitive demand response model. Detailed methods are proposed to aggregate individual cost offers to a DERA cost curve to bid in SCUC market while three methods are proposed to simulate DER actual dispatch. Based on the DERA models in this document, the SCUC-DER project will be able to assess the impacts of DERA on the distribution system’s operation and reliability.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2024

Distributed Energy Resource Interconnection Roadmap

Adopting strategic reforms to DER interconnection can help reduce interconnection delays, fairly allocate costs, improve transparency and equity, and support efficient and strategic investment in distribution and sub-transmission grids that can accommodate a rapidly evolving energy landscape. The Interconnection Innovation e-Xchange envisions this roadmap and its transmission system companion volume as collaborative resources to facilitate continued stakeholder discussions, problem-solving, and innovation as the U.S. works together to enable simpler, faster, and fairer interconnection of clean energy resources all while enhancing the reliability, resiliency, and security of our electric grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2024

Wholesale Electricity Analysis via Simulation & Learning Experiments (WEASLE): Platform Development and Pilot Competition

This document reports the development of the Wholesale Electricity Analysis via Simulation and Learning Experiments (WEASLE) platform and the pilot competition that was conducted to test the platform. Due to the increasing reliance on variable renewable energy resources for bulk power, the pilot competition, called the Energy Storage Participation Algorithm Competition (ESPA-Comp), was used to test the effect of various market designs on storage utilization and market efficiency. Basic details of the platform are provided, including an overview of the market clearing engine, the battery dispatch and degradation models, electric grid topology and resource mix, and software architecture. Two market designs were tested: a two-settlement market analogous to typical ISO design today, and a multi-settlement market that allows additional forward-trading periods during the real-time market. Results from the pilot competition show that the storage bidding problem is nontrivial and is well suited for future challenges. We find that: 1) all four teams utilized different approaches to the bidding problem, 2) different methodological approaches led to substantially different offer behaviors, 3) resource profits are clustered by team and methodological approach, 4) simulated offers reduced market surplus by about 0.5%, 5) substantially different prices between two-settlement and multi-settlement markets albeit minimal difference in overall market surplus.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2024

Grid Optimization Competition Challenge 3 Problem Formulation

This report contains the problem formulation for the Grid Optimization (GO) Competition Challenge 3. The Grid Optimization Competition is run by a team of researchers from a number of organizations, including the sponsor Advanced Research Projects Agency - Energy (ARPA-E), lead organization Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and technical contributors from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), Texas A&M University (TAMU), Georgia Institute of Technology (GT), University of Wisconsin (UW), and others. The GO Competition poses challenge problems in the field of power grid management, invites entrants to develop solvers for these problems, invokes the solvers on a set of problem instances using common hardware, ranks the solvers according to their performance, and awards prizes according to the rankings. The overall goal of the GO Competition is to spur innovative research on high impact and computationally challenging problems in power grid management from initial development through commercial deployment. Complete information about the GO Competition can be found online at [2]. The webpage covers previous Challenges, rules, timeline, registration information, data formats, scoring methods, computational platform information, information on supported solvers and languages, sponsor information, frequently asked questions, administrator contact information, publicly available problem instances, computer code for reading and evaluating problem and solution data, a sandbox for testing solvers, and a solver submission interface, results, and publications.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2024

Energy Storage Participation Algorithm Competition Overview: Market simulation, divisions, stages, storage attributes, and scoring

The Energy Storage Participation Algorithm Competition (ESPA-Comp) aims to assess the performance of participants’ battery storage offer algorithms on their ability to maximize the value of battery storage resources under three different market designs: two-settlement, multi-settlement, and rolling horizon forward markets. This document describes the overall design of the competition at a high level.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2024

Model Formulations: Market clearing models, market design specifications, and dispatch simulation

This document provides various model formulations that will be implemented for the Energy Storage Participation Algorithm pilot competition (ESPA-Comp). This competition will assess the performance of different storage offer algorithms in terms of their ability to maximize the value of storage resources participating under various market designs that vary in the range of complexity of possible storage offers. The model formulations include a general market clearing optimization model and specification to implement it in various market designs. We provide specifications for three market designs to be tested in ESPA-Comp, which we call the two-settlement, multi-settlement, and rolling horizon forward markets. The market designs include different trading frequencies and offer formats. Storage resources participating in the market are provided with primitive values for the resource’s physical capabilities, and they are provided with a storage offer format that their algorithms will be tasked with populating. A detailed physical model is used to assess each storage resource’s ability to maintain its scheduled dispatch according to its state-of-charge, operating temperature, and power conversion efficiency.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2023

SCUC-DER Integration Report: Integrating Distributed Energy Resources (DER) Using Advanced Unit Commitment Models and DER Aggregation Methodologies

Distributed energy resources (DERs) are continuing to grow due to regulatory, policy, and market shifts, and it needs to be ensured that small DERs are given a level playing field with traditional resources. Legacy market processes such as unit-commitment problems were designed for a power grid consisting largely of centralized power plants. In contrast, DERs consist of many small devices with distinct operating characteristics that may or may not be connected at the transmission interconnection points, limiting their visibility to the independent system operators (ISOs) who operate wholesale electricity markets. This report details the development and initial results from a simulation platform that integrates state-of-the-art security-constrained unit commitment software, detailed feeder models, and a DER aggregator model to quantify potential DER integration issues. Quantitative results to date illustrate potential infeasible scheduling solutions from SCUC when the DERA includes aggregations of energy-limited energy storage resources. Likewise, if aggregations are not penalized for dispatch deviations, they may have incentives to deviate from the SCUC-determined resource schedules. Assumptions about the amount of aggregated demand response resources (DRRs) and the ability of DERAs to follow profit incentives have an important impact – DRRs have significant flexibility and can typically feasibly meet their SCUC schedule, but on the other hand, their profit incentives can cause unscheduled increases in load before and after DRR dispatch. Computation time results on the SCUC solver and simulation platform only show a modest increase in SCUC solution time as the number of DERAs is increased, but results to date only reflect the RTS-GMLC test system; results may show more significant solver slowdown in larger transmission systems. The largest contribution to simulation time is attributed to the DERA offer generation method, which is suggested for future improvements.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2023

Distribution Network Capacity Market Design: Marginal Distribution Capacity Pricing Mechanism for Efficient Investment and Cost Allocation

As electricity markets begin to shift from reliance on large, centralized power plants and towards distributed energy resources (DERs), there is a growing acknowledgement that more efficient planning, operations, and oversight is needed in the distribution system. This paper addresses one step in that direction by proposing an auction mechanism that uses a detailed distribution system planning model that allocates permits to end-used customers who request capacity to install new devices at their location and network upgrade contracts to utilities or 3rd-party companies who offer to upgrade system components. The resulting plan maximizes market surplus, that is, maximizes the total benefit to consumers minus the cost of network upgrades. We apply a marginal pricing scheme to the auction’s results such that the cost of each permits or contracts is differentiated by time and location, based on the Lagrangian multipliers of binding network constraints. These prices are shown to be no greater than the bid price of any awarded contract and no less than the offered cost of any awarded upgrade contract. Furthermore, the nonlinearity of power flows in the planning model result in an additional surplus that would be collected by the entity that hosts the auction, which could then be refunded to market participants or used to cover overhead costs of running the market. We provide four example auction results in a simple three-node distribution feeder to demonstrate the properties of the design. Results suggest that larger or more realistic case studies could be a promising next step.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2022

Impact of FERC Order 2222 on DER Participation Rules in US Electricity Markets

Electricity markets in the bulk grid are beginning to implement market mechanisms that support the procurement of flexible capabilities from wide range of technologies, including distributed energy resources (DERs). The flexibility of these resources will help counterbalance supply uncertainties from large-scale integration of variable renewable generation. To encourage development of distributed and aggregated market participants, FERC Order 2222 was issued in September 2020 to require each Independent System Operator (ISO) in the US to implement rules that enable broader participation from aggregations of DERs in the bulk market. The following paper first describes the generic design of ISO markets before introducing the new market participation rules that ISOs have proposed for compliance with Order 2222. The paper then describes how software performance issues may continue to affect the eligibility requirements and offer structures for DER aggregations participating in ISOs, noting that continued research on computational methods may help reduce burdens for DER integration. The prospects for transmission and distribution system coordination is second major issue discussed, which will require minor changes to existing processes in the short term. In the longer term, there is more opportunity for more wide-ranging reforms, such as the development of a Distribution System Operator (DSO) framework. Newly proposed market rules may affect how Transactive Energy Systems (TES) will help facilitate efficient formation of DER aggregations and operation of the individual DERs within an aggregation. Within the TES context, the challenge is to fully understand how resource eligibility and operational and planning coordination methods will affect the design and implementation of TES.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2022

Capacity Markets for Transactive Energy Systems

Capacity markets provide important incentives for resource adequacy in electricity markets and may become more important for providing sufficient revenue and generation capacity with changes to energy market prices driven by increasing levels of zero marginal cost resources. However, current capacity market designs also have important shortfalls that may limit the benefits they can provide to the future grid. Current capacity markets are primarily designed for participation from conventional thermal generators, but markets are evolving with increasing levels of variable renewable energy resources. However, further reforms may be necessary to enable more participation from DERs and demand-side resources. To understand the benefits and shortfalls of current capacity market design, we review the historical reasons electricity markets have needed capacity markets or capacity payments for resource adequacy, and how current capacity market designs may create challenges for incorporating increasing levels of DERs and demand-side resources. We then consider how transactive systems, which allow the coordination of bids and offers for DERs and demand-side resources through a market interaction approach, administered by a Distribution System Operator (DSO), can address traditional resource adequacy problems due to inelastic consumer demand. We also consider the need for a DSO-level capacity market in helping to meet resource adequacy, reliability, and other electricity market objectives. We find that because the missing money in electricity markets is largely driven by incentives to meet resource adequacy goals, and the bulk grid would always supply power to the DSO, that resource adequacy is unlikely to be a determining factor in the need for a DSO-level capacity market. Many current reliability problems could also be addressed by the incorporation of more flexible demand enabled with transactive energy systems. However, other DSO objectives, including resilience, reactive power, voltage control, environmental policies, and energy equity could lead to specific challenges that could be aided by a DSO-level capacity market. We consider the possibility of a DSO-level capacity market in addressing these challenges as well as its potential role in coordinating with the Independent System Operator (ISO) who operates the wholesale market. We conclude with suggestions for future research, including the need to develop analytical models of DSO-level capacity market designs to address these potential objectives and examine their implications for DSOs and consumers.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2022

Modeling and Market Design Considerations for Conventional and Decarbonized Resources

The following paper reviews various market design issues that will need to be reconsidered due to anticipated changes in the resources that supply energy in wholesale electricity markets. As the energy supply continues towards decarbonization, the change in resource technologies will affect the fundamentals of production scheduling and the policies to address supply variability and uncertainty. We show through simple numerical examples that the existing market design approach based on fuel costs will result in $0/MWh prices with intermittent price spikes during reserve shortages, but that incorporating more granular reserve pricing, energy storage participation, and price-responsive demand participation can restore efficient market clearing with reasonable pricing outcomes. The market design approach fundamentally shifts from fuel based to opportunity cost based. We briefly review alternative market design frameworks that can support this shift, including intraday markets, decentralized markets, flexibility options, and swing contracts. Market designs may also be required to accommodate or support various out-of-market policies and agreements; ideally, these external factors can be integrated into the market design to facilitate efficient exchanges across longer time scales, between other markets, and in support of public policy goals. The paper concludes by discussing how decarbonization trends may affect the design and use of production cost models for short term operations and long term planning studies.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗