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Eisenberg, Daniel A.

Publications and source records attributed to Eisenberg, Daniel A..

A tri-level optimization model for interdependent infrastructure network resilience against compound hazard events

Resilient operation of interdependent infrastructures against compound hazard events is essential for maintaining societal well-being. To address consequence assessment challenges in this problem space, we propose a novel policy-guided tri-level optimization model applied to a proof-of-concept case study with fuel distribution and transportation networks – encompassing one realistic network; one fictitious, yet realistic network; as well as networks drawn from three synthetic distributions. Mathematically, our approach takes the form of a defender-attacker-defender (DAD) model—a multi-agent tri-level optimization, comprised of a defender, attacker, and an operator acting in sequence. Here, in this study, our notional operator may choose proxy actions to operate an interdependent system comprised of fuel terminals and gas stations (functioning as supplies) and a transportation network with traffic flow (functioning as demand) to minimize unmet demand at gas stations. A notional attacker aims to hypothetically disrupt normal operations by reducing supply at the supply terminals, and the notional defender aims to identify best proxy defense policy options which include hardening supply terminals or allowing alternative distribution methods such as trucking reserve supplies. We solve our DAD formulation at a metropolitan scale and present practical defense policy insights against hypothetical compound hazards. We demonstrate the generalizability of our framework by presenting results for a realistic network; a fictitious, yet realistic network; as well as for three networks drawn from synthetic distributions. Additionally, we demonstrate the scalability of the framework by investigating runtime performance as a function of the network size. Steps for future research are also discussed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Visualizing Organizational Influence on Energy Infrastructure

Energy Infrastructure components depend on an evolving, interdependent business ecosystem exposed to long-term, legal, adversarial tactics. An INL-Naval Postgraduate School partnership was designed to support INL Lab Directed Research and Development, NPS graduate research projects, and joint publications. The Technology, Organization, and Person of interest Graph Extraction, Analysis, and Reporting (TOP GEAR) enumerates networks of organizations and people that own, operate, and maintain regional infrastructure assets. TOP GEAR allows analysts to model current and future state what-if scenarios that include technological and policy mitigations.

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗

Comparison of Socio-Technical Threat Models

Given the adoption of emerging technologies and the increasing complexity of managing such systems with a lifecycle much shorter than that of critical infrastructure systems, there is a practical need to be able to analyze sociotechnical dependencies and their associated evolving risks. Threat models based on social influence techniques can be used to implement adversarial tactics analogous to the cyber kill chain and attested to within the MITRE ATT&CK for ICS framework including Initial Access, Persistence, Collection, and Impact. Furthermore, as with cyber disruptions, the impact of social influence threat models can have an asymmetric impact that is not spatially-localized. Finally, unlike cyber attacks with a reasonably short duration (ransomware takes days to months), social influence based attacks have the potential to persist for much longer as they are based on long-term strategic infrastructure investments within the private sector. Given the increased importance of electric vehicle charging stations as a long-term, strategic infrastructure investment within the Energy and Transportation Sectors, we provide initial results that compare the impact of a Loss of Availability (T0826) realized through cyber and social influence based threat models. The analysis employs techniques from automated reasoning and measures of network complexity to understand evolving dominance of EV payment and charging networks within geographic region of interest. Within this context, we compare the impact of a loss of availability due to ransomware versus that of loss of support due to a merger and acquisition. Results across several different metro areas will be provided.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

A Data Processing Pipeline for Adversarial Socio-Technical Network Analysis

With the rapid adoption of emerging technologies, there is a need to catalog and model sociotechnical interdependencies that have been historically used to influence the operation of Critical Infrastructure networks including the impacts of mergers and acquisitions, hostile takeovers, and foreign investment. Our research intends to address this need with two primary contributions. First, we have developed a data curation and processing pipeline to generate sociotechnical networks extracted from a variety of data sources including SEC filings and infrastructure asset databases. The pipeline, implemented in Apache Airflow, extracts and normalizes the representation of entities and relations, specified within ontologies. Our intent is to provide an extensible, machine-actionable approach to quickly communicate such models, reproduce previous results, and adapt them to new, unanticipated situations. Second, networks produced by our pipeline enable the development of graph-theoretic metrics that consider the properties of network components in addition to its topology. Metadata associated with network components---whether semantic, temporal, or geospatial---affects the alignment of generated networks with assumptions underlying complexity metrics. Validation of generated networks relative to component types defined by an ontology, may allow the research community to adapt metrics to the semantics of the domains being studied. Generated networks may be processed as knowledge, dynamic, or spatial graphs and enables a variety of analyses including automated reasoning and measures of network complexity. Automated reasoning views extracted entities and relations as a knowledge graph; this enables application of inference rules that represent historically-attested adversarial business methods and applies that behavior to a specific geographic context. Measures of network complexity, including degree distribution, reachability analyses, temporal analysis, and community detection can be adapted to indicate adversarial organizational influence.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗